SOLEDAD DE G. CRISOLO, IN HER BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN OF NOEL CRISOLO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ALBERTA REINOSO, AS GUARDIAN OF PELAGIO REINOSO, RESPOND…

Crisolo versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Soledad de Guzman Crisolo, in her own behalf and as guardian of Noel Crisolo, against the Court of Appeals and Alberta Reinoso, acting as guardian of her brother Pelagio Reinoso. The dispute is a land registration controversy: the Crisolos obtained a decree of registration over two lots in Mabini, Pangasinan, and the Reinosos sought to reopen that decree on the ground of fraud. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules — that a pure question of law on appeal belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals, and that a party who was given, and abandoned, his day in court cannot later reopen a decree of registration under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act.

Procedural History

The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch Seven, rendered judgment on August 20, 1965, ordering registration of the lots in the names of the spouses Pedro Crisolo and Soledad de Guzman Crisolo. The court later ordered issuance of the decree, and a writ of possession followed.

Within one year from the decree, Alberta Reinoso, as guardian of Pelagio Reinoso, filed a petition for review under Section 38 of Act Number 496. The trial court, after considering the opposition and the memoranda, issued an order on May 13, 1966, finding no merit in the petition and denying it. Alberta Reinoso appealed to the Court of Appeals.

While the appeal was pending, the Crisolos moved to remand the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the appeal raised purely questions of law. The Court of Appeals denied that course and, on November 11, 1970, rendered its decision setting aside the trial court's order and remanding the case for further proceedings under Section 38. After reconsideration was denied, the Crisolos elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

In 1952, according to the allegations of the Reinoso petition, the Crisolos took advantage of the insanity and incapacity of Pelagio Reinoso and, by means of fraud, induced him to sign a deed of exchange of properties. The Reinosos claimed that possession of the exchanged property was never delivered to them, and that while Pelagio was confined in the National Psychopathic Hospital, the Crisolos instituted the land registration case and obtained a decree based on that allegedly fictitious and fraudulent deed.

In the original registration proceedings, a lawyer appeared and announced the opposition of Pelagio Reinoso and his children, Alberta and Brigido. The oppositors were given fifteen days to formalize their opposition in writing. Only Alberta and Brigido perfected theirs; the announced opposition of Pelagio and his children was considered abandoned upon motion of the applicants during the hearing on March 5, 1964.

Registration was then decreed in favor of the Crisolos. Within the one-year period, the Reinosos filed the petition for review, alleging fraud. The trial court found no merit and denied it; the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a reopening; and the Crisolos brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the appeal from the order denying the petition for reopening involved purely a question of law and therefore fell within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court rather than the Court of Appeals.
• Whether or not an oppositor in a land registration case, who abandoned his opposition and allowed a decision and decree to be issued, may thereafter reopen the decree by a petition for review under Section 38 of Act Number 496 on the ground of fraud.

Applicable Provisions

Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as quoted in the decision, provides:

SEC. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — x x x The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in — xxx xxx xxx (6) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.

This provision is the basis for the Court's holding that the appeal, raising only a question of law, belonged to the Supreme Court and not to the Court of Appeals.

Section 38 of Act Number 496, the Land Registration Act, is the provision under which the Reinosos sought to reopen the decree, and it is the provision the Court construes in denying them relief.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal raised purely a question of law. A question of law is one that does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence; the doubt arises as to what the law is on a given state of facts. The question on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying the reopening because the defense of fraud was available to the private respondent in the original proceedings but was never availed of when he abandoned his opposition. That is a question of law, and under Section 17 of the Judiciary Act it falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals should have certified the appeal to the Supreme Court instead of deciding it.

On the second and primordial issue, the Court held that an oppositor who abandons his opposition and allows a decree to issue is not entitled to reopen it. The persons contemplated by Section 38 are those who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard. The Reinosos were not so deprived; they were given their day in court, announced their opposition, and failed to substantiate it. The Court stressed that mere allegation of fraud is not enough: specific, intentional acts to deceive must be alleged and proved, and the fraud must be actual or positive, and extrinsic rather than intrinsic, to justify reopening a decree.

Doctrine

First, a question of law — one that does not require examination of the probative value of the evidence — falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 17 of the Judiciary Act; the Court of Appeals must certify such an appeal rather than decide it.

Second, under Section 38 of Act Number 496, only a person fraudulently deprived of the opportunity to be heard in the original registration case may seek review or reopening of the decree. One who was given that opportunity and abandoned or failed to substantiate his opposition is not entitled to reopening.

Third, the fraud that justifies reopening must be actual or positive fraud, extrinsic and not intrinsic, and must be specifically alleged and proved; a bare allegation of fraud will not suffice.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the trial court's order of May 13, 1966, denying the petition for review and reopening of the decree, without prejudice to whatever right the private respondent may still avail of under existing law, with costs against the private respondent.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: a party who had his day in court and abandoned his opposition cannot reopen a registration decree on a mere allegation of fraud, for the fraud that Section 38 contemplates must be extrinsic, actual, and proved. Examiners use this case on the boundaries of a question of law versus a question of fact for appellate jurisdiction, and on the strict requirements for reopening a Torrens decree.