G.R. No. L-21286. February 28, 1969
FILEMON CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENT.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Original action of Mandamus for reinstatement
of petitioner to his position as clerk expediter with respondent Government Service
Insurance System.
The record discloses that had petitioner and his counsel, Atty. Antonino de los Reyes, dealt with
the Court with truth and candor, instead of concealing the true facts and
misleading the Court, the petition would not have been given due course at the
time of its filing.
Petitioner, in this verified petition, represented to the Court
that: – he is a civil service eligible
employed as a clerk expediter in respondent GSIS since 1951; in July, 1960, the
GSIS filed administrative charges against him for “misconduct or
dishonesty” and suspended him from his office since then; on August 23,
1960, prior to the expiration of the 60-day period of preventive suspension, the
GSIS forewent the administrative charges against him and “in lieu thereof,
it elected to file in the City Fiscal’s Office in
Manila a criminal complaint (I.S. No. 60-25705) for the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial and public
documents”; on July 17, 1961, the corresponding information was filed against him before the Court of
First Instance of Manila;[1]
on July 28, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the
information against the petitioner, upon motion of the fiscal, that upon reinvestigation
it was found that “he is not in
any way connected with the said case,”[2]
but the said Court denied his motion for reinstatement with back pay;[3]
he then requested the GSIS for reinstatement but the latter refused, alleging
the existence of another criminal case for estafa
against him before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan;
this second criminal case was dismissed upon petition of the fiscal by the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan on February 5,
1963, which further directed in its Order that:
“x
x x As prayed for by
the defense counsel without objection
on the part of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, the immediate reinstatement of
the accused Filemon Cruz with payment of salary
during the period of suspension is hereby ordered.”[4]
Petitioner then wrote the GSIS per his letter of February 6,
1963, notifying it of the dismissal of said criminal charge of estafa by the Bulacan Court, and
requesting, for his immediate reinstatement, which request was reiterated in
another letter of February 12, 1963;[5] and despite the lapse of more than 30 days since then, the
GSIS refused to reinstate him.
Petitioner averred;
“That the continuous suspension of the petitioner is, under
the circumstances, equivalent to a separation from the service and petitioner has
been deprived and/ or excluded of his right to due process of law as he
(petitioner) was not given an opportunity to defend himself or through counsel,
hence, his separation is therefore unlawful;”[6]
Respondent GSIS, in its documented Answer, showed that
petitioner’s allegations were far from true; and that far from being
“under continuous suspension” since July, 1960, petitioner had been
found guilty in the administrative charges against him and separated from the service effective from the date of his suspension, after due hearing where he testified on his own behalf and was
duly represented by another counsel, Atty. Dakila
Castro; and that petitioner had been advised several times of his separation
from the service. Thus, the records
submitted by the GSIS, which have not been disputed by petitioner but on the
contrary were admitted by him in his Reply and Memorandum, as shown
hereinafter, disclose the following facts:
1. The
GSIS, far from foregoing the administrative charges against petitioner and
electing to prosecute him criminally in Manila, as claimed by petitioner,
formally proceeded with said charges before its 3-member Special Board of
Inquiry, the GSIS body created to investigate administrative cases in the
System, which formally heard the case, and petitioner testified on his own
behalf and was represented by his counsel during the proceedings;[7]
2.
As summarized in the GSIS Special Board of
Inquiry’s 7-page single-spaced memorandum and formal findings of its investigation,
dated November 28, 1960,
“The prosecution rested its case after presentation of the
three witnesses and documentary evidences, Exhibits “A” to
“N” with Messrs. Cornelia Ledda and
Rodolfo Buzon utilized as rebuttal witnesses. The defense rested its case after presenting
Mrs. Gaudencia Morales and respondent as their
witnesses and Exhibit “1” with respondent himself as the sur-rebuttal witness.”[8]
x x x x
“After a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense and taking note of the contents of the memorandum
for respondent as submitted by his counsel, the Special Board of Inquiry
deduced the following points which are clearly shown by the facts and the
evidence: (1) that both the prosecution
and the defense have no dispute as to the fact that the check in question
(Exhibit “A”) was taken out of the room of the Life Insurance Claims
Division, Office, in the afternoon of July 6, 1060, and subsequently encashed by fraudulent means; (2) That the said check was
taken unnoticed from the same division by an employee therefrom and passed it over to only one person who is an
outsider; and (3) That this person to whom it was passed is Rodolfo Buzon. The only
question in issue is, ‘Who between Messrs. Filemon
Cruz, the respondent herein, and Cornelio Ledda, was
the employee who took the check? Was it
the respondent or Mr. Ledda? From the words of the very person who
received the check himself, Mr. Rodolfo Buzon,
respondent was the one who passed the said check to him. His testimony is direct and positive, not
vague and circumstantial.”[9]
Said board, therefore, made the following recommendation and
decision:
“Premises considered and as shown
by the facts and the evidence, the Special Board of Inquiry finds respondent
guilty of the administrative offenses of (1) DISHONESTY, and (2) ACTS
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, and recommends that he be
considered resigned from the service with
prejudice to his reinstatement in the GSIS, effective as of the date of
his preventive suspension.”[10]
The GSIS Board of Trustees, per its resolution No. 956 approved
on March 15, 1961, acting pursuant to said findings of its Special Board of
Inquiry and the recommendation of Board Trustee del Rosario (to whom the Board
had previously referred the matter) and who noted that petitioner,
“participated in the illegal handling and cashing of checks, intercepting their
delivery to the prejudice of the payees”, resolved “to approve that
Mr. Filemon Cruz be considered resigned from the
service with prejudice to his reinstatement in the GSIS, effective as of the
date of his preventive suspension.” Petitioner was advised of his
separation per letters to him dated March
17, 1961, sent by registered mail and April 7, 1961.[11]
4. Contrary to petitioner’s
claims, the subject matter of the administrative case and the criminal case in
Manila against him consisted of two different GSIS checks in favor of two
distinct payees lost and fraudulently encashed, and
therefore had no relation to each other;[12]
similarly, the criminal case against petitioner in Bulacan was
an estafa charge filed by certain Bulacan residents and had no
relation to the administrative case.[13] After the dismissal in July, 1962 of the criminal case in Manila, the GSIS refused his request for
reinstatement, not on the ground of the pendency
of the other criminal case in Bulacan, (as alleged by
petitioner) but because he had already been separated from the service for
cause since March, 1961. The
letter-reply of Ramon A. Diaz dated October
29, 1962 clearly reiterated this fact of petitioner’s separation in no uncertain terms.
“October 29, 1962
“Mr. Filemon Cruz
Tambobong, Bocaue,
Bulacan
“Dear Mr. Cruz:
“We are in receipt of your letter dated October 22, 1962, with its enclosures. Please be informed that per our records in
the Special Board of Inquiry, your case
had already been resolved as early as March 15, 1961,
under Board Resolution No. 956. You were duly informed thereof in our letter
to you of March 17, 1961, under registered mail of March
20, 1961. We do not have any record of any motion for reconsideration which,
according to you in your letter, was filed with this Office.
As the records stand, you are no longer an employee of the
System. You were considered resigned
with prejudice to reinstatement in the GSIS, effective as of the date of your
preventive suspension as decided by the Board of Trustees under Resolution No.
956, series of 1961. Your contention
therefore that your case is pending is not true. Your administrative case had been terminated
and decided long ago as stated above.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RAMON A. DIAZ
General
Manager”[14]
5. It need only be noted
furthermore that in alleging that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had ordered his reinstatement with back-pay upon
dismissing the case against him on February 5, 1963,[15] supra, petitioner and his
counsel appear to have suppressed willfully the fact that the said Court in its
Amendatory Order of February 13, 1963, upon the fiscal’s
motion, had ordered the deletion of that portion as to petitioner’s reinstatement,
since this obviously was the prerogative of the Department head concerned and
beyond said Court’s authority.[16]
Petitioner, in his Reply to Answer, as well as in his Memorandum
now admit that indeed that he had been duly heard in the administrative case
and that the GSIS Board of Trustees had “adopted the initial decision of
the Special Board of Inquiry and dismissed the petitioner from the
service.”[17]
In his Reply, petitioner, through counsel, had earlier contended
that the GSIS Board of Trustees’ approval of the recommendation “that
petitioner be considered resigned effective as of July 27, 1960 is ineffectual
because petitioner has not resigned
from his position in the respondent corporation”[18] – a patently erroneous and frivolous
non-argument, since the penalty of “considered resigned” is but a
form of imposing dismissal or separation from the service.
We find, therefore, no basis for the petition in the facts and in
the law. Petitioner has not been
unlawfully excluded from the position claimed by him, but has in fact been
legally separated therefrom for cause effective from the date of his preventive
suspension on July 26, 1960 after due hearing where he appeared and was duly
represented by counsel. Respondent owed
him no duty of reinstatement, enforceable by the writ of mandamus.
A final note of advertence is required in view of the above
recital of the facts of record which show that petitioner and counsel
nevertheless filed on May 15, 1963, the verified petition at bar, suppressing
the fact of his separation from the
service of the GSIS after
due hearing, and alleging instead that he had been under “continuous
suspension’ since July 1960, and that he had not been given an opportunity to
defend himself or through counsel — allegations obviously made to give a
delusive semblance of plausibility to the petition. The admonition of the Court, speaking through
Justice Fernando, in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Associate Commissioner Josue L. Cadiao[19]
bears apt repetition: –
“This is all then that this petition presents. Clearly it should be dismissed for it is
bereft of any support in law. A word
more however is required in view of the conspicious
failure of petitioner’s counsel to exhibit the candor required of an officer of the
Court. The petition, as shown in the
motion to dismiss and in the course of the oral argument, left out many facts
within the knowledge of the petitioner with the evident purpose of imparting a
semblance of plausibility to a petition otherwise clearly lacking merit. While counsel is expected to exhibit the
utmost zeal on behalf of a client, it is likewise imperative if the rule of law
were to be truly meaningful that the orders of this Court be based on a full and
candid disclosure of relevant matters, so that whatever action may thereafter
be taken be warranted by the events as they did transpire. Members of the Bar would then be remiss in
their duty towards a court of justice if in their undoubtedly earnest effort
to serve their client’s cause, there is, as in this case, a failure to live up
to their exacting responsibility to exert the utmost diligence that their
pleadings submitted reflect the facts with truth and accuracy.”
The imposition of treble costs against
petitioner and his counsel under Rule 143 section 3 is therefore called for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. With treble costs against
petitioner and his counsel.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., did not take part.
[1]
Annex A, Petition.
[2]
Annex B, Petition.
[3]
Annex C, Petition.
[4]
Annex D, Petition.
[5]
Annexes E
and F, Petition.
[6]
Par XIV,
Petition.
[7]
Annexes A, A-1 to A-4, Answer
[8]
Annex A-5, Page 5, Answer
[9]
Annex A-5, pp. 6-7, Answer.
[10]
Annex A-5, p. 7, Answer.
[11]
Annex A-6, A-7, A-8, and Annex B, Answer.
[12]
Answer, Paragraph IV.
[13]
Answer, Paragraph VII.
[14]
Annex B, Answer.
[15]
Par. IX, Petition
and Annex D thereof.
[16]
Annexes C and D, Answer
[17]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 1-2.
[18]
Petitioner’s Reply, p. 1.
[19]
G.R. No. L-28725, March
12, 1968; see also Albert v. CFI of Manila G.R. No. L-16364, May 29, 1968.