SERGIO ALABAT, PETRONILO ALABAT, NICOLAS ALABAT AND FORTUNATO ALABAT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. TORIBIA TANDOG VDA. DE ALABAT, LEONCIO ALABAT, JARMILO ALABAT, AND PREMIA ALABAT…

Alabat versus Alabat

The Case

This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Surigao in a suit for partition. Four children of the late Escolastico Alabat by his first marriage sued the four children of his second marriage and his surviving widow, Toribia Tandog, to divide several unregistered parcels of land in Taganaan, Surigao, and a cash deposit in the Philippine National Bank in Butuan. The case matters because it draws a bright line between two successions that the trial court confused: the estate of the soldier Leonardo Alabat, who died during the Japanese Occupation, and the estate of his father Escolastico, who died in 1959. It also teaches when a natural child may inherit, and what law governs a succession opened under the old Civil Code.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs filed a complaint for partition in the Court of First Instance of Surigao. The defendants answered that the properties came from a death benefit paid by the United States Veterans Administration for the death of their brother Leonardo, a soldier killed in action, and that the only heirs were Leonardo's mother and his natural daughter, Wenifreda Alabat, who intervened in the case. After trial, the trial judge, the Honorable Teofilo Buslon, held that only Toribia Tandog and Wenifreda Alabat were entitled to share, to the exclusion of the children of the first marriage, relying on Article 991 of the new Civil Code. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court on questions of law.

Facts

Escolastico Alabat had eight children: four by his first marriage with Cornelia Bucayan, and four by his second marriage with Toribia Tandog. Leonardo Alabat was a son of the second marriage, a USAFFE soldier killed in action during the Second World War, unmarried. He left his parents and a natural daughter, Wenifreda, born to Carmen Almeda, who was never legally married to Leonardo although both were free to marry when Wenifreda was conceived. Carmen Almeda filed a claim with the United States Veterans Administration for the death benefit, but it was denied for lack of proof of marriage, and the sum of 16,000 pesos was paid instead to Escolastico and Toribia.

With that money the spouses bought five parcels of land, and they deposited 4,000 pesos with the Philippine National Bank in Butuan. Escolastico died in 1959 without a will. His four children by the first marriage then sued for partition, and Wenifreda intervened, claiming through her deceased father.

The parties stipulated that the lands and the deposit came from the death benefit, and the trial court found that Wenifreda had enjoyed the status of a recognized natural child from birth. On that basis, and on Article 991 of the new Civil Code, the trial court awarded the property to the mother and the natural daughter alone.

Issues

• Whether or not the new Civil Code governs the succession of Leonardo Alabat, who died during the Japanese Occupation under the regime of the old Civil Code.
• Whether or not Wenifreda Alabat may inherit from Leonardo merely by enjoying the status of a natural child, without acknowledgment.
• Whether or not the death benefit paid by the United States Veterans Administration formed part of the estate of Leonardo Alabat.
• Whether or not Article 991 of the new Civil Code applies, and whether or not the plaintiffs, as children of Escolastico, are entitled to share in the properties and to maintain the suit for partition.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2263 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

Article 2263. The rights to the succession of a person are governed by the law in force at the time of his death, even though that law may have been repealed or modified.

This fixes the law of the succession of Leonardo, who died during the Japanese Occupation, as the old Civil Code of 1889, not the new Civil Code applied by the trial court.

Article 135 of the Civil Code of 1889 provides:

Article 135. The father is obliged to recognize the natural child, when there exists any of the circumstances mentioned in article one hundred and seventeen, and also when the fact of the birth of the child is proven by an authentic document or by a final judgment.

This shows that possession of the status of a natural child is not itself acknowledgment, but only a ground to compel the parent to acknowledge.

Article 996 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

Article 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.

This governs the succession of Escolastico, who died in 1959, and gives the widow a share equal to each child.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in applying the new Civil Code to the succession of Leonardo, who died in 1945 or earlier under the regime of the Code of 1889.

On the second issue, the Court held that the rights of a natural child spring not from the filiation itself but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent, made voluntarily or by court decree. Possession of the status of natural child is not a sufficient operative acknowledgment; it is only a ground to compel acknowledgment. The record showed no voluntary or compulsory acknowledgment, and no timely action to compel it, so Wenifreda could not be declared possessed of hereditary rights in Leonardo's estate.

On the third issue, the Court held that the death benefit was not part of Leonardo's estate. It was paid to his parents as indemnity or insurance for his death; he was never entitled to it himself, since he died before the payment accrued. The money was therefore the exclusive property of Escolastico and Toribia. Treating it as community property, Escolastico owned one half, and upon his death in 1959 without a will that half descended to all eight surviving children of both marriages, with the widow taking a share equal to each child under Article 996.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that Article 991 did not apply, and that even if it did, the death benefit would belong in equal shares to the natural child and the parents, and the parents' half could not belong to the mother alone. The Court stressed that the estate to be settled is that of Escolastico, not that of his predeceased son Leonardo, and that the plaintiffs, as children of Escolastico, are clearly entitled to share in the properties and to maintain the suit for partition.

Doctrine

First, the rights to the succession of a person are governed by the law in force at the time of his death, even though that law may have been repealed or modified. Second, the rights of a natural child spring not from the filiation itself but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent, made voluntarily or by court decree; possession of the status of natural child is not per se a sufficient operative acknowledgment but only a ground to compel the parent to acknowledge the child. Third, a death benefit paid by the government to the parents of a soldier is the exclusive property of the parents, not part of the soldier's estate, because he died before the payment accrued. Fourth, where a widow and legitimate children survive, the widow takes in the succession the same share as each child.

Disposition

The decision appealed from was reversed and set aside, and the case was remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings conformably to the opinion, with costs against the defendants.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that the rights of a natural child spring not from filiation but from acknowledgment, and that the law of the succession is the law in force at the time of death. Examiners use this case to test acknowledgment of natural children and the governing law of successions.