REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION), COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, MARLENE…

Petitioner, through this petition for review by certiorari,
seeks to annul and set aside the respondent Court of Appeals’ April 29, 1980
decision and August 15, 1980 resolution in CA-G.R. No. 10081-SP, entitled
“Republic of the Philippines versus Hon. Roque Tamayo, et al.” — a special action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus — sustaining the lower court’s action in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal as not having been perfected on time.

The root case is an expropriation proceedings initiated by the
petitioner over a 15,000 square meter lot of private respondents situated in
Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed in the lower court as Civil Case No. 525,
entitled “Republic of the Philip­pines
vs. Turandot Aldaba, et
al.” The subject parcel of land is needed by the petitioner to set up a
permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop, Bureau of
Equipment, Department of Public Highways, a public purpose authorized by law to
be undertaken by the Ministry of Public Highways.  On March
2, 1978, the lower court issued a writ of possession placing the petitioner in possession of the land in
question, upon its deposit of the amount of P7,200.00
as provisional value.  On March 31, 1978,
counsel for private respondents filed a motion praying for the creation of a
three (3) -man committee in accordance with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, to study and submit a report as to the just and reasonable compensation
for the parcel of land subject of expropriation.  On July 31, 1978, the lower court issued an order naming the
chairman and members of the committee of three.  On November 17, 1978, the three-man committee submitted a
joint report to the lower court, recommending that the just compensation of the
expropriated land be fixed at P50.00 per square meter.  In this petition, the Solicitor General
claims that he was not served copies of the aforementioned March 31, 1978
motion of private respondents,
July 31, 1978 order of the respondent lower court and the November 17, 1978
report of the three-man committee.  The
records reveal that the Solicitor General authorized the provincial fiscal of Bulacan to represent him in that proceedings
(pp. 11-12, C.A.
rec.).  Parenthetically, private
respondents in their comment to this petition, alleged
“that the Provincial Fiscal, being duly authorized by the office of the
Solicitor General to represent the latter in this case, the court merely
furnished the office of the Provincial Fiscal with all the pleadings and other
papers of the case” (p. 53, rec.).

On December 18, 1978,
the Solicitor General received a copy of the lower court’s order dated December 8, 1978.  The order reads in part:

“The joint report filed by the three-man committee charged
with the determination of the just compensation of the property herein sought
to be condemned is hereby APPROVED, such that the just compensation of the land
described in Paragraph II of the Complaint is fixed at Thirty Pesos (P30.00)
per square meter.

“The defendant may now withdraw from the Philippine National
Bank, Malolos, Branch, the sum of P7,200.00 deposited
by the Third Regional Equipment Services, Department
of Public Highways under Account No. 35109, said sum to be part of the total
amount of P450,000.00 (15,000 square meters at P30.00 per square meter), which
the Department of Public Highways, Third Regional Equipment Services, Malolos, Bulacan, shall,
and is hereby ordered, to pay to the herein defendants as just compensation for
the subject property.”

On December 22, 1978,
the Solicitor General filed through the mail a notice of appeal, as well
as a first motion for extension of time of 30 days from January 17, 1979 within which to file
record on appeal.  The extension sought
for was granted by the lower court in its order dated January 17, 1979.

On February 13, 1979, the lower court, acting upon petitioner’s
manifestation filed on January 9, 1979 and motion filed on February 8, 1979,
allowed the Solicitor General to borrow the records of the expropriation case
“under proper receipt, the Clerk of Court taking the necessary steps to
index and number the pages thereof and to ensure its integrity; and granted a
second extension of thirty (30) days from February 17, 1979, within which to
file the record on appeal of the Republic of the Philippines” (p. 79, C.A. rec.).

Again, on March 22, 1979,
the lower court granted petitioner’s third motion for an extension of thirty
(30) days from March 19, 1979
within which to file its record on appeal (p. 80, C.A. rec.).

Subsequently, the lower court, in an order dated April 24, 1980, acted favorably upon
petitioner’s motion for a fourth extension of thirty (30) days from April 19,
1979 within which to file its record on appeal and petitioner’s
request that the records of the expropriation case be forwarded to the
Solicitor General (p. 81, C.A. rec.).

In a motion dated May
17, 1979, the petitioner, invoking heavy pressure of work, asked
for a fifth extension of thirty (30) days from May 18, 1979 or until
June 17, 1979,
which to file its record on appeal (pp. 82-83, C.A. rec.).

On June 7, 1979,
when its motion for a fifth extension has not yet been acted upon by the lower
court, petitioner filed its record on appeal (p. 13, rec.).

On June 15, 1979, eight (8) days after petitioner had filed its
record on appeal, private respondents filed an opposition to the aforesaid
fifth motion for extension (pp. 85-87, C.A. rec.), and an objection to
petitioner’s record on appeal (pp. 88-89, C.A. rec.), on the ground that the
same was filed beyond the reglementary period,
because petitioner’s motion dated May 17, 1979 for extension to file record on
appeal was mailed only on May 21, 1979 (pp. 13-14, rec.).

On June 27, 1979,
petitioner filed its opposition to the aforesaid objection to its record on
appeal, contending that the said May
17, 1979 motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May 18, 1979, which was the last day
of the extended period allowed by the
lower court’s order of April 24, 1979 (p. 14, rec.).

In an order dated August
13, 1979 but received by the Solicitor General only on September 10, 1979, the
lower court dismissed the appeal of petitioner on the ground that the fifth
motion for extension of time dated May 17, 1979 within which to file the record on appeal and the record on appeal were filed out
of time.  The lower court found that the said fifth
motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May 21, 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 as claimed by petitioner (pp. 14, 34-35, rec.).  The order of
dismissal reads:

“Upon consideration of the approval of the record on appeal
filed by the Republic and acting on the manifestation filed on July 25, 1979 by the defendants thru
counsel, the Court finds no merit in the same.

“The last motion of the Office of the Solicitor General for
extension of time to file record on appeal was on May 17, 1979, seeking for an
additional extension of thirty (30)
days from April 18, 1979.

“The thirty-day period requested by the Solicitor General from
May 18, 1979 therefore
expired on June 17, 1979.  But this last request for extension was not
acted upon by the court.  The Republic of
the Philippines
had therefore only up to May 17, 1979,
within which to file record on appeal. 
The record on appeal was filed only on June 11, 1979 (should be June 7), which is well beyond the
period to file record on appeal. 
Moreover, the last motion for extension which was not acted upon by the
Court had only been filed on May 21, 1979 as shown by the stamp of the Manila
Post Office, the date of the mailing which should be reckoned with in computing
periods of mailed pleadings, and received by the Court on June 22, 1979.  Both the motion for extension filed on May
21, 1979 and the record on appeal filed on June 11, 1979 (should be June 7),
have therefore been filed beyond the reglementary
period of 30 days from April 18, 1979, or up to May 18, 1979.

“x  x  x” (pp. 34-35,
rec.).

On October 4, 1979, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
claiming that “1) there is merit in plaintiff’s appeal from this Honorable
Court’s order of December 8, 1978, a copy of which was received on December 18,
1978; 2) plaintiff’s May 17, 1979 motion for 30 days extension from May 17,
1979 to file Record on Appeal, was actually filed on May 18, 1979; and 3) the
Honorable Court denied plaintiff’s appeal without first resolving plaintiff’s
motion for a 30-day extension, from May 18, 1979 to file Record on Appeal”
(pp. 14-15, rec.; pp. 52-66, C.A. rec.). 
Relative to the timeliness of the filing of its fifth motion for
extension of time, petitioner submitted a certification of the Postmaster of
the Central Office of the Bureau of Posts, Manila, that registered letter No.
3273 containing the aforesaid motion addressed to the Clerk of Court of the
Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan “x x x was received by this Office late Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979. 
The letter was not included in the only morning dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, 1979, Monday (May 20 being a Sunday) under the
Manila-Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15″
(p. 66, C.A. rec.).

On the merits of the dismissed appeal, petitioner stressed that
the creation of a three-man committee to fix the just compensation of the expropriated
lot was without legal basis, because Section 5, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
upon which the same was anchored had already been repealed by the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 76 which took effect on December 6, 1972 — under which
the court has no alternative but to base the just compensation of expropriated
property upon the current and fair market value declared by the owner or
administrator, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower.

On October 31, 1979,
the lower court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit (pp. 36-40, rec.; pp. 28-32, C.A.
rec.), thus:

“The grounds advanced by the plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines
have been fully taken into account by the Court in its order of August 13, 1979, particularly the
late filing of the record on appeal. 
Plaintiff’s counsel should not have assumed that the motion for
extension of the period for filing of the record on appeal would be granted.

“The plaintiff’s counsel’s belief that their May 17, 1979
motion would be granted cannot be the basis for the plaintiff to be absolved of
the effect of late filing of the record on appeal, considering that the Court had
liberally extended for five times **, each for thirty (30) days, the filing of
said record.  This Court considers said
extensions as sufficient time for the counsel for plaintiff to prepare its
record on appeal.  Plaintiff’s counsel,
with all the resources it has, to protect its client’s interests, should have
been vigilant enough not to assume and should not expect that their motion for
extension would be granted.  It is not
correct therefore that only three days had elapsed after the reglementary period to perfect appeal because the reglementary period ended not on June 17, 1979, but on May 17, 1979, because the last motion for
extension was not granted by the Court.

“The Court deplores the insinuation of plaintiff’s counsel
that it took hook, line and sinker, defendant’s allegation about the fact of
mailing.  It has carefully gone over the
record and found that the date of mailing of the motion for extension is May
21, 1979, as shown by the stamp ‘Registered, Manila, Philip­pines, May 21,
1979’ appearing on the covering envelope containing the motion for
extension.  Therefore, the explanation
contained in Annex B of the motion for reconsideration to the effect that
registered Letter No. 3273, addressed to the Clerk of Court, Court of First
Instance of Malolos, Bulacan,
was received by the Manila Post Office late Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979, but
was not included in the ‘only’ morning dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, 1979, Monday (May 20
being a Sunday), under the Manila-Malolos Bill No.
202, page 1, line 15′, can not overturn the fact of date of actual mailing which
is May 21, 1979, because it is of judicial knowledge that a registered letter
when posted is immediately stamped with the date of its receipt, indicating
therein the number of the registry, both on the covering envelope itself and on
the receipt delivered to the person who delivered the letter to the post
office.  The four (4) times only; 5th
extension was not acted upon by the Court. 
The letter Annex B of the motion
therefore lacks sufficient weight and persuasiveness to prove the fact that the
letter asking for another extension was actually filed on May 18,
1979, and not May 21,
1979.

“Regarding the creation of a three-man committee which
according to plaintiff the Court sorely lacked the prerogative to create
pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court because it has been
superseded by the provisions of PD 76 which definitely fixed the guidelines for
the determination of just compensation of private property acquired by the
State for public use, the Court had to resort to this old method of determining
fair market value, which is defined as:

‘The “current and fair market value” shall be understood
to mean the “price of which a willing seller would sell and a willing
buyer would buy neither being under abnormal pressure’,

because, firstly; the plaintiff failed to
show evidence thereof as declared by the owner or administrator of the property
under the provisions of PD 76, or the valuation or assessment of the value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. 
Hence, for all intents and purposes, the findings of the three-man
committee have become the basis of the valuation, Paragraph III of the
complaint notwithstanding, because allegation in the complaint,
unless proved, are not binding as evidence.

“Presidential Decree No. 42, from its very caption, which
reads:

‘PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 42 AUTHORIZING
THE PLAINTIFF IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
INVOLVED UPON DEPOSITING THE ASSESSED VALUE FOR PURPOSES OF TAXATION”

does not fix the
value of the property to be expropriated, but rather for the purpose of taking
possession of the property involved, the assessed value for purposes of taxation is required to be deposited in the
Philippine National Bank or any of its
branches or agencies.  This is borne out
by the first Whereas of the decree which finds
the existing procedure for the exercise of the right of eminent domain not
expeditious enough to enable the plaintiff to take or enter upon the possession
of the real property involved, when needed for public purposes.  The second Whereas
states that the measure is in the national interest in order to effect
the desired changes and reforms to create a new society and economic order for
the benefit of the country and its people.

“The body of the law
does not specify the valuation of the property, but rather the method by which
seizure of the property could be done immediately, and that is by the
act of depositing with the Philippine National Bank, in its main office or any
of its branches or agencies, an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation, to be held by said bank subject to the
orders and final disposition of the Court.

“Only in this respect are the provisions of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court and or any other existing law contrary to or inconsistent
therewith repealed.  If at all, the
decree, PD 42, fixes only a provisional value of the property which does
not necessarily represent the true and correct value of the land as defined in
PD 76.  It is only provisional or
tentative to serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property
being expropriated by the condemnor.  This is in line with the recent decision of
the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated on October 18, 1979, in the case of the Municipality
of Daet,
Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Li Seng Giap & Co., Inc., Respondents, G.R. No. L-45861, which
states in part:

‘x x x, it can already be gleaned that
said decree fixes only the provisional value of the property.  As a provisional value, it does not
necessarily represent the true and correct value of the land.  The value is only “provisional” or
“tentative” to serve as the
basis for the immediate occupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor.’

“x x x x”
(pp. 28-32, rec.).

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid orders of the lower court,
petitioner on December 3, 1979 filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. No. 10081-Sp, entitled:  Republic of the Philippines versus Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Branch VI, presided over
by Hon. Roque Tamayo, et
al., whereby it prayed that: “1) This petition be given due course; 2) A
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary retraining order be issued ex-parte restraining respondent court from executing,
enforcing and/or implementing its Order dated December 8, 1978, x x x and its orders dated August
13, 1979 and October 31, 1979 x x x;
3) After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered:  [a] annuling and
setting aside respondent court’s Orders of August 13, 1979 x x x; [b] Directing and compelling
respondent court to allow and approve petitioner’s record on appeal and to
certify and elevate the same to this Honorable Court; [c] Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order herein prayed for to be made permanent and perpetual”
and for such other relief as the Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises.

On December 14, 1979,
respondent Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order to maintain
the status quo, and required private respondents to file their comment (pp. 67-68, C.A.
rec.).

On January 2, 1980,
private respondents filed the required comment (pp. 69-91, C.A.
rec.).

On April 29, 1980,
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s action and set aside its December 14, 1979 restraining
order.  The respondent Court of Appeals
ruled that “A review of the whole record convinces Us
that the challenged orders are not a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion x x
x” (pp. 44-45,
rec.).  The Solicitor General received a
copy of the aforesaid decision on May
19, 1980.

On May 30, 1980,
the Solicitor General sought a thirty-day extension from June 3, 1980 within which to file a motion for reconsideration (pp. 106-­107, C.A. rec.).

On June 20, 1980,
the respondent Court of Appeals granted the extension sought (p. 108, C.A.
rec.).

On June 23, 1980, the Solicitor General filed his motion for
reconsideration on the ground that, “The Honorable Court of Appeals was
misled by private respondents’ counsel
in holding that petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file record on
appeal dated May 17, 1979 x x x
was filed on May 21, 1979, not on May 18, 1979 (which was the last day within
which to file petitioner’s record on appeal); hence, this Honorable Court was
not correct in ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER’S AFORESAID MOTION
FOR EXTENSION was filed beyond the reglementary
period” (pp. 109-118, C.A. rec.). 
Petitioner also moved to set the case for oral argument (p. 119, C.A.
rec.).  Petitioner vehemently insisted as
it did in the main action (pp. 10-12, C.A. rec.), that it is erroneous to conclude that
its

“x x x x motion for extension dated May
17, 1979 x x x was filed on
May 21, 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 which is the last day of the extended
period fixed by respondent court for petitioner to file its record on
appeal.  It is submitted that the motion
for extension dated May 17, 1979 x x x was actually filed on May 18, 1979 as there is
incontrovertible proof that the same was in fact mailed on May 18, 1979 via registered mail (Registry Letter
3273) at the Manila Central Office of the Bureau of Posts.  A letter dated September 25, 1979 of Delfin Celis, postmaster of Central Post Office, Manila,
to the Chief of the Records Section of the Office of the Solicitor General
shows that the envelope containing the May
17, 1979 motion was received by the Post Office of Manila on May 17, 1979.  Said letter states:

‘In compliance to your request in your letter dated September 20,
1979 in connection with registered letter No. 3273 addressed to the Clerk of
Court, Court of First Instance Malolos, Bulacan, please be informed that it was
received by this Office late Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979.  The letter was not included in the only
morning dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and was
dispatched May 21, 1979,
Monday (May 20 being a Sunday) under the Manila-Malolos
Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15.’

“Thus, it is conceded that the envelope containing the
registered letter of petitioner’s motion for extension to file record on appeal
dated May 17, 1979 has on its face the date May 21, 1979 stamped thereon x x x.  If the aforesaid proof of mailing presented
by private respondent is taken into account solely without taking into
consideration the letter of Postmaster Delfin Celis dated September 25, 1979 x x
x, then it could be said that petitioner’s motion for
extension to file record on appeal dated May 17, 1979 was filed out of
time.  However, the certification of the
Postmaster stating that the letter was actually received in the Post Office on May 18, 1979 conclusively shows that
such date is the date of mailing, and the date May 21, was thus wrongly stamped
thereon by an employee of the Post Office. 
Petitioner should not be blamed for the mistake committed by the
personnel of the Post Office of stamping May 21, 1979 on the envelope of said Registered Letter No.
3273.  Petitioner’s counsel had nothing
to do with the aforesaid mistake that had been com­mitted by the personnel of
the Post Office.

“In resumé, it can be said with
certainty that the records of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Post
Office of Manila clearly show that the petitioner’s motion for extension dated
May 17, 1979 was seasonably filed on May 18, 1979 as the latter was actually
the date of its mailing and therefore said date should be deemed as the actual
date of its filing before respondent court.

“At this juncture, it may be stated that undersigned counsel
were contrained to seek extension to file record on
appeal because of the pressure of work and their need to borrow the records of
the case from the trial court.  Thus, as
early as January 9, 1979,
they were borrowing the expediente of the case
so as to enable them to prepare an accurate record on appeal.  Petitioner in its motion and manifestation of
January 9, 1979 stated why
it wanted to borrow the expediente of the case
at bar, as follows:

‘3.  The
records of the undersigned counsel may not be complete as it had authorized the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan to appear in the
hearings before this Honorable Court,
thus it is possible that the Office of the Solicitor General may not have been
furnished copies of Orders of this Honorable Court, as well as pleadings that
may have been furnished the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan.

‘4.  This
being the case, undersigned counsel can not prepare an accurate and concise
record on appeal, hence it is necessary that the records of the case be lent to
the undersigned counsel pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 136 of the Revised Rules of
Court’ (pp. 6-7, Motion for Reconsi­deration [in the CFI of Bulacan];
see pp. 52, 57-58, C.A. rec.).

“On April 10, 1979,
undersigned counsel reiterated their desire to borrow said expediente
but it was not until May 3, 1979
that the expediente of the case consisting of
164 pages were received by the Docket Section of the Office of the Solicitor General. 
It was only on May 16, 1979 that said expediente
were delivered to undersigned Solicitor, thus compelling him to prepare the May 17,
1979 motion.  And for the same reasons, it was only on June 7,
1979 that the record
on appeal was filed, which was well within the 30 days extension from May 18,
1979 prayed for in
petitioner’s motion of May 17, 1979.

“x       x      x” (pp.
109-113, C.A. rec.).

On July 14, 1980,
respondent Court of Appeals resolved to require private respondents to comment
on the motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the
resolution (p. 121, C.A. rec.).

Earlier, however, or on July
8, 1980, private respondents mailed their opposition to the
motion for reconsideration and their waiver to appear for oral argument (pp.
122-123, C.A.
rec.).  Both were received by the Court
of Appeals on July 14, 1980, the very day the resolution requiring private
respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration, was released by the
Court of Appeals.  In the petition before
this Court, the Solicitor General Laments the fact that no copies of the aforesaid pleadings of the private
respondents were ever served on and received by him (p. 18, rec.).  Indeed, said pleadings of the private
respondents do not show nor indicate that copies thereof were served on the
Solicitor General (pp. 121-123, C.A. rec.).

In the aforesaid opposition of private respondents, they claimed
that

“The undersigned counsel merely stated that the date of filing
the fifth motion for extension to file record on appeal by the office of the
Solicitor General was on May 21, 1979, as shown on the envelope bearing the
stamp of the Manila Post Office, which clearly reads ‘May 21, 1979‘ and
the undersigned counsel brought to the attention of the lower court that the
date of filing of this fifth extension was the date shown when the mailing was
made as stamped on the envelope.  That
there can be no other date than the date stamped on the envelope made by the
Manila Post Office when the fifth request for extension of filing the record on
appeal was mailed.  This fact of the date
of mailing, May 21, 1979,
was stamped on the envelope.

“The office of the Solicitor General further alleged:

‘If x x x taken
into account solely without taking into consideration the letter of the Post
Master Delfin Celis, dated
September 25, 1979 x x, then it could be said that
petitioner’s motion for extension to
file record on appeal, dated May 17, 1979, was filed out of time.’

“From the above statement of the Office of the Solicitor
General there can never be any abuse in the exercise of judgment as to
constitute a grave abuse of discretion. 
The lower court chose to rely on the date stamped on the envelope by the
Manila Post Office rather than considering as paramount a mere letter from the
Manila Post Office employee, Delfin Celis.

“x x x x x x.

“If we are to believe that the stamped date, May 21, 1979, was wrongly stamped by
an employee of the Manila Post Office, then thousands of mails received and/or
mailed on that date were all wrongly stamped. 
How can the lower court believe that the date May 21, 1979, was merely erroneously stamped on
the envelope?  The lower court’s finding
of facts on this regard, must also be sustained.

“The other reason given by the Office of the Solicitor General
was that they have asked for the complete record of the case but that it was only forwarded to their office sometime on May 3,
1979.

“The record of the case cannot be easily forwarded to the
Solicitor General because there was the case of motion for intervention filed
in connection with the case.

“The failure on the part of the court to immediately comply
with the request of the office of the Solicitor General cannot be a justifying
reason for failure to comply with the rules of court and of the order of filing the record on appeal within the reglementary period, or time given by the court.

“The office of the Solicitor General gave the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan the power to handle the case for
(them) and the office of the Provincial Fiscal was furnished with all
pleadings, orders and other papers of the case. 
The record therefore of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal can easily
be available to them.  Besides no less
than five (5) extensions of time had been requested and the last one was not
acted upon by the Court and yet the Office of the Solicitor General filed the
Record on Appeal only on June 17, 1979 (should be June 7, 1979), which is far
beyond the reglementary period which was May 17, 1979
(should be May 18, 1979).

“x x x x” (pp. 123-125, C.A.
rec.).

On August 15, 1980,
respondent Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
thus:

“Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated June 23, 1980 filed by the Solicitor
General and the opposition thereto filed on July 8, 1980 by the respondents and considering that the said motion does not cite new matters which
have not been considered in the decision promulgated on April
29, 1980, the said
motion is hereby denied.

“Petitioner’s ‘Motion to Set Case for Oral Argument’ dated June 23, 1980 is likewise
DENIED.”

Aforesaid resolution was received by the Solicitor General on August 20, 1980.

Hence, this recourse.

Petition was filed on October 24, 1980; two extensions of time of
thirty (30) days each having been previously asked by and granted to petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.

On October 29, 1980,
WE resolved to require respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10)
days from notice of the resolution and at the same time issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from executing, enforcing and/or
implementing the decision dated April
28, 1980 issued in CA-G.R. No. SP-10081, entitled “Republic of
the Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon. Roque Tamayo, etc., et al., Respondents” of the Court of
Appeals, and the Order dated December 8, 1978 issued in Civil Case No. 5257-M,
entitled “Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Turandot Aldaba, et al.,
Defendants” of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch VI, at Malolos, Bulacan
(pp. 49-51, rec.).

On November 14, 1980,
private respondents filed their comment to the petition contending that no
abuse of discretion or act in excess of jurisdiction exists as to require a
review by this Honorable Court (pp. 52-64, rec.).

On November 24, 1980,
WE resolved to give due course to the petition and to declare the case
submitted for decision (p. 65, rec.).

But on December 22, 1980, private respondents filed a motion,
praying for the outright dismissal of the instant petition on the main ground
that the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed has already become final and executory, hence, unappealable,
because this petition was filed out of time as the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in the Court of Appeals was pro forma (pp.
66-67, rec.).

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
respondent Court of Appeals itself committed a grave abuse of discretion in not
finding that the respondent
trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s
appeal.

The questioned orders
should be set aside.

I. It must be underscored that the basic provisions of the Rules of
Court basis of the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal by the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan as sustained by the respondent
Court of Appeals are Section 13, Rule 41: 
Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal are not
filed within the period of time herein provided, the appeal shall be dismissed;
and Section 14, Rule 41:  A motion to
dismiss an appeal many of the grounds mentioned in the preceding section may be
filed in the Court of First Instance prior to the transmittal of the record to
the appellate court.

The Court of First Instance of Bulacan
dismissed herein petitioner’s appeal on the bases of the foregoing provisions
upon its finding that the record on appeal of petitioner was filed out of time
as it was filed only on June 7, 1979 or twenty (20) days after May 18, 1979,
the last day of the appeal period as extended; petitioner’s fifth extension of
time of thirty days from May 18, 1979, not having been favorably acted upon by
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan upon its
finding that the same was also filed late or three days after the last day of
the extended appeal period.  The
implication of the questioned orders of the Court of First Instance is that
since the fifth extension of time was filed out of time, no action may be taken
thereon by it; hence, petitioner Republic had only up to May 18, 1979 within
which to file the record on appeal. 
Consequently, the filing thereof only on June 7, 1979 was too late.

The petitioner, however, herein contends as it did before the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan and before the
respondent Court of Appeals, that its fifth extension of time was actually
filed on May 18, 1979, not on May 21, 1979 as found out by the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals and in
support thereof, pointed to the certification of the postmaster of the Central
Office of the Bureau of Posts, dated September 25, 1979 (p. 47, rec.) to the
effect that the said motion for extension of time as contained in registered
mail No. 3273 addressed to the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Malolos) “x x x was received by this office
late Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979.  The
letter was not included in the only morning dispatch of May 19, to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, 1979, Monday (May 20 being a Sunday) under the
Manila-Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15.”

But the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
opined that said certification cannot override the prevailing practice in post
offices “that a registered letter when posted is immediately stamped with
the date of its receipt, indicating therein the number of the registry, both on
the covering envelope itself and on the receipt delivered to the person who
delivered the letter to the office” of which it took judicial notice.

WE entertain grave doubts that the aforesaid post office practice
is a proper subject of judicial notice.

Section 1 of Rule 129 on judicial notice provides that “The
existence and territorial extent of states, their forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts
of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, the
geographical divisions and political history of the world and all similar
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions, shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction
of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this
section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and
may resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents or reference.”

Undoubtedly, the post office practice of which the Court of First
Instance took judicial notice is not covered by any of the specific instances
cited above.  Neither can it be classified under
“matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions x x x.” For
a matter to be taken judicial notice of by the courts of law, it must be a
subject of common and general knowledge. 
In other words, judicial notice of facts is measured by general
knowledge of the same facts.  A fact is
said to be generally recognized or known when its existence or operation is
accepted by the public without qualification or contention.  The test is whether the fact involved is so
notoriously known as to make it proper to assume its existence without
proof.  The fact that a belief is not
universal, however, is not controlling for it is very seldom that any belief is
accepted by everyone.  It is enough that
the matters are familiarly known to the majority of mankind or those persons
familiar with the particular matter in question (20 Am Jur
49-50; Martin, Rules of Court 37, Second Edition).  Furthermore, a matter may be personally known
to the judge and yet not be a matter of judicial knowledge and vice versa, a
matter may not be actually known to an individual judge, and nevertheless be a
proper subject of judicial cognizance.

The post office practice herein involved is not tested by the aforestated considerations, a proper matter of judicial
notice.  Moreover, the certification
issued by the very postmaster of the post office where the letter containing
the questioned motion for extension of time was posted, is a very clear
manifestation that the said post office practice is not of unquestionable
demonstration.  Indeed, the doctrine of
judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.  The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubts upon the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative (31 CJS 522; Martin, Rules of Court 38,
Second Edition).

It is therefore manifest from the foregoing that the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan committed a palpable error
amounting to a grave abuse of discretion in relying on the alleged post office
practice aforementioned over the uncontroverted
certification of the postmaster earlier referred to.  That being so, the
dismissal of petitioner’s appeal therefore lacks factual basis.  It should have acted on petitioner’s fifth
motion for extension of time which WE find
to have been filed on time.

The records reveal that a favorable action on the aforesaid fifth
motion for extension of time is warranted by the following circumstances:  (1) the record on appeal was filed by
petitioner even before the lower court could consider the questioned motion for
extension of time; and private respondents objected to the said motion only
after petitioner had filed the record on appeal; (2) the order of the lower
court granting the fourth extension of time did not contain any caveat
that no further extension shall be allowed; (3) the fact that the CFI records of
the case were sent to the Solicitor General only on May 3, 1979 and ostensibly
handed to the Solicitor assigned to the case only on May 16, 1979 or barely two
(2) days Wore the expiration of the extended appeal period; and (4) pressure of
work in the undermanned Office of the Solicitor General who is the counsel of
the National Government and all other governmental agencies and instrumentalities; and (5) and the
unconscionable amount of P450,000.00 for a parcel of 1.5 hectares situated
in a barrio of Malolos, Bulacan,
with only a provisional value of P7,200.00 obviously based upon its assessed
value appearing on its tax declaration. 
No sugar, rice or coconut land of only 15,000 square meters could
command such a fabulous price.

WE therefore rule that the respondent Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in affirming the disputed orders of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan.

II. But even assuming that the motion for extension to file record
on appeal dated May 17, 1979 was filed not on May 18, 1979 but on May 21, 1979
as claimed by private respondents, which is a delay of only one (1) working
day, May 19 and 20 being Saturday and Sunday, respectively, that circumstance
alone would not justify the outright dismissal of the appeal of petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, especially so in the light of the undisputed fact that
petitioner had already filed with the lower court the record on appeal at the
time the questioned dismissal order was issued by the lower court.  For, as ruled in one case, “x x x x
the delay of four days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for an
extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of
equity and considering that the record on appeal is now with the respondent
judge” (Ramos vs. Bagasao, et al., G.R. No.
51552, February 28 1980, Second Division; emphasis supplied).  Moreover, WE have already liberalized in a
number of cases the jurisprudence on the matter of perfection of appeals.  For one, in De las
Alas vs. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 200-216 [1978]), WE ruled that:

“x x x
litigation should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicality, and under the circumstances obtaining in this case, WE said in
the case of Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals (L-43511, July 23, 1976, 72 SCRA 120,
126), thus:

‘x x x Dismissal of appeals purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearing of appeals on their merits. 
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override,
substantial justice.  If a technical and
rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.

‘x x x x.’

III. Moreover, a special circumstance which is the subject of one
of the main issues raised by petitioner in its appeal warrants US to exercise
once more OUR exclusive prerogative to suspend OUR own rules or to exempt a
particular case from its operation as in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (83 SCRA 459, 478-480 [1978]), thus:
“x x x The Rules have
been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting
justice.  As a corollary, if their
application and operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and
enhance it, their suspension is justified. 
In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo, ‘(T)his Court, through the revered and
eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in
the case of C. Viuda de Ordoverza
v. Raymundo, to lay down for recognition in holding
that ‘ “it is always in the power of the court (Supreme Court) to suspend
its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the  purposes of justice require it
…… ‘ “ (underscoring ours).  As emphasized by the Solicitor General, if
the questioned orders are not annulled and set aside, its enforcement and
implementation will result to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public
interest.” This is so because the Government would lose its opportunity to
assail the order of the lower court dated December 8, 1978, the dispositive
portion of which reads, as follows:

“x x x x x.

‘The joint report filed by the three-man committee charged with the
determination of the just compensation of the property herein sought to be
condemned is hereby approved, such that the just compensation of the land
described in Paragraph II of the Complaint is fixed at Thirty Pesos (P30.00)
per square meter.

‘The defendant may now withdraw
from the Philippine National Bank, Malolos
Branch, the sum of P7,200.00 deposited by the Third Regional Equipment
Services, Department of Public Highways under Account No. 35109, said sum to be
part of the total amount of P450,000.00 (15,000 square meters at P30.00 per
square meter), which the Department of Public Highways, Third Regional
Equipment Services, Malolos,
Bulacan, shall, and is hereby ordered, to pay to the
herein defendants as just compensation for the subject property.

‘SO ORDERED’ (pp. 3-4, Order dated December 8, 1978).

“It must be stressed at this stage
that the Government would lose no less than P425,000.00
if the lower court’s order of December
8, 1978 is not scrutinized on appeal.  It must be stated that the lower court was
without jurisdiction to create a three-man committee because Sec. 5, Rule 67 of
the Revised Rules of Court was repealed by P.D. 76 which took effect on December 6, 1972, the salient
features of which read, as follows:

‘The “current and fair market value” shall be understood
to mean the “price of which a willing seller would sell and a willing
buyer would buy neither being under abnormal pressure.’

‘For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property
acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and
fair market value declared by the owner or administrator or such market value
as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.’

“Thus, from December 6, 1972, the effectivity
date of PD 76, the just compensation to be paid for private property acquired
by the government for public use is the current and fair market value declared
by the owner or administrator or such market value as determined by the
Assessor whichever is lower.  Pursuant to
said Decree, the government’s obligation to private respondent would only be P24,376.00.  The lower court thus had no jurisdiction to
fix an amount of just compensation higher than P24,376.00.  It follows therefore that the joint report submitted by the three-man committee created
by the lower court could not serve as a legal basis for the determination of
the just compensation of the property sought to be condemned.

“x  x  x” (pp. 19-21, rec.).

IV.  With
respect to the motion to dismiss filed on December 22, 1980 by private respondents, WE find no
merit therein.  The contention of private
respondents that the June 23, 1980
motion for reconsideration of petitioner with the Court of Appeals was pro forma is belied by the results obtained in this petition
before US.

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED; THE DECISION DATED APRIL 29, 1980 AND THE RESOLUTION
DATED AUGUST 15, 1980 OF
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; AND THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPROVE
PETITIONER’S RECORD ON
APPEAL AND TO ELEVATE THE SAME TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.  NO COST.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., in the result.