NARCISO SOLANCHO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. JOSEFA RAMOS AND ISMAEL CALDERON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Solancho versus Ramos

The Case

This is an appeal by Narciso Solancho against Josefa Ramos, Flaviano Ramos, Valentin Arios, and Ismael Calderon, arising from a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land filed before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that there was a pending administrative case between the parties over the same land before the District Land Office, and the trial court granted the dismissal. The case matters because the Supreme Court draws a sharp line between a pending action in a court of justice and a pending administrative proceeding before the Bureau of Lands, and clarifies the proper scope of a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court.

Procedural History

On December 8, 1961, Narciso Solancho filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against the defendants, seeking recovery of ownership and possession of a piece of land, plus damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Instead of answering, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that a pending administrative case between the plaintiff and Josefa Ramos over the same parcel of land before the District Land Office deprived the court of jurisdiction until the plaintiff had exhausted all administrative remedies. Attached to the motion were a letter of the Bureau of Lands advising Josefa Ramos to file her protest to the free patent application, and her written protest.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its order of January 6, 1962. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things that his free patent application had been withdrawn. The court issued an order of February 10, 1962, deferring resolution of the motion until it was appraised of the action of the Bureau of Lands on the free patent application. It then issued an order of March 9, 1962, directing the District Land Office to investigate whether the land in question is really private land. On May 30, 1962, the lower court denied the motion to reconsider. Hence, the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

Facts

Narciso Solancho alleged in his complaint that he is the owner of the land in question and had been in possession of it since time immemorial up to 1959, when the defendants, by means of force, violence, threats, strategy, stealth, and intimidation, usurped and took possession of a portion of it. He alleged that the unlawful occupation would deprive him of the use and fruits of the land, causing him damages, and that notwithstanding repeated demands the defendants refused to vacate and surrender possession.

The defendants did not answer. They moved to dismiss on the ground that there was a pending administrative case between the plaintiff and Josefa Ramos over the same parcel of land before the District Land Office, and that the court had therefore acquired no jurisdiction until the plaintiff exhausted all administrative remedies. They attached to their motion a letter of the Bureau of Lands advising Josefa Ramos to file her protest to the free patent application, and her written protest.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, stating that his free patent application had been withdrawn, and later filed a manifestation that the application had been rejected by the Bureau of Lands. The court deferred resolution, ordered an investigation into the status of the land, and ultimately denied reconsideration. The plaintiff appealed.

Issues

• Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on a motion to dismiss based on facts not alleged in the complaint.
• Whether or not the defendants failed to adduce evidence in support of their allegation that there is a pending administrative case concerning the land.
• Whether or not the pendency of an administrative case before the Bureau of Lands is a ground for dismissal of the action under the Rules of Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, on the grounds for dismissal, provides:

Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.

This is the ground invoked by the defendants, and the Court holds that it does not cover a proceeding before the Bureau of Lands.

Section 1, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, defining the word action, provides:

Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Every other remedy is a special proceeding.

This definition confines the ground of a pending action to suits in a court of justice, and excludes administrative bodies such as the Bureau of Lands.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the contention is unmeritorious. A motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is not like a demurrer under the old Code of Civil Procedure that must be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. Except where the ground is that the complaint states no cause of action, which must be based only on the allegations in the complaint, a motion to dismiss may be based on facts not alleged and may even deny those alleged in the complaint.

On the second issue, the Court held that the defendants had sufficiently supported their allegation. They attached to their motion to dismiss a letter of the Bureau of Lands advising Josefa Ramos to file her protest, and the written protest itself, making these a part of their pleading and rendering unnecessary the presentation of evidence by the defendants.

On the third issue, the Court held that both parties and the trial court had missed the extent and meaning of the ground of the motion to dismiss. The Rule uses the phrase "another action," and this phrase must be construed in line with the definition of action in Section 1 of Rule 2. The Court quoted the definition and underscored that an action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, and that every other remedy is a special proceeding. It concluded that it is very clear that the Bureau of Lands is not covered under the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court. The pendency of the administrative case was therefore not a ground for dismissal.

Doctrine

A motion to dismiss under Rule 16 may be based on facts not alleged in the complaint and may even deny those alleged, except where the ground is that the complaint states no cause of action, which must rest solely on the allegations of the complaint. The ground of a pending action requires another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, and the word action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice; every other remedy is a special proceeding. A proceeding before the Bureau of Lands is administrative, not an action, and its pendency does not warrant dismissal of a court action.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the orders appealed from, remanded the record to the lower court for further proceedings, and taxed the costs against the appellees.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that an action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, so a pending administrative case before the Bureau of Lands is not "another action" that will dismiss a complaint. Examiners use this case to test the grounds for a motion to dismiss and the distinction between an action and a special proceeding or administrative remedy.