G.R. No. L-22295. January 30, 1970
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PRUDENCIO MADARANG, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Defendant in this appeal asks this Court to reverse the judgment of
the trial court finding him guilty of murder and senÂtencing him, inter alia to life imprisonment. A plea insistently pressed in appellant’s
brief and imperatively calling for resolution is that the People’s evidence
does not meet the constitutional test of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The night of April 22,
1963 found Jose Abella alone in his house
located in Barrio Macalang, Municipality
of Dasol,
Province of Pangasinan. For his wife, Felicidad
Molino, was at a nearby barrio attending a benefit dance. His protege,
14-year old Eufemio Villanueva, was playing cards in
another house. Neighbors were summoned
by Jose’s cries for help. They saw him
in a serious condition with a bullet wound between the anus and the
testicles. He was dead before medical
help could be summoned. A medico-legal
necropsy report filed by Dr. Elpidio M. Liceralde, Municipal Health Officer of Infanta,
Pangasinan, described the wound as a
“penetrating wound admitting the tip of the forefinger at the right aspect
of the scrotum partly hitting the right testicle, conminuted
fracture of the anterior ramus of the pelvic bone,
right side; massive hemoperitoneum, one and one-half
(1 1/2) liters to two (2) liters; perforations of the small intestines, x x x no gun powder burns.”
Cause of death, so Dr. Liceralde reported, was
“shock due to massive internal hemorrhage.” A slug was located at the
anterio-inferior aspect of the right kidney. It was not, however, produced in court; it
was lost. By April 23, the manhunt was
on. Investigations were conducted. It
was only on May 28, 1963
that criminal prosecution was started with a complaint for murder against
defendant filed by PC Sgt. Pablo Jimenez.
1. The People’s case was
built upon evidence following:
Ricardo Villanueva.
The People would want to show, by the testimony of this witness, that on
the night in question, he went out fishing; that on his return, he passed by
the fence at the gate of the house of the deceased Jose Abella;
that at a distance of thirty meters, he noticed Prudencio
Madarang and Leoncio Madarang, brothers, the former peeping into the Abella home, with the latter looking around; that to
observe them he hid under a camarin some seven meters
from where Prudencio stood; that Prudencio
moved apart the outer wall of the house made of coconut leaves, inserted a
short gun and fired a shot inside; that together, the brothers Prudencio and Leoncio Madarang ran, and that
he, too, took to his heels in fright.
The story given by this witness would have meant much for the
People’s case were it believable. But is it?
Ricardo Villanueva, who used to live in the house of the deceased
Jose Abella, is the father of 14-year old Eufemio Villanueva heretofore mentioned, who, at the time
of the incident here involved, was living with the said Jose Abella and his wife.
Right from the start, Ricardo Villanueva was one of the suspects. Shortly after the ninth day of prayer, he was
investigated by the Constabulary. It was
then that he told the Constabulary that he knew nothing about
Jose Abella’s murder.
He gave as reason that at the time of the commission thereof, he was in
the hills some four kilometers away from the scene. But then, in the following July, when he was
called upon by the Fiscal to shed light on the case, he testified that he
really was present at the commission of the offense as he had heretofore
described. There is, however, the
disquieting note that he admitted to the Fiscal having told the Constabulary
that he had no knowledge of the crime.
Interesting it is to note that by his own admission, what he
allegedly witnessed that evening he kept to himself. He breathed not a word; not to his wife, not
to his neighbors, not even to the widow of the deceased. He made one exception. He related the incident to Pedro Abella, uncle of the deceased Jose Abella,
in July. Pedro Abella,
the record discloses, was the moving spirit behind the prosecution of appellant
and who engaged the services of a
private prosecutor. This explains why
witness Ricardo Villanueva was belatedly included in the list of witnesses
enumerated in the information before the Court of First Instance.
It is no wonder then that the lower court rejected Villanueva as
unbelievable.[1]
For, indeed, he does not play it straight with truth.
Anselmo Villaruz. This witness, as is Ricardo Villanueva, does
not appear as such in the criminal complaint.
Neither is he listed in the information.
He was described in the record as a surprise witness.[2]
For, during the several investigations conducted to ferret out the killer, the
name of this witness was never mentioned.
He declared that about 7:00 o’clock
in the evening of April 22, 1963,
he boarded a Pantranco bus in Eguia,
bound for Bayambang(Municipality of Infanta), which was four
kilometers away, to attend a prayer.
Upon returning home some three hours afterwards, and reaching a
crossing, he defecated at the edge of the road.
It was then that he heard a gun report coming from the west where the
house of Jose Abella was, about three hundred meters
away from him. After the gunfire, he saw
the accused Prudencio Madarang
and his brother Leoncio Madarang
running towards the east. He was three
meters more or less from them when he recognized them. Subsequently,
he went home.
Witness Villaruz lived in another
barrio, namely, barrio Eguia, in the same municipality
of Dasol,
Pangasinan. He
admitted that he used to go to the house of the deceased Jose Abella and that he knew the accused Prudencio
Madarang since childhood. Strangely enough, he told the court that he
first learned of the death of Jose Abella only in
July 1963, when he went to the house of Pedro Abella
who told him to see Atty. Aquino, the private
prosecutor in this case. This is rather
odd. News of murder, like the one under
consideration, spreads among barrio folks like wildfire. As with the other witness, Ricardo
Villanueva, Anselmo Villaruz
never communicated to anyone what he claimed he heard and saw that night of the
murder until he revealed the same to Pedro Abella. Anyway, the most that can be inferred from
the evidence produced by Anselmo Villaruz is that, if true, defendant and his brother
Leoncio were placed near the scene of the crime under
suspicious circumstances. This belated
revelation and a similar version as belatedly given by the other witness
Ricardo Villanueva must have accounted for the fact that Leoncio
Madarang was not and never was included in the crimÂinal
charge with his brother, defendant Prudencio Madarang.
Not a credible witness, Anselmo Villaruz should be knocked off as a prop to the case for
the prosecution.
2. But the prosecution
did not stop with the two witnesses just mentioned. A number of other witnesses were brought to court in an effort to
weave a tight web of circumstantial evidence on which apparently is pinned the
hope that appellant should not
escape unpunished.
The first was that testified to by Crisostomo
Molino, brother-in-law of the deceased.
His version was that defendant wanted to bury the deceased with the
clothes used at the time of death. To
which said witness objected. Molino
suggested that the accused seek the help of the PC and the NBI. According to Molino, defendant waved this off
with the statement that it was difficult to do so. Then Molino came up with the testimony that
the accused told him to stop looking for the killer of Jose Abella,
otherwise his (Molino’s) life would be in danger. The fact, however, is that it was this
witness himself who brought the clothes used by the deceased consisting of a
shirt, underwear, a pair of pants, blanket and a bag to the municipal
building. His version was contradicted
by defendant. Molino, so defendant
claims, could not have been without motive in declaring against him. Because one carabao
in the care of Molino was transferred to defendant by the latter’s deceased
father-in-law.
Then came Pedro Alpena. Abella gave in
court the story that during the burial on April 24, 1963, it was suggested that the body of the deceased be turned face
downward. For, superstiÂtion had it that
if the killer were a stranger, the latter would not be able to get away and
could easily be identified. The accused, a high school graduate, was
credited with having objected to this and having stated that those who wanted
could do so if they did not pity him (the accused). This was done, and allegedly the accused
fainted.
A third circumstance happened on the 23rd of May 1963.
This was testified to by Ambrosio Ramirez and Venancio Mirador. The wife of Ambrosio
Ramirez and the wife of Pedro Abella heretofore mentioned were sisters. Venancio Mirador, upon the other hand, was an uncle of the deceased
Jose Abella, although the accused was a nephew of Mirador’s wife.
Ramirez declared that on May 23, 1963, he dropped in at the house of Venancio Mirador to borrow lead
for catching fish. The accused was
talking to Mirador and he remembered the accused make
the following statement: “If it is
possible Manong I would surrender so that my younger
brother and my mother-in-law will not be included.” To which Venancio Mirador answered: “If you do not like your brother and
mother-in-law to be included you better surrender yourself. It was then Ambrosio’s
turn to tell the accused in this wise:
“If you will surrender
you surrender now and I will accompany you.” The accused replied: “Yes, I will do Manong
but I have no gun with which to surrender.
If possible you go and look for a gun which is cal. 32. I will buy it or change it with palay or rooster.” Venancio Mirador and Ambrosio Ramirez went
out ostensibly to look for a gun. After
about two hours, the two returned empty-handed.
Ambrosio Ramirez prodded defendant to
surrender. But Prudencio
Madarang replied:
“You wait first I am going to consult my lawyer.” Ambrosio Ramirez told the accused as follows: “That could be done but you must
return.” On May 26, Ambrosio Ramirez returned to
the house of Prudencio Madarang
to inquire about the result of his mission in Manila. And
the reply of Prudencio Madarang
was that his lawyer, Marceliano Urbano,
warned him that he would just be hanging himself if he did so; and forthwith he
offered to settle the case amicably.
The foregoing version was
confirmed by Venancio Mirador.
Continuing, Ambrosio Ramirez told the court that in June of the same
year, he was sent for by the accused who was then in the
municipal jail of Dasol. The latter requested him not to testify, in this case, to which he allegedly
declined. Coincidentally, Venancio Mirador also testified
that on June 23, 1963,
he was fetched by the wife of the accused.
Taken to the municipal building, witness was there requested by
defendant not to testify against him.
Defendant added that the evidence was weak and that he would fight the
case. Receiving a negative answer, the
accused was reported to have stated
that the witness should pity him.
All the imputations
heretofore related were vehemently denied by defendant. None of the witnesses for the prosecution
heretofore related ever mentioned the fact that defendant admitted
directly having committed the crime of
murder against his father-in-law.
In fact, Ambrosio Ramirez declared that the accused did not admit having killed Jose Abella, and that said accused merely desired to surrender because he was under suspicion. The transÂcript of the testimony of Ambrosio
Ramirez on cross-examination on
this point reads –
“Q The fact is, Prudencio Madarang, did not admit
to you that he killed Jose Abella?
A No, sir he only told me that he wanted to surrender, sir.
Q And up to now, Mr. Witness, you do not know the reason why Prudencio Madarang ever said why
he wanted to surrender?
A I know, sir.
COURT:
Q What is the reason why he wanted to surrender?
A Since he is under suspicion, he wanted to surrender
himself so that his younger brother and his mother-in-law will not be included, sir.”[3]
It will be recalled that
the version given by the People’s witnesses as to the offer of surrender was
qualified with the statement, “If it is possible”. This could be indicative of the fact that
defendant was not sure whether or not he should surrender. It could not be logically assumed that he
definitely was the author of the crime.
Not escaping attention is the
statement witness Ramirez attributed to defendant that the latter demurred to
giving himself up because he (defendant) had no gun to surrender, suggested that Ramirez and the other witness (Venancio Mirador) look for one, and even offered to pay for it with money or palay
or rooster. Serious doubt is at once
created as to whether such unusual statement could have come from the lips of
defendant. And, if he did, this statement
could mean that really defendant was not the author of the crime. It
would have been an easy matter for him to say that he could not surrender any weapon because he had
thrown it away. Or, that he would
try to look for the lethal weapon – if he really did kill Abella with a gun.
Another thing is that Venancio Mirador, in his
testimony on rebuttal, betrayed an utter lack of veracity. His testimony which follows is quite
revealing:
“Q Have you ever been a witness before in any
Court?
A Not yet, sir.
Q You
mean to say, this is the first time that you appear before a court of justice
to testify?
A There
was once, sir, but I was told of declaring which is not true, that is why, we
lost. That time 1 was forced to declare
that we did not go inside the fence but, in fact, we went inside, so, we
lost.”[4]
The foregoing
circumstantial evidence sums up the case for the People.
No sufficient motive
there was for the son-in-law to murder his father-in-law. The best that could be offered was that
related in court by Pedro Abella. He declared that in FebÂruary 1963, the two quarreled
while Jose Abella was threshing his palay. After this, Prudencio wanted to take over the threshing. It was then when “Jose Abella placed the nylon over the palay
threshed but when Prudencio Madarang
had his turn, he wanted to take the nylon to cover his palay
threshed but Jose Abella did not like it.”[5] Even then, the same witness, Pedro Abella, told the
court that defendant and deceased were thereafter in good terms again –
“Q And after that quarrel, Prudencio
Madarang and your nephew, the deceased Jose Abella, were in good terms and you know that, is it not?
A Yes,
sir when I am present they are
in good terms but I do not know if I am out of their presence, sir.
Q But
since that time you never heard of any quarrel between Prudencio
Madarang and Jose Abella?
A I do
not know of any personal encounter between or by them but one time Jose Abella scolded Prudencio Madarang, sir.
Q And that scolding was sometime in February, 1963?
A That scolding was earlier if I am not mistaken that was November
or December, sir, before their personal encounter.”[6]
It is at this point that
we are reminded that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if: “(a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”[7]
Directing our attention
to the third requisite, we find it difficult to bring ourselves to a conviction
that the State has proven the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. Even on the assumption that the
statements attributed to appellant were true, such evidence does not rise above
the level of mere conjecture or suspicion of guilt. We pause and hesitate to declare a forfeiture
of defendant’s liberty. His liability
has not been satisfactorily shown. His
innocence could be doubted, it is true.
But this does not exclude another or others as the author or authors of
the crime. Worthwhile it is to recall
that in order that circumstantial evidence may bring about conviction,
all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent.[8]
Pertinent, too, is a reaffirmaÂtion of the other precept that when inculpatory facts aid circumstances are capable of two
explanations, one consistent with innoÂcence and the other with guilt, such
evidence would not meet the test of moral certainty and would not support
conviction.[9]
Given the moral twilight between guilt and innocence, our duty is plain:
acquit.
With the conclusion just reached, we need not look into
defendant’s alibi – that since April
20, 1963 he was out peddling 39 crates of mangoes and did not
return until the 23rd of April -to shore up his claim of innocence. The reason being that in a criminal
prosecution, the People must rely on the strength of its own evidence, not on
the weakness of the defense.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby
reversed, and defendant-appellant Prudencio Madarang is hereby acquitted.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, and Teehankee,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Barredo, J., concurs in the result.
[1]
Appellant’s brief, p. 68.
[2]
Tr., Estrada, September 26, 1963,
p. 34.
[3]
Tr., Estrada, September 9, 1963,
pp. 20-21; emphasis supplied.
[4]
Tr., Vinluan, October 30, 1963, pp. 89-90.
[5]
Tr., Estrada, September 25, 1963,
p. 12.
[6]
Id., p. 17.
[7]
Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
[8]
People vs. Ludday, 61 Phil.
216, 221.
[9]
6 Moran, Comments on the miles of Court, 1963 ed., p. 163, citing People
vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 and People vs. Abana, 76 Phil. 1.