THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AMBROSIO MANCERA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Surigao (Crim. Case No. 2072), the accused Ambrosio Mancera
pleaded not guilty to the information. Later, when the case was called
for trial on October 11, 1957, the accused, through counsel, manifested
his willingness to plead guilty to the lesser crime of serious physical
injuries, there being no intent to kill, and the fiscal, with the
approval of the court, amended the information accordingly. Whereupon,
the accused was allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a
plea of guilty to the amended information.

Thereafter, the accused requested that he be given opportunity to
prove drunkenness as a mitigating circumstance, and trial was had upon
this issue. After the hearing, the court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries as defined and
penalized under Article 263, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code;
refusing to give him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
drunkenness for being a habitual drunkard and of plea of guilty
“because he is not pleading guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide
which is charged in the above information but to the lesser offense of
serious physical injuries”; and sentencing him to undergo the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, six (6) months prision correccional
as maximum, to indemnify the complaining witness in the sum of P700.00
or serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which shall not
be more than one-third of the principal penalty or in any case not more
than one year, and to pay the costs. From this judgment, accused
Mancera appealed directly to this Court, urging that he be given the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt.

The refusal of the court a quo to give appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty appears to be based on our ruling in People vs. Noble (77 Phil. 93; 43 Off. Gaz. No. 6, 2010, and People vs.
Saturnino 96 Phil. 868) that an offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense than that charged cannot be considered a mitigating
circumstance. Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General, who shares
the view of appellant that this circumstance should be appreciated in
his favor in mitigation of his penalty, cites the case of People Court
considered a plea of guilty by the accused to the lesser crime of
homicide as a mitigating circumstance, inspite of the fact that he had
previously entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder.

We agree with appellant and the Solicitor General that the former
should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty. In the recent case of People vs. Intal, 101 Phil.,
306; 67 Off. Gaz., (8) 1398, we drew the distinction between the
doctrine of the Noble and Saturnino cases on one hand, and the Calma
case on the other. We said that the first doctrine applies where the
accused merely made an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense; while
the second doctrine governs where the accused having signified his
intention to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that charged, the
information is accordingly amended and the accused enters a plea of
guilty to the amended information. In the instant case, although the
appellant had already pleaded not guilty to the information for
frustrated homicide, the fiscal agreed to the amendment of the
information to serious physical injuries because he believed he could
not prove the intent to kill on the part of the accused (t.s.n., p. 2),
and it was only after the information was amended that the accused
entered a plea of guilty to the amended information. Consequently, it
is the doctrine in the case of People vs. Calma, supra, that governs this case, and appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.

The crime of serious physical injuries committed by appellant is
penalized under Article 263, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period or from 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months. There being one mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
one, the principal penalty should be imposed in the minimum period or
from 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 1 year of prision correccional.
The In determinate Sentence Law no longer applies because the maximum
term of the imposable penalty does not exceed 1 year (Act 4103 as
amended, sec 2).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that
the principal penalty imposed upon appellant is reduced to 4 months and
1 day of arresto mayor. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs de oficio.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.