ESTEBAN C. MANUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BR. XVIII, Q.C., ANTONIO A. BARANDA, EDSEL LABAYEN AND ROLANDO GA…

One wonders why the respondent judge did not immediately grant
the petitioner’s motion to quash the information on the obvious and valid
ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense.  This decisive act could have avoided the
needless molestation of one more citizen and cleared the clogged dockets of
this Court of still another of the persecutions big and small so rampant during
those days of martial law.  More
importantly, it would have affirmed once again the freedom of expression
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights to which every one was entitled even under the
1973 Constitution.

This case goes back to April
21, 1976, when a raid was
conducted by the agents of the now defunct Anti-Smuggling
Action Center
on two rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo, Manila,
pursuant to a
warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Acting Collector of
Customs of Manila on April
20, 1976.^[1] The raid resulted in the seizure of several
articles allegedly smuggled into the country by their owners, three of whom
were tourists from Hongkong.  These articles subsequently became the
subject of seizure proceedings in the Bureau of Customs but most of them were
ordered released upon proof that the customs duties and other charges thereon
had been duly paid as evidenced by the corresponding official receipts.  Only a few items “of no commercial
value” were ordered confiscated.^[2]

While the seizure proceedings were pending, the petitioner, as
counsel for the owners of the seized articles, sent a letter dated April 19, 1976, to the Chairman of
the ASAC in which he complained about the conduct of the raid and demanded that
the persons responsible therefor be
investigated.  The letter follows in
full:^[3]

ESTEBAN C. MANUEL

Attorney at Law

643 Carvajal Street

Binondo, Manila

AApril
29, 1976

The Chairman

ASAC, Camp
Aguinaldo

Quezon City

S i r :

This is in behalf of my clients, Mrs. Ng Woo Hay and her son, Mr.
Lee Kee Ming, who sought my help in reporting to your
goodself their complaint about certain acts committed
by ASAC men which, from all appearances, constitute criminal offenses.  I am referring to the raid they conducted on
April 21, 1976 at about 4:30 in the afternoon at Tokyo Hotel, Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila,
pursuant to a “Warrant of Seizure and Detention” (seizure
Identification No. 14922) issued by the Acting Collector of Customs on April 20, 1976.  The raiding team, about 10 in number and headed by one Amado Tirol, took advantage of the fact that Mrs. Ng Woo Hay was
alone in her hotel room.  The ASAC agents,
despite Mrs. Ng’s protest and
claim of innocence, forced their way into the room and ransacked the place for
alleged untaxed goods.  Not only did they
take everything they could find in the room, but also forcibly took from her
person the wrist watch and jade bracelet (gold plated) she was wearing at the
time.  They also forced open her handbag
and divested her of her wallet containing 70 Hongkong
dollars, as well as her necklace and her son’s wrist watch which she had placed
in said handbag.  Mrs. Ng was also
subjected to the indignities of being searched by a male person.  After emptying the room of its
contents, the raiding team presented to her a carbon copy of a list purporting
to show the goods seized.  The list,
however, appears not only illegible but does not reflect all the goods that
were taken away by the ASAC agents.  What
is more, said men, likewise taking advantage of the absence of Mrs. Ng’s son, owner of some of the
articles, falsified the signature of the latter by writing his name on the
space designated as “owner”, making it appear that he (Lee Kee Ming) had acknowledged that the list covers all the
items seized.

The documents and other papers presented to me by my clients reveal
that the articles seized were declared at the Manila
International Airport
upon arrival, and were properly appraised. 
The corresponding customs charges were likewise paid.  It is evident, therefore, that my clients were victims of foul play masterminded by no less than law enforcers who prey on
tourists, particularly Chinese, for obvious reasons.

I examined the records in the Bureau of Customs and found out that
it was on the basis of an affidavit executed by ASAC Agent Rolando Gatmaitan and the letter-request sent by the Vice-Chairman
of ASAC Brig. Gen. Ramon Z. Aguirre, to the Collector of Customs that prompted
the latter to issue the warrant in question. 
In this connection, I must state, with all frankness, that there was
undue haste in the request for the issuance of the warrant, because it is
discernible from a mere reading of the affidavit that its contents are mere
pro-forma and hearsay statements of the abovenamed
ASAC agent.  It could not have, as it now appears, justified the drastic action sought to be accomplished.

Needless to state,
the incident complained of not only has caused considerable damage to my
clients but to our country as well.  It
is for this reason that we demand for an immediate and full dress investigation of the ASAC
officers and men who took part in or caused the issuance of the warrant, as well as those who participated
in the raid, with the view of purging the government of
undesirables; and that pending such investigation, the said officers and men be
suspended from further performing their duties.

VVery truly yours,

(SGD.) ESTEBAN C. MANUEL

The Chairman of the ASAC ordered the investigation as demanded,
but the agents charged were all exonerated in a decision dated August 25, 1976.^[4]
Not satisfied with what he later described as a “home town decision,”
the petitioner, on behalf of his clients, filed a complaint for robbery against
the same agents with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila.  This was later withdrawn, however, on advice of the inquest fiscal who said that
the case might come under the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.^[5] The petitioner says he then went to Camp Aguinaldo but was discouraged from filing the complaint there when he was told that it
would take about a year to complete the
preliminary investigation alone.^[6] The owners of the seized articles then instituted
a civil complaint for damages which the petitioner filed for them in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 7,
1976.^[7]

Three days later, there appeared in the June 10, 1976 issue of the Bulletin Today the
following report:^[8]

TOURISTS SUE AGENTS,
OFFICIAL

Four Chinese, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong,
have filed a case for damages against a
customs official and 11 agents of the government’s anti-smuggling action
center (ASAC) in connection with a raid conducted in their hotel rooms, more
than a month ago.

The case was docketed in Manila’s
court of first instance (CFI) as Civil Case No. 102694.

The complaints also alleged they lost assorted materials amounting
to P46,003.40

Named respondents in the case were acting customs collector Ramon
Z. Aguirre, Rolando Gatmaitan, Antonio Baranda, Amado M. Tirol, Francisco C. Santos, Edsel
Labayen, Jose Robles, Nestor Eusebio,
Freddie Ocnila, Renato
Quiroz, Pedro Cunanan, Jr., and Enrique Perez, all of
ASAC.

The acting customs collector was impleaded
in the case in his official capacity for having issued the warrant that led to the criminal offenses complained of.

Aguirre, ASAC vice-chairman, was named as defendant for soliciting
the issuance of a warrant of
seizure and detention reportedly on the basis of charges contained in an
affidavit executed by Gatmaitan, another ASAC agent.

Esteban Manuel filed the case in behalf of the plaintiffs composed
of Manila resident Ng Tee, and Hong Kong
visitors Ng Woo Hay, Cheng Pik Ying, and Lee Kee Ming who came to the Philippines
to visit their relatives and friends.

The agents allegedly subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took
her necklace, bracelet and wrist watch. 
They allegedly seized many articles valued at P27,000 which have
remained unaccounted for in the list submitted by the defendants as the
inventory of the items confiscated.

On the basis of these antecedent facts, an information for libel
was filed against the petitioner, Lee Kee Ming and Ng
Woo Hay in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.^[9] A reading of the information does not show
why the two Chinese were included in the charge; all it said was that they were
the clients of the petitioner.  As for
the petitioner himself, it was alleged that he had committed the crime of libel
by writing the letter of April 29, 1976 (which was quoted in full) and by causing the publication of the news item in the Bulletin
Today.

The subject of this petition is the order of the respondent judge
dated March 23, 1977,^[10]
denying the motion to quash filed by the petitioner, who had claimed that his letter to the ASAC Chairman was not
actionable because it was a privileged communication; that the news report in
the Bulletin Today was not based on the letter-complaint; and that in any case
it was a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and therefore also
privileged.^[11] His motion
for reconsideration having been also denied in the order dated April
27, 1977,^[12] he now seeks relief from this Court against
what he claims as the grave abuse of
discretion committed by the respondent judge in sustaining the information.

It is perhaps indicative of the weakness of the respondents’
position that when asked to comment on the petitioner’s motion to quash, the
city fiscal never did so during a period of more than ninety days.^[13]
It was left to a
private prosecutor to enter his own appearance thereafter, presumably
because the fiscal did not seem to be very enthusiastic about the case, and to
file the comment for the private respondents himself.^[14]
Later, when the petitioner came to this Court and we required a comment from
the Solicitor General, this official complied only after asking for (and
getting) twenty-six extensions for a total of nine months and seven days, and
at that the comment was only a half-hearted defense of the challenged orders.^[15] Despite the petitioner’s effective rebuttal
in his reply, the Solicitor General did not ask for leave to file a rejoinder as if he had lost all taste for combat notwithstanding the many points
raised by the petitioner that had to be refuted.

Perhaps it was just as well. 
Like a good general, the Solicitor General probably understood that the
battle was lost.

Indeed it was.  In fact, it
should never have commenced.

From the purely procedural perspective, there is much to fault
about the information.  The two Chinese
clients who were impleaded with the petitioner were
charged with absolutely nothing, prompting the respondent judge to
peremptorily dismiss the information as to them.^[16]
Worse, the information imputed to the remaining accused two different offenses,
to wit, writing the allegedly libelous letter and causing the publication of
the allegedly libelous news report.  This was not allowed under Rule 110, Section
12, of the Rules of Court, providing that “a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.”^[17] If libelous, the letter and the news report
constituted separate offenses that should have been charged in separate informations. 
(However, not having been raised in the motion to quash, that ground was
deemed waived under Rule 15, Section 8, of the Rules of Court.)^[18]

From the viewpoint of substantive law, the charge is even more
defective, if not ridiculous.  Any one
with an elementary knowledge of constitutional law and criminal law would have
known that neither the letter nor the news account was libelous.

The applicable provision in the Revised Penal Code reads as
follows:

Article 354.  Requirement
for publicity.  – Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:

1.       A private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and

2.       A fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.

The letter comes under Item 1 as it was addressed by the petitioner to
the ASAC Chairman to complain against the conduct of his men when they raided
the Chinese tourists’ rooms in the Tokyo Hotel. 
It was sent by the
petitioner mainly in his capacity as a lawyer in the discharge of his legal
duty to protect his clients.  While his
principal purpose was to vindicate his clients’ interests against the abuses
committed by the ASAC agents, he could also invoke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the
public service.  The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose the proper
disciplinary sanctions.  Significantly,
as an index of good faith, the letter was sent privately, directly to the
addressee, without any fanfare or publicity.

As for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the
petitioner, an ordinary citizen without any known ties to the newspapers, could
have by himself caused the publication of such an explosive item.  There is no prima facie showing
that, by some kind of influence he had over the periodical, he succeeded in
having it published to defame the ASAC agents. 
It does not appear either that the report was paid for like an
advertisement.  This looks instead to be
the result of the resourcefulness of the newspaper in discovering matters of
public interest for dutiful disclosure to its readers.  It should be presumed that the report was
included in the issue as part of the newspaper’s
coverage of important current events as selected by its editorial staff.

At any rate, the news item comes under Item 2 of the above-quoted
article as it is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good
faith and without comments or
remarks.  This is also privileged.  Moreover, it is not correct to say, as the Solicitor General does, that Article 354
is not applicable because the complaint reported as filed would not by itself
alone constitute a judicial proceeding even before the issues are joined and trial is begun. 
The doctrine he invokes is no longer controlling.  The case of Choa Tek Hee v. Philippine Publishing
Co.,^[19] which he cites, has been superseded by Cuenco v. Cuenco,^[20] where the Court categorically held:

We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should
be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks
nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated
should be covered by the privilege. 
(Emphasis provided)

It may also be argued that the complaint, standing by itself, is
a public record and may be published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court unless the court directs otherwise in the interest of morality
or decency.

It is true that the matters mentioned in Article 354  as
exceptions to the general rule are not absolutely privileged and are still
actionable.  However, since what is
presumed is not malice but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution to
overcome that presumption by proof that the accused was actually motivated by
malice.  Absent such proof, the charge
must fail.

We are not
unmindful of the contention that the information should not be dismissed
outright because the prosecution must first be given a chance to introduce evidence to overcome the
presumption.  This is indeed the normal
procedure.  However, where it appears
from the allegations in the information itself that the accused acted in good
faith and for justifiable ends in making the allegedly libelous imputations, and in pertinent pleadings, there is no
need to prolong the proceedings to the prejudice of the defendant.  The Court can and should dismiss the charge
without further ado, as we held in People v. Andres:^[21]

The prosecution claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the
case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the trial judge’s conclusion on
the face of the information that defendant-appellee
was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to be proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of
defendant-appellee’s publication is a matter of
defense and is not a proper
ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel (Lu Chu
Sing, et al. vs. Lu Tiong
Gui, 76 Phil. 669).

When in the information itself it appears that the communication
alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once
apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and produce evidence
before he can raise the question of privilege.  And if, added to this, the questioned
imputations appear to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant’s plea for
reconsideration based on complainant’s supposed partiality and abuse of power
from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client’s
interest as a litigant in complainant’s court, it would become evident that
the facts thus alleged in the information would not constitute an offense of libel.

As has already been said by this Court:  “As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matter
privileged,       the courts are inclined
to be liberal.  The matter to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and
impropriety.” Having this in mind, it can not be said that the trial
court committed a reversible error in this case of finding that the allegations
in the information itself present a case of an absolutely privileged
communication justifying the dismissal of the case.

The two exceptions provided for under Article 354 are based on
the wider guarantee of freedom of expression as an institution of all
republican societies.  This in turn is predicated on the proposition that the
ordinary citizen has a right and a duty to involve himself in matters
that affect the public welfare and, for this purpose, to inform himself of such
matters.

The vitality of republicanism derives from an alert citizenry
that is always ready to participate in the discussion and resolution of public
issues.  These issues include the conduct
of government functionaries who are accountable to the people in the
performance of their assigned powers, which after all come from the people
themselves.  Every citizen has a right to
expect from all public servants utmost fidelity to the trust reposed in them
and the maximum of efficiency and integrity in the discharge of their functions.  Every citizen has a right to complain and
criticize if this hope is betrayed.

It is no less important to observe that this vigilance is not
only a right but a responsibility of the highest order that should not be
shirked for fear of official reprisal or because of mere civic lethargy.  Whenever the citizen discovers official
anomaly, it is his duty to expose and denounce it, that the culprits may be
punished and the public service cleansed even as the rights violated are
vindicated or redressed.  It can never be
overstressed that indifference to ineptness will breed more ineptness and that toleration of corruption
will breed more corruption.  The sins of
the public service are imputable not only to those who actually commit them but
also to those who by their silence or inaction permit and encourage their
commission.

The responsibility to review the conduct of the government
functionaries is especially addressed to the lawyer because his training
enables him, better than most citizens, to determine if the law has been
violated or irregularities have been committed, and to take the needed steps to
remedy the wrong and punish the guilty.

The respondents contend that the letter was written by the
petitioner to influence the seizure proceedings which were then pending.  Even assuming that to be true, such purpose
did not necessarily make the letter malicious, especially if it is considered
that the complaint against the ASAC
agents could not be raised in the said proceedings.  The ASAC Chairman, not the Collector of
Customs, had jurisdiction to discipline the agents.

It should also be noted, as further evidence of lack of malice,
that even after the seizure proceedings had been concluded in favor of the
petitioner’s clients, he pursued their complaint against the ASAC agents in the
fiscal’s office in Manila and then with the military
authorities in Camp Aguinaldo, ending with the filing
of the civil case for damages in the court of first instance of Manila.

It would be a sad day indeed if for denouncing venality in government,
the citizen could be called to task and be himself punished on the ground of
malicious defamation.  If every accuser were himself to be accused
for discharging his duty as he sees it, then will the wrong-doer have been
granted in effect, and by this Court no less, an undeserved immunity for his
misdeeds or omissions.  The private
individual would be barred from complaining about public misconduct.  Every criticism he makes would be tainted
with malice and pronounced as criminal. 
The next step may well be a conspiracy among those in the government to
cover up each other’s faults and to insulate themselves from the legitimate
efforts of the people to question their conduct.

The second exception is justified under the right of every
citizen to be informed on matters of public interest, which, significantly, was
first recognized in the 1973
Constitution.  Even if it were not, the
right would still be embraced in the broader safeguard of freedom of
expression, for the simple reason that the right to speak intelligently on
“matters that touch the existing order” necessarily imports the
availability of adequate official information on such matters.  Surely, the exercise of such right cannot
inspire belief if based only on conjectures and rumors and half-truths because
direct access to the facts is not allowed to the ordinary citizen.

This right is now effectively enjoyed with the help of the mass
media, which have fortunately resumed their role as an independent conduit of
information between the government and the people.  It is the recognized duty of the media to
report to the public what is going on in the government, including the proceedings in any of its departments or
agencies, save only in exceptional cases involving decency or confidentiality when
disclosure may be prohibited.  To
protect them in the discharge of this mission, the law says that as long as the
account is a fair and true report of such proceedings, and made without any
remarks or comment, it is considered privileged and malice is not
presumed.  Its publication is encouraged
rather than suppressed or punished.

This is one reason why the Court looks with disapproval on
censorship in general as an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
expression.  Censorship presumes malice at the outset.  It prevents inquiry into public affairs and
curtails their disclosure and discussion, leaving the people in the dark as to
what is happening in the public service. 
By locking the public portals to the citizen,
who can only guess at the goings-on in the forbidden precincts, censorship
separates the people from their government.  This certainly should not be permitted.  “A free press stands as one of the great
interpreters between the government and the people,” declared Justice
Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
“To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.”

It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the
publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff
and the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded.  The charge was leveled against the petitioner
and, “curiouser” still, his clients who had
nothing to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper.  There is here a manifest effort to persecute
and intimidate the petitioner for his temerity in accusing the ASAC agents who
apparently enjoyed special privileges – and perhaps also immunities – during
those oppressive times.  The
non-inclusion of the periodicals was a transparent hypocrisy, an ostensibly pious
if not at all convincing pretense of respect for freedom of expression that was
in fact one of the most desecrated liberties during the past despotism.

We are convinced that the information against the petitioner
should never have been filed at all and that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information on the
ground that the allegations therein did not constitute an offense.  The petitioner is entitled to the relief he
seeks from those who in the guise of law and through the instrumentality of the
trial court would impose upon him this arrant tyranny.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.  The orders of the respondent judge dated March 23, 1977, and April 27, 1977, are SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case No. Q-7045, in his court, is DISMISSED.  Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo, p. 128.

^[2] Ibid,
p. 130.

^[3] Id.,
pp. 14-16.

^[4] Id.,
pp. 133-136.

^[5] Id.,
p. 245.

^[6] Id.,
pp. 245-246.

^[7] Id.,
p. 246.

^[8] Id.,
pp. 117-118.

^[9] Id.,
pp. 14-17.

^[10] Id.,
p. 28.

^[11] Id.,
pp. 18-23.

^[12] Id.,
p. 32.

^[13] Id.,
pp. 23, 27.

^[14] Id.,
pp. 26-27.

^[15] Id.,
pp. 112, 113-126.

^[16] Id.,
p. 28.

^[17] Now Rule 110, Section 13.

^[18] See also Rule 117, Section 8, Rules of Court.

^[19] 34 Phil. 447.

^[20] 70 SCRA 23.

^[21] 58 O.G. 3545.