LORENZA CONCEPCION, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. EMILIA CONCEPCION, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Concepcion versus Concepcion

The Case

This is the case of Concepcion versus Concepcion, decided by the Supreme Court in August 1952. Six nephews and nieces of the late Manuela Concepcion sued their cousin Emilia Concepcion to recover their shares in the estate of their aunt, and Emilia defended by claiming that the very same properties had been donated to her. The whole case therefore turns on a single question of interpretation: whether the deed of donation executed in her favor is a donation inter vivos, a transfer made during the donor's lifetime, or a donation mortis causa, a disposition taking effect only upon death. The answer decides everything, because a donation mortis causa is in truth a will and must comply with the formalities of testamentary succession, while a donation inter vivos needs only the donor's consent and the donee's acceptance. The case matters to every reviewee because it supplies the enduring rule for distinguishing the two, and it teaches that the label the parties attach to the deed does not control.

Procedural History

The case began in the Court of First Instance of Zambales. The six nephews and nieces first filed a special proceeding for the summary settlement of the estate of their aunt, and Emilia opposed it, claiming the six parcels under the donation. That court did not resolve the question of title; it merely ordered the estate partitioned among all the heirs, including Emilia and her four brothers. Because Emilia refused to surrender the parcels, the six petitioners then brought a separate civil action in the same court to be declared owners of their shares. After trial, the lower court held that the donation was mortis causa and, not having been executed with the formalities of a will, was null and void; it declared the properties part of the estate and ordered Emilia to deliver to each plaintiff a one-eleventh share of the fruits of the land. Emilia appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, finding that only questions of law were involved, certified the case to the Supreme Court. The appeal therefore reached the Supreme Court by certification rather than by ordinary appeal.

Facts

On the seventh of March 1944, Manuela Concepcion, a widow with no children and no compulsory heirs, executed a deed of donation in favor of her niece Emilia Concepcion. The document was entitled "donation onerosa mortis causa." In its body, the donor recited that the gift was made in consideration of the good services Emilia had rendered to her before and during those days, and out of special predilection for her good qualities and affection. The deed imposed conditions: that the produce of one third of the first parcel be set aside annually for the celebration of the donor's anniversary after her death and for masses in suffrage of the souls of her departed relatives, not exceeding fifty pesos a year; that the donor had reserved what was necessary for her maintenance; and that the donation would produce effects only upon the donor's death. Emilia accepted the donation in the same instrument, and both signed below the acceptance. The deed was later registered under the provisions of the Torrens system applicable to unregistered land.

A little more than three years later, on the eighteenth of November 1947, Manuela Concepcion died. Her six nephews and nieces instituted the special proceeding for the settlement of her estate, and when Emilia set up the donation, the present action followed.

Issues

• Whether or not the deed of donation in favor of Emilia Concepcion is a donation inter vivos or a donation mortis causa.
• Whether or not, if the donation is mortis causa, it is void for failure to comply with the formalities required for the execution of wills.

Applicable Provisions

Article 620 of the Civil Code provides:

Donations mortis causa shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary succession.

This is the provision that makes the classification decisive, for if the deed is mortis causa it must be tested against the law on wills, which the deed plainly does not satisfy.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the donation is inter vivos, not mortis causa. The trial court had been impressed by the title and by the clause that the donation would produce effects only upon the donor's death, but the Court laid down the controlling rule: it is the body of the document and the statements contained therein, and not the title, that must be considered in ascertaining the donor's intention. The Court acknowledged that the distinction is not always sharp and clear, and that the one who drafted the document was himself confused. Examining the body, the Court found that the donation was remunerative rather than onerous, made for past services freely rendered and out of affection, and that the phrase mortis causa should not be given too much importance. It relied on its own precedents, including Laureta versus Mata, Sambaan versus Villanueva, Joya versus Tiongco, and Balaqui versus Dongso, all holding that where the main consideration is not the donor's death but services rendered or affection, the donation is inter vivos, and the condition that it take effect only after death means merely that possession and enjoyment of the fruits are postponed. The Court also drew support from the acceptance: only donations inter vivos need be accepted, while a donation mortis causa, being in the nature of a legacy, need not be; the fact that the parties embodied the acceptance in the deed and regarded it as necessary showed their intention that the donation be inter vivos.

On the second issue, because the donation is inter vivos, the requisites of the law on the execution of wills do not apply to it, and it is valid. The absence of a third witness and of an attestation clause is therefore of no consequence.

Doctrine

A donation is mortis causa when its principal consideration is the death of the donor, and it is then governed by the rules of testamentary succession under Article 620 of the Civil Code. A donation is inter vivos when the main consideration is the services rendered by the donee or the donor's affection for the donee, even if the donor styles it mortis causa and even if it is to take effect only after the donor's death. In that case the donation transfers title immediately upon acceptance, and the clause postponing its effect is read as postponing only the possession and enjoyment of the fruits. The label used in the title does not control; the body of the instrument does. Finally, acceptance is required only for donations inter vivos, so an acceptance embodied in the deed and treated by the parties as necessary is strong evidence of an inter vivos intent.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, with costs, holding the donation inter vivos and valid, so that Emilia Concepcion prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: it is the body of the deed, not its title, that determines whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa, and a gift for services or affection remains inter vivos even if it says it takes effect upon death. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between donations inter vivos and mortis causa, the effect of a mislabeled deed, and the rule that only donations inter vivos require acceptance.