G.R. No. L-18453. September 29, 1962
CAMPOS RUEDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, HON. BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, HON. ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, HON. AMANDO C. BUGAYONG, AS ASSOCIATE…
DIZON, J.:
at 1012 Azcarraga St. (now Recto Avenue), Manila, at a monthly salary of P200.00
from May 21, 1949 to May 31, 1953, and at P230.00 from June 1 to December 31,
1953. On November 26, 1958 he filed a complaint against petitioner with the
Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 1140-V) to recover compensation for
alleged overtime, Sunday and holiday services rendered during said period.
On December 8, 1958 petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds: that the claims set forth therein were barred by (a)
the statute of limitations; (b) the decision rendered by Regional
Office No. 1, Department of Labor in Case No. C-4364 entitled “Manuel Muyot,
Complainant, vs. Super Service and Auto Supply, Jose A. Campos, Manager,
Respondent”; and by the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Civil Case No. 30138 entitled “Manuel Muyot, Plaintiff, vs. Campos Rueda
Corporation, Defendant”, and in Civil Case No. 36060 entitled “Campos Rueda
Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Juliano E. Estrella, etc., et al.,
Respondents”.
Respondent Muyot opposed said motion to dismiss alleging that, as the
decisions relied upon therein were rendered by courts that had no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, the same did not constitute res judicata; that his
causes of action were not barred by the statute of limitations because the legal
period provided for in Section 7-A of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1993, was interrupted when he filed a case with the Department
of Labor on October 27, 1955 and another with the Court of First Instance on
July 7, 1956.
On March 17, 1959, petitioner filed a supplementary motion to dismiss
alleging that the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the
complaint did not seek the reinstatement of Muyot who, according to the
complaint, ceased to be an employee of petitioner since December 31, 1953. In
other words, the claim merely involved collection of pay for overtime, Sunday
and holiday work.
On August 3, 1959, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Judge Arsenio
I. Martinez, denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and required him to answer
the complaint. In its order of August 15, 1959, the respondent court, en banc,
also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On November 11, 1959, petitioner filed its answer denying respondent’s claim
for overtime and Sunday and holiday services pay. Among other affirmative
defenses it reasserted its contention that respondent court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case.
During the trial, upon motion of respondent Muyot, respondent court issued a
subpoena duces tecum requiring the petitioner “to bring the Daily Time Records
of employees working at the Super Service Station for the years 1952-1953”.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the subpoena on the ground that (a) it did
not reasonably designate the particular employee or employees’ daily time record
concerned, but gave a blanket description which the rules do not allow; (b) that
the records sought to be produced did not appear to be prima facie relevant to
the issue involved in the case and (c) that the respondent in whose behalf the
subpoena duces tecum was issued had not offered or tendered to advance the
reasonable cost of producing the records sought to be produced.
On June 24, 1960, the respondent court, through Judge Jose S. Bautista,
denied the motion to quash, and on July 11, 1960, the court, en banc, also
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence the present original action for Certiorari, and Prohibition filed by
Campos Rueda Corporation, to annul the respondent court’s orders of August 3 and
15, 1959, June 24 and July 11, 1960 mentioned heretofore.
The allegations made in Muyot’s complaint against petitioner show
conclusively that his employment with the latter was terminated on December 31,
1953—almost five years before said complaint was filed; that, without asking for
his reinstatement, neither directly nor indirectly, he only sought to collect
what, in his opinion, was due and payable to him for overtime, Sunday and
holiday services he had rendered to his former employer during the period of his
employment.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop etc. vs. Jimenez Yanson, et al., G. R. Nos.
L-12341 and L-12345 decided on April 30, 1958, we held:
“In the present case, it is apparent that the petition below is simply for
the collection of unpaid salaries and wages alleged to be due for services
rendered years ago. No labor dispute appears to be presently involved since the
petition itself indicates that the employment has long terminated and
petitioners are not asking that they be reinstated. Clearly, the petition does
not fall under any of the cases enumerated in the law as coming within the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, so that it was error for that court not to
have ordered its dismissal.”
In the Mindanao Bus Employees etc. vs. the Court of Industrial Relations, et
al., we also held:
“The petitioner union claims that its members employed by the respondent
company are entitled to overtime wages which have not been paid notwithstanding
repeated demands, and prays ‘that after due hearing, respondent employer be
ordered to pay for the herein claims and for such other relief as justice and
equity may merit.’ It is clear that the case is for collection of overtime wages
claimed to be due and unpaid and does not involve hours of employment under
Commonwealth Act No. 444. Hence the Court does not have jurisdiction over the
case and correctly dismissed the petition.”
Again, in Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
et al., 108 Phil., 134, decided on May 23, 1960, we clearly and unequivocably
restated the same view as follows:
“* * * where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is
sought to be reestablished because of its wrongful severance (as where the
employee seeks reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations has
jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with employment,
such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
After the termination of the relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such
claims become mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.“We are aware that in 2 cases, Mindanao Bus Employees Labor Union (PLUM) vs.
Mindanao Bus Co., et al., G. R. No. L-9795, prom. December 28, 1957; Gomez vs.
North Camarines, Lumber Co., Inc. 104 Phil., 294, some statements implying a
different view have been made, but we now hold and declare the principle set
forth in the next preceding paragraph as the one governing all cases of this
nature.”
Three days after the promulgation of the decision in the Price Stabilization
case (supra), we again held in Sta. Cecilia Saw Mills Co. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al. 108 Phil., 300:
“It appears from the ‘compliance’ of the respondents * * * that they are no
longer in the service of the petitioner, * * * and that they are not seeking
reinstatement to their respective positions. Hence no labor dispute is involved
in the case and for that reason the Court of Industrial Relations has not
jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondents’ petition.”
The decisions abovequoted apply squarely to the present case, making it clear
and beyond question that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have
jurisdiction over respondent Muyot’s claims subject matter of case No. 1140-V
filed with said court.
Respondent Muyot must have finally realized that the Court of Industrial
Relations had no jurisdiction over his claims for, according to his answer filed
in the present case, he had filed on July 14, 1961—more than two years after the
filing of his action—a motion for leave to amend his complaint and to admit the
amended complaint attached to his motion, the amendment consisting precisely in
the addition of a third cause of action where, inter alia, he alleged that on
May 31, 1953, he was illegally dismissed by herein petitioner and that, as a
consequence, he was entitled to reinstatement, with back wages from the date of
his illegal dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.
Obviously the purpose of the amendment was to make his case fall within the
jurisdiction of the respondent court. This attempt is, in our opinion, of no
avail.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations made in the complaint or petition. On the other
hand, we have also held heretofore that this principle applies to proceedings in
the Court of Industrial Relations (Administrator etc. vs. Alberto, et al., G. R.
No. L-12133, October 31, 1958).
The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyot’s complaint to place his action
within the jurisdiction of the respondent court could not be cured by amendment,
for in Rosario vs. Carandang, we clearly held that “a complaint can not be
amended so as to confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the
cause of action originally set forth was not within the court’s jurisdiction.”
(Rosario vs. Carandang, et al., 96 Phil., 845 51 Off. Gaz. [5] 23871).
Moreover, the record does not show at all that the Court of Industrial
Relations has admitted the amended complaint.
In the light of our view on the question of jurisdiction, we deem it
unnecessary, for the purpose of this decision, to decide the question of res
judicata and prescription of the causes of action raised in the petition under
consideration.
Wherefore, the writs prayed for are granted and, as a consequence, the orders
complained of are annuled. With costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes,
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.