CIRILO VENTURA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ANASTACIA BAYSA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an action for partition of two parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Paniqui, province of Tarlac, brought by plaintiffs against
defendants before the court of first instance of said province on May 12,
1950.

It is, alleged that Agaton Claridad was the owner of Lots Nos. 5186 and 5047 of
the Paniqui cadastre, his title thereto being evidenced by Original Titles Nos.
39522 and 38628; that Agaton Claridad died leaving two children, Juana Claridad
and Isidro Claridad, who are also deceased; that Juana Claridad was survived by
plaintiffs, Her children, while Isidro Claridad was survived by his wife,
children, and his grandchildren, who are named as defendants; that both
plaintiffs and defendants inherited the lands belonging to their common
predecessor-in-interest share and share alike, one-half belonging to the
plaintiffs and the other half to defendants; and that defendants are now in
possession of said lands, having enjoyed their fruits since 1917. Hence,
plaintiffs pray for the partition of the lands, for an accounting of their
crops, and for damages.

Defendants in their answer allege that the two parcels of land were not owned
by Agaton Claridad, though they admit that Lot 5186 was registered in the name
of “heirs of Agaton Claridad, deceased” in Original Certificate of Title No.
39522, and Lot 5047 was registered in the name of “estate of Agaton Claridad,
deceased” in Original Certificate of Title No. 88628; that plaintiffs are the
children Of Juana Claridad while defendants are the wife, children, and
grandchildren of Isidro Claridad; and that defendants are in possession and
enjoyment of the lands in question. Defendants set up the defense that Isidro
Claridad was the true owner of the lands in question though he has claimed them
in the name of his father Agaton Claridad in the cadastral proceedings for
sentimental reasons to perpetuate the name of his father; that defendants are
the sole heirs of their father Isidro Claridad; that plaintiffs were estopped
from claiming any right thereto since their right had already prescribed, hence,
they pray that they be declared the absolute owners of the properties in
question to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.

After issues were joined, the case was set for hearing for the first time on
March 12, 1951. On said date, the court issued an order giving the parties 15
days within which to file a written agreement of their announced amicable
settlement subject to the condition that if no settlement is reached the hearing
will be had on March 27, 1951. On this date, for failure of the parties to
submit the proposed settlement, the case was to have been heard but the court
issued an order transferring the hearing to the April calendar for lack of
material time. On October 11, 1951, the clerk of court issued a notice getting
the trial of the case for November 19, 1951, but when this date came the court
issued an order postponing the hearing to a new assignment because it was
discovered that no notice of hearing was served on defendants’ counsel. On March
2, 1956, the court motu proprio dismissed the case because it found that it has
been pending for almost six years without any move on the part of plaintiffs
thus showing lack of interest on their part to prosecute the case to final
termination. On March 26, 1956, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration,
and when this was denied, plaintiffs appealed. The case was certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it involves only questions of
law.

The grounds on which the lower court dismissed this case for lack of interest
on the part of plaintiffs to prosecute it to its final termination are:

“This case was originally instituted in this Court on May 12, 1950, that is
almost six years ago. The case was first set for hearing on March 12, 1951; but,
in view of the announcement made by the parties on that day that they were on
the way to amicably settling this case, they were given fifteen days from thence
within which to file in Court their announced amicable settlement. The records
do not show that the parties came to effect the settlement of this case, so the
case was finally set for hearing for November 19, 1951. The hearing set for the
latter date was postponed due to the fact that counsel for defendants was not
duly notified of the hearing of this case.

“The record shows furthetr that from the last postponement of the hearing of
this case up to the present, more than four years have elapsed, without the
plaintiffs having taken any steps to have this case set again for hearing on the
merits, which circumstance shows that plaintiffs have no longer interest in
prosecuting this case to final determination.”

Considering that this ease was originally instituted on May 12, 1960, was
first set for hearing on March 12, 1951, was finally set for hearing on November
19, 1951 in view of the failure of the parties to come to an amicable settlement
as they announced in open court, as well as the failure to serve notice of
hearing on defendants’ counsel, and that since that date (November 19, 1951) no
further move was taken by plaintiffs to prosecute the case to its final
termination thus allowing more than four years to elapse, we are of the opinion
that the lower court acted properly in motu proprio dismissing the case upon the
assumption that plaintiffs have already lost interest in prosecuting it to its
final termination.

This action finds support in Section 3, Rule 30, of the Rules of Court which
provides, among other things, that the court may on its own motion dismiss a
case when it appears that plaintiff has failed to prosecute the same “for an
unreasonable length of time.” Indeed, a lapse of more than four years from the
date the case has been set for hearing after several postponements on grounds
not of the court’s own making can be said to be unreasonable when plaintiffs
have not taken any step to further prosecute it as found by the lower court.
Rather than affirming that the lower court has not exercised proper discretion
in dismissing the case as counsel for appellants seems to insinuate, such an
attitude shall be commended for it is in keeping with the spirit of the law
which commands that a case should be disposed of with the least possible
delay.

While it is true that under the rules it is the duty of the clerk of court to
include a case in the trial calendar after issues are joined, to fix the date
for trial, and to cause notice to be served upon the parties, this does not
relieve the plaintiffs of their own duty to prosecute the case diligently and to
call the attention of the court, if necessary, to the necessity of putting the
case back to its calendar if that has been neglected by the court because of the
numerous cases it has to attend to (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., et al. vs.
American President Lines, Ltd., et al., 94 Phil., 879). It is, therefore,
preposterous for plaintiffs to now claim as excuse that if they have not taken
any further move to prosecute their case it is due to their belief that that
duty devolves upon the clerk of court. Their claim that they have not lost
interest in prosecuting their case is betrayed by their own inaction.

Under our rules, a dismissal of a case on the ground that plaintiff has
failed to prosecute it for an unreasonable length of time has the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise provided for by the court (Section
3, Rule 30). No such provision was made by the lower court in its order of
dismissal. However, considering that the lands in question are covered by
torrens titles wherein they appear registered in the name of the common ancestor
of both plaintiffs and defendants, although the latter claim that they were
merely placed in the name of their predecessor-in-interest for sentimental
reasons, it is the sense of the Court that the claim of plaintiffs is
meritorious and should not be allowed to be defeated on a mere technicality. And
so we hold that plaintiffs should be given another opportunity to bring the
matter to court by declaring that the dismissal of the case should be without
prejudice.

Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated March 2, 1956 is hereby
modified by declaring that the dismissal is without prejudice. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.