CANDIDA VILLALUZ, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JUAN NEME AND FELICISIMA VILLAFRANCA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

After the approval of her application, but before the granting of the patent, on March 6, 1926, Maria Rocabo donated the southern portion of the land to Maria, and the northern portion to Patricia, in two notarial
deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 7), giving them the right to present
the deeds of donations to the Bureau of Lands. The said donees accepted the donations and took actual possession of their respective portions, but only Maria Villaluz
remained on the entire land because Patricia left. Maria cultivated and
improved the land from 1927 to 1938 inclusive. Maria and Patricia,
however, forgot and cared not to present the deeds of donation to the
Bureau of Lands. On March 27, 1930, the patent was granted and O.C.T.
No. 217 was issued in the name of Maria Rocabo. Realizing that the deeds of donations were not in accordance with the formalities required by law, and because Sinforosa Villaluz, who had the custody of the title would not surrender it to the donees, unless given a share, upon the advise of a Notary Public, Carlos de Jesus, Maria, Patricia and Sinforosa, on September 1, 1939, executed a deed of extra-judicial partition (Exh.
2), among themselves, to the exclusion and without the knowledge and
consent of their nephews and nieces, the herein plaintiffs-appellants,
and in virtue thereof, O.C.T. No. 217 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 269 was issued in their names (Exh. 5), after having made representations that they were the only heirs of their mother, Maria Rocabo. On September 2, 1939, the 3 sisters declared the land for taxation purposes (Exh. 4). On September 11, 1939, they sold the land to Eamona Pajarillo, wife of Adriano Mago and Angela Pajarillo., wife of defendant Juan Neme (Exh. 3). Ramona and Angela declared the land for taxation purposes in their names (Exh. 6). On August 3, 1953, the heirs of Adriano and Ramona sold the undivided interest of the latter to Juan Neme (Exh. 8), who, on August 8, 1953, sold the southern half portion of the property in favor of defendant Felicisima Villafranca (Exh. 13). Thereafter, the. plaintiffs-appellants came to know that the land which was in the administration of their aunts Sinforosa,
Patricia and Maria, was already in the possession of the defendants.
After attempts of amicable settlement had failed, the plaintiffs on
June 3, 1954, filed a complaint for partition of said land and recovery
of their respective shares on the property and accounting of the fruits
thereof.

It
also appears that the deeds of sale of the land in question executed in
favor of the defendants, had not been registered in favor of the
defendants and had not been recorded in accordance with Public Land Act
No. 141 and the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496; that the vendees
failed to have their deed of sale (Exh. 3), annotated on said T.C.T. No. 269, or have the title thereof transferred in their names.

After
due trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dismissing the
complaint,’ with costs against the plaintiffs, and declaring the
defendants the owners of the land described in the complaint and in the
T.C.T. No. 269. Plaintiffs in their appeal, claim that the lower court
erred (1). In not finding- that the extra-judicial partition (Exh. 2), only affected the partition of Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria, surnamed Villaluz, on the land in question and not the participation of the plaintiffs-appellants, as compulsory heirs of Maria Rocabo;
(2) In finding that plaintiffs-appellants are already barred from
claiming their participation thereon; and (3) In finding that
defendants-appellees are owners, with right of possession, of the said land.

The
contention of the plaintiffs-appellants is meritorious. The decision
found to be an incontrovertible fact that the land in question should
be divided among the heirs of the decedent Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria Villaluz and her grandchildren. Thus, the trial Court said :

“* * * The settlement of the estate of Maria Rocabo
was summarily effected by the extrajudicial partition executed on
September 1, 1939, by the three surviving children to the exclusion of
the plaintiffs who were entitled to inherit by representation. By
virtue of the extrajudicial partition Exhibit 1, the Original
Certificate of Title No. 217 in the name of Maria Roeabo was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 269 was issued in lien thereof in favor of Sinforosa Villaluz, Patricia Villaluz and Maria Villaluz on September 6, 1939, to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. * * *”.

Furthermore,
Maria having left no testament or last will, her heirs succeeded to the
possession and ownership of the land in question from the time of her
death (Art. 440, Old Civil Code, Art. 533, New Civil Code; Lubrico vs. Arbado, 12 Phil. 391). The deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh.
2), was fraudulent and vicious, the same having been executed among the
3 sisters, without including their co-heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same. The partition, therefore, did not and could
not prejudice the interest and participation of the herein
plaintiffs-appellants, and the sale of the land to the defendants did
not and could not also prejudice and affect plaintiffs-appellants’
interest and participation thereon. The cancellation of O.C.T. No. 217
and the issuance of T.C.T. No. 269, did not
likewise prejudice the interest and the participation of the
plaintiffs-appellants. The three sisters could not have, sold what did
not belong to them. Nemo dat quod non habet.

The
trial court held that under Sec. 4, Rule 73 of the Rules, the
plaintiffs’ cause of action had already prescribed. This section,
however, refers only to the settlement and distribution of the estate
of the deceased by the heirs who make such partition among themselves
in good faith, believing that they are the only heirs with the right to
succeed. In case at bar, however, the 3 surviving sisters could not
have ignored that they had co-heirs, the children of the 3 brothers who
predeceased their mother. Considering that Maria Rocabo
died during the regime of the Spanish Civil Code, the distribution of
her properties should be governed by said Code, wherein it is provided
that between co-heirs, the act to demand the partition of the
inheritance does not prescribe (Art. 1965 [Old Civil Code], Baysa, et al. vs. Baysa, 53 Off. Gaz. 7282). Verily, the 3 living sisters were possessing the property as administratrices
or trustees for and in behalf of the other co-heirs,
plaintiffs-appellants herein, who have the right to vindicate their
inheritance, regardless of the lapse of time (Sevilla vs. de los Angeles, L-7745; 51 Off. Gaz., 5590, and cases cited therein).

Moreover,
the acquisition of the land in question is governed by the Public Land
Act No. 141 and the Land Registration Law Act No. 496. And considering
that the deed of sale had not been registered in accordance with the
said laws, the same did not constitute a conveyance which would bind or
affect the land, because the registration of a voluntary sale of land
is the operative act that transmits or transfer title (Tuason vs. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635).

Defendants-appellees
further argue that the extrajudicial partition should not be taken
independently of the deeds of donation, as in fact, according to them,
the crux of tile ease lies mainly in the two deeds of donation, which
enabled the donees to possess the land and
cut any and all rights of the plaintiffs-appellants to claim
participation therein. In other words, it is pretended that after the
alleged donations, the land in question was no longer a part of the
intestate estate of Maria Rocabo, and the
plaintiffs-appellants could no longer participate thereon. But the
deeds of donation, according to the trial court, were defective and
inoperative, because they were not executed in accordance with law. The
trial court itself began to count the period of prescription “after the
execution of the extrajudicial partition and the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 269.” The donees themselves knew that the donations were defective and inoperative, otherwise they would not have subsequently decided to execute
the deed of extra-judicial partition, which also goes to show that the
rights of the three sisters and the vendees, stemmed from the said
extrajudicial partition. The defendants-appellees finally argue that, this notwithstanding, the subsequent registration of the land in the names of the two donees and Sinforosa Villaluz
pursuant to the extra-judicial partition on September 1, 1939, and the
subsequent sale thereof by the registered owners to the defendants-appellees,
on September 11, 1939, followed by the actual, adverse and continuous
possession by the vendees and successors for more than 10 years, before
the present complaint was filed, had barred the right of appellants to
recover, title of the property and claim participation therein. Having
held that the three sisters were mere trustees of the property for the
benefit of the appellants, and it appearing that they had not
repudiated the trust, defendants-appellees‘
pretension in this respect, is without merit. The finding in the
appealed decision that “there is no evidence that the said defendants
are not innocent purchasers and for value” (good faith), is of no
moment in the case at bar. As heretofore adverted to, there was no
effective sale at all, which would affect the rights of the
plaintiffs-appellants.

Moreover, the lack of good faith on the part of the defendants-appellees
can reasonably be inferred from their conduct in not presenting for
registration the supposed deed of sale in their favor; in failing to
annotate the sale on the T.C.T. of the alleged donees,
and in not asking that a transfer certificate of title be issued in
their (vendees’) names. It may also be reasonably concluded that if
they did not present the deed of sale for registration, it was because
they knew that their vendors were not the sole and only heirs so as to
entitle them to the ownership of the land in question.

In
view hereof, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and the
case is remanded to the court of origin for further and appropriate
proceedings.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.