ORIENTAL TIN CANS WORKERS UNION-PAFLU, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ORIENTAL TIN CAN AND METAL SHEETS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, ORIENTAL CORRUGATED FIBRE BOARD BO…

A petition to enforce observance
of the check-off system was filed on March 2,
1959 by
the Oriental Tin Cans Workers’ Union-PAFLU in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Named respondents were “Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheets Manufacturing Company,
Oriental Corrugated Fibre Board Box Corporation and or
Chua Tee (General Manager)”.

Among other things, the petition
alleged that some of petitioner’s members employed by respondents had signed
individual check-off authorizations; that petitioner requested in its (letters
of February 9, 1959 and February 21, 1959 that respondents check-off the union
dues of the aforesaid members; that respondents have refused to do so; and that
“such refusal of the respondents to check-off petitioning union’s dues will most
likely effect a strike”.

Respondents filed their “Answer
To Petition” on March 16,
1959; but
thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, dated June 2,
1959, on
the ground that “the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the petition”.

An opposition to the motion and a
reply thereto were filed. After hearing, Judge Tabigne
of the Court of Industrial Relations issued, on September 8,
1959, an
order dismissing the petition. On September 17,
1959,
petitioner moved for reconsideration. By a three-to-two vote, the Court of
Industrial Relations, en
banc, per resolution of February 19, 1960, sustained the dismissal
and denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner has come to this Court
by petition for certiorari to review the afore-stated order and resolution of
the Court of Industrial Relations.

The point at issue is whether
jurisdiction to enforce check-off authorized by employees in writing pertains to
the Court of Industrial Relations.

Republic Act 875, effective
June 17,
1953, has
curtailed the broad jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under
Commonwealth Act 103. As this Court stated in Campos vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-17905,
May 25, 1962.

“We may, therefore, restate, for
the benefit of the bench and the bar, that in order that the Court of Industrial
Relations may acquire jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic
Act No. 875, the following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist between the parties
un employer-employee relationship, or the claimant must seek his reinstatement;
and (b) the controversy must
relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national
interest, or must have a bearing on an unfair labor practice charge, or must
arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage
Law.”

Petitioner contends that the
controversy in question arises under Section 10 of Republic Act 602, that is,
under the Minimum Wage Law.

Section 10
of. Republic
Act 602 provides:

“SEC.
10. Direct Payment of
Wages.—

* * * * * * *

“(b) Wages, including wages which may be
paid retroactively or whatever reason, shall be paid directly to the employee to
whom they are due, except:

“(3) In cases where the right of
the employees or his union to check-off has been recognized by the employer or
authorized in writing by the individual employees
concerned.”

It is true that this Court has
ruled that Section 10 aforementioned imposes a statutory duty upon the employer
to check-off union dues when employees so authorize such check-off in writing
(A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Bicol
Transportation Employees Mutual Association, 91 Phil. 649; Manila Trading &
Supply Company vs. Manila
Trading Labor Association, 93 Phil. 288; Prisco
vs. CIR, 102 Phil. 515).
Nonetheless, with the effectivity of Republic Act 875,
not every case that arises under the Minimum Wage Law falls within the Court of
Industrial Relations’ jurisdiction.

Section 7 of Republic Act 875
states:

“SEC.
7. Fixing Working Conditions by Court
Order.- In order to prevent undue restriction of free enterprise for
capital and labor and to encourage the truly democratic method of regulating the
relations between the employer and employee by means of an agreement freely
entered into in collective bargaining, no court of the Philippines shall have
the power to set wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
employment except as in this Act otherwise provided and except as is provided in
Republic Act Numbered Six hundred two and Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred
forty-four as to hours of work.”

Now, under the Minimum Wage Law,
Republic Act 602, the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction only in two
cases, namely, those provided in Section 16, subsections (b) and (c):

“Sec.
16.
–Jurisdiction of the courts.—
(a) The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to restrain violations
of this Act; action by the Secretary or by the employees affected to recover
underpayment may be brought in any competent Court, which shall render its
decision on such cases within fifteen days from the time the case has been
submitted for decision; in appropriate instances appeal from the decisions of
these courts on any action under this Act shall be in accordance with applicable
law.”

“(b) In the event that a disputed
case before the Court of Industrial Relations involves as the sole issue or as
one of the issues a dispute as to minimum wages above the applicable statutory
minimum, and the Secretary of Labor has issued no wage order for the industry or
locality applicable to the enterprise, the Court of Industrial Relations may
hear and decide such wage issue; Provided, however, That the Secretary
of Labor shall not undertake to fix the minimum wage for an industry or branch
thereof which involves only a single enterprise as a single
employer.

“(c) Where the demands of minimum
wages involve an actual strike, the matter shall be submitted to the Secretary
of Labor, who shall attempt to secure a settlement between the parties through
conciliation. Should the Secretary fail within fifteen days to effect said
settlement, he shall indorse the matter together with other issues involved, to
the Court of Industrial Relations which will acquire jurisdiction on the case
including the minimum wages issue, and after a hearing where the views of the
Secretary of Labor will be given, will decide the case in the same manner as
provided in other cases. The decision shall be rendered by the court en banc within fifteen days after the
case has been submitted for determination, and its finding of facts shall be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, and shall be subject only to an
appeal by certiorari.”

The point, in fact, is not of
first impression. In Valleson, Inc. vs. Tiburcio,
L-18185, September 28,
1962,
this Court ruled that “for the Court of Industrial Relations to have
jurisdiction over a minimum wage case, it is necessary, either that the wage
therein claimed be ‘above the
statutory minimum,’ or, else, that the demand of minimum wage therein made
‘involves an actual strike'”. The same pronouncement was made in
Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Bangilan,
L-16357, April 22, 1963v

“On the other hand, the
Industrial
Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to
Sectiono 16, subsections (b) and (c), ‘in the event a case . .. involves as sole issue or as one of the issues a dispute as
to minimum wages above the applicable
statutory minimum . . . ; and ‘where the demands of minimum wages
involve an actual strike . . .’ The case at bar does not fall under either of
the two categories.”

The present case, similarly, fall
outside Section 16, sub-sections (b) and (c) of Republic Act 602. There is no
dispute here as to minimum wage above the applicable statutory minimum and there
is no actual strike involved.

WHEREFORE, the order and resolution under
review are hereby affirmed, with costs.

SO
ORDERED.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.