BAYANI R. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the January 11, 1976 Order of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission which affirmed the October
29, 1975 Order of the Acting Referee dismissing petitioner’s claim for compensation.

On March 29, 1976,
We denied the aforesaid petition for late payment of
legal fees (p. 17, rec.).  WE however
reconsidered said denial on May 3, 1976, upon a motion for reconsideration thereof
filed by petitioner, and required respondent company to comment on the petition
(p. 24, rec.).

After receipt and consideration of the aforesaid comment, We resolved on June
7, 1976 to treat the
petition as a special civil action (p. 31, rec.).  Petitioner then submitted his memorandum on July 15, 1976, while private
respondent company filed its memorandum on August 13, 1976.  On
August 20, 1976, the case
was deemed submitted for decision.

Disclosed by the records are the following facts:  Petitioner was employed as a carpenter by
respondent company with a daily wage of ten (P10.00) pesos, working seven (7)
days a week.  On November 10, 1973 (pp. 24-26, WCC rec.), while
petitioner, together with some co-workers, was carrying a water pump in the
course of his employment, his right foot sank in a muddy place and was
twisted.  He instantly felt a crack in his
back that caused pain from his right leg to the upper portion of his body.  Eduardo Arciaga, petitioner’s foreman, has
personal knowledge of the accident. 
Believing that it was just a case of pulled muscle, petitioner continued
to work until November 27, 1973,
when he could no longer bear the pain from his right foot to his waist.  Petitioner immediately submitted himself to a
medical examination at the company-engaged Cotton
Hospital and was therein
hospitalized up to January 13, 1974.  He was again hospitalized for the same injury
from March 28, 1974 to April 4, 1974.  Thereafter, he was allowed regular treatment,
free of charge, at the same Cotton Hospital.  Without his injury being completely cured,
the free treatment was stopped and the respondent company extended to
petitioner the amount of seven hundred fifty (P750.00) pesos as financial
assistance.  That was on August 26, 1975.

Petitioner then filed his position paper on October 6, 1975 (p. 23, WCC rec.) on his claim
for compensation earlier filed on March
13, 1975 with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.  The case was assigned to Acting Referee Celso
C. Ladera, a member of the Task Force. 
After the parties had submitted their respective affidavits and
evidence, the Acting Referee issued on October 29, 1975 an Order dismiss­ing
petitioner’s compensation claim on the ground that petitioner was not an
employee of the respondent.

On appeal, the Commission en banc, while finding
that there existed an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondent, company, nevertheless,
affirmed the dismissal order of the acting referee on the ground that petitioner
failed “x x to prove the particular ailment or
injury he suffered on November 13 (should be 10), 1973 and its causal
connection with the nature of his employment with the respondent.” The
Commission en banc said:

“Notwithstanding the existence of employer-employee
relationship, however, at the time when the alleged accident happened, we are
inclined to affirm the order of dismissal for failure of the claimant to prove
the particular ailment or injury he suffered on November 13 (should be 10),
1973 and its causal connection with the nature of his employment with the
respondent.  What is clear is that, he
suffered pains on his right leg that went up to his back without establishing
any disabling ailment or injury.  Claimant
has therefore failed to establish his claim by substantial evidence.” (P. 14, rec.).

The instant order of
dismissal is a clear case of a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission.  It was a patent error and
therefore must be set aside.

Section 2 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, Act No. 3428, as amended, is explicit that “[W]hen an employee suffers personal injury from
any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts x x x illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or
the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified.  x
x x” In the present case,
there can be no question that the personal injury that disabled herein
petitioner was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment; for the respondent company never presented evidence to the
contrary.  And the chain of events
subsequent to the accident that befell petitioner on November 10, 1973, as narrated by petitioner in his affidavit —

“4.   Na noong Novembre
10, 1973, mga alas 10 ng umaga apat (4) kaming mga manggagawa na nagbubuhat ng
isang motor ng tubig doon sa General Motor, Las Pinas, Rizal, nang sa aking pag­lalakad
ay biglang nabaon sa putik at napilipit ang aking kanang paa, na sa aking
pag-aakalang ito ay hindi malubha at tila litid lamang ang nagkaroon ng
deferencia, nagpatuloy ako sa trabaho hanggang noong ika-27 ng Novembre, 1973,
na ako ay naospital sa Cotton Hospital sa Ortigas, Pasig, Rizal, dala ng
masidhing sakit sa aking kanang paa na umabot sa aking bayawang; na ako ay
naospital hanggang Enero 13, 1974 at ibinalik muli noong March 28, 1974 hanggang
Abril 4, 1974; Na ang aking pagka-ospital ay ibinalikat ng pagawaan at dito’y
may tulong rin ang Medicare;

“5.   Na nang ako ay
pumasok sa nasabing pagawaan, ay sinuri ako o ‘medical and physical check-up’
ng nasabing ospital at taon-taon ay isinagawa ito ng pagawaan bilang patakaran;

xx                  xx                     xx                     xx

“8.   Na noong Agosto
26, 1975, nang ang aking maybahay ay pinapunta ko sa aming pagawaan, upang
hingin na ako ay ipasok sa ospital dala ng aking karamdaman, siya ay binigyan
ng P750.00 bilang ‘financial assistance’ dala na aking karamdaman at kalakip
nito ang sulat at ACCEPTANCE na tinanggap at napirmahan na eking asawa xx x;

“9.   Na maliban sa
tabletas na inirecita sa aking upang maalis ang sakit na aking paa, ako ay
hindi na nagpapagamot dala ng kawalan at kahirapan;

“10. Na ang salaysay na ito ay akin isinagawa upang ihanap ng
katarungan ang nangyari sa akin na
hanggang sa ngayo’y may karamdaman at hindi na makapaghanapbuhay buhat ng
nasabing aksidente.”

easily leads to
the conclusion that petitioner did suffer personal injury from the November
10, 1973 accident
that rendered him inutile.  The causal
and circumstantial connection between his personal injury and employment is but
too apparent under the facts of the case.

The basis of the Commission’s Order dismissing the compensation
claim which is the alleged failure of
the petitioner “x x to prove the particular ailment or injury he suffered
on November 13 (should be 10), 1973 and its causal connection with the nature
of his employment with respondent x x” is not only clearly unfounded, but
likewise betrays the Commission’s distorted shifting of the burden of proof in
compensation cases in relation to the presumption of compensability.  From the documentary evidence on record,
there can be no denying the fact that indeed petitioner was injured in that November 10, 1973 accident which thereafter disabled him from
work.  And furthermore, petitioner’s SSS
Medical Certificate shows that he is suffering from Herniated Nucleus Pulposus
L5 SI, L5 Root Radiculopathy.  This final
diagnosis was dated August 26, 1974 (pp. 46-47, WCC rec.).  Indeed, this Court is amazed at the cavalier
manner the Commission disposed of this compensation claim, particularly the
bases of its conclusion.

Either the respondent Commission overlooked the entire evidence
on record, specially the SSS Medical Certificate
attached to the record, or ignored them.

There are reasonable
bases to conclude that petitioner’s illness of hernia was the direct result of
or is traceable to that accident of November 10, 1973 and/or the nature of his work.  Petitioner’s work with respondent company was
described by a coworker of his as follows: “x x na masasabi kong may
kabig-atan ang trabaho namin sa nasabing pagawaan (construction) at sari-sari
uring trabahong karaniwan ay mabig-at ito (pag-insulat ng tubo, pagbubuhat ng
bakal, paghuhukay para sa tubo, pag-akyat sa itaas ng gusaling planta upang
maglagay ng andanyo, at iba pa, bukod sa nasa labas kami ng ulanan at
arawan;” (p. 26, WCC rec.).

According
to Horovitz (4 NACCA L.J., 71-73),
where disease results from a personal injury, the sickness (illness)
constitutes an injury by accident and therefore a compensable physical harm
(Fernandez & Quiazon Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation, 484 [1964]).  To be thus compensable the disease must come
from, or be, an accident arising from the nature of his work or employment and
occurred in the course thereof (Ibid., p. 484, citing Rolan vs. Perez, 63 Phil.
80).  American courts have held that
hernia due to strain over a period of a few months (Mill’s case, 155 N.E. 423) or resulting from strain suffered in
such activities as lifting heavy timbers, lifting heavy bundles of paper,
pushing a heavy box of pipe across a floor, pushing a heavy wheelbarrow,
picking up a log, pulling a tong chain, lifting a bale of wire, and pushing a
coal car in a mine, have been held compensable even though the injury itself
constituted the only mishap (5 SCHNEIDER Workmen’s Compensation Text, 578-579
[permanent Ed.]).  The case of herein
petitioner is analogous to the foregoing cases.

Hence, even precluding
any actual injury sustained by petitioner on the very day of the accident
(November 10, 1973), his compensation claim can still stand on his illness of
hernia; which as aforestated can be reasonably attributed or traceable to the
accident that befell petitioner and/or the nature of his work with respondent.

There is furthermore in
favor of petitioner the well-settled doctrine that when an illness supervened during
the course of employment, like petitioner’s illness, there is the rebuttable
presumption that the same arose out of or at least was aggravated in
the course of his employment.  And with
that presumption the burden of proving by substantial evidence that the
illness was not work-connected shifts to the employer and the claimant is
relieved of the burden to show causation. 
In the instant case, there was patent failure on the part of respondent
company to discharge that burden.  Hence,
the presumption becomes conclusive; and that alone entitles petitioner to a
compensation award.

Finally, there is likewise merit it the contention of petitioner
that all the requisites for the compensability of hernia as laid down by the
Evaluation Division of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in the case of
Bonilla vs. WCC(13 SCRA 748 [1965]), which are: 
(1) that the hernia is of recent origin; (2) that its appearance was
accompanied by pain, discoloration and evidence of tearing of these tissue; (3)
that it was immediately preceded by some strain out of and in the course of
employment; and (4) that a protrusion or mass appeared in the area immediately
following the alleged strain, are present in this case.

There can be no question
as to the presence of the first three requisites.  The attendant circumstances of petitioner’s
injury or illness as earlier described attest to the presence of the said requisites. 
Although there is no positive evidence on records to show the presence
of the last requisite, that, however, can easily be
presumed on the basis of the final diagnosis on petitioner’s illness as
Herniated Nucleus Pulposus.

Under the facts obtaining, petitioner, who appears to be
incapacitated from work up to the present, is entitled to the maximum
compensation benefits of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos (Sec. 14, Act 3428, as
amended).  Since that is the maximum allowed by law, his additional
claim of One Thousand and Five Hundred Ten (P1,510.00)
Pesos, although undisputed, cannot be awarded. 
His undisputed claim for medical reimbursement in the amount of Three
Hundred Forty-Four (P344.00) Pesos is, however,
allowed.  Furthermore, because of the
facts and circumstances obtaining in this case and considering petitioner’s
pathetic condition, respondent company is further ordered to comply with
Section 13 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Before finally disposing of this compensation case, We cannot but express Our strong disapproval over the manner
the Commission decided this case.  The
impugned order of the Commission was indeed a foul blow to the social justice
clause of the Constitution and its injunction for the State to afford
protection to labor.  Respondent
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, like
the defunct Court of Industrial Relations, as an agency of the State is “x
x under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of ‘meaning­less patter’
(Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, et al. vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., et al., 51
SCRA 189, 210-211 [1973]).  Indeed, We
had many a time in the past called the attention of the now defunct Workmen’s
Compensation Commission to its failure to observe fealty to the social justice
directive of the Constitution and dissuaded it from assuming such posture (Vda.
de Leorna, et al. vs. WCC, et al., L-42543, Sept. 30, 1976). The Workmen’s
Compensation Act, which the Commission is mandated to implement, is a social
legislation designed to provide prompt and reasonable compensation to the
workman who had been the victim of an accident in the pursuit of his
employment; to the end that he may not become entirely “destitute and
possibly a charge upon society.”

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND RESPONDENT
COMPANY IS HEREBY DIRECTED:

(1) TO PAY THE CLAIMANT —

(A) THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P6,000.00]
PESOS AS DISABILITY COMPENSATION;

(B) THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOUR [P344.00] PESOS AS REFUND FOR
MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED;

(C) TEN PER CENT [10%] OF THE TOTAL COMPENSATION AS ATTORNEY’S
FEES;

(2) TO PROVIDE THE CLAIMANT SUCH MEDICAL, SURGICAL AND HOSPITAL
SERVICE AND SUPPLIES AS THE NATURE OF THE AILMENT REQUIRES;

(3) TO PAY THE SUM OF SIXTY-ONE [P61.00] PESOS AS ADMINISTRATIVE
FEE; AND

(4) TO PAY DOUBLE COSTS.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.