PHILCOX (PHILS.), INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & SOTERO G. CABUGUAS, RESPONDENTS.
LOPEZ, J.:
1) The December 14, 2012 Decision[1] of public respondent in NLRC Case No. VAC-08-000508-2012 which disposed the case as follows: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION reiterating the regular employment of complainant but declaring the latter’s illegal dismissal. Respondent Philcox Philippines, Inc. is ordered to pay complainant the total amount of P273,685.50 in concept of separation pay, backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and attorney’s fees temporarily computed until the promulgation of this Decision on 14 December 2012.
SO ORDERED.”
and
2) The March 27, 2013 Resolution[2] of public respondent which denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Evidence for the Petitioner
Petitioner is engaged in the business of, among others, building, servicing and maintaining infrastructure for telecommunication projects as well as selling supplies and equipment.
On July 1, 2008, petitioner entered into an Agreement for Voice and/or Data Station Installation Services[3] with Innove Communications, Inc. (Innove) which is a wholly-owned Globe subsidiary and does business under service marks or business names Globe Lines, Globe Wi-max and Globe Broadband.
Petitioner hired respondent and several others as project employees to help petitioner perform its contractual obligations to Innove within the service areas in Bacolod. The employment contract expressly stipulated that the employment was “co-terminus with the contract of PHILCOX with Globe/Innove Telecommunication projects, or unless sooner terminated for cause.”
While petitioner tried its best to work for the renewal of its Agreement with Innove, competing contractors offering cheaper rates made it difficult to obtain a renewal. After its expiry on June 30, 2010, the parties agreed to an extension of the Agreement for the period July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010. All workers, including complainant, were each given notice[4] of the December 31, 2010 expiration date. However, on December 21, 2010, the parties agreed to another extension of the Agreement to cover the period January 1, 2011 to February 28, 2011. The workers were also given notices[5] of this new extension period. On February 28, 2011, the Agreement expired and so did the employment contracts of all of petitioner’s workers assigned to the Bacolod Service Areas of Globe and Innove. Petitioner thereafter filed with the Department of Labor and Employment an Establishment Employment Report.[6]
Private respondent was not illegally dismissed from employment by petitioner. The termination of his employment was brought about by the expiration of his project employment contract.
The Evidence for the Private Respondent
Private respondent was first hired by petitioner on May 20, 2000 as Driver-Installer at its project in Bacolod City. Petitioner was engaged as contractor of Innove which is a subsidiary of Globe and as such, renders services and several installation works relevant to the operation of Globe. From May 20, 2000 up to 2006, private respondent worked as operation-driver/installer. Thereafter, he was assigned in sales and marketing as technical driver coordinator from 2006-2009. Beginning from 2009 until he was terminated from employment on February 28, 2011, private respondent served as operation-driver installer and repairman.
In 2007, after having worked for petitioner for almost seven (7) years since May 20, 2000, private respondent was made to sign a contract every six (6) months, the last of which was executed on March 23, 2010. Except for extension of services made known to private respondent through notices, no subsequent contract was executed by petitioner and private respondent.
On February 28, 2011, private respondent was terminated from his employment on the ground that petitioner’s Agreement with Innove had already expired.
Contending that he is not a project employee, private respondent filed a Complaint[7] for illegal dismissal with various money claims before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI in Bacolod City which docketed the case as NLRC RAB Case No. VI-01-10055-12.
On June 11, 2012, Labor Arbiter Jessie G. Sullano rendered a Decision,[8] the dispositive portion of which states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
- Holding that complainant was a regular employee of the herein respondents;
- Directing the respondents Philcox Philippines, Inc. and Antonio Tioco, solidarily and jointly liable to pay complainant the sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE PESOS (PHP107,525.00) representing his separation pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, refund of cash bond and attorney’s fee;
- Directing the respondents to deposit the afore-quoted sum of (PHP107,525.00) with the Cashier of this Regional Arbitration Branch within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.”
Aggrieved by the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner interposed an appeal to public respondent which rendered the assailed Decision and Resolution now subject of this Petition for Certiorari before Us.
In its Petition, petitioner contended that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it held that private respondent was a regular employee who was illegally dismissed from employment.
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that a certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment, particularly in the findings or conclusions of the quasi-judicial tribunals or lower courts. For errors of judgment, appeal, if provided for by law, is the proper remedy and not certiorari.[9] Accordingly, in this petition for certiorari before Us, the judicial inquiry should be limited to the issue of whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so because “grave abuse of discretion” is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose. The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.” Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to “truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.” From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross.[10]
In this case, public respondent affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s finding that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner and not a project employee. Consequently, public respondent found private respondent to have been illegally dismissed from his employment. No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to public respondent as such finding is amply supported by the facts and evidence on record.
There is essentially no dispute that private respondent was employed by petitioner and that he signed employment contracts which ultimately expired on February 28, 2011. There is likewise no dispute that private respondent’s employment with petitioner spanned several years. Under Article 280 of the Labor Code which was aptly cited by public respondent, private respondent is deemed a regular employee, any provision of a written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding.
As correctly held by public respondent:
“xxx Complainant has been rendering work as driver-installer since the year 2000 and later as sales marketing and technical driver coordinator for respondent company which, in turn, was engaged in the business of building, servicing and maintaining infrastructure for telecommunication projects. Considering, therefore, the nature of the business of respondent Philcox, vis-à -vis the nature of the activities performed by the employees as well as the duration of the work rendered, complainant has become a regular employee of respondents.”
Indeed, the test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of that activity to the business.[11]
A perusal of the employment contracts[12] between petitioner and private respondent revealed the absence of a specific project to be undertaken for a specific period. There is only a general statement of “specific Telecommunications short term projects” without indicating the particular type of project for which private respondent was hired for. For lack of a specific project or undertaking, petitioner cannot invoke the exception provided in Article 280 of the Labor Code.[13]
As correctly observed by public respondent, private respondent had been allowed to perform his work for several years in various capacities as driver-installer then sales and marketing technical driver coordinator. Undeniably, private respondent had been rendering works which are usual, necessary and desirable in the business of petitioner. Hence, petitioner cannot use the alleged expiration of the employment contract of private respondent to shield its illegal acts. The project employment contracts that private respondent was made to sign every six (6) months until his termination from employment were only a stratagem to violate private respondent’s security of tenure in the company. Verily, if from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be disregarded for being contrary to public policy.[14]
All told, public respondent rightly upheld private respondent’s status as a regular employee and a project employee.
Consequently, private respondent’s termination from his employment constitutes illegal dismissal for lack of a just or authorized cause. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. The law intends the award of backwages and similar benefits to accumulate past the date of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision until the dismissed employee is actually reinstated.
No grave abuse of discretion can, thus, be imputed to public respondent in granting private respondent’s money claims which are consequences of illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision and March 27, 2013 Resolution of public respondent in NLRC Case No. VAC-08-000508-2012 STAND.
SO ORDERED.
Delos Santos, J., Chairman, and Lagura-Yap, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, page 28.
[2] Rollo, page 43.
[3] Rollo, page 62.
[4] Rollo, page 86.
[5] Rollo, page 90.
[6] Rollo, page 91.
[7] Rollo, page 45.
[8] Rollo, page 151.
[9] Isabel N. Guzman vs. Aniano Guzman and Primitiva G. Montealto, G. R. No. 172588, March 13, 2013, citing Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Radiomarine Network, Inc., G.R. No. 152092, August 4, 2010 and Apostol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141854, October 15, 2008.
[10] Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc.vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013, citing Yu vs. Judge Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011.
[11] Macarthur Malicdem and Hermenegildo Flores vs. Marulas Industrial Corporation and Mike Mancilla, G.R. No. 204406, February 26, 2014.
[12] Rollo, pp. 128-150.
[13] Except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee.
[14] Poseidon Fishing v. NLRC, 518 Phil. 146, cited in Macarthur Malicdem and Hermenegildo Flores vs. Marulas Industrial Corporation and Mike Mancilla, supra.