VIRGILIO B. CRESPO,[] PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VAN M. MENDOZA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions April 20, 1998 TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION CONTRERAS, J.:


CONTRERAS, J.:


Addressed here is an Appeal[1] from the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26 of Surallah, South Cotabato granting Civil Case No. 747-B for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages.

The antecedent facts are:

Appellee Virgilio B. Crespo filed on July 30, 2003, a complaint,[3] docketed as Civil Case No. 747-B, against appellant Van M. Mendoza alleging that appellee is the true and lawful owner of the two (2) parcels of land designated as Lot No. 2846, Pls-214-D-1 and Lot No. 2847, Pls-214-D-10 (subject lots) with land area of 1000 square meters each, located in Barangay Rizal, Poblacion Banga, South Cotabato, and covered by tax declaration no. ARP No. 99-004-00662 in the name of appellee; that he neither sold, transferred, conveyed nor disposed of in any manner the subject lots to anybody particularly appellant; that sometime on April 20, 1998, appellant through malice and bad faith and employing false pretense, deceit and forgery, caused the execution of a Deed of Sale purportedly to show that appellant sold, transferred and conveyed the subject lands to appellant; that the existence of the deed of sale became known to appellee only in January 2003 when he was told that appellant was applying for the issuance of title over the subject lots; that the deed of sale was null and void, being fraudulent, falsified and fictitious as the signature of appellee thereon was a forgery; that appellee deserved to recover the ownership and possession of the subject lands but appellant refused to return the same; that earnest effort to amicably settle the controversy among themselves had already been resorted to but to no avail; that the matter was referred to the Barangay Lupon of Barangay Rizal, Poblacion Banga, South Cotabato, for conciliation but no settlement was reached; that appellant, taking advantage of appellee’s indigence and inability to afford the services of a counsel, mischievously dared appellee to file a suit against him. Thenceforth, appellee asked PHP 50,000.00 as moral damages, PHP 20,000.00 as exemplary damages and PHP 10,000.00 for the expenses and costs of suits. Appellee prayed that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 20, 1998 and other documents and instruments made and executed pursuant thereto be declared null and void and that appellant be ordered to surrender to him the ownership and possession over the subject lots.

On September 29, 2003, appellant filed an Answer with Counterclaim.[4] He denied the material allegations of appellee and at the same time raised his defenses that the subject lots had been sold to him by appellee through his middlemen, his sister, Concepcion “Cacay” Crespo-Liboon (Cacay for brevity), and nephew, Edsel Miague (Edsel for brevity), who both acted as witnesses to the sale. The Deed of Sale was already prepared by appellee’s counsel when it was presented by Cacay and Edsel to him. After their representations and assurances, appellant was then convinced to buy the subject lots at the total price of PHP 34,000.00. Appellant also denied that they had barangay conciliation. He had not received any notice to a conciliation proceeding. As counterclaims, appellant asked the lower court to make appellee pay the amount of PHP 10,000.00 as counsel’s acceptance fee, PHP 25,000.00 as attorney’s fees, PHP 1,000.00 as counsel’s appearance fee per session, PHP 20,000.00 as litigation expenses, PHP 20,000.00 as moral damages and PHP 20,000.00 as exemplary damages. Appellant prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence to show a cause of action and to uphold the validity of the deed of sale.

In the course of trial, appellee, to prove forgery and ownership over the subject lots, presented Declaration of Real Property Nos. 99-04-00658-99-004-00662, Machine copy of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale bearing his (appellee) alleged forged signature, Certificate of Live Birth of Julie Malamid Crespo bearing his true signature, Joint Affidavit dated March 5, 1979 of appellee and his wife Norberta showing the signatures of the spouses, and his two (2) identification cards with his signatures on them.[5] On the other hand, appellant failed to formally offer his exhibits.

Hence, after a trial, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision dated November 13, 2009, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and discussed, the court hereby renders its decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The defendant is therefore ordered:

  1. To vacate the premises and turn over possession of the property in question to the plaintiffs;
  2. To pay plaintiffs the following:

    a) FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 5,000.00) as actual expenses in filing the instant case; and

    b) FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 5,000.00) as reimbursement of attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, appellant filed the instant appeal raising the following assignment of errors:[6]

  1. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEED OF SALE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE IS A FORGERY.
  2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE OF THIS CASE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN HIS NEPHEW AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
  3. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THAT THE PERSON WHO ENTERS INTO A SALE TRANSACTION OVER A REAL PROPERTY MUST DIG DEEPER INTO THE OWNERSHIP OF THE REAL PROPERTY.
  4. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THAT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN THIS CASE IS IN CONNIVANCE WITH EDCEL MIAGUE IN THE SALE TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.

In essence, the issues in the instant case are (1) whether the signature of appellee Virgilio B. Crespo on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 20, 1998 is a forgery; and (2) whether appellant is a buyer in good faith.

Appellant argues that appellee failed to present an expert witness to prove the alleged forgery.[7]

It is a rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.[8] In this case, appellee presented several documents showing his real signature such as the Certificate of Live Birth of his daughter Julie Malamid Crespo, which was filed on March 27, 1979, Joint Affidavit dated March 5, 1979, and his Identification Cards issued by the South Cotabato I Electric Cooperative, Inc. and the Office of Senior Citizen Affairs. A comparison of appellee’s signature on these documentary evidence with the allegedly forged signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale reveals that there is a great discrepancy in the way the signatures were written, the style and strokes. Even a layman can tell that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was not made by appellee but by someone else. There was actually no imitation of appellee’s signature. Hence, contrary to appellant’s argument, there is no need to employ a handwriting expert to examine the signatures because the assailed signature is totally different from appellee’s real signature.

The lower court is correct in formulating his ruling based only on the visual comparison of the signatures without the aid of a handwriting expert. In Vicente Manzano, Jr. v. Marcelino Garcia,[9] the Supreme Court declared that:

It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.” xxx In the case at bar, however, the variance in the alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale, on one hand, and in the evidence on record and in the verifications of the pleadings before this Court and the courts a quo, on the other hand, was enormous and obvious, such that this Court can readily conclude that the pacto de retro sale was in all likelihood made by someone who has not even seen the customary signature of Garcia.

On the second issue, appellant argues that there is no reason for him to dig deeper into and investigate the veracity and legality of the documents presented to him by the agents of appellee before he bought the subject lands.

It must be noted that the subject lands are unregistered, which means they were not covered by certificates of title. There being no certificates of title to rely on, appellant becomes duty-bound to investigate on the circumstances surrounding the subject lots. However, appellant merely relied on the already executed deed of absolute sale without questions. At the very least, appellant could have sought audience with appellee to ascertain the identity of the real owner and the condition of the subject lots. In Estate of Margarita D. Cabacungan, etc. v. Marilou Laigo, et al.,[10] the Supreme Court declared the following:

[F]undamental is the rule in land registration law that the issue of whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchase was made from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean, in which case the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. Since the properties in question are unregistered lands, respondents purchased the same at their own peril. Their claim of having bought the properties in good faith, i.e., without notice that there is some other person with a right to or interest therein, would not protect them should it turn out, as it in fact did in this case, that their seller, Roberto, had no right to sell them. (emphasis and underlining supplied)

Moreover, appellant bought the subject lots without even taking into consideration the fact that Edsel was not armed with a special power of attorney to sell. In a sale of real property through an agent, special power of attorney to that effect is required under Articles 18974 and 1878 of the New Civil Code that read:

Article 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void. (n)

Article 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: xxx

5. To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration;

Hence, the sale of the two (2) parcels of land by Edsel without a written authority from appellee is void. A void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone and cannot be ratified.[11] In Spouses Joselina Alcantara, et al. v. Brigida L. Nido, et al.,[12] the Supreme Court declared the following:

A special power of attorney is also necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired for a valuable consideration. Without an authority in writing, respondent cannot validly sell the lot to petitioners. Hence, any “sale” in favor of the petitioners is void.

xxx When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void. Thus the authority of an agent to execute a contract for the sale of real estate must be conferred in writing and must give him specific authority, either to conduct the general business of the principal or to execute a binding contract containing terms and conditions which are in the contract he did execute. A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26 of Surallah, South Cotabato is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Lloren, J., Ch., and Santos, JJ., concur.


[*] Plaintiff-Appellee Virgilio B. Crespo died on March 18, 2004. He was substituted by his heirs, namely Norberta M. Crespo, Julie C. Agraviador, Susie M. Crespo, Jonathan M. Crespo, Virtex M. Crespo and Jinky C. Dohina, per lower court’s Order dated April 15, 2004.

[1] Rollo, pp. 57-77

[2] Rollo, pp. 78-91

[3] Records, pp. 1-5

[4] Records, pp. 21-25

[5] Folder of Exhibits

[6] Rollo, p. 62

[7] Rollo, p. 67

[8] Dionisio C. Ladignon v. Court Of Appeals and Luzviminda C. Dimaun, G.R. No. 122973, July 18, 2000

[9] G.R. No. 179323, November 28, 2011

[10] G.R. No. 175073, August 15, 2011

[11] Amelia S. Roberts v. Martin B. Papio, G.R. No. 166714, 9 February 2007

[12] G.R. No. 165133, April 19, 2010 citing Regina P. Dizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122544-124741, January 28, 2003