ABDULSAMAD P. BOGABONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, RESPONDENT.

Bogabong versus Balindong

The Case

This is an administrative matter filed by Abdulsamad P. Bogabong against Judge Rasad G. Balindong, then Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Branch 8. The complainant charged the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and partiality arising from the judge's handling of a quo warranto case over the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bubonga Marawi. The case matters because it draws the line between a correctible error of judgment, which is remedied only by appeal, and gross ignorance of the law, which is a serious administrative offense — and it shows how that line is crossed when a judge defies elementary, well-known rules on succession, on injunctive bonds, and on execution pending appeal.

Procedural History

The controversy began in the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City, where the respondent judge granted a temporary restraining order, later a writ of preliminary injunction, and eventually a decision in the quo warranto case in favor of Omera Hadji Isa-Ali. He then granted execution pending appeal. The complainant elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City, and separately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the order of execution pending appeal. The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases. In a decision dated September 13, 2012, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, declared the complainant the rightful Barangay Chairman for the 2007 to 2010 term, nullified the execution pending appeal, and found the respondent judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to gross ignorance of the law for issuing the injunctive reliefs without requiring bonds. That appellate decision became the basis for this administrative complaint. The Office of the Court Administrator reviewed the matter and recommended a finding of guilt. The case reached the Supreme Court as an administrative matter, decided by the Court en banc.

Facts

The complainant was elected First Kagawad of Barangay Bubonga Marawi in the July 2002 Barangay Elections. When the incumbent chairman died and no elections were held, he assumed the chairmanship in a hold-over capacity by operation of law, and the Provincial Director of the Department of the Interior and Local Government for Lanao del Sur issued certifications attesting to this. On April 10, 2008, however, the Mayor of Marawi City appointed a certain Omera Hadji Isa-Ali as Barangay Chairman, and the Provincial Director later recognized Omera as the legitimate chairman. The complainant brought the matter to the Department of the Interior and Local Government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which resolved in his favor in May 2009, and he again took over as chairman in a hold-over capacity and withdrew the barangay's Internal Revenue Allotment.

This prompted Omera to file a quo warranto case against the complainant. The respondent judge granted Omera a temporary restraining order in July 2009, then issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the complainant and the Land Bank of the Philippines to cease disbursing the barangay's Internal Revenue Allotment. In his decision of August 24, 2009, the respondent judge ruled for Omera, holding that the complainant had waived his right to the position for failing to assume office within one year and two months after the previous chairman's death.

The complainant appealed to the Court of Appeals. Omera moved for execution pending appeal, citing impairment of public services. The respondent judge granted the motion, saying the appeal seemed dilatory and that the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment ineffective, and ordered the release of the funds to Omera. The Court of Appeals later reversed all of this, declared the complainant the rightful chairman, nullified the execution pending appeal for lack of evidence of good reasons, and found that the judge had issued the restraining order and injunction without requiring bonds. The record also showed that the respondent judge had twice before been found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for similar improper issuances of injunctive reliefs. His optional retirement had been approved effective March 31, 2018, but the release of his benefits was held in abeyance.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority despite his claim that his rulings were mere errors of judgment.
• Whether or not the respondent judge erred in recognizing Omera as Barangay Chairman by virtue of the mayor's appointment rather than by automatic succession.
• Whether or not the respondent judge gravely erred in issuing a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction without requiring the applicant to post a bond.
• Whether or not the respondent judge gravely erred in granting execution pending appeal without evidence of good reasons.
• Whether or not the penalty of dismissal may still be imposed given the respondent judge's optional retirement, and if not, what penalty is appropriate.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. — A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when: (a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.

This provision bears on the case because the respondent judge issued the injunctive reliefs without any bond and without any explanation for the exemption.

Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Discretionary execution. (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

This provision bears on the case because the respondent judge granted execution pending appeal on speculation rather than on good reasons supported by evidence.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that not every judicial error warrants administrative sanction; only errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice may be sanctioned. But when the law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office simply to apply it, and anything less is ignorance of the law. The respondent judge's acts were more than tolerable misjudgment; they were patent disregard of elementary rules.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge plainly erred in recognizing Omera as Barangay Chairman merely by virtue of the mayor's appointment. Under existing and established laws, permanent vacancies in elective positions are filled through automatic succession, not by appointment.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent judge gravely erred in issuing the restraining order and injunction without a bond. Exemption from posting a bond is merely an exception, and the reason for the exemption must be stated in the order. The respondent judge's order contained no explanation at all regarding the bond.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the respondent judge gravely erred in granting execution pending appeal when no evidence justified it. Worse, he granted it on the ground that the appeal seemed dilatory, when the authority to determine whether an appeal is dilatory lies with the appellate court.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge punishable by dismissal, suspension, or a fine. Considering the gravity of the infraction and that this was the third similar offense, dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification would have been appropriate had the respondent judge not retired. In lieu of dismissal, the Court imposed forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, plus disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office.

Doctrine

A judge's failure to interpret the law or appreciate the evidence does not by itself render the judge administratively liable; only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice are sanctioned. When the law or rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Permanent vacancies in elective local positions are filled by automatic succession, not by appointment. Under Section 4 of Rule 58, a bond is the rule and exemption is the exception, and the reason for any exemption must be stated in the order. Under Section 2 of Rule 39, execution pending appeal requires good reasons stated in a special order after due hearing, and the trial court may not declare an appeal dilatory — that power belongs to the appellate court.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Rasad G. Balindong guilty of gross ignorance of the law and, in lieu of dismissal which could no longer be imposed due to his retirement, forfeited all his benefits except accrued leave credits and disqualified him from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Remember This

Memorize this line: when the law or rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it is gross ignorance of the law. Examiners use this case to test the boundary between a correctible error of judgment and an administrative offense, and to test the mandatory bond under Rule 58 and the good reasons requirement for execution pending appeal under Rule 39.