SOTERO OLFATO, MAURO V. BARADAS, CIRIACO L. PADILLA, MANUEL S. GONZALES, CECILIO F. HERNANDEZ, LUCIO P, MENDOZA, JR., BENEDICTO C. MAGSINO, AND BIENVENIDO P. TRINIDAD, PETITIONE…

Petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary
restraining order.

In the local elections held last January 30, 1980, petitioner Sotero Olfato was the official
candidate of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for Mayor of
Tanauan, Batangas.  The other petitioners were the official NP
candidates for Members, Sangguniang Bayan, in the same municipality.  Respondent Francisco E. Lirio,
on the other hand, was the official candidate of the Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for
mayor of said town.

In the canvass of votes cast in Tanauan,
Batangas by the Tanauan
Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner Olfato and
respondent Lirio obtained the following votes:

Sotero Olfato – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – 15,293

Francisco
E. Lirio – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
13,714

The other petitioners obtained the plurality of the votes cast
for Members, Sangguniang Bayan
over their rival KBL candidates, ‘to wit:

(Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation, pp. 21-22, rec.).

On the basis of the results of its canvass of votes, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanauan, Batangas, proclaimed on February 5, 1980 petitioner Olfato
and the rest of the petitioners as the duly elected Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively.

On February 6, 1980,
petitioners took their oaths of office as Mayor and as Members, Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas, before Notary
Public. Roberto P. Laurel.

Earlier, on February 2, 1980 or three (3) days, before
petitioners were proclaimed, respondent Lirio,
together with the candidates on his ticket for Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas, filed with
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for suspension of
canvass and of proclamation of “winning candidates” for the elective
positions of Tanauan, which was docketed as
Pre-Proclamation Case No. 118, entitled “Francisco E. Lirio,
et al. vs. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, et al.” (pp. 23-30, rec.).

Invoking Section 2, paragraphs 1, 2 and 8, of Article XII (C) of
the Constitution and Section 175 of the 1978 Election Code as well as the
ruling of this Court in the case of Aratuc, et al.
vs. COMELEC, et al.(G.R. Nos. 49705-09, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251)
respondent Lirio and the members of his KBL ticket
vigorously pressed for the suspension of canvass and the proclamation of the
aforesaid “winning candidates” for the position of Mayor, Vice Mayor
and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tanauan, Batangas.

To justify their petition for the suspension of the canvass and
of proclamation, they alleged as grounds the following:

1)
Disenfranchisement of voters who were not allowed to vote although their names
were in the official list of voters;

2) Terrorism of
voters;

3) Voters with fake
ID’s who were not in the voters’ list were allowed to vote without being
certified by the corresponding election committee; and

4) Flying voters.

Thus, in said petition, Lirio alleged
that around 3,000 fake voters using forms allegedly misinterpreting paragraph 2
of Section 13 of Resolution No. 1410 of the COMELEC (General Instructions for
the Citizens Election Committee, Exh. “B”
thereof) and allegedly mimeographed by the NP headquarters in Batangas, were able to cast their votes.  Hence, Lirio
averred in said petition the following:

“In the particular case of Tanauan,
the following novel, sophisticated but effective way of cheating occurred;

“(a) Upon
representation of a certain Atty. Trinidad of the Laurel Law Offices, the
election registrar in Tanauan by the name of Atty. Quirino Opeña, issued a circular misinterpreting
par. 2 of Section 13 of Resolution No. 1410 of the COMELEC, General Instructions
for the Citizens Election Committee, which reads:

‘SEC. 13. Who may vote.-

x  x  x  x  x  x  x

‘Any registered voter whose name has been omitted in the list of
voters of the voting center shall be allowed upon presentation of his
certificate of registration or upon showing through his registration record or
any document that he is a registered voter, or if he is identified under
oath by any of the committee or by any watcher, or upon order of a court
directing the committee to allow him to vote.’

—- Sec. 13,
par. 2, COMELEC Resolution No. 1410: 
Underlining supplied.

“(b)  The instruction, a xerox
copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exh.
A, reads:

‘OFFICE OF THE ELECTION REGISTRAR

Tanauan, Batangas

‘TO ALL ELECTION COMMITTEE:

‘Any voter whose name cannot be found in the master list may be
allowed to vote provided:

‘a.  He swears under oath
that he was a voter and duly identified.

‘Any member of the Committee may swear the voter.

‘Their names will be in a separate list.

(Sgd) Quirino Opeña

QUIRINO OPEÑA

Registrar

‘January
30, 1980.’

“(c)
This is an erroneous instruction because par. 2 refers to a registered voter
whose name is in the master list or book of voters but omitted in the list of
voters in the voting center.  And the oath
must be not by the person who claims to be a voter but by ‘any member of the
committee or by any watcher.’

“(d)
Taking advantage of this instruction, the headquarters of the NP in Batangas mimeographed forms, a xerox
copy of which is hereto attached and made a part hereof as Exh.
B, and which reads:

‘COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS

OFFICE OF THE
ELECTION REGISTRAR

Tanauan, Batangas

‘Res. 1410 Sec. 13

‘— If he is
identified under oath by any member of the committee —‘

‘AKO, si ________ay sumusumpa
na ako dating botante sa Barangay
__________.

‘SAKSI:

__________________________            ______________

Member-Committee of
watcher                      Lagda

Diit na kanang hinlalaki

‘SINUMPAAN SA HARAPAN KO NGAYONG IKA 30
Ng Enero, 1980.

__________________________

Chairman:  Election Committee’

“e) Then the
leaders of the NP in Tanauan brought truckloads of
electors from voting center to another voting center, and have them filled up
forms like Exh. B hereof, and the election committees
wittingly or unwittingly allowed the persons who claimed to be voters to
vote” (pp. 25-27, rec.).

Consequently, respondent urged for the suspension of the canvass
of election returns prior to the identification and the segregation of the
alleged fake ballots from the genuine ballots.

Lirio further alleged that the number
of voters affected by all the aforesaid irregularities is estimated to be not
less than 10,000 votes which therefore will materially affect the results of
the votes for the positions of Mayor, Vice Mayor and Councilors of Tanauan.

Hence, Lirio prayed inter alia that an order be issued for the suspension of
the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of “winning candidates”
for the positions of Mayor, Vice Mayor and Councilors of Tanauan,
Batangas; that respondent therein, particularly
private respondent Olfato, et al., be required to
answer said petition and that after hearing, a new election be held for Tanauan allowing particularly the electors who were
illegally disenfranchised, to vote.

On February 9, 1980, respondent Lirio
filed with respondent Commission a supplementary petition which averred, among
others “x x x x that these election irregularities involving fake
voters and massive disenfranchisement (sufficient in number to affect the
results of the election, as in this case), are proper grounds for a
pre-proclamation controversy (although they may also be grounds for a
protest), because they affect the very integrity of the election return; in
other words, the election returns, insofar as these fake voters and
disenfranchised electors are concerned, do not speak the truth; to say the
least, they are incomplete expression of the people’s will through the
ballots.  We understand that this is the
first time that this question is being raised; and we hope that this Honorable
Commission will sustain our contention in order to prevent the ‘grabbing’ of
proclamation as in this case, and to make the sovereign will of the people
triumph” (pp. 5-6, Supplementary Petition, pp. 34-35, rec.).

Noteworthy at this point is the allegation of Lirio
in said supplementary petition mentioned in a letter they had addressed to the
Minister of Justice, Ricardo Puno, dated February 8,
1980 (Annex “A”, Supplementary Petition, p. 33, rec.), that the
aforesaid fake voters have been quantified to be 2,776 persons in 68 out
of the 102 voting centers of Tanauan.  Thus, the pertinent paragraph of their letter’to Minister Puno on the
matter reads:

“We have identified a total of 2,776 persons who were thus
allowed to vote but whose names do not appear in the masters registration list
of voters, with the help of three lawyers. 
This number is only partial since it covers only 68 out of 102 voting
centers of Tanauan. 
The lists of these persons are attached hereto with their respective
voting centers and marked as Annexes “D”, “D-1” to
“D-67”.

Hence, respondent Lirio prayed for the
annulment of the proclamation of herein petitioners and further prayed that the
matters raised in the petition for suspension of canvass and of proclamation
filed on February 2, 1980, reiterated in said supplementary petition be set for
hearing after respondents of said petition, Municipal Board of Canvassers and Sotero Olfato have filed their
answers (Supplementary Petition, pp. 31-36, rec.).

In a related development, on the same date February 9, 1980, J. Antonio Leviste,
KBL gubernatorial candidate filed with respondent COMELEC a petition to suspend
proclamation of NP gubernatorial candidate Jose C. Laurel V on the following
grounds, namely:

1) Fake voters;

2) Electors with
fake identification cards;

3) Flying voters;

4) Substitute
voters;

5) Massive
disenfranchisement; and

6) Falsification
of election returns particularly in the towns of Lobo and Tuy.

J. Antonio Leviste in said petition
prayed, among others, for a joint hearing with the petition for annulment of
proclamation filed by respondent Lirio against herein
petitioners.  Thus:

“In the present one, we are incor­porating by reference the
petition for annulment of proclamation just filed before this Honorable
Commission by Mayor Francisco Lirio of Tanauan, Batangas against the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of said town and the NP official candidate for
Mayor, Sotero Olfato.  We respectfully suggest a joint hearing of
these two petitions (pp. 41-45, rec., underscoring supplied).

On February 13, 1980, respondent Commission issued Minute
Resolution No. 9092 in P. P. Case No. 118, suspending the effects of the
proclamation of herein petitioners as duly elected Mayor and Members, Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas, and requiring
the therein respondents (petitioners herein) to file their answer to the
aforementioned supplementary petition of herein respondent Lirio
and the other KBL candidates, within five (5) days of said resolution (p. 20,
rec.).

On February 15, 1980,
respondent Lirio filed with the Court of First
Instance of Batangas an election protest ex abundante ad cautela
against petitioner Olfato on the following grounds,
namely:

a) Fake voters;

b) Electors with
fake identification cards;

c) Flying voters;

d) Substitute
voters;

e) Massive
disenfranchisement;

f)  Vote-buying;

g) Terrorism of
voters;

h) Ballots
prepared by one or more hands;

i)  Marked ballots;
and

j)  Erroneous appreciation of ballots (pp. 106?110,
rec.).

On February 16, 1980,
respondent Commission promulgated Minute Resolution No. 9119 denying the
petition of KBL gubernatorial candidate of Batangas,
J. Antonio Leviste (P.P. Case No. 360) for the
suspension of the proclamation of NP gubernatorial candidate Jose C. Laurel V.
Thus:

“xxx               xxx                   xxx                   xxx

“9119.  (PP No. 360). 
In the matter of the petition to Suspend Proclamation and the Supplement
thereto filed thru counsel by Governor J. Antonio C. Leviste
of Batangas, praying among others, for the suspension
of proclamation of the winning candidates for Governor of said province on
grounds of fake voters, fake I.D. cards, flying substitute voters,
falsification of election returns. 
Considering that the issues ventilated have been sufficiently discussed
in the petitioner’s other previous petitions, which matters should have been
raised before the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Batangas,
the Commission, on proper motion, duly seconded, RESOLVED to deny the petition,
and to refer the complaints contained therein to the Joint Task Force of the
Commission on Elections and the Ministry of Justice for possible criminal pro­secution”
(p. 40, rec., underscoring supplied).

Hence, in view of the promulgation by respondent Commission of
Minute Resolution No. 9119, herein petitioners filed with respondent Commission
on February 18, 1980, an urgent motion for reconsideration of Minute Resolution
No. 9092 (pp. 51-57, rec.).  Petitioners
claimed that the grounds averred by Leviste in the
latter’s petition for the suspension of the proclamation of NP gubernatorial
candidate for Governor of Batangas, were the same as
those relied upon by respondent Lirio.  The said “Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration” maintained that considering that respondent Commission on
Minute Resolution No. 9119, denied the Leviste
petition in P.P. Case No. 360, it should reconsider its stand in P.P. Case No.
118, by revoking and setting aside Minute Resolution No. 9092.  It further maintained that the grounds relied
upon by therein petitioners (respondents herein) were not among those
explicitly mentioned by Secs. 172, 173 and 174 of the
1978 Election Code.  Petitioners argued
that the grounds relied upon by therein petitioners (respondents herein) were
proper grounds for an election protest which fails under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
the officials involved being elective municipal officials.

On February 20, 1980,
respondent Lirio and his co-petitioners in P.P. Case
No. 118 filed with respondent Commission an opposition to the urgent motion for
reconsideration (p. 5, Respondent Lirio’s
Memorandum).

In said opposition, it was pointed out that P.P. Case No. 118 is
different from P.P. Case No. 360 (Leviste petition)
because in the former, the quanti­fication of the votes was complete and
sufficient to alter the results of the election while in the latter case the
quantification of the votes was incomplete; that the main basis of the petition
in P.P. Case No. 118 is the fact that fake voters with fake ID’s and/or fake
identification slips were allowed to vote; that Sections 172, 173 and 174 of
the 1978 Election Code are not the only grounds for annulment and/or suspension
of proclamation (citing the cases of Diaz, Sr. vs. COMELEC, 42 SCRA 426; Sinsuat vs. Pendatun, 36 SCRA
613; Kibag vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 588; Antonio vs.
COMELEC, 22 SCRA 319; and Villalon vs. COMELEC, 5
SCRA 594).  It prayed that respondents’
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration be denied and that “this
case be set for hearing and the reception of such evidence as the parties may
decide.”

On February 23, 1980, after the lapse of the five (5) day period
within which therein respondents (petitioners herein) were required to answer
as per Resolution No. 9092, and after their failure to do so, respondent
Commission, in a telegram-notice dated February 23, 1980, to respondent Lirio’s counsel, granted the prayer in the opposition to
the motion for reconsideration when it set the case “FOR HEARING ON 5
MARCH 1980 AT 10:00 A.M.  AT THE SESSION
HALL COMELEC MANILA.”

Hence, at about 11:55 A.M. of February 26, 1980, petitioners
filed with this Court the present petition wherein it is alleged inter alia that respondent Commission has acted with grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to act on petitioners’ urgent motion for
reconsideration dated February 18, 1980 and in adopting, approving and
promulgating Minute Resolution No. 9092.

Significantly, on the same date, February 26, 1980 at about 1:00
P.M., acting on said urgent motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners, respondent Commission issued Minute Resolution No. 9306.  Thus:

“xxx               xxx                   xxx

“9306.  (PP No. 118). 
In the matter of ‘FRANCISCO E. LIRIO, ET AL., vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS TANAUAN, BATANGAS and SOTERO OLFATO, ET AL.” Con­sidering the
grounds alleged in the Supplementary Petition of February 9, 1980 and respondents’ Motion for Recon­sideration
and the Opposition thereto, and after re-evaluation (sic) the grounds which are
summarized as follows:

‘a) Disenfranchisement
of voters who were not allowed to vote although their names were in the
official list of voters;

‘b) Terrorism of
voters;

‘c) Voters with fake
IDs who were not in the voters list were allowed to vote without being
certified by the corresponding election com­mittee; and

‘d) Flying voters

are proper grounds for an election protest,
the Commission, on proper motion, duly seconded, RESOLVED AS IT HEREBY RESOLVES
to dismiss the petition and to reinstate the proclamation made by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers in favor of the respondent and his entire ticket,
without prejudice to other legal remedies under the Election Code of 1978,
including the prosecution of the criminal offenses, if warranted” (p. 99,
rec., underscoring  supplied).

Likewise, on the same date, February 26, 1980, this Court dismissed the Leviste petition in G.R. No. L-52687.

On February 27, 1980,
Guillermo L. Roxas and Melquiades
Salisi, NP candidates for Vice Mayor and Member, Sangguniang Bayan, respectively,
were proclaimed as duly elected officials in their respective positions.  On February
28, 1980, they took their oaths of office.

On February 28, 1980,
this Court in a resolution required respondents to comment and not to file a
motion to dismiss within ten (10) days from notice.

On the same date, February 28, 1980, petitioners’ counsel filed a
manifestation alleging inter alia:  that the instant petition was filed at about
11:00 o’clock in the morning of February 26, 1980; that at around 6:00 o’clock
in the afternoon of the same date, they (petitioners) were informed that
respondent Commission at its session held at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
promulgated Minute Resolution No. 9306 reinstating the proclamation of
petitioners as winning candidates of Tanauan, Batangas; that at about 9:00 A.M. of February 27, 1980,
they (petitioners) were officially furnished a certified xerox
copy of said resolution (p. 61, rec.).

Also, on February 28, 1980, respondent Lirio
filed with COMELEC an urgent motion for reconsideration of said Resolution No.
9306 pointing out, among others, that in their (respondents’) opposition to
herein petitioners’ urgent motion for reconsideration, they prayed that said
motion be denied and that the case be set for hearing; that said prayer was actually
granted by respondent Commission when it set the case for hearing on March 5,
1980 as per telegram to respondents’ counsel dated February 23, 1980; that said
notice of hearing was made after the lapse of five (5) day period within which
respondents (peti­tioners herein) were required to answer and upon their
failure to do so; that when Minute Resolution No. 9306 was issued respondents
(petitioners herein) may already be considered to have been in default and
their motion for reconsideration already impliedly denied (pp. 100-102, rec.).

On February 29, 1980,
petitioner Olfato filed with respondent Commission an
opposition to respondent Lirio’s urgent motion for
reconsideration (pp. 103-105, rec.).

Thus, on the same date, February 29, 1980, peti­tioners filed
with this Court an “Urgent Manifestation Ad Cautelam”
stating among other things:  that at 5:30
P.M. of February 28, 1980, they received private respondent Lirio’s
urgent motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission’s Minute Resolution
No. 9306; that should respondent Commission act favorably on said urgent motion
for reconsideration, petitioners will pursue the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for temporary prohibitory injunction and
restraining order with the corresponding amendments (p. 65, rec.).

On March 1, 1980,
respondent Commission heard the parties in oral arguments, after which
respondent Lirio’s urgent motion for reconsideration
and peti­tioners’ opposition thereto were deemed submitted for resolution.

On March 3, 1980,
petitioners assumed their respective offices pursuant to Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52.

On March 10, 1980,
respondent Lirio filed with this Court a
manifestation alleging that the present petition has become moot and academic
in view of COMELEC Reso­lution No. 9306 dated February 26, 1980, allowing petitioners to be proclaimed
(p. 67, rec.).

On March 11, 1980,
respondent Commission filed with this Court a manifestation with motion to
suspend the period for filing its comment in view of the like­lihood that the
case may indeed become moot and academic (pp. 69-72, rec.).

On March 12, 1980,
respondent Commission adopted, approved and promulgated Minute Resolution No.
9558, subject of the present amended petition. 
Thus:

“xxx               xxx                   xxx                   xxx

“9558.  This is a petition for recon­sideration of Comelec Resolution No. 9306 dated February 26, 1980, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“RESOLVED AS IT HEREBY RESOLVES to dismiss the petition and to
reinstate the proclamation made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers in favor
of the respondent and his entire ticket, without prejudice to other legal
remedies under the Election Code of 1978, including the prosecution of the
criminal offenses, if warranted.

“After considering the comments of the respondents, as well as
the oral arguments of both parties at the hearing held on March 1, 1980, the
Commission, on proper motion, duly seconded, RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to
amend Resolution No. 9306 as follows:

“1.   To
reinstate the petition of Francisco Lirio, et al. by
requiring the respondents to file their answer (not a motion to dismiss) within
ten (10) days from receipt of this order.

“2.  To consider the proclamation made in favor
of SOTERO OLFATO and his ticket as one made in accordance with Comelec Reso­lution No. 9440, dated March 6, 1980, in that
said proclamation is temporary in nature as it is subject to the final outcome
of P.P. No. 118” (p. 98, rec., underscoring supplied).

On March 21, 1980,
petitioners filed with this Court the instant amended petition seeking to
review and set aside Minute Resolution No. 9558, adopted by respondent
Commission on March 12, 1980
(pp. 77-97, rec.).

On March 24, 1980,
petitioners filed their answer in P.P. Case No. 118, with respondent Commission
(p. 8, Respondent Lirio’s memorandum).

On April 10, 1980,
this Court adopted a resolution which admitted the amended petition of
petitioners, required the respondents to answer the same and not to file a
motion to dismiss and issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining,
respondent Commission from:

“a) enforcing
its Minute Resolution No. 9558 in P.P. Case No. 118;

“b) taking any
further action or proceeding in said P.P. Case No. 118; and

“c) performing any
act or taking any action or proceeding of whatever nature that may prevent or
obstruct the lawful exercise and discharge by petitioners of their powers and
functions as duly elected municipal officials of Tanauan,
Batangas” (pp. 111-112, rec.).

On April 25, 1980,
private respondent Francisco E. Lirio filed his
answer to the amended petition of, petitioners (pp. 121-134, rec.).

On May 8, 1980,
this Court in a resolution, ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda.

On May 9, 1980,
respondent Commission on Elections filed its answer to the amended petition
(pp. 135-145, rec.).

Thus, upon the filing by the parties of their respective
memoranda, the instant petition is now before US for resolution.

Basically, the main objection of the petitioners is the alleged
want of jurisdiction of respondent Commission on Elections over P.P. Case No.
118, entitled “Francisco E. Lirio, et al. vs.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers, et al.”

Petitioners contend that while Pre-Proclamation Case No. 118, was
filed by respondent Lirio, et al. as a
pre-proclamation controversy, the grounds relied upon by Lirio
are not proper grounds in a pre-proclamation controversy but proper grounds in
an election protest.

To reiterate, the petition of respondent Lirio,
docketed as Pre-Proclamation Case No. 118, alleges the following grounds for
the suspension of petitioners’ proclamation:

1.  Disenfranchisement of voters who were not
allowed to vote although their names were in the official list of voters;

2.  Turncoatism of
voters;

3.  Voters with fake IDs who were not in the
voters’ list were allowed to vote without being certified by the corresponding
election committee;

4.  Flying voters.

In paragraph 6 of the supplementary petition dated February 9,
1980 filed by respondent Lirio, he averred, among
others, that:

“6.  It is respectfully submitted that these
irregularities involving fake voters and massive disenfranchisement
(sufficient in number to affect the results of the election, as in this case), are
proper grounds for a pre-proclamation controversy (although they may
also be grounds for a protest) because they affect the very integrity of
the election returns, insofar as these fake voters and disenfranchised electors
are concerned, do not speak the truth; to say the least, they are incomplete
expressions of people’s will through the ballots.  We understand that this is the first time
that this question is being raised; x x x x” (pp. 34-35, rec.,
broken underscoring supplied).

Likewise, page 11 of respondent Lirio’s
memorandum states:

“At the outset, we would wish to state that the main basis
of private respondent Lirio‘ s petition and
Supplemental Petition in P.P. Case No. 118 for the annulment/suspension of the
proclamation of petitioners Olfato, et al. is the
fact that fake voters with farce IDs and/ or with fake identification slips
were allowed to vote and their spurious votes were reflected in the election
returns, all authored by NP candidate Olfato, his
leaders and henchmen.  The other
grounds of massive disenfranchisement, substitute voters, flying voters and
terrorism of voters are only corollary maters (sic) and included therein only
for the purpose of showing the extensiveness of the fraud committed in the
Municipality of Tanauan, Batangas
in the January 30, 1980 elections.  Hence,
it is immaterial that the said other grounds are proper only for election
protest” (broken underscoring supplied).

Hence, from the foregoing averments of respondent Lirio, petitioners contend that the same amount to an
admission on Lirio’s part that the grounds adduced by
him (Lirio) with the exception of fake voters with
false IDs and fake identification slips, as Lirio
claims, are all proper in an election protest and not in a pre-proclamation
controversy.

Petitioners strongly assert that the grounds for a
pre-proclamation controversy under the present applicable laws are those
expressly enumerated in Section 175 of the 1978 Election Code.  Thus, they say:

“The crucial question now left to be resolved and upon which
the jurisdiction of respondent Commission hinges is whether the respondent
Commission has power and authority to inquire into the allegation of fake
voters, with fake IDs and fake identification slips in a pre-proclamation
controversy pursuant to its power vested by law under Section 175 of
Presidential Decree 1296 more popularly known as the 1978 Election Code.

“It is our contention that respondent Commission has no
jurisdiction to determine, in a pre-proclamation controversy, whether
indeed there had been fake voters and thereafter, to annul a proclamation
already made, for Section 175 is a delimitation on the broad powers
vested by law in the Commission on Elections” (p. 9, Petitioners
Memorandum).

Section 175 of the 1978 Election Code reads:

“Section 175. 
Suspension and annulment of proclamation.  – The Com­mission shall be the sole judge
of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or
rulings shall be final and executory.  It may, motu
proprio or upon written petition, and after
due notice and hearing, order the suspension of the proclamation of a
candidate-elect or annul any proclama­tion, if one has been made, on any of
the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 hereof”
(underscoring supplied).

Petitioners further assert that “nowhere in the 1978
Election Code are other grounds, similar or analogous, enumerated or provided
for the suspension or annulment of the proclamation other than those in
Sections 172, 173 and 174.”

Section 172 provides:

“Section 172.  Material defects
in the election returns.  – If it should
clearly appear that some requisites in form or data had been omitted in the
election returns, the board shall return them by the most expeditious means, to
the corresponding election committee for correction.  Said election returns, however, shall not be
returned for a recount of the ballots or for any alteration of the number of
votes set forth therein:  Provided, That
in case of the omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate
and/or his corresponding votes, the board of canvassers shall require the
election committee concerned to complete the necessary data in the election
returns and affix therein their initials: 
Provided, further, That if the votes omitted in the returns cannot be
ascertained by other means except by recounting the ballots, the Commission
after satisfying itself that the identity and integrity of the ballot box have
not been violated, and also after satisfying itself that the integrity of the
ballots therein has been duly preserved, order the committee to count the votes
for the candidate affected, or his representative and thereafter complete the
returns.”

Section 173 provides:

“Section 173.  When
election returns appear to be tampered with or falsified.  -If the election returns submitted to the
board of canvassers appear to be tampered with, altered or falsified after
it has left the hands of the election committee, the board shall use the
other authentic copies of said election returns and, if necessary, the copy
inside the ballot box which upon previous authority given by the Commission may
be retrieved in accordance with Section 163 hereof.  If the other copies of the returns are like­wise
tampered with, altered, or falsified, the board of canvassers or any candidate
affected shall bring the matter to the attention of the Commission.  The Commission shall then, after giving
notice to all candidates concerned and after satisfying itself that nothing in
the ballot box indicates that its identity and integrity have been violated,
order the opening of the ballot box and likewise after satisfying itself that
the integrity of the ballots therein has been duly preserved shall order the
election com­mittee to recount the votes of the candidates affected and prepare
a new return which shall then be used by the board of canvassers as basis of
the canvass” (underscoring supplied).

And Section 174 provides:

“Section 174. 
Discrepancies in election returns. 
– In case it appears to the board of canvassers that there exists
discrepancies in the other authentic copies of the election returns from a
voting center or discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in words and
figures in the same return and in either case, the difference affects the
results of the election, the Commission, upon motion of the board of canvassers
or any candidate affected and after due notice to all candidates concerned,
shall proceed summarily to determine whether the integrity of the ballot box
had been preserved and once satisfied thereof, shall order the opening of the
ballot box to recount the votes cast in the voting center solely for the
purpose of determining the true result of the count of votes of the candidates
concerned:  Provided, however, That if
upon the opening of the ballot box it should appear that there are evidences or
signs of replacement or tampering of the ballots, the Commission shall not
recount the ballots but shall forthwith seal the ballot box and order its
safekeeping.”

It is therefore clear from the above-quoted provisions that
Section 172 speaks of material defects in the election returns, Section 173
speaks of tampered, altered or falsified returns and Section 174 speaks of
discrepancies of election returns.

Hence, petitioners further averred that “it is clear that fake
voters, fake IDs and fake identification slips are fraudulent election
practices which may not be entertained by the respondent Commission in a
pre-proclamation controversy” (p. 17, Petitioners’ Memorandum,
underscoring supplied).

Petitioners in defending the alleged authenticity of the returns
argued that “even assuming arguendo that
voters with fake IDs and false identification slips, were able to vote in the
January 30, 1980 elections, the election returns prepared on the basis of the
ballots cast and counted cannot be classified as spurious or manufactured.  Had no elections taken place and yet, returns
were made and submitted by the election committee, no doubt these returns would
be spurious.  But where votes are cast,
counted and returns prepared, the latter cannot be considered as manufactured
or falsified.”

“The genuineness of the election returns is there­fore
unquestionable.  What may probably be
questioned are the ballots themselves and this cannot be done in a
pre-proclamation controversy where petitioners seek to nullify a proclamation
validly made for pre?proclamation controversies, being summary in nature,
must be disposed of with little or no delay” (p. 13, Petitioners’
Memorandum, underscoring supplied).

Respondent Lirio, in vehemently
refuting the alleged want of jurisdiction of respondent Commission, on page 12
of his memorandum states:

“It is now our submission that the respondent COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the nature of P.P. Case No. 118.

“The Constitution grants respondent COMELEC the general power to
‘enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections;’ makes
it the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualification of elections x x x
provincial and city officials, and mandates it to ‘perform such other functions
as may be provided by law’ (Sec. 1, pars. 1, 2 and 8, Art. XII, Constitution).

“The 1978 Election Code, which Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 expressly made applicable to the January 30,
1980 local elections, provides that ‘the Commission shall be the sole judge of
all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings
shall be final and executory‘ (Sec. 175) and that it
shall ‘have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly
and honest elections’ (1st par., Sec. 185), with power and authority to
‘enforce and execute the decisions, directives, orders and instructions on any
matter affecting the conduct of any electoral process’ (Sec. 185[c]).”

The previous rule that the Comelec
cannot go beyond the election returns in canvassing the same (NP vs. Comelec, 85 Phil. 149, 157-158; Dizon
vs. Provincial Board, 52 Phil. 47, 57-59) had been eroded in subsequent cases
since 1966.

Thus in the 1966 case of Lagumbay vs. Comelec (L-25444, Jan. 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 175), this Court
empowered the Commission on Elections to nullify certain contested returns on
the ground of “statistical improbabilities”, when WE sustained the
authority of the Commission to examine voting records, the number of ballots
and the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every
candidate, when the returns are obviously false or fabricated. In said case, WE
adopted “a practical approach to the Commission’s mission to insure a free
and honest elections” by denying prima facie recognition to
the election returns on the ground that they were manifestly manufactured or
falsified.

In the Lagumbay case, this Court
further-stated:

“In Mitchell vs. Stevens supra, the returns showed a
noticeable excess of votes over the number of registered voters, and the court
rejected the returns as obviously ‘manufactured’.  Why? 
The excess could have been due to the fact that, disregarding all
pertinent data, the election officers wrote the number of votes their fancy
dictated; and so the return was literally a ‘manufactured’, ‘fabricated’
return.  Or maybe because persons other
than voters, were permitted to take part and vote; or because registered voters
cast more than one ballot each, or because those in charge of the tally sheet
falsified their counts.  Hence, as the
Mitchell decision concluded, the returns were ‘not true returns x x x but simply manufactured
evidences of an attempt to defeat the popular will.’ All these possibilities
and/or probabilities were plain fraudulent practices, resulting in
misrepresentation of the election outcome. ‘Manufactured’ was the word used.
‘Fabricated’ or ‘false’ could as well have been employed.”

“xxx               xxx                   xxx                   xxx.

“Of course we agree that frauds in the holding of the election
should be handled – and finally settled – by the corresponding courts or
electoral tribunals.  That is the general
rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence, is necessary; but where the
fraud is so palpable from the return itself (res
ipsa loquitur
– the thing speaks for itself, there is no reason to accept it and give it prima
facie value.

“At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty
precincts may ultimately be ascertained before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.  (This answers the erroneous
claim that our decision usurps functions of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal).  All we hold now, is that the
returns show ‘prima facie‘ that they do not reflect true and
valid reports of regular voting.  The con­trary
may be shown by candidate Climaco -in the
corresponding election protest.

“The well-known delay in the adjudication of election protests
often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a
vindication, when the term of office is about to expire, or has expired.  And so the notion has spread among candidates
for public office that the ‘important thing’ is the proclamation; and to win
it, they or their partisans have tolerated or abetted the tampering or the
‘manufacture’ of election returns just to get the proclamation, and then let
the victimized candidate to file the protest, and spend his money to work for
an empty triumph.

“It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in
all previous elections.  Never was the
point pressed upon us in a more clear-cut manner.  And without, in any way modifying our stand
as outlined in the Nacionalista Party vs. Commission
decision, we feel the mores of the day require application – even extension –
of the principle in the Mitchell decision, which is realistic and common sensical even as it strikes a blow at such pernicious
‘grab-the ­proclamation-prolong-the-protest’ slogan of some candidates or
parties.

“xxx   xxx “(16
SCRA, 178, 179?180).

Likewise, in the 1971 case of Diaz, Sr. vs. Com­mission on
Elections (L-33378, Nov. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 426, 435), WE reiterated the above
doctrine.  In said Diaz case, the
petitioner’s petition for the amendment of all the election returns from the
municipality of Sagada, Mountain Province, in
connection with the 1970 elections for delegate of said Province to the
Constitutional Convention, and for the exclusion from the canvass of all the
returns aforesaid, for being spurious, fabricated and/or fictitious, was
dismissed by the respondent Comelec.  Petitioner therein charged that many election
inspectors in Sagada had been improperly appointed
(because they had been previously found by the House Electoral Tribunal to have
deliberately tolerated and abetted the commission of frauds in Sagada in connection with the 1961 elections), and
that the elections for convention delegates (3) in said municipality were
tainted with fraud and terrorism, and other irregularities.  It prompted the Comelec
to order the bringing to Manila of the precinct book of voters and CE form 39 for
all precincts of Sagada and had the same examined by
the fingerprint and handwriting experts of the Commission and the NBI.  While the Comelec
discovered the existence of fraudulent practices and commission of other
election irregularities such as illegal voting, nevertheless it sustained the
validity of the returns from Sagada, on the ground
that more than one-half of those who voted were the registered voters in said
precincts (underscoring supplied).

This Court in overruling the Commission on Elections anchored its
conclusion on the reports of the finger­print experts on their examination of
the precinct books of voters and other voting records.  In effect, this Court sanctioned the Comelec’s procedure, upon establishment of a strong prima
facie case, of causing the examination by fingerprint and handwriting
experts and analysis of the signatures and fingerprints of the precinct books
of voters and the CE 39’s and voting records, in order to determine whether the
reported elections were a sham amounting to no election at all and accordingly
accord no prima facie value to the election returns and reject
them as manufactured or false returns.

Thus, this Court concluded that where all the evidence and
circumstances point to a systematic plan of allowing persons who were not
registered voters to cast their ballots in all the precincts of a certain
municipality and to count such spurious ballots and take them into account in
the returns, there is no alternative but to consider said returns as deliberately
prepared with a view to alter the true results of the voting, through either
malice or coercion.  The returns thereby
become false or falsified.

In the Diaz vs. Comelec case, this
Supreme Tribunal, through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, stressed:

“Thus the analysis of the returns for the six precincts
validated by the Commission leads to the same conclusion as that derived from a
consideration of all the returns from Sagada, to
wit:  that even if all the votes cast by
persons identified as registered voters were to be added to the votes cast by
persons who can not be definitely ascertained as registered or not, and
granting, ad arguendo, that all of them
voted for respondent Daoas, still the resulting total
is much below the number of votes credited to the latter in the returns for Sagada.  Plainly, the
said returns cannot be relied upon and should be regarded as fictitious or
manufactured and excluded from the canvass of the votes cast for the different
candidates in the district.  This
conclusion becomes all the more imperative when account is taken of the
additional circumstances that (a) of the 2,188 ballots cast in Sagada in the 1970 election for convention delegates,
nearly one-half (1,012) were cast by persons definitely identified as not
registered therein, and this number may even increase because some of the 399
thumbprints and/or signatures that could not be identified may have been cast
by non-registered persons; (b) that such wholesale illegal voting could not
have taken place without the connivance of the inspectors, either maliciously
or through intimidation, as found by COMELEC in its resolution and the true
results can not be ascertained; (c) that 16 of the inspectors and poll clerks
who acted as such in the 1970 elections in Sagada had
been found by the House Electoral Tribunal to have ‘deliberately tolerated and
abetted the commission of frauds’ in the 1961 elections (H.E.T. Case No. 145);
(d) that Sagada has been notorious for massive and
large scale frauds in the past, as found by COMELEC itself; and (e) that the
resolution of the COMELEC in this case contradicts that which it adopted in
connection with the returns from Karomatan, Lanao, all of which were rejected and excluded from canvass
on account of similar anomalies (Usam vs. Comelec, C.R. No. L-33325), when justice and equity
imperatively demand that there should be no discrimi­nation in the application
of the rules by COMELEC.

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“In the leading case of Gardiner vs. Romulo,
26 Phil. 521, this Court quoted with approval from a similar case, Russel vs. State;

“Russell vs. State (11 Kan. 236), the court said in part: ‘Now
comes the contestant and says that the record (of the election board) is a lie,
and proves that 127 of the names so recorded as the names of legal voters are
fictitious, and that 127 spurious ballots were cast into the ballot box.  In other words, he proves absolutely that
nearly one-fourth of this record is false. 
And this falsehood cannot have been the result of ignorance or
mistake.  It is not possible that this
could have happened without the knowledge, consent, and connivance of both the
clerks, and some, at least, if not all, of the judges.  Surely, there was criminal culpability if not
actual, intentional wrongdoing on the part of all the officers of that election
board.  But, says the contestee,
the whole record is not shown to be false. 
Reject the 127 votes proved to have been spurious, and accept the
balance not thus proven, In other words, accept all the re­cord not proved
untrue.  If the falsehood resulted from
mere mistake, there would be great force in this demand.  So also, if the falsehood resulted from the
fraud or wrong-doing of others than the board. 
But where the recording officers are proved to have knowingly made a
largely false and fraudulent record, how can we place reliance on any of the
record?  Falsus
in uno, falus
in omnibus.

‘”It doubtless happens that some legal voters are by this
decision deprived of the benefit of their votes.  Perhaps there were honest votes cast, enough
to have given the majority to Fredonia. 
A large majority of the citizens of Fredonia are honest men, and are
doubtless as much grieved as we at this terrible trespass on the purity of the
ballot box.  May this example preach its
lesson, not alone to them, but equally to every citizen of the State.  They who in Rome watched and kept the sacred
fire were vestal virgins.  Equally pure
should they be who watch and guard that which is far more to us than mystic
altar fires.” (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil.
521, 559-560).’

“And this Court concluded:

 ‘”In concluding this
extremely disagreeable task, we desire to state that we are aware of the
seriousness of disenfranchising the innocent electors of a whole precinct for
acts done by others.  We are not
unmindful of the force of the argument that if courts set aside the returns
from a precinct for light and trifling causes, it will encourage the
unscrupulous to seek profit by the honest mistakes of election officers
committed in the conscientious performance of their duties.  On the other hand we appreciate the
importance to the people of enforcing those statutory provisions which the
legislature have provided to insure a free and undefiled expression of the
popular will at the polls, to the extent that fraud may not flourish under the
guise of honesty.  The right of suffrage
is of comparatively recent origin in this country.  If at this early stage of its existence, the
courts are to countenance such bold disregard of the law as was exhibited in
the Municipality of Camiling at the last general
election, representative government will soon become a farce; a mere catchword
or an empty illusion.  Regardless of the
political unrest engendered by such deplorable litigation as the present and
its enormous expense to the contestants, we are of the opinion that a firm
stand against fraudulent elections must now be taken, once for all.  If no encouragement is offered to vicious
practices, they will, at least, never grow larger” (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521, 565-566).’

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“As already observed, WE are not here dealing with occasional
or sporadic irregularities that succeeded in surprising the good faith of the
election inspectors.  All the evidence
and circumstances point to a systematic plan of allowing persons who were not
registered voters in Sagada to cast their ballots in
all the precincts of Sagada, and to count such
spurious ballots and take them into account in the returns.  There is thus no alternative but to con­sider
said returns as deliberately prepared with a view to alter the real results of
the voting, through either malice or coercion. 
In either case, the returns must be deemed manufactured or falsified,
without any title to be included in the canvass of votes for delegates by the
Pro­vincial Board of Canvassers for the Mountain Province” (supra,
pp. 432-434, 435).

Incidentally, the 1971 Diaz ruling was reiterated on the same
date (November 29, 1971) the Diaz case was resolved, in the case of Estaniel vs. Commission on Elections (L-334453, Nov. 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 436).

In the Estaniel case, Mr. Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, invoked the Diaz ruling
and emphasized:

“In the Sagada case resolved just
now by the Court in Diaz vs. Comelec, L-33378,
and likewise involving a delegate seat (from the Mountain Province) for the
Constitutional Convention under Republic Act No. 6132, the Court sanctioned the
Comelec’s procedure, upon establishment of a strong prima
facie case, of causing the examination and analysis of the signatures
and fingerprints of the precinct books of voters and the CE 39’s and voting
records, in order to determine whether the reported elections were sham and
tantamount to no election at all and accordingly accord no prima facie
value to the election returns and reject them as manufactured and false
returns.

“The Court, however, therein, emphasized through Mr. Justice
Reyes that ‘justice and equity imperatively demand that there should be no
discrimi­nation in the application of the rules by Comelec.’

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“Much as the Court wishes to pronounce finis to this contest
(which must have been likewise the Comelec’s
well-meaning but erroneously implemented motivation for its questioned
resolution), it is there­fore constrained to remand the case to the Comelec, in the interest of the electorate of Cotabato as well as of the contending candidates, for the
carrying out of the examination and analysis by Comelec’s
own and deputized fingerprint and handwriting experts of the voting records in
the four municipalities of Pikit, Pagalungan,
Maganoy and Dinaig, and for
the questioning of the chairmen of the boards of inspectors in said four towns,
during the November, 1970 elections for Constitutional Con­vention delegates,
to the extent necessary for Comelec to determine
whether or not the elections therein where sham and the corresponding election
returns should be rejected and excluded as manufactured returns and insofar as
the results for tenth place winner would be affected thereby ” (supra,
pp. 446, 447).

Moreover, a month later, in the case of Usman
vs. Comelec (Dec. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 667), Mr. Chief
Justice Castro, then Associate Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:

“On November 12, 1970, Luis Quibranza,
Francisco Abalos, Alfredo Bosico,
Luis Buendia and Bonifacio Legaspi (hereinafter referred to as the Comelec
petitioners), candidates for delegate in the aforementioned district,
petitioned the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as the Comelec) for a declaration of nullity of the election returns
from all the precincts of seven municipalities and municipal districts – Karomatan, Pantao-Ragat, Matungao Munai, Tangcal, Magsaysay, and Nunungan and four barrios – Kapatagan,
Salvador, Lala, and Kauswagan
of Lanao del Norte. 
The Comelec petitioners alleged as grounds
that in the said municipalities and barrios, no actual voting took place
because of ‘terrorism and other machinations,’ and that

‘fictitious election returns were prepared under duress, and the
influence of terrorism and/or bribery wherein, it was made to appear that
certain favored candidates obtained most, if not all the votes fictitiously
cast therein, while petitioners were made to appear as having obtained very
few, if no votes at all.’

“The Comelec petitioners
particularly stressed that the canvassing of the fictitious votes and the
preparation of the election returns from the precincts of Karomatan
were in violation of the procedure laid down in resolution 769 of the Comelec.  They prayed
for the holding of a special election in the municipalities and barrios
concerned and, ad interim, the suspension of the canvass as well
as the proclamation of the winning candidates until after hearing and decision
on the merits of the petition.

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“On November 24, 1970, the Comelec petitioners,
joined by another candidate, Petri Ali Pacasum,
amended their peti­tion, asking for the exclusion of the election returns from
the precincts of the barrios of Kapatagan, Salvador, Lala, and Kauswagan; except those
from precincts 16 and 24 of Kapatagan and precincts
14 and 14-A of Salvador, and repeating their allegation that no elections
actually took place in the questioned precincts,

‘and/or in the remote possibility that elections had been
initiated, they were suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting because of violence or terrorism and that the votes not cast therein
are sufficient to affect the results of the elections,’

and adding that the election returns from
the said precincts

‘…. were prepared prior to the elections, and/or had been
tampered with and/or are statistically improbable in that the number of voters
who allegedly cast their votes is out of proportion to the actual population in
those municipalities and municipal districts concerned.’

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“Thus, Usman, on March 22, 1971,
filed the present petition for review, (1) challenging the jurisdiction of the Comelec in resolving the issue relating to the genuineness
and authenticity of the disputed election returns, and in inquiring into the
regularity or irregularity of the thumbmarks and
signatures of the voters who voted; (2) questioning the regularity of the
proceedings adopted by the Comelec in relation to the
exercise of its jurisdiction; and (3) assailing the probative value of the
findings made regarding the sig­natures and thumbmarks
of the voters who voted in the 42 precincts of Karomatan.  Usman prayed for
(1) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Comelec from enforcing its resolution dated March 25, 1971;
(2) the setting aside of the Comelec resolution dated
March 12, 1971 and the inclusion of the results from the 42 precincts of Karomatan in the canvass of the election returns and his
proclamation as the winning candidate; and (3) in case this Court sustains the
aforesaid Comelec resolution, the calling of a
special election in all the 42 precincts of Karomatan,
pursuant to section 17(e) of Republic Act 6132 (Section 17[e] states: ‘Whenever
the Commission determines, after notice and hearing, that no voting has been
held or that voting has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism, and the votes not
cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election, the
Commission may call for the holding or continuation of the election in the
precinct or precincts concerned.  Pending
such call, no candidate whose election may be affected by the holding or
continuation of the election, shall be proclaimed elected.’)

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“Usman’s main argument hinges
entirely on what he views as the well-circumscribed jurisdiction of the Comelec in pre-proclamation controversies.  He argues that the Comelec,
in such proceedings –­summary in nature and character –­has jurisdiction only
to determine questions relating to the qualification of the members of the
board of canvassers, the completeness or incompleteness of a canvass, and the
integrity and, authenticity of election returns.

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“The broad power of the Comelec,
conferred upon it by the Constitution, to enforce and administer ‘all laws
relative to the conduct of elections’ and to decide all administrative
questions affecting elections ‘for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and
honest elections,’ has been the key in the resolution of many pre-proclamation
controversies involving the integrity and authenticity of election
returns.  Invoking the aforestated power of the Comelec,
we justified the action and upheld the authority of the Comelec
to order the exclusion of ‘obviously manufactured’ returns (Lagumbay
vs. Climaco and Comelec, 16
SCRA 175), or tampered returns (Cauton vs. Comelec and Sanidad, 19 SCRA
911), or returns prepared under threats and coercion or under circumstances
affecting the returns’ integrity and authenticity (Pacis
vs. Comelec, 25 SCRA 391; Antonio, Jr. vs. Comelec, et al., 32 SCRA 319), emphasizing the duty of the Comelec to see to the use and inclusion in the canvass of
only genuine elections.

“Several circumstances, defying exact description and
dependent mainly on the factual milieu of the parti­cular controversy, have the
effect of destroying the integrity and authenticity of disputed election
returns and of avoiding their prima facie value and
character.  If satisfactorily proven,
although in a summary proceeding, such circumstances as alleged by the affected
or interested parties, stamp the election returns with the indelible mark of
falsity and irregularity, and, consequently, of unreliability, and justify
their exclusion from the canvass.

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“In the performance of its duty to guard against the use and
inclusion of returns prepared under circumstances showing their falsity in the
canvass of election results, the Comelec should not
be hampered in the choice of effective means and methods to fully ascertain the
genuineness and regularity of disputed election returns.  To establish the indubitable existence of any
of such circumstances — necessarily not evident from an examination of the
election returns themselves — demands recourse to proof independent of the
election returns or to evidence aliunde.

“At this juncture, we find it necessary to mention that the
results of the examination and analysis of the voters’ fingerprints and
signatures indicating that many of the registered voters have been voted for by
persons not even registered in the 42 precincts of Karomatan,
constituted not the sole factor which prompted the Comelec
to declare the 42 election returns as ‘spurious and/or manufactured.’ A
totality of circumstances — not merely of persuasive but of compelling
character — led the Comelec to consider and conclude
that the aforesaid election returns are ‘spurious and/or manufactured’ and
therefore unworthy of inclusion in the canvass of the election results.  The Comelec heavily
relied on the following noteworthy circumstances:

“1.  The very high percentage of voting in the 42
precincts of Karomatan — with 100% voting in 7
precincts where the number of votes exceeded the number of registered voters —
in the whole town of Karomatan, there appeared an
excess of 138 votes over the number of registered voters;

“2.  The day before the elections, the members of
the boards of inspectors of Karomatan were summoned
to the office of the mayor where they were ‘asked’ to ‘cooperate’ by making
some candidates win in their respective precincts;

“3.  The members of the boards of inspectors of Karomatan, either out of fear due to terrorism or in
connivance with those responsible for the election anomalies, allowed voting by
persons other than those registered as voters in their respective precincts;

“4.  The other irregularities -­among them,
multiple registration, blurred fingerprints making identifi­cation impossible,
and ID pictures attached to CE forms 1 showing the registered voters as minors
— appearing in the precinct books of voters of Karomatan
making possible the per­petration of the election anomalies; and

“5.  xxx                      xxx                   xxx.

“6.  We fully agree with the Comelec
that the totality of all the foregoing circumstances, taken together with the
findings of the Fingerprint Identification Division of the Comelec
and of the Questioned Documents experts of the NBI, more than suffices to com­pletely
overcome the prima facie value of the 42 election returns from Karomatan, strongly belying their integrity and
authenticity.  These circumstances
definitely point, not merely to a few isolated instances of irregularities
affecting the integrity and authenticity of the election returns, but to an
organized, well-directed large-scale operation to make a mockery of the
elections in Karomatan.  We find and so hold that the election returns
from the 42 precincts in question were prepared under circumstances
conclusively showing that they are false, and are so devoid of value as to be
completely unworthy of inclusion in the canvass.  We have no alternative but to affirm the Comelec’s finding that they are spurious and manufactured.

“xxx   xxx” (supra,
pp. 670-671, 672, 678, 683, 686, 687-689).

Thus, it becomes clear from the above rulings that respondent
Commission on Elections has the power and authority to inquire into the
allegation of fake voters, with fake IDs and fake identification slips in a
pre-proclamation controversy in order to determine the authenticity or
integrity of the election returns or whether such election returns faithfully
record that only registered or genuine electors were allowed to vote.

This ruling was further underscored in the case of Abes vs. Comelec decided on
December 15, 1967 (21 SCRA 1252, 1255-1256), where this Court held: “…
Neither Constitution nor statute has granted Comelec
or the board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of election returns, to
look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.” Thus,
it is noted that before the canvass the Comelec must
first determine the genuineness and integrity of the election returns.  If on the face of the election returns the
authenticity, thereof is not patent, then the Comelec
can go beyond the face thereof to satisfy itself of their authenticity or
integrity.

While admittedly the Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction
over election contests involving municipal or municipal offices (Sec. 190, 1978
Election Code), WE must not lose sight of the fact that the instant suit
involved a pre-proclamation controversy filed by the private respondent before
the respondent Commission, Indeed, it is immaterial if some of the grounds
adduced by the private respondent (petitioner therein) are grounds for an
election contest rather than grounds for a pre-proclamation controversy.

Section 175 (first sentence) of the 1978 Election Code explicitly
provides that “the Commission shall be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings
shall be final and executory” (emphasis
supplied).

The law says “all”, and therefore covers all
pre-proclamation controversies involving national, provincial, city and
municipal elective officials.  The law
does not distinguish nor contain qualifications.

Although the second sentence of Section 175 of the 1978 Election
Code provides that suspension or annulment of a proclamation may be made if
based on the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174, WE are not
prepared to declare that the enumeration is exclusive.  The enumeration made in Section 175 only
emphasizes the old rulings of this Court and statutory provisions on the matter
affirming the power of the Comelec to suspend or
annul a proclamation based on material defects in the election returns,
tampered, altered, falsified election returns or in case of discrepancies in
the election returns.

It may not be amiss to state also that Sections 172, 173 and 174
of the 1978 Election Code are substantially a reproduction of Sections 204, 205
and 206 respectively of the 1971 Election Code.

Section 204 provides:

“Section 204.  Material
defects in the election returns.  – If it
should clearly appear that some requisite in form or data had been omitted in
the election returns, the board shall return them by the most expeditious means,
to the corresponding boards of inspectors for correction.  Said election returns, however, shall not be
returned for a recount of the ballots or for any alteration of the number of
votes set forth therein:  Provided, That
in case of the omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate
and/or his corresponding votes, the board of canvassers shall require the board
of inspectors concerned to complete the necessary data in the election returns
and affix therein their initials: 
Provided, further, That if the votes omitted to be placed in the return
cannot be ascertained by other means except by recounting the ballots, the
Commission on Elections after satisfying itself that the identity and integrity
of the ballot box have not been violated, shall order the board of inspectors
to open the ballot box, and also after satisfying itself that the integrity of
the ballots therein has been duly pre­served, order the board to count the
votes for the candidate whose votes have been omitted in the presence of the
candidate affected, or his representative and thereafter complete the return.

Section 205 provides:

“Sec. 205.  When
election returns appear to be tampered or falsified.  -If the copy of the election return submitted
to the board of canvassers appears to be tampered, altered or falsified after
it has left the hands of the board of inspectors, the board of canvassers shall
use the other authentic copies of said election return, except the copies
furnished the political parties, and, if necessary, the copy inside the ballot
box which upon previous authority given by the Commission may be retrieved in
accordance with Section one hundred ninety-seven hereof.  If all copies of said returns are equally
tampered, altered or falsified and cannot be used in the canvass, the board or
any candidate affected shall bring the matter to the attention of the
Commission.  The Commission shall then,
after giving notice to all can­didates concerned and after satisfying itself
that nothing in the ballot box indicates that its identity and integrity have
been violated, order the opening of the ballot box and likewise after
satisfying itself that the integrity of the ballots therein has been duly
preserved shall order the board of inspectors to recount the votes of the candidates
affected and prepare a new return which shall then be used by the board of
canvassers as basis of the canvass.”

And Section 206 provides:

“Sec. 206.  Recounting
of votes.  -In case it appears to the
board of canvassers that there exists discre­pancies in two or more authentic
copies of election returns, other than the copies furnished the political
parties from an election precinct or discrepancies in the votes of any
candidate in words and figures in the same return and in either case, the difference
affects the result of the election, the proper Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the board or of any candidate affected and after due notice to all
candidates concerned shall proceed summarily to determine whether the integrity
of the ballot box had been preserved and once satisfied thereof shall order the
opening of the ballot box to recount the votes cast in the precinct solely for
the purpose of determining the true result of the count of votes of the
candidates concerned:  Provided, however,
That if upon the opening of the ballot box it should appear that there are
evidences or signs of replacement or tampering of the ballots, the Court shall
not recount the ballots but shall forthwith seal the ballot box and deliver the
same to the Commission on Elections for safekeeping.”

To give a strict interpretation of Section 175 (second sentence)
of the 1978 Election Code would be to limit the grounds in pre-proclamation con­troversies
to matters purely affecting election returns. 
WE believe that to revert to the old doctrine prohibiting the Comelec from looking behind the election returns as to the
existence of election irregularities is not consistent with the very purpose of
the law.  Clearly, Sections 172, 173 and
174 only speak of irregularities committed in the preparation of election
returns themselves.  WE cannot see
any difference however if the Comelec be allowed to
suspend a canvass or suspend or annul a proclamation of a candidate-elect on
the ground that irregularities or mistakes in the preparation of the returns
such as tampering, altering, falsifying of returns, material defects or
discrepancies of election returns exist and deny said authority to the Comelec if based on grounds not apparent on the face of the
election returns but indirectly affecting their integrity.  Certainly, it would be ridiculous to deny the
Comelec the authority to suspend a canvass or suspend
or annul a proclamation if based on grounds of election irregularities
committed during the election which would necessarily also vitiate or affect
the integrity of the election returns such as fake voters whose votes cast and
included during the canvass would inevitably be reflected in the election
returns them­selves, although not apparent upon the face.  Seemingly genuine returns based on fake votes
are equally spurious as tampered election returns.  To sustain the validity of election returns
despite a prima facie showing of the commission prior to the
voting of election irregulari­ties independent of the subsequent act of preparing
the election returns is to stamp our approval on making said election returns
as an impenetrable shield in the perpetration of election anomalies.

Hence, once there is a prima facie showing of the
commission of other election irregularities which will ultimately be reflected
in the election returns, the Comelec should in a
pre-proclamation controversy, with due observance of due process of course, be
also authorized to suspend canvass, suspend or annul a proclamation of a
candidate-elect, for it smacks of absurdity to proscribe the commission of one
kind of irregularity and yet countenance another kind of irregularity, when
both irregularities make a mockery of suffrage.

In the case of Aratuc vs. Commission on
Elections (February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251), the issue as to the enlargement of
the powers of the Comelec has been foreclosed.  Thus:

“Correspondingly, the Election Code of 1978, which is the
first legislative construction of the pertinent constitutional provisions, makes
the Commission also the ‘sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies’ and
further provides that ‘any of its decisions, orders or rulings (in such
controversies) shall be final and executory‘, just as
in election con­tests, ‘the decision of the Commission shall be final, and executory and inappealable‘
(Section 193).

“It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory
modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and envigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the
independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful
and honest elections (emphasis supplied).

Justice Pacifico de Castro in a
separate opinion in the Aratuc case affirming the
enlarged powers of the Comelec as envisioned by the
framers of the 1973 Constitution, said:

“x x x
With the conferment of exclusive authority on the electoral process upon it,
the Commission may be said to have been given full dis­cretionary authority,
the exercise of which would give rise to a controversy involving a political
question.

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“If the Commission has the power to suspend motu propio the proclamation of a
candidate-elect, it must have the power to conduct inquiry into the cause for
which it ordains the suspension of the proclamation, such as making its own
examination of the integrity of election returns, or inquiring into any
relevant matter affecting the purity of the ballot (88 SCRA 290, 291,
underscoring supplied).

“The Commission on Elections has been granted powers under the
Consti­tution which, under the old Constitution, belonged either to the
legislative body (Electoral Tribunals) or to the courts.  This is evident from the provision of the new
Constitution which reads:

‘(2)
Be the sole judge of all contents relating to the elections, returns, and quali­fication
of all Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city
officials’ (Section 2, Article XII, Consti­tution).

“The Commission is thus envisioned to exercise exclusive
powers on all electoral matters except the right to vote, such as the
enforcement and administration of laws relative to the conduct of elections
deciding adminis­trative questions affecting elections, except those involving
the right to vote, but also those that heretofore have been regarded, as matters
for strictly judicial inquiry, such as the hearing and disposition of election
contests, as is doubtlessly shown by the transfer thereto of the powers
previously conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal of Congress and the Courts
(see section 2, par. 2, Article XII, New Constitution).  x x x” (supra, pp. 288-289).

The aforesaid enlarged powers of the Comelec
under the 1973 Constitution become more apparent under Section 174 of the 1978
Election Code wherein the authority to recount the votes cast in a voting
center, formerly vested upon the Court of First Instance, is now exercised by
the Commission on Elections.  Thus
Section 163 of the Revised Election Code (R.A. No. 180, as amended by R.A. Nos.
599, 867, 2242, 3036, 3522, 3588, and 4074) provides:

“Sec. 163.  When
statements of a precinct are contradictory. 
– In case it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that another
copy or other authentic copies of the statement from an election precinct
submitted to the board give to a candidate a different number of votes and the
difference affects the result of the election, the Court of First Instance
of the province, upon motion of the board or of any candidate affected, may
proceed to recount the votes cast in the precinct for the sole purpose of
determining which is the true statement or which is the true result of the
count of the votes cast in said precinct for the office in question.  Notice of such proceeding shall be given to
all candidates affected (C.A. 357-158)” [underscoring supplied].

The Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388) also provides:

“Sec. 206.  Recounting
of votes.  – In case it appears to the
board of canvassers that there exists discrep­ancies in two or more authentic
copies of election returns, other than the copies furnished the political
parties from an election precinct or discrep­ancies in the votes of any
candidate in words and figures in the same return and in either case, the
difference affects the result of the election, the proper Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the board or of any candidate affected and after
due notice to all candidates concerned shall proceed summarily to determine
whether the integrity of the ballot box had been preserved and once satisfied
thereof shall order the opening of the ballot box to recount the votes cast in
the precinct solely for the purpose of determining the true result of the count
of votes of the candidates con­cerned: 
Provided, however, That if upon the opening of the ballot box it should
appear that there are evidences or signs of replacement or tampering of the
ballots, the Court shall not recount the ballots but shall forthwith seal the
ballot box and deliver the same to the Commission for safekeeping”
(underscoring supplied).

Whereas, Section 174 of the 1978 Election Code provides:

“Section 174. 
Discrepancies in election returns. 
– In case it appears to the board of canvassers that there exists
discrepancies in the other authentic copies of the election returns from a
voting center or discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in words and
figures in the same return and in either case, the difference affects the
results of the election, the Commission, upon motion of the board of
canvassers or any candidate affected and after due notice to all candidates
concerned, shall proceed summarily to determine whether the integrity of the
ballot box had been preserved and once satisfied thereof, shall order the
opening of the ballot box to recount the votes cast in the voting center solely
for the purpose of determining the true result of the count of votes of the
candidates con­cerned:  Provided,
however, That if upon the opening of the ballot box it should appear that there
are evidences or signs of replacement or tampering of the ballots, the Commission
shall not recount the ballots but shall forthwith seal the ballot box and order
its safekeeping” (under­scoring supplied).

Petitioners in asserting the non-applicability of the Aratuc case, supra, and the Diaz case, supra,
pointed out that in the above cases cited by private respondent Lirio, “massive substitution of voters, failure of
actual’ voting and almost 100% voters turn out in certain voting centers
impelled the Supreme Court to issue the guidelines for the canvass of
votes” (Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 18).

Suffice it to reiterate that in the petition and supplementary
petition filed by respondents Lirio, et al., they
charged, among other things, that fake voters numbering about 2,776 persons in
68 voting centers out of the 102 voting centers of Tanauan
(approximately 66%), allegedly with fake IDs and/or with fake identi­fication
slips, were allowed to vote in the January 30, 1980 elections, and that these
votes have been reflected in the returns. 
As correctly advanced by respondent Commission, said election returns
would not reflect the true will of the electorate.  And considering that the difference in the
number of votes garnered by petitioner Sotero Olfato over private respondent Francisco E. Lirio is only about 1,579, the number of votes in the afore­said
questioned returns could materially affect the result of the elections.  That the precariousness of the alleged
winning margin of petitioner Olfato over respondent Lirio can be gleaned from the totality of the votes
contested is therefore beyond doubt.

An examination of the official list of registered voters in the
remaining 34 voting centers may reveal additional fake voters allowed to vote,
to aggravate the election irregularity.

Petitioners also argued that private respondent cannot now raise
for the first time in a petition to annul proclamation the alleged spuriousness
or falsity of the election returns since no objection to the canvass of the
election returns had ever been made before the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

Much reliance has been made by the petitioners on the ruling of
this Court declaring that “all questions regarding the returns should be
initially raised before the Board of Canvassers, subject to appeal from its
decision to the COMELEC” (Anni vs. Rasul, No. L-34904, Aug. 30, 1972, 46 SCRA 758, 769; citing
Moore vs. COMELEC, 31 SCRA 60, 67 [1970]).

But there was compliance with the aforesaid rule, when respondent
Lirio filed with the Comelec
on February 2, 1980, three days before the proclamation of petitioners on
February 5, 1980, the petition (P.P. No. 118) to suspend the canvass and
proclamation of petitioners, making the Municipal Board of Canvassers a
respondent, which was then notified of the challenge raised by respondent Lirio.

It may be appropriate to note here that said ruling applies to
cases where the irregularities of the election returns are patent upon their
faces, which makes it incumbent upon the aggrieved candidates to raise their
objection before the Board of Canvassers. 
The rationale of the above doctrine has been aptly explained by this Court
through Justice Conrado Sanchez in the case of Abrigo vs. COMELEC (No. L-31374, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 26,
35, 36.  Thus:

“x x x
After the preparation of the election returns by the board of inspectors, the
next step outlined by the law is the canvass thereof by the canvassing
board.  It is before this body that a
candidate must present any question regarding the election returns.  x x x The law envisions that while the board is doing its
work in canvassing the election returns and tallying in the results, its
attention should be called to any question which could affect its work.  The board should be given an opportunity, as
Section 163 (now Section 174) plainly directs, to decide whether — on the
existence or non-existence of discrepancy — to defer the canvass or to
continue with it.  After all, it is upon
this body that the duty to canvass is reposed. 
This function, it would seem to us, complements its authority to canvass
only election returns which are in due form and to exclude those which
are  ‘obviously manufactured or palpably
irregular” (underscoring supplied).

It is only then after the Board of Canvassers has passed upon the
objection when the Comelec will exercise its
appellate jurisdiction.

It must be observed further, that there is no plausible reason to
prohibit an aggrieved candidate from filing an objection regarding the election
returns directly before the Comelec itself if the
election irregularities that vitiate the integrity of the election returns are
not apparent upon their faces.  What is
therefore involved is the original jurisdiction of the Comelec
rather than its appellate jurisdiction for precisely the objection is filed not
before the Board of Canvassers because the irregularities are not apparent upon
the face of the election returns.

The reason is obvious — “the board of canvassers exists for
a specific function — that is, to canvass the result of the election as shown
in the election returns and to proclaim the winning candidates.  Once this specific function had been
performed the existence of the board of canvassers is ended or terminated”
(Aquino vs. COMELEC, L-28392, Jan. 29, 1968, cited in
Pelayo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, No. L-28869, June 29, 1968,
23 SCRA 1374, 1386).

And it is more within the powers of the Comelec,
being the “sole judge of all pre-proclamation contro­versies”, to
determine the circumstances that stamp the election returns with the indelible
mark of falsity.

At any rate, as heretofore stated, private respondent Lirio filed his petition for suspension of canvass and of
proclamation against the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanauan
and the petitioners on February 2, 1980 or three days before petitioners were
proclaimed and before the termination of the canvass.  The same may therefore be considered as a
formal objection to the integrity of the election returns based on fake votes.

Not even the rule of “expresio unius est exclusio
alterius” will, carry the day for the
petitioners.

“Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation
of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no
reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have
been included, and manifest injustice will follow, by not so including them,
the maxim ‘expresio unius est exclusio alterius‘,
should not be invoked” (Blevins, vs. Mullaly,
135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519, cited in People vs. Manantan,
No. L-14129, July 31, 1962, 115 Phil. 657, 668-669).

“The rule of ‘expresio unius est exclusio
alterius‘ shall be applied only as a means of
discovering the legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and shall
never be permitted to defeat the plainly indicative purpose of the
legislature” (82 C.J.S. p. 668).

Moreover, “the cardinal rule of statutory construction
requires the court to give effect to the general legislative intent if that can
be discovered within the four corners of the Act.  When the object intended to be accomplished
by the statute is once clearly ascertained general words may be restrained to
it and those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate
the intent” (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322,
cited in Martin, G.R. Statutory Construction, Revised Ed., p. 46).

“The Courts should give the statute a reasonable or liberal
construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will
defeat it (82 C.J.S., p. 593) even though such construction is not within ‘the
strict literal interpretation of the statute (In re Marshall, 69 A. 2d, p. 619,
cited in Martin, G.R., Statutory Construction, Revised Ed., p. 67).

“Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the
principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215, U.S. 233). 
It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to
defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. vs. U.S. 252 U.S.
159).  The court may consider the spirit
and reason of a statute, as in this parti­cular instance, where a literal
meaning would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford,
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294, cited in People vs. Manantan, supra, p. 665).

Finally, petitioners, in assailing the jurisdiction of respondent
Comelec, argue that the electoral protest filed by
respondent Lirio before the Court of First Instance
of batangas deprived the Comelec
of its juris­diction over P.P. Case No. 118.

But the records amply show that private respondent’s petition for
suspension of canvass and of proclamation was earlier filed on February 2,
1980, whereas the electoral protest was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas on February 15, 1980.  Evidently the electoral protest was filed by Lirio to preserve his right in the event the prayers he
sought in P.P. Case No. 118 would not be granted as said electoral protest bore
the character of an ex abundante ad
cautela. 
Thus the footnote of said electoral protest reads:

“Protestant has petition with the COMELEC for the annulment of
the proclama­tion of the protestee.  Because the COMELEC has only suspended the
effects of the proclamation, this protest is being filed ex abundante ad cautela”
(p. 106, rec.).

The second issue raised by petitioners is that Comelec acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in reinstating respondent Lirio’s
petition for the annulment of petitioners’ proclamation.

WE cannot fault respondent Commission if in the course of its
search for the solutions to the problems posed by the numerous cases brought
before it, characterized by multifarious and oftentimes confusing charges and
counter-charges, it committed a mistake in its choice of solutions.  Respondent Commission cannot be charged with
being guilty of an “omission to weigh pertinent considerations” nor
the blunder of rendering a “decision arrived at without rational
deliberation”.  Precisely, the
reinstatement of respondent Lirio’s petition, affords
the parties full hearing on the issues raised by said petition to avoid any
injustice to either party.  Certainly,
the error, if any, does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioners likewise charged that respondent Commission is guilty
of discrimination in the application of its rules.  The charge is anchored on the alleged
conflicting decisions made by respondent Comelec in
the Leviste petition and the Lirio
petition, notwithstanding the alleged identity of circumstances in both cases.

WE do not agree, for aside from the claim of private respondent Lirio that the fake voters involved in their (private
respondents’) petition were quantified unlike the Leviste
petition, it would be improper to presume irregularity in the performance of
official acts on the part of the Comelec.  It must be noted that not only did respondent
Lirio and his co-petitioners in P.P. Case No. 118
charge alleged election irregularities but also adduced evidence to prove the
existence of said election irregularities. 
Hearing with due notice to the parties was conducted on March 1, 1980,
after which respondent Commission “after considering the comments of the
respondents, as well as the oral arguments of both parties at the hearing”
promulgated the questioned resolution (Resolution No. 9558, amending Resolution
No. 9306).  Respondent Commission
therefore, had the occasion to exercise its discretion in both petitions and it
has not been shown that it committed such a capricious and whimsical exercise
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or to grave abuse of
discretion.

“x x x
[I]n the performance of its constitutional duty of insuring free, orderly and
honest elections the COMELEC possess wide latitude of discretion which, unless
shown to have been exercised in an arbitrary or improvident manner, will not be
interfered with by this Court” (Ligot vs.
COMELEC, No. L-31380, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 45, 47).

WE are more inclined to presume that respondent Commission, in
proceeding summarily with the Leviste petition and
the Lirio petition, acted regularly or
indiscriminately in the application of its rules.  In the aforesaid Resolution No. 9558,
although silent as to what transpired during the hearing, it can be safely
presumed that with due observance of the basic rules of due process, respondent
Commission indeed heard the basic contentions of both sides, which includes
necessarily the contention of respondent Lirio that
election irregularities affecting the authenticity and integrity of the
election returns were committed.  That
respondent Commission issued the questioned resolution with due consideration
on the matter, is a presumption that would be in accord with the basic rules on
presumption of regularity of official acts. 
Thus, as aptly stated by this Court through Justice Antonio Barredo in the above-cited case of Aratuc
vs. COMELEC, supra:

“Such, to Our mind, is the consti­tutional scheme relative to
the Commission on Elections.  Conceived
by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular
suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed concomitant powers, it
is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption
of regularity to its course of action and choice of means in performing its
duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic
fabric of our government.  Ideally,
its members should be free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, x x x” (underscoring
supplied).

The last issue raised by petitioners during the hearing is that
respondent Commission on Elections in questioning the alleged fake voters with
fake IDs and/or fake identification slips violated the consti­tutional
provision prohibiting said Commission to decide questions involving the right
to vote.

It is true that questions involving the right to vote is not
within the ambit of the Comelec as mandated by the
Constitution.  Thus, paragraph 3, Section
2, Article XII(c) of the 1973 Constitution, specifically provides:

“Sec. 2.  The Commission
on Elections shall have the following powers and functions:

“(1) x x x .

“(2) x x x .

“(3) Decide,
save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions
affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of
polling places, the appoint­ment of election officials and inspectors and the
registration of voters” (under­scoring supplied).

Likewise, it was held in the case of Nacionalista
Party vs. Comelec, supra, that “x x x the power to decide questions
involving the right to vote is provided in the Election Law, the enforcement
and administration of which is placed in the exclusive charge of the
Commission” (85 Phil. 149, 156).

WE cannot agree with petitioners that respondent Commission has
trodden into the forbidden scope of questions involving the right to vote.  It must be observed that preparation of
election forms or documents such as registration records and the issuance of
voters’ IDs or identification slips are functions exercised by the Commission
on Elections in the enforce­ment and administration of election laws.  If unscrupulous individuals however, resorted
to election anomalies such as issuance of fake voter’s IDs and/or fake
identification slips or resorted to misrepresentation before the election
registrar to subvert the will of the electorate, an inquiry conducted by the Comelec as to the commission of such election anomalies
does not violate the above-said constitutional prohibition.  It is well within the powers of the
Commission on Elections.  If, however, in
the course of its inquiry conducted to determine the commission of election
anomalies regarding the preparation of false or fake election documents,
persons possessed with such spurious documents and who participated in the
voting are identified or their number determined, the Commission on Elections
does not thereby pass upon the right to vote of a duly registered and genuine
voter.

It is significant to note that Resolution No. 9558 is not final
and definitive in character as it only considered the proclamation in favor of
petitioners as temporary in nature as it was made subject to the final outcome
of P.P. Case no. 118.

The resultant delay that may be caused by the remand of this case
to the respondent Commission is eclipsed by its paramount purpose of
ascertaining the true will of the electorate in P.P. Case No. 118; so that one
of the contending parties may be duly proclaimed and thereafter assume office,
subject only to the outcome of the regular election protest that the losing
party may, after the proceedings before the Comelec,
pursue.

WHEREFORE, THE PRESENT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.  RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS HEREBY
ORDERED TO PROCEED IN P.P. CASE NO. 118 WITH DISPATCH.  NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Concepcion,
Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concurs and
dissents in a separate opinion.

Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Aquino, J., see concurrence.

Abad Santos, J., no part.

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*
Guillermo L. Roxas and Melquiades
F. Salisi, who were NP official candidates for Vice
Mayor and Member, Sangguniang Bayan,
respectively, also won but were not proclaimed because of the pendency of a petition to disqualify them on the ground of
“turn­coatism“, subject matter of a
restraining order of this Court in G.R. No. L-52404.

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