G.R. No. L-42483. December 21, 1977
LEONOR S. MULINGTAPANG, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
in RO4-WC Case No. 160990.
Petitioner is the mother of the late Hernando S. Mulingtapang, who, during his lifetime, was employed by
respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation as
maintenance lubricator. Hernando S. Mulingtapang
died on October 26, 1974, after a bout with pneumonia which he
contracted or began to feel on September 3, 1974.
Accordingly, a claim for death benefits was filed on November 29, 1974 with the
Department of Labor, Regional Office No. IV. Attached to, and made an integral part
of, the claim was a physician’s report
dated November 25, 1974 with a diagnostic finding that the deceased died of
“pneumonia, sec. acute leukemia” (p. 7, WCC rec.).
On October 23, 1975, an acting referee of the Department of
Labor’s Workmen’s Compensation Unit rendered a decision ordering respondent
Marcelo Steel Corporation to pay petitioner the sum of Four Thousand One
Hundred Sixty (P4,160.00) Pesos as death benefits plus
Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos as burial expenses; and to this Office, the amount
of Forty-Two (P42.00) Pesos as administrative fees.
The basic facts of the claim are:
the deceased Hernando S. Mulingtapang during
his lifetime was employed by the respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation as maintenance
lubricator with an annual salary of P3,428.24; that on September 3, 1974, he
got sick while on duty and was
advised to seek hospitalization by Miss Quinida P. de
Vera, company nurse; that on September 10, 1974, the respondent corporation
filed its controversion on the ground that Hernando’s
illness which it claimed as fever, leukemia was not work-connected (p. 43, WCC
rec.); that on October 14, 22 and 26, 1974, he was treated for his illness
diagnosed as
pneumonia, secondary acute leukemia by Dr. Jose E. Abjelina
at the Don Juan Mayuga Memorial Hospital, Lemery, Batangas, where he died
on October 26, 1974 (p. 7, WCC rec.); and at the time of his death, he was
survived by his dependent father and mother, namely, Ruperto
M. Mulingtapang and Leonor S.
Mulingtapang, but the father subsequently died on
January 30, 1975 (p. 16, rec.).
In so awarding death benefits in favor of herein petitioner, the
acting referee brushed aside as unmeritorious the defense interposed by the
respondent corporation that the “ailment that caused the death of the
deceased was not work-connected nor aggravated and therefore, not
compensable” as supported by the affidavit of three doctors, namely, Dr.
Leonardo C. Aquino, Dr. Nestor A. Laceda
and Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, that the illness of leukemia is not an occupational
disease, nor work-caused nor work-aggravated, and could be contracted by any
person, irrespective of age, work or station in life. Instead, the acting referee relied on the
legal presumption of compensability that arose from its undisputed finding that
“x x the ailment which caused the death of
the deceased supervened in the course of employment” (emphasis
supplied) as well as on the certification
of the attending physician, Dr. Jose Abjelina, to the
effect that the illness that caused the death of subject was aggravated by the
nature of his work and that strenuous activity of an acute leukemia patient may
be a cause of pneumonia (p. 7, WCC rec.).
But upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent
corporation, the respondent Commission, although maintaining the basic facts of
the case as found by the acting referee, reversed the aforestated
decision, thus:
“At the threshold, it may be stated that acute leukemia or
pneumonia is not an occupational disease, hence, the same is not compensable per se. It may be argued,
however, that having supervened in the course of employment, it is presumed
that the illness also arose out of the deceased’s employment. There is no quarrel here. On the other hand, it should be pointed out
that the statutory presumption of compensability is a rebuttable
one. The burden of proof is on the
respondent-employer to show that while the illness, subject to the claim,
supervened in the course of employment, it does not necessarily follow that it
also arose from the employment or at least aggravated by it. In the case at bar, it should be admitted
that the illness of the deceased supervened in the course of his employment,
hence, inevitably from the start, the claimant enjoys the protective shelter
of the statutory presumption that herein claim is compensable. But after carefully examining the records
of the case and weighing the evidence of the parties, we find and so hold that
the respondent has adduced substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of
compensability. Thus, it was shown that
the deceased was employed as a lubricator maintenance worker which does not
require strenuous work.
“In the light of the foregoing, we are inclined to hold that
the illness of the deceased, which
caused his death, was not the result of his work. The illness is not peculiar or inherent in
the nature and characteristic and condition of his work as a lubricator
maintenance laborer. (sic)”
[pp. 74-75, WCC rec;
emphasis supplied].
The main thrust of the present petition is that respondent
Commission gravely abused its discretion in finding and concluding that the
evidence presented by respondent corporation was
substantial enough to overcome the presumption of compensability.
WE find the petition
meritorious. Hence, We reverse the questioned decision of the respondent Commission.
I. The conclusion
of the respondent Commission that the work of the deceased Hernando S. Mulingtapang as lubricator maintenance worker did “x x not require strenuous work,”
finds no support in the records. WE find
in the records no evidence, and the respondent corporation does not claim to
have presented any, on the nature of the deceased’s work with the respondent
corporation which would indeed show that the actual work of the deceased was
not strenuous.
II. Because the only evidence presented by the respondent corporation before
the acting referee consisted of the affidavits of the three doctors earlier
mentioned, it is thus safe to conclude that the respondent Commission anchored
its express finding of substantial evidence of respondent corporation as having
overcome the presumption of compensability on the said affidavits, ail of
which, as earlier stated, merely opined that the illness of leukemia is not an
occupational disease; nor work-connected or -aggravated and which could be contracted by any person
irrespective of age, work or station in life.
In so basing its aforesaid conclusion of substantial evidence, the respondent Commission committed a patent error amounting to a grave abuse of
discretion. For the evidence necessary to destroy
the aforesaid legal presumption
of compensability must do more
than create a doubt. It must be such as a reasonable mind must
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Hence, We have repeatedly ruled that the mere opinions of doctors on the
non-causal connection between illness and/or death and the nature of
claimant’s work, presented as evidence by the employer, do not meet the
required quantum of evidence as aforestated; and
therefore, such opinions cannot prevail over the presumption of compensability
established by law (Simon vs. Republic, 71 SCRA 646 [1977]; Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228 [1974]; Abana
vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1282-1283 [1968]; and Magalona vs. WCC, 21 SCRA 1203 [1967]).
Furthermore, WE have applied with pedantic rigor the aforesaid
legal presumption of compensability even in the absence of a definite finding
or knowledge of the precise medical cause of the claimant’s illness as long as
the illness and/or death supervened in the course of employment. For precisely, the vital
function of legal presumptions is to dispense with the need for proof.
Thus, in Castro vs. WCC (75 SCRA 179-180 [1977]), WE reiterated
that WE stated in ITEMCOP vs. Florzo (16 SCRA 2104 [1966])
that:
“At any rate, the law presumes, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, that the claim is compensable. The burden to disconnect by substantial
evidence the injury or sickness from employment, is
laid at the employer’s door. So rigid is
the rule that even where the cause of
the employee’s death is unknown — as petitioners claim — the right to
compensation subsists. Reason for this
is that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is a social legislation; it is designed
to give relief to the workmen; therefore, to effectuate its purpose, it must be
liberally construed x x.”
III. The records likewise show that petitioner’s claim
for death benefits filed on November 29, 1974 was not effectively controverted; because it did not dispute that it had
knowledge of the death of its deceased employee, through its company physician,
as of the very date of his death or on October 26, 1974 (pp. 13-14,
rec.). The Employer’s Report filed only
on December 9, 1974 was
too late and therefore did not constitute a timely compliance with the
requirement that the same should
be filed within ten days from knowledge
of the disability or within 14 days from the disability or death (Section 45 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended).
Respondent corporation cannot avail of the controversion
it filed on September 10, 1974
(p. 43, WCC rec.) on the ground
of non-work connection, because the same was filed in connection with the
illness (which it claimed as high fever, leukemia) contracted on September 3,
1974 by Hernando which it acquired knowledge of on even date through its
foreman (p. 15, WCC rec.); and not his death on October 26, 1974 by reason of pneumonia, secondary acute leukemia (p. 7, WCC rec.). As the records stand,
the claim for death benefits of petitioner was not timely controverted. Being an uncontroverted
claim, its disposition must therefore proceed from the premises that the
respondent corporation has renounced its right to challenge the validity of the
claim as it was thereby barred by such failure from interposing
non-jurisdictional defenses, such as non-compensability of the claim. Hence, respondent Commission likewise erred
in ignoring the aforesaid effects of non-controversion
in disposing the petitioner’s claim for death benefits.
IV. It appearing that petitioner was
represented by counsel only before this Court, a corresponding award of
attorney’s fees should be made equivalent to five (5) percent of the total
benefits herein awarded.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS
HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND RESPONDENT MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION IS
HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY
I. THE CLAIMANT
A.
DEATH BENEFITS IN THE AMOUNT OF
SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS;
B.
BURIAL EXPENSES IN THE SUM OF TWO
HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS; AND
C.
ATTORNEY’S FEES EQUIVALENT TO FIVE
PERCENT (5%) OF THE BENEFITS AWARDED;
II. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION THE AMOUNT OF SIXTY-ONE
(P61.00) PESOS; AND
III. THE COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Martin, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.