G.R. No. L-20483. September 30, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YONG SAI TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. YONG SAI, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
ZALDIVAR. J.:
of the Court of First Instance of Tacloban City allowing the
petitioner, Yong Sai, to take his oath as a naturalized Filipino
citizen.
On August 10, 1959, Yong Sai, a Chinese citizen, filed a petition
for naturalization in the Court of First Instance of Tacloban City. The
lower court, being satisfied that the petition was in order and the
requirements that conferred jurisdiction upon the court to hear and
decide the case had been complied with, heard the case. After hearing,
the lower court, on March 31, 1960, rendered a decision declaring that
the petitioner had all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications, to be a Filipino citizen, as provided by law,
thereby granting the petition for naturalization, subject to the
compliance with the requirements as provided in Republic Act No. 530.
No appeal having been taken from the decision, on May 21, 1962,
petitioner filed with the lower court a petition to take his oath. The
petition was heard on the same day, and satisfied that petitioner had
complied with the requirements provided in Section 1 of Republic Act
530, the court a quo issued an order granting the petition.
Petitioner took his oath of allegiance on the same date, May 21, 1962,
and, accordingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued in his
favor on the same day.
Within the reglementary period the Solicitor General filed a notice
of appeal from the order of the lower court allowing the petitioner to
take his oath as a Filipino citizen.
In the present appeal the stand of the Solicitor General may be
stated, as follows: That the decision of the lower court granting the
petition for citizenship, and its order allowing the petitioner to take
his oath as a Filipino citizen, are not in accordance with law. The
Solicitor General specifically points out: (1) that petitioner does not
have a lucrative trade or occupation;(2) that petitioner failed to
establish by competent and satisfactory evidence his compliance with
the requirements of Section 1, Republic Act 530; and (3) that
petitioner failed to attach to his petition for naturalization his
certificate of arrival in the Philippines as required by law.
On April 4, 1963, counsel for petitioner filed with this Court a
motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that since the two-year period
provided in Republic Act 530 had elapsed and that petitioner had
already taken his oath, the original decision was no longer appealable.
Nevertheless, in a later motion dated February 2, 1964, petitioner
intimated that should he be allowed to present additional evidence to
prove his compliance with Section 1 of Republic Act 530, and to present
another copy of his landing certificate in lieu of the first which he
allegedly submitted to the late Judge Segundo C. Moscoso but which
might have been lost or misplaced by said Judge, he “is willing to
conditionally waive any and all rights accruing to him as a Filipino by
virtue of his oath taking and the issuance of the Certificate of
Naturalization for purposes of this motion and if the same is granted
but reserves the right to raise this question if the case is tried on
the merits.”[1] This Court, however, deferred action on these motions until the time when the case is decided on the merits.
These motions to dismiss the appeal of the Government have no merit.
It is a settled rule that the decision of the court of first instance
in naturalization cases does not become final until after the
expiration of the period to appeal from the order of the court
authorizing the taking of the oath of allegiance as provided in Section
1 of Republic Act No. 530 – and this, notwithstanding that the
applicant for citizenship had already taken his oath of allegiance.[2]
Likewise, it is a settled rule that an appeal from the order of the
court of first instance authorizing the taking of the oath of
allegiance, under Section 1 of Republic Act 530, subjects the entire
naturalization proceedings to scrutiny by the Supreme Court, so that
any matter pertinent to the determination of: whether or not the
applicant for naturalization is really qualified to become a Filipino
citizen, whether or not the original petition had complied with all the
requirements of the law, and whether or not the procedural requirements
in the lower court had been complied with, may be reviewed on appeal by
this Court even if those matters are not touched in the briefs or
pleadings of the parties.[3]
Scrutinizing the pleadings and the evidence in the present case, We
find that the appeal is well taken. As admitted by petitioner himself
in his petition, as well as in his testimony, his average annual salary
as employee of the La Fortuna Trading Company was only P3,000.00.
Considering that he has a wife and three children to support,[4]
and that all the children were still studying, such income would not be
sufficient to qualify him for Philippine citizenship. This is in line
with the standard set by this Court in a number of cases, wherein We
held as not having a lucrative trade or profession an applicant for
citizenship: who has a yearly income of P4,800 but with a wife to
support (Chie v. Republic, L-20169, February 26, 1965); or who has a
yearly income of P6,300 but with a wife and one child to support (Tan
v. Republic, L-16013, March 30, 1963); or who has a yearly income of
P6,680 but with a wife and two children to support (Ng v. Republic,
L-21179, January 22, 1966); or who has a yearly income of P4,200, or
P5,000, or P5,980, but with a wife and three children to support (Uy v.
Republic, L-19578, October 27, 1964; Chai v. Republic, L-19112, October
30, 1964; and Gui v. Republic, L-13717, July 31, 1962). And even if we
assume as true what petitioner alleges in his brief that in the years
1962 and 1963 his incomes were P6,389.51 and P5,844.50, respectively,
or an average of P6,117 annually, and that all of his children, except
one, were already of legal age and, therefore, he has only one
dependent child left, this circumstance would not improve petitioner’s
situation: first, “because income for the purposes of the
Naturalization Law must be reckoned as of the date of application;”[5]
and second, because even if his income for the succeeding year, or
during the hearing of the oath taking, may be considered, the same is
still below the level of what We termed “lucrative.” In the case of Tan
v. Republic, L-16013, March 30, 1963, this Court held that an applicant
who has an annual income of P6,300 with a wife and one child to
support, cannot be considered as having a lucrative trade or profession
as to render him eligible for naturalization.
Aside from the contention of the Government that petitioner has no
lucrative trade or employment, the record reveals matters which
constitute sufficient grounds to reverse the decision of the lower
court granting the petition for naturalization, and to set aside the
order allowing the petitioner to take the oath of allegiance. We have
noted that petitioner failed to state all his former places of
residence in his application for naturalization. Thus, in his petition,
petitioner averred: “My present place of residence is 107 Pres. Wilson
Street, Tacloban City, Leyte, Philippines, and my former residence was
Poblacion, Municipality of Maasin, province of Leyte, Philippines.”
During the hearing, however, he testified, on cross-examination, as
follows:
“Q Before you came to Tacloban to reside, where did you reside?
A In Sogod and Maasin, Leyte.”
And in the decision rendered on April 2, 1960, the lower court
found: “Since his arrival in the Philippines he has been residing in
Dumaguete for about 4 years, later he transferred to Sogod for another
four years, then Maasin during 13 years and lastly in Tacloban City,
where he is now a resident.”
From what are stated in the foregoing paragraph, it is clear that
petitioner did not state in his petition, and so the publication of his
application did not contain, his former residences, Dumaguete and
Sogod. As held by this Court, such failure “is a fatal defect that, not
only warrants dismissal of the petition,[6] but, also, affects the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide the case.”[7]
Another circumstance which would warrant the denial of petitioner’s
application for naturalization is his failure to disclose in his
petition all the names by which he had been known. The petitioner
presented as evidence in his own behalf certifications by the local
civil registrar, Flaviano S. Angub, and of Mayor Jovencio M. Caday, of
Sogod, Leyte, regarding the birth of his four children, Lourdes Yong,
Juanilio Yong, Gonzalo Yong, Jr., and Anastacio Yong (Exhibits I, J-1,
K and L). In all those certifications it is stated that those four are
the children of “Gonzalo Yong” and Leonila Dublado. The certificates do
not even state that Gonzalo Yong is also known as Yong Sai, or vice
versa. Having failed to state in his petition that he was also known as
Gonzalo Yong, so that in the publication of his petition for
naturalization there is no statement that he is known as Gonzalo Yong
besides the name Yong Sai, his petition suffered from a fatal defect
which is a sufficient ground to deny the petition.
“We believe that it has been shown that the appellee
Alexander Lim Uy in the present case is also known by the name of
Alejandro Lim Uy. It appearing that in the petition for naturalization
as well as in the notice of hearing it was not stated that the
petitioner Alexander Lim Uy is also known as Alejandro Lim Uy alias
Alexander Lim Uy x x x We believe that one vital requirement of the law
had not been complied with, and this circumstance has rendered invalid
the proceedings had in the court below. This Court in a long line of
decisions ruled that the failure on the part of the petitioner to state
in his petition for naturalization all the names by which he is known
constitutes a fatal defect of the petition and is a sufficient ground
to deny the petition. (Yu Seco vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-13441, June
30, 1960; Kwan Kwock How vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-18521, Jan. 30,
1964; Ong Khan vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-19709, Sept. 30, 1964; Go vs.
Republic, G. R. No. L-20558, March 31, 1965.” (Alexander Lim Uy v.
Republic, L-19916, June 23, 1965)[8]
We believe that enough grounds have been discussed to warrant the
reversal of the decision of the lower court granting the petition for
naturalization and the setting aside of the order authorizing the
taking of the oath of allegiance of the petitioner, and We do not
consider it necessary to discuss the other points raised by the
Government in this appeal.
In this connection, We wish to reiterate what this Court said,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, expressing Our disapproval
of the practice of the trial courts of allowing applicants for
naturalization to take their oaths of allegiance even before the
expiration of the period for the Government to appeal from the order
authorizing the taking of the oath of allegiance:
“Finally, we must agree with the Government’s stand
that the act of the court of first instance in allowing this applicant
to take the oath of allegiance even before the expiration of the
Government’s period to appeal from the order overruling its objections
thereto, and, in fact, three (3) days before the Solicitor General
received copy of the appealed order, is highly irregular, to say the
least. Republic Act No. 530 contemplates that the applicant for
naturalization becomes entitled to all the privileges of citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance, and the precipitate administration
of the oath in the present case appears to be an attempt to render
nugatory the Government’s appeal. The record is devoid of any
justification for such unseemly haste in conferring the privileges of
citizenship before any and all doubts about applicant’s right thereto
are finally settled, and we must make of record our disapproval of the
practice.” (So v. Republic, L-20145, June 30, 1965)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo dated March 31,
1960, granting the petition for naturalization is reversed and the
petition for naturalization is denied; and the order of May 21, 1962,
appealed from, is set aside. The oath of allegiance taken by
petitioner, Yong Sai, is declared without force and legal effect, and
the certificate of naturalization issued to him is ordered cancelled;
with costs against petitioner-appellee.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., no part.
[1] As quoted from the motion.
[2] So v. Republic,
L-20145, June 30, 1965; Pe v. Republic, L-20375, January 31, 1966; Co
Im Ty v. Republic, L-17919, July 30, 1966.
[3] How v. Republic,
L-18521, January 30, 1964; Guan v. Republic, L-15691, March 27, 1961;
Liong v. Republic, L-21671, February 28, 1966; Co Im Ty v. Republic,
supra; Lim Eng Yu v. Republic, L-20809, August 31, 1966.
[4] Assuming that his daughter, Mrs. Lourdes Yong Cajoles who is married, is not being supported by petitioner.
[5] Tai v. Republic,
L-19418, December 23, 1964; Yu Ti v. Republic, L-19913, June 23, 1965;
Uy v. Republic, L-19916, June 23, 1965; Hok v. Republic, L-20479,
October 29, 1965; Ng v. Republic, L-21179, January 22, 1966; Pe v.
Republic, L-20375, January 31, 1966; Kong v. Republic, L-20503,
February 28, 1966; Heng v. Republic, L-21079, February 28, 1966.
[6] Keng v. Republic,
L-13139, May 24, 1961; Co v. Republic, L-15794, December 29, 1962;
Serwani v. Republic, L-18219, December 27, 1963; Qua v. Republic,
L-19814, October 27, 1964; Tan v. Republic, L-19694, March 30, 1965;
Kok v. Republic, L-16767, June 30, 1965; Republic v. Reyes, et al.,
L-20602, December 24, 1965; Liong v. Republic, L-21671, February 28,
1966.
[7] Go v. Republic,
L-20558, March 31, 1965; Tan Cona v. Republic, L-13224, April 24, 1960;
Kui v. Republic, L-11172, December 22, 1958; Cui v. Republic, L-9858,
May 27, 1957.
[8] See also Le Ng Len v. Republic, G. R. No. L-20151, March 31, 1965.