THE MUNICIPALITY OF CALOOCAN, RIZAL, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MANOTOK REALTY, INC., AND SEVERINO MANOTOK, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The municipality of Caloocan, Rizal, has appealed from the decision
of Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, Judge, who dismissed its complaint of April
22, 1952, seeking to expropriate a parcel of land of the defendant
Manotok Realty, Inc. Avowedly acting under Rep. Act No. 267, as
amended, the plaintiff proposed to subdivide the property for resale to
the actual tenants thereof.

Answering the complaint on May 7, 1952, the defendants moved for dismissal, setting up three main defenses: (a)
Nullity of the resolution of the municipal council directing the
expropriation, because the approval of the Department Head had not been
obtained; (b) The Government’s right to expropriate lands for resale to tenants applied only to landed estates—which was not the case, defendants’ property having hardly an area of four hectares, 39,374 sq. m., to be exact; and (c) The expropriation did not appear to be for public use and benefit—it was simply to accommodate a few individuals.

After considering arguments on both sides, the judge upheld the
motion to dismiss holding, in short, that the property was not a
“landed estate”, (citing pertinent decisions) and that the condemnation
did not serve a public purpose.

The plaintiff has appealed as stated, and has vigorously maintained,
in its printed brief, the proposition that the lower court erred: (a) in holding there was no legal authority nor plausible reason for the taking of defendants’ land and (b) in declaring the expropriation was not for public purposes.

The defendants, on the other hand, besides justifying His Honor’s
position, disputed the timeliness of this appeal, and reiterate the
essential need of approval by the Department Head.

The issues and the facts are well-defined. The expropriation we
believe was clearly improper. The lot measured less than four hectares,
and was not a landed estate, subject to expropriation for purposes of
subdivision and resale to occupants thereof.^[1] In Urban Estates Inc.
vs. Montesa (see below) we said a parcel containing about five hectares
was not a landed estate subject to expropriation for division among
tenants.

The piece of land here in question was purchased in 1943 from Dr.
Leonides Lerma, by defendant Severino Manotok for the benefit of his
children. So that in May 1946 a Transfer Certificate of Title was duly
issued in the name of said children, nine of them, each becoming
registered owner of one-ninths (1/9) of the property. And before this
proceeding was started, they formed the corporation Manotok Realty Co.,
to administer their interests.

Divided among nine persons, the title would give 4375 square meters
of land to each. Obviously the Government—insular or municipal—can not
consider that four thousand square meters is “landed estate” for
expropriation purposes. And grouping the nine persons together, or
suing them together as a corporation does not conceal the resultant
deprivation of nine individuals of their landed portions of 4375 square
meters each. It would undoubtedly be unfair to implead twenty owners of
small contiguous lands and then maintain that they own a large estate
subject to condemnation proceedings (Cf. Republic vs. Samia, 89 Phil.,
483).

Anyway, even considered as a whole, the Manotok property is not a large estate subject to expropriation under the Constitution.

The other questions do not need to be decided. Judgment affirmed. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Guido vs. Rural Progress Adm. 47 Off. Gaz., 1848, 84 Phil., 847;
City of Manila vs. Arellano Law College, 47 Off. Gaz., 4197, 85 Phil.,
663; Republic of the Philippines vs. Samia 89 Phil., 483; Urban Estate
Inc. vs. Montesa, 88 Phil., 348.