G.R. No. L-37871. November 23, 1981
RESTITUTA V. VDA. DE GORDON,
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J.:
The Court affirms the appealed decision finding the same to be in
accordance with the applicable law. The
appellate court correctly upheld the tax sale of the real properties at which
respondent Rosario Duazo acquired the same and her ownership upon petitioner
Restituta V. Vda. de Gordon’s failure to redeem the same, having found the sale
to have been conducted “under the direction and supervision of the City
Treasurer of Quezon City after the proper procedure and legal formalities had
been duly accomplished.”
The appellate court’s decision under review held as follows:
“The opposition [to respondent Duazo’s petition for
consolidation of ownership] has not controverted by specific denials the
material averments in the petition.
Hence the material averments in the petition are deemed admitted. (Section 1, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court)
“Moreover, the opposition has not raised the issue of
irregularity in the public sale of the two parcels of land in question. This defense is deemed waived. (Section 2, Rule 9, id.)
“The uncontested averments in the petition and the annex
attached to said petition disclose that the two parcels of land in question
were sold at public auction at the City Hall, Quezon City on December 3, 1964
under the direction and supervision of the City Treasurer of Quezon City after
the proper procedures and legal formalities had been duly accomplished; that
the taxes against the two parcels of land in question for the years 1953 to
1963, inclusive, remained unpaid; that the City Treasurer of Quezon City, upon
warrant of a certified copy of the record of such delinquency, advertised for
sale the two parcels of land in question to satisfy the taxes, penalties and
costs for a period of thirty (30) days prior to the sale on December 3, 1964,
by keeping a notice of sale posted at the main entrance on the City Hall and in
a public and conspicuous place in the district where the same is located and by
publication of said notice once a week for three (3) weeks in the “DAILY
MIRROR”, a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City, the
advertisement stating the amount of taxes and penalties due, time and place of
sale, name of the taxpayer against whom the taxes are levied, approximate area,
lot and block number, location by district, street and street number of the
property; that at the public sale on December 3, 1964, the two parcels of land
in question were sold to [Duazo] for the amount of P10,500.00 representing the
tax, penalty and costs; that the certificate of sale executed by the City
Treasurer was duly registered on December 28, 1964 in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City; that upon the failure of the registered owner
to redeem the two parcels of land in question within the one year period
prescribed by law, the City Treasurer of Quezon City executed on January 4,
1966 a final deed of sale of said lands and the improvements thereon; and that
said final deed of sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City on January 18, 1966.
“The principal issues to be resolved in this appeal are (1)
whether the price is so grossly inadequate as to justify the setting aside of
the public sale and (2) whether the oppositor [Gordon] is entitled to redeem
the two parcels of land in question.
“The combined assessed value of the two parcels of land is
P16,800.00. The price paid at the public
sale is P10,500.00. The residential
house on the land is assessed at P45,580.00.
But the assessment was made in 1961.
The present value of the residential house must be much less now
considering the depreciation for over ten years.
“While the price of P10,500.00 is less than the total assessed
value of the land and the improvement thereon, said price cannot be considered
so grossly inadequate as to be shocking to the conscience of the court.
“In Director of Lands vs. Abarca, 61 Phil. 70, cited by the
lower court in the order appealed from, the Supreme Court considered the price
of P877.25 as so inadequate to shock the conscience of the court because the
assessed value of the property in question was P60,000.00. The assessed value of the land was more than
sixty times the price paid at the auction sale.
“In the case at bar, the price of P10,500.00 is about one
sixth of the total assessed value of the two parcels of land in question and
the residential house thereon. The
finding of the lower court that the house and land in question have a fair
market value of not less than P200,000.00 has no factual basis. It cannot be said, therefore, that the price
of P10,500.00 is so inadequate as to be shocking to the conscience of the
court.
“Mere inadequacy of the price alone is not sufficient ground
to annul the public sale. (Barrozo vs.
Macaraeg, 83 Phil. 378)
“Moreover, in Velasquez vs. Coronel, 5 SCRA 985, 988, the Supreme
Court has held:
‘It is true that respondent treasurer now claims that the prices
for which the lands were sold are unconscionable considering the wide
divergence between their assessed values and the amounts for which they had
been actually sold. However, while in
ordinary sales for reasons of equity a transaction may be invalidated on the
ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one’s conscience
as to justify the courts to interfere, such does not follow when the law gives
to the owner the right to redeem, as when a sale is made at public auction,
upon the theory that the lesser the price the easier it is for the owner to
effect the redemption. And so it was
aptly said: ‘When there is the right to
redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material, because the
judgment debtor may reacquire the property or also sell his right to redeem
and thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained
at the auction sale.’ (Italics copied).
“The contention that the oppositor can still redeem the two
parcels of land in question because the public sale has not been judicially
confirmed deserves scant consideration.
The cases cited by the oppositor and by the lower court all refer to
foreclosure of mortgage sales which are by express provision of law subject
to judicial confirmation. The public
sale in the instant case is governed by Section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 470
which gives the delinquent taxpayer a period of one year from the date of the
sale within which to repurchase the property sold. In case the delinquent taxpayer does not
repurchase the property sold within the period of one year from the date of the
sale, it becomes a mandatory duty of the provincial treasurer to issue in favor
of the purchaser a final deed of sale.
(Velasquez vs. Coronel, supra) We find that the oppositor is not
entitled to repurchase the two parcels of land in question because she failed
to do so within one year from the date of the sale thereof.
“WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and the
ownership of [Duazo] over the two parcels of land in question and the
improvements thereon is declared consolidated.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 12204 and 12205 and to issue the
corresponding transfer certificates of title to [Duazo] over the two parcels
of land in question, upon the payment of the prescribed fees. No pronouncement as to costs.”[3]
The Court finds petitioner’s assignment of errors to be without
merit.
Petitioner’s first assignment of error as to alleged lack of
personal notice of the tax sale is negated by her own averments in her own
opposition filed in the court a quo that “(T)he Oppositor in the
above entitled petition is a woman 80 years of age. She was not aware of the auction sale
conducted by the City Treasurer of Quezon City on December 3, 1964 or if there
was any notice sent to her, the same did not reach her or it must have escaped
her mind considering her age. x x
x.”[4]
Petitioner’s second assignment of error that the period for
redemption should be the two-year period provided in Republic Act No. 1275
likewise has no merit, since the specific law governing tax sales of properties
in Quezon City is the Quezon City Charter, Commonwealth Act No. 502 which
provides in section 31 thereof for a one-year redemption period. The special law covering Quezon City
necessarily prevails over the general law.
Furthermore, as respondent has pointed out, as of the time of filing in
1974 of respondent’s brief, petitioner had not then for a period of 10 years
(and 17 years as of now) sought to exercise her alleged right of redemption or
make an actual tender thereof, as follows:
“Moreover, even if we do concede, merely for the sake of
argument, that the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1275 may be made applicable in
this case which is certainly not and Petitioner should have been granted TWO
(2) YEARS from date of the public sale, within which to exercise her right of
redemption, yet since the sale of the questioned land to herein Respondent in
that public auction in 1964, herein Petitioner never had shown any good faith
in exercising her right of redemption.
Since 1964 when the auction sale took place, up to the present, 1974,
or a period of TEN (10) YEARS have already elapsed and yet herein Petitioner
never made any tender of payments with either the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City or the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court, at least to show her
good faith.
“Furthermore, if herein Petitioner really believes in good
faith, that [she] had still that right of redemption, then she should have paid
the real estate taxes, but as the records will show, since 1964, Private
Respondent Rosario Duazo is the one paying the real estate taxes of the lands
in question.”[5]
Petitioner’s third and last assignment of error as to the alleged
gross inadequacy of the purchase price must likewise fail. As the Court has held in Velasquez vs.
Coronel,[6]
alleged gross inadequacy of price is not material “when the law gives the
owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the
theory that the lesser the price the easier it is for the owner to effect the
redemption.” As the Court further stressed in the recent case of Tajonera
vs. Court of Appeals,[7]
the law governing tax sales for delinquent taxes may be “harsh and
drastic, but it is a necessary means of insuring the prompt collection of taxes
so essential to the life of the Government.”
ACCORDINGLY, the appellate court’s decision under review
is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., no part.
[1]
At the time of the filing of the petition in this Court on November 29, 1973,
petitioner Restituta V. Vda. de Gordon had already died on November 1,
1970 as stated in the verification executed by Aurora M. Clarin de Paredes who
alleged that she caused the filing of the petition “as beneficial owner of
the properties” and that “(D)uring the lifetime of the petitioner
[who is my foster mother], the properties under litigation were sold by
petitioner to the undersigned in a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on July 16,
1962, duly notarized by Atty. Samuel M. Soriano, and entered in his notarial
register as Doc. No. 110, Page No. 88, Book No. II, Series of 1962.”
Record, at page 13; note in brackets supplied.
[2]
Second Division composed in 1973 of Concepcion Jr., Reyes, A. and Fernandez, ponente,
JJ.
[3]
Record, pages 18 to 23; notes in brackets supplied.
[4]
Petitioner’s brief, pages 5 – 6; see Record on Appeal, pp. 16 – 17.
[5]
Respondent’s brief, pp. 15-16.
[6] 5
SCRA 985, citing other cases.
[7]
103 SCRA 467, 475, citing Paguio vs. Ruiz, 93 Phil. 306 (1953).