TEODORA AMAR, FOR HERSELF AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN OCASO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JESUS ODIAMAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Amar versus Odiaman

The Case

This is a lecture on Amar versus Odiaman, a civil case decided by the Supreme Court in September 1960. Teodora Amar, for herself and as administratrix of the estate of the late Juan Ocaso, sued Jesus Odiaman to recover a parcel of land in Sapian, Capiz, which she claimed the defendant and others had seized in April 1948 by deceit, fraud, and false pretenses, and to recover damages for the products of the land. The case matters because it fixes the rule on extinctive prescription of actions to recover real property that accrued before the new Civil Code took effect, and it settles that the filing of a case that is later dismissed does not interrupt the prescriptive period under the old Code of Civil Procedure.

Procedural History

The plaintiff filed her original complaint in November 1958 in the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was already barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, holding that the cause of action accrued in April 1948 and that the ten-year period expired after April 1958, with no allegation of interruption. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, and the motion was denied.

The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, adding allegations that she had earlier filed a forcible entry case in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sapian, which was dismissed on appeal upon her own motion in July 1951, and another case for ownership and damages in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, which was dismissed without prejudice in September 1957. The trial court treated the motion to amend as a second motion for reconsideration and denied it, reiterating that the running of the prescriptive period is not interrupted either by extrajudicial demand or by the presentation of a judicial action. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

Facts

In April 1948, the defendant Jesus Odiaman and three others allegedly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of a parcel of land in barrio Majanlud, Sapian, Capiz, through deceit, fraud, and false pretenses. The plaintiff claimed damages of 190 pesos yearly as products of the land since 1948, plus 800 pesos for attorney's fees and incidental expenses.

Before filing the present action, the plaintiff had twice gone to court over the same land. In September 1948 she filed a forcible entry case in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sapian, which was appealed to the Court of First Instance of Capiz and dismissed in July 1951 upon her own motion. In May 1952 she filed another case for ownership and damages over the same parcel, which was dismissed in September 1957 without prejudice to refiling.

The present complaint, a refiling of that dismissed case, was instituted only in November 1958, more than ten years after the cause of action accrued in April 1948.

Issues

• Whether or not the plaintiff's action to recover the land is barred by the statute of limitations.
• Whether or not the filing of the two earlier cases interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
• Whether or not the old Code of Civil Procedure, rather than the new Civil Code, governs the prescription of the action.

Applicable Provisions

Article 1116 of the new Civil Code provides:

Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required.

This provision tells us that because the prescriptive period had already run before the new Civil Code took effect, the law previously in force governs the case.

Section 40 of Act Number 190, the old Code of Civil Procedure, provides:

An action for recovery of title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues.

This is the ten-year period that the plaintiff's action is measured against, counted from April 1948.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the action is barred. The plaintiff's cause of action accrued in April 1948, and the present action was instituted only in November 1958, or seven months after the ten-year period had elapsed. The lower court therefore correctly dismissed the complaint.

On the second issue, the Court held that the filing of the two earlier cases did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. Interpreting Section 40 of Act Number 190, the Court held that the old Code of Civil Procedure contains no specific or express provision on the suspension or interruption of the running period of prescription by the institution of an action. The Court declared that the filing of an action within the prescription period, if the plaintiff desists in its prosecution or the case is dismissed, does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations and takes no time out of the period of prescription. The parties are left in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all.

On the third issue, the Court held that the old Code of Civil Procedure governs. The plaintiff invoked Articles 1943, 1945, and 1946 of the old Civil Code, but these refer to interruption of possession in relation to acquisitive prescription, not to extinctive prescription of actions. The pertinent article, Article 1973 of the old Civil Code, had been repealed by Section 50 of Act Number 190, as held in Pelaez versus Abreu. The cases the plaintiff cited were inapplicable because their causes of action arose long before Act Number 190 took effect.

Doctrine

First, under Article 1116 of the new Civil Code, a prescriptive period that had already run before the new Civil Code took effect is governed by the law previously in force. Second, under Section 40 of Act Number 190, an action to recover title to or possession of real property must be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. Third, the filing of an action that is later dismissed, whether upon the plaintiff's own motion or without prejudice, does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period under Act Number 190, because that law contains no express provision on interruption by the institution of an action.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. The defendant won.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that under the old Code of Civil Procedure, the filing of a case that is later dismissed does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, and the parties are left as though no action had been commenced at all. Examiners like to use this case on the computation of the ten-year period to recover real property and on the rule that a dismissed action does not toll prescription.