PILAR L. DE VALENZUELA, PETITIONER, VS. TITO M. DUPAYA. RESPONDENT

Appeal by petition
for review from a decision of the Public Service Commission,in its Case
No. 126903, granting Tito Dupaya authority to establish and operate an
ice plant with a production capacity of 15 tons of ice per day in
Lal-lo, Cagayan, and to distribute and sell ice therein as well as in
the neighboring municipalities of Calamanlugan, Gattaran, Alcala,
Cumao, Pagao, Lasam, Aliacapan, Buguey, Gonzaga, and Sta. Ana, all of
Cagayan Province; and overruling the opposition of petitioner herein,
Pilar de Valenzuela, who operates a 6-ton ice plant in Apart! with
right to sell in Calamaniugan, Buguey, Gonzaga, Lal-lo and Gattaran.

The burden of petitioner’s appeal is that she was denied her day in
Court, for while the Public Service Commission, through hearing officer
Ernesto Alcala, had granted applicant Dupaya opportunity to submit his
evidence on seven days of hearing, “spread over a period of three and
a half months”, oppositor-appellant was permitted, by order of January
14, 1960, to submit her evidence before the Justice of the Peace of
Aparri only up to February 10, 1960. Subsequently, upon her motion, it
was extended up to February 24, I960, with the warning “no other
petition for extension will be entertained and that, upon failure of
oppositor to present and complete her evidence on the said date, this
case will be considered submitted for decision on the merits of the
evidence presented by the parties”. The Justice of the Peace having set
the hearing for February 23, oppositor-appellant was able to submit the
evidence of four witnesses on that day, and one more on the next,
February 24. She then asked the Commission to extend the authority of
the Justice of the Peace for 15 or 30 more days, because her witnesses
from Gonzaga town could not arrive, as the Pateng river was swollen and
they could not cross; but the Public Service Commission refused to
grant the extension prayed for, considered the case submitted, and
decided it in favor of applicant Dupaya.

Wherefore, applicant charged the Commission with abuse of discretion.

The following errors are charged:

“1. The Public Service Commission gravely abused its
discretion by unreasonably restricting to a short period of time the
authority of the Justice of the Peace of Aparri, within which to
receive the evidence of oppositor-petitioner.

2. The Public
Service Commission gravely abused its dis- cretion by refusing to
extend the authority of the Justice of the Peace of Aparri to enable
oppositor-petitioner to complete her evidence in support of her
opposition.

3. The Public Service Commission acted without
and/or in excess of its jurisdiction in rendering its decision dated
March 10, 1960 granting to applicant-respondent authority to install,
maintain and operate a 15-ton ice plant in Lal-lo, oppositor-petitioner
not having completed her evidence yet, consequently it is not supported
by evidence.”

We find no reversible errors in those assigned by appellant. The
limitation of the period yanted by the Commission for completion of her
evidence appears on record motivated by the desire to have all the
evidence in the case heard and reported by hearing officer Alcala
before the latter’s impending retire- ment (Rec., folios 318-319), This
appears to be adequate reason, because if the appellant’s evidence were
to be heard by another hearing officer further delay would be
unavoidable, since the second referee would have to acquaint himself
first with the evidence heard by his predecessor before making his own
report and recommendation.

While it is true that the rigid adherence to the Commission’s
hearing schedules prevented the appellant from placing on record the
testimony of some of her witnesses, there is no showing what they would
have testified, or that, if given the chance, they would have led the
Commission to a different result. Appellant disclosed only what she
expected to prove by the testimony of her plant manager, to wit, “that
the produce of her ice plant is more than sufficient to supply ice to
the people residing in the municipalities wherein she is authorized to
sell ice” (Oppositor’s motion of March 4, 1960, Annex “D”, Petition).
Such testimony would not have sufficed to overcome the evidence before
the Commission to the effect that petitioner-appellant (oppositor
below) does not distribute ice outside of Aparri; so much so that the
people in the other municipalities must proceed to that town to get
ice. This despite the 20 kilometers that separate Aparri from Lal-lo,
where applicant (appellee herein) proposed to establish his own ice
plant. Obviously, a sufficient production of ice in Aparri does not
prove that it is duly transported to and made available in, other
municipalities; production is one thing and proper distribution is
something else.

Furthermore, the Commission held, on the authority of previous
decisions of the Supreme Court, that, in view of the universal and
widespread demand for ice, “no evidence is necessary to show that an
Ice plant in the locality is much more advantageous to the general
public as to facility in acquiring the commodity “(San Miguel Brewery vs.
Espiritu, 60 Phil. 745; Santiago Ice Plant vs. Lahoz, 87 Phil. 221).
Petitioner-appellant has not demonstrated how the unreceived testimony
would have affected this finding adversely.

We feel that the proper step for petitioner to take should have been
the timely filing in the Commission of an apposite motion for
rehearing, supported by affidavits of the witnesses who were not able
to testify, giving the substance of their intended evidence. Not having
done so, she is in no position to claim substantial injury to her
rights.

Finding no reversible error, the Public Service Commission decision under review is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C. J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.