LEONARDO NAVARRO, PLAINTIFF?APPELLANT, VS. LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

An action for Prohibition and Injunction, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, was filed before the Court of First Instance
of Baguio City, on June 3, 1963, by Leonardo Navarro
against Luis L. Lardizabal, Leopoldo
Nievera, Domingo Cabili and
Jacinto Rillera who are the City Mayor, Chief of Police, City Treasurer and Market
Superintendent, of Baguio City, respectively.

It is alleged in the complaint, that plaintiff Leonardo Navarro was an occupant of stall No. 87 of the City Market of Baguio, for more than six (6) months prior to the filing of the case in
court  – 
“having previously acquired full ownership of the business conducted thereon (stall) by lawful
transfer of ownership from the former lessee or stallholder
(Juanita Cachero)”; that he had paid the regular fees for the occupancy of said stall; that in accordance with
Ordinance No. 314-A of the City of Baguio, plaintiff filed an application for the award to him of said stall, to the proper
authorities of the City of Baguio; that “said
application is pending consi­deration before
the City Market Committee which has taken cognizance of said application” at the  time the
complaint was filed in court; that the defendants have interferred with the possession of the plaintiff of the stall by threats and intimidation that
on June 3, 1963, the City Mayor issued an order directing the Chief of Police
to eject the plaintiff from the said stall, and the latter official, in
compliance with the order, on June 4, 1963, forcibly removed plaintiff’s stock
in trade inside the stall, brought them to the Police Department, and pre­vented
him from occupying, the stall;
that the order of the City Mayor and the acts of the Chief of Police “are without or in excess
of jurisdiction of said, defendants”; and that plaintiff suffered
damages  as a result of the illegal and
arbitrary acts of the defendants.  For re­lief,
plaintiff prayed that a writ of preliminary man­datory injunction be issued, and after a hearing, the same be made permanent;
that the defendants and their agents be permanently restrained from harassing
and dis­turbing the plaintiff in the occupation and use of said stall; and that the defendants be sentenced to pay damages.

Ordinance No. 314-A of the City of Baguio, re­ferred to in the
complaint, reads thus:

“Section 1.  – The Market Committee be,
as it is hereby, authorized:

(a) To award stalls which may be declared vacant under existing
regulations, directly to actual occupants of such stalls, who are operating,
capita­lizing and managing or conducting the business thereof;

(b) To award stalls directly to persons qualified to lease mar­ket
stalls, who may have acquired the business conducted therein thru any of the
recognized modes of transfering ownership, from the
former lessee or stallholder:

Provided, That the direct award shall only
be made to Filipino citizens, who are qualified to hold or lease a stall in the
City Market.”

In their answer, the defendants traversed the alle­gations in the
complaint; and by way of special defense, alleged: (a) that plaintiff has no
approved application to lease or occupy the stall No. 87; (b) that Juanita Cachero
is the lawful and recognized lessee of said stall by virtue of a valid and
subsisting contract of lease; (c) that plaintiff is neither a helper nor
recognized partner of Juanita Cachero in the business
being conducted in said stall; (d) that the City Mayor, by virtue of the powers
vested in him by the Charter of Baguio City and
Republic Act No. 37, as implemented by
Order No. 32 of the Department of Finance, has the general and exclusive
supervision and control over public markets in the City of Baguio;
and (e) that plaintiff not being a lawful lessee
of stall No. 87, was an illegal occupant thereof.

From the documentary evidence presented during the trial, and
upon the pleadings of the parties, and the annexes thereto, upon which the case
was submitted for decision, it appears
that Juanita Cachero is the law­ful and recognized present holder of the
stall in ques­tion under a valid and
subsisting contract of lease with the city authorities.  The plaintiff, however, was able to occupy
the stall, for more than six (6) months prior to the filing of the case in
court, presumably with the consent of Juanita Cachero
(not a party
in the case), upon an alleged agreement between Cachero
and Navarro whereby the former transferred to the latter the owner­ship of, the
business being conducted in said stall. 
Realizing, however, that his (Navarro’s) occupancy of the stall was not legal until and
unless a contract of lease of the stall
is awarded in his favor by the city authorities, he filed an application for
the transfer of said stall in his name. 
Plaintiff’s application, however, was protested by a D. B. Baton, on the
ground that the stall applied for is not vacant.  In view of the protest of Baton, the City Market
Committee, the office authorized to make awards of stalls, indefinitely
postponed the consideration of the appli­cation, and at the time the complaint
was filed in court, the application has not yet been acted upon nor approved
City Market Committee.

After trial, decision was rendered dismissing the complaint.  Hence, this appeal by the
plaintiff.

The right to lease and occupy a stall in a public market, is not
a common right but a purely statutory privilege, governed by laws and
ordinances.  (Samson vs. Fugoso, 45 Off. Gaz. 300) Therefore, for an appli­cant to be able to claim
a right to occupy a stall in a public market, he is bound to comply strictly
with the provisions of the laws and ordinances on the mat­ter.

In the case at bar, cognizant of his status as an illegal
occupant of the stall in
question, the plain­tiff filed an application to lease the stall occupied by
him with the market authorities; however, in view of the protest of D. B. Baton against the application,
and to enable the City Market Committee, the body authorized to make the awards
of stalls
in the city market, to determine whether the applicant Navarro possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
to be a lessee of a stall in the city market, the City Market Committee postponed
indefinitely the consideration of Navarro’s application.  In fact, it is not denied that at the time
the com­plaint was filed in court, Navarro’s application has not yet been
approved.

The contention of the plaintiff that because he has acquired
“full ownership of the business conduct­ed thereon (stall) by transfer of
ownership from the former lessee or stallholder” (Juanita Cachero), and, therefore,
he had acquired a valid right to occupy the stall, can have no relevant
consideration in support of his claim of preferential right to the stall, for
the following reasons: First, the contention is denied by the defendants, and plaintiff’s own admission that he has no
contract of lease or award of the stall in his favor, nor permission, even temporarily,
to occupy the sane, are facts and matters which defeat his claim to occupy the
stall; Second, no competent
evidence, oral or documentary, has been presented
which would justify a finding that Juanita Cachero
has entered into the sup­posed agreement, and for the further reason that the latter is not a party in the case; Third, admitting in gratia argumenti the existence of the alleged agreement, the
same cannot have the effect of a legal and
valid transfer or assignment of the
right to
occupy the stall, because said agreement is contrary to Section 5, Depart­ment
of Finance Order No. 32 which prohibits
the trans­fer of possession or occupancy of a stall from a partner to a
co-partner; Fourth the agreement
between Cachero and Navarro contemplated a transfer only of the business
or stock in trade but not of the right
to occupy the stall; Fifth, paragraph (h) of Ordinance No. 314–A above-quoted,
as the trial court held:

“x x
x is repugnant and contrary to Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32, because under said
Department Order, parti­cularly Section
5 and 6, any market
stallholder who enters into
business partnership with any party after he has acquired the
right to lease such a stall shall have no authority to transfer to his
partner or partners the right to occupy
the stall, so that since plaintiff
disclosed having acquired full ownership, occu­pancy and use of said stall No. 87 by transfer and
there is no evidence that he is either a helper
or rela­tive within the third degree, as a requisite thereof, his alleged claim to occupy said stall
should perforce be cancelled, as it was cancelled.  It is evident he acquired no privi­lege, much
less a right, to occupy said stall.”

and; Sixth, admitting ad arguendo, that said paragraph (h) of Ordinance 314-A is
not in conflict with Department Order No. 32, and the agreement is valid, the City Market Committee has the
discretion to approve or disapprove the same, and under the facts obtaining in the case, it clearly appears that the City
Market Committee has not yet approved plaintiff’s
application to occupy the stall.

Even under Ordinance 314-A
of the City of Baguio, it us required that before market
stall may be awarded to an applicant, it is necessary that said stall first be de­clared vacant (par. [a], and that
the proper authority has determined that the applicant has all the qualifica­tions
to lease a stall in the city
market, which conditions are not present In the case at bar.

The foregoing, taken into account together with the indubitable
fact that Juanita Cachero is still the lawful and
recognized lessee of the stall in question, which is not vacant, on one hand,
and Navarro’s application to lease said stall has not yet been approved by, the
City Market Committee, on the other hand, and the fact that the occupancy of a
stall in a public market cannot be the subject of a valid contract unless
approved by the city authority (Mercado vs. Aguilar, 45 Off. Gaz. No. 5,
supp. 118) afford solid support to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not
established a valid and legal right to occupy said stall.  The complaint, therefore, states no cause of
action, and the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint.

It clearly appears on the record that the remedy of prohibition sought by the plaintiff
basically seeks to de­termine
his right to occupy the stall No. 87
of the City Market.  The remedy is
improper, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction,
and to restrain the doing of some act about to be done.  The petitioner must clearly show that he has a legal right to the subject of the
action without which he shall fail.  As
the mainte­nance, operation, supervision and control of public mar­kets within
a city or municipality is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal
authorities, and considering that the
plaintiff has no valid and legal right to occupy the stall in question,
therefore, the order of the defend­ant City Mayor to have the plaintiff ejected
from the stall is within his power and authority, and the facts obtaining in the case do not indicate, that in
the exercise of his authority,
the City Mayor had committed gross abuse of discretion.  The mere
fact that in the exercise of
such power, the person to whom the
execution of the order of ejectment was entrusted had committed alleged arbitrary
acts, the chief of police having forcibly ejected the plaintiff from the stall
– which has not been proven, does not entitle the aggrieved party to the
remedy of prohibi­tion or injunction.  The plaintiff has some other appropriate remedy recognized in law.

For
the foregoing considerations, the appeal is denied, with costs against the
appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., is on official leave of absence.