MEDARDO MUÑOZ, PETITIONER, VS. EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE B. BERNABE AND MANUEL ESCUDERO, ASSOCIATE JUDGES OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT, FOURTH DIVISION, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner was accused of treason before the People’s Court in
an information dated February 23, 1946. No bail was recommended in the
information. He pleaded not guilty and applied for bail. By agreement of the
parties the court set the bail application and the case on the merits for joint
hearing on January 15, 1947; but on said date the court postponed the hearing to
March 17 and 18, 1947, upon motion of the defense and over the objection of the
prosecution. On March 17, 1947, again upon motion of the defense and over the
objection of the prosecution, the court ordered the hearing postponed “until
further petition of defense or until new assignment.” Two subsequent assignments
for hearing made by the court were likewise postponed upon petition of the
prosecution with the conformity of the defense. At last the agreed joint hearing
was commenced on November 19, 1947.

After the first witness for the prosecution had testified the
petitioner moved the court to limit the hearing to his application for bail so
that he might enjoy provisional liberty pending the trial on the merits. That
motion was denied by the court, which continued the joint hearing on November
20, 1947, at which another witness for the prosectution testified, over the
objection of the petitioner, who had asked that the joint hearing be suspended
until he could raise the question of his bail before the Supreme Court.

The continuation of the joint hearing having been set by the
court for December 12, 15 and 16, 1947, the petitioner, on December 3, filed the
present petition for the writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judges of the
Fourth Division of the then People’s Court to hear and decide his application
for bail before continuing the hearing of his case on the merits, and for the
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain them form continuing the joint
hearing. This Court required the respondents to answer but declined to restrain
them.

1. Respondents did not unlawfully neglect the performance of
   their official duty to hear the petitioner’s application for bail. As a matter
   of fact the very act complained of is that they persisted in hearing that
   application. But that hearing, the petitioner complains, was at the same time a
   hearing of the case on the merits and the resolution on his application for bail
   might be delayed. Hence he wanted a summary hearing on his application before
   the trial on the merits.

   Considering that the joint hearing on the application for
   bail and on hte merits of the main case was adopted by the respondents by
   agreement of both parties, and that the repeated postponements of that hearing
   with the consequent delay were made at petitioner’s instance or with his
   conformity, we find no factual and legal basis upon which to declare the
   respondents guilty of an unlawful neglect of duty to justify the issuance fo the
   mandatory writ prayed for. It is true that the petitioner had the right to apply
   for bial and to have his application heard summarily and promptly. But that
   right could be waived, and he did waive it, firstly, by agreeing to a joint
   hearing and, secondly, by himself asking and consenting to repeated
   postponements. He therefore cannot be said to have been unlawfully excluded from
   the use and enjoyment of his right. (See Sec. 3, Rule 67.)

2. It was discretionary on the part of the respondent judges to
   permit or not to permit the petitioner to go back on his previous agreement for
   a joint hearing in the interest of justice. That discretion cannot be controlled
   by this Court through the writ of mandamus.

We do not know, although we may assume, that after the filing
of this petition the respondent judges continued with the hearing and received
sufficient evidence upon which to decide the application for bail. If that be so
and if the application had not been decided up to the time the People’s Court
was abolished, the petitioner could and should urge the proper Court of First
Instance to decide it.

The petition is denied, without prejudice to petitioner’s
seeking a prompt decision on his application for bail in the proper Court of
First Instance, in case he has not yet done so. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

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DISSENTING

PERFECTO, J.:

We dissent from the majority’s decision. In our opinion, the
petition should be granted and thus we vote.

The petition for bail should have been and should be disposed
of without any delay. Otherwise, the purposes of the provisions of the
Constitution on bail would be defeated. Bailing of an accused is a pre.iminayr
step in criminal proceedings and should not be postponed regardless of any
consideration. As in this case, said step is delayed until the evidence on the
merits shall have been presented. Such delay will make useless the
constitutional guarantee as to the right of an accused to be bailed.

The trial court failed to do its official duty and the Supreme
Court also is failing to do its duty by refusing to give to petitioner the
remedy he is praying for.