SIMEONA GANADEN VDA. DE URSUA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FLORENIO PELAYO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Ursua versus Pelayo

The Case

This is the case of Ursua versus Pelayo, decided by the Supreme Court in April 1960. Simeona Ganaden Vda. de Ursua sued Florenio Pelayo to annul a final judgment and an order of execution rendered against her in an earlier civil case, and to recover damages, on the theory that the earlier judgment and order were void for want of due process. The case matters because it teaches two things at once: first, that a Court of First Instance is not powerless to annul a judgment or order of a co-equal branch of the same court, since jurisdiction is measured by the nature of the litigation and not by the identity of the judge; and second, that the remedy of annulment will not lie where the very matter was already litigated and finally adjudicated, because the bar of res adjudicata, meaning a matter already judged, closes the door.

Procedural History

The plaintiff first litigated against the defendant in a civil case before a branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, where judgment was rendered in the defendant's favor. She sought relief from that judgment, then tried to appeal, but her counsel failed to prosecute the appeal in due time, and the judgment became final. She then moved to set aside the judgment and for a new trial on due process grounds; that motion was denied. She went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari, but the petition was not given due course.

She then filed the present complaint before another branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, asking that the earlier decision and the order of execution be annulled and that damages be awarded. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by a prior judgment and that the complaint stated no cause of action. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case, with costs against the plaintiff, reasoning that no judge can annul the order or decision of a judge of another branch of the same court. The plaintiff announced her intention to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but since she raised purely questions of law, the record was forwarded to the Supreme Court, which decided the appeal.

Facts

On October 29, 1954, Florenio Pelayo sued Mrs. Ursua. He alleged that he owned a lot in the Nuestra Señora de Guia Estate in the District of Tondo, Manila, having purchased it from the government; that since 1950 Mrs. Ursua had been molesting his possession, claiming ownership; and that her claim was groundless in law and in fact. He prayed that he be declared absolute owner and that she be ordered to pay damages. In her answer, Mrs. Ursua alleged that the sale to Pelayo was illegal and void, because she had a better right to purchase the lot, having been in possession in good faith long before the sale, and because Pelayo had bought it through fraudulent misrepresentations.

Notice of hearing was seasonably served on her counsel, but the lawyer who received it, Atty. Crispulo Ducusin, did not transmit it to Atty. Federico Ganaden, the attorney in charge of the case. When the case was heard on May 17, 1955, neither Mrs. Ursua nor her counsel appeared. The deputy clerk of court was authorized to receive the evidence, and on May 24, 1955, the court rendered judgment declaring the lot to belong to Pelayo, ordering Mrs. Ursua to vacate, and sentencing her to pay damages for the use of the property plus attorney's fees. Copy of the decision was served on her counsel on June 2, 1955, but Atty. Ducusin again failed to turn it over to Atty. Ganaden, who was then in San Fernando, La Union.

As soon as she learned of the decision, on July 9, 1955, Mrs. Ursua filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable negligence, but it was denied on August 2, 1955. She tried to appeal, but in vain, because her counsel failed to prosecute the appeal in due time, and the decision of May 24, 1955 became final. On September 21, 1955, she moved to set the decision aside and for a new trial, arguing that it was rendered without due process because the evidence was received by the deputy clerk of court rather than by the judge himself, although the judge had authorized the deputy to receive it, and because the decision was probably not prepared personally by the judge, having been rendered almost four months before the transcription of the stenographic notes. That motion was denied on October 4, 1955, and her petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court was not given due course.

Issues

• Whether or not a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to entertain an action for the annulment of a judgment and an order rendered by a judge of another branch of the same court.
• Whether or not the plaintiff's action for annulment and damages is barred by a prior judgment under the principle of res adjudicata.

Applicable Provisions

The decision rests on the jurisdiction of courts of first instance as defined in the Revised Judiciary Act, which the Court states as follows:

Courts of first instance shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject matter of which are not capable of pecuniary estimation.

This provision bears on the case because an action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice is not capable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, whatever branch of it may be asked to act.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the lower court erred in finding itself, in effect, without jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The jurisdiction of all courts in the Philippines, insofar as it depends upon the nature of the litigation, is defined in the Revised Judiciary Act, and under that law an action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice belongs to the category of civil cases not capable of pecuniary estimation. The Court distinguished the authority cited in the dismissal order, the Montesa case, because the issue there was whether a Court of First Instance may indirectly, by interlocutory order or writ of preliminary injunction, set aside an attachment levied under an order issued in another case pending before another branch of the same court. That was not the nature of the proceeding before the Court, which was an action brought for the specific purpose of annulling a judgment.

On the second issue, the Court held that although the lower court erred on the question of jurisdiction, the defendant's motion to dismiss was well taken, and the case was properly dismissed, because the plaintiff's action was barred under the principle of res adjudicata by the proceedings in the earlier civil case. The Court reasoned that the cause of action set forth in the complaint and the remedy prayed for were actually pleaded and sought by Mrs. Ursua in the earlier case. Her alleged right to that remedy was passed upon by the court having jurisdiction, and if its ruling was not brought for review to an appellate court, it was all due to the failure of her counsel to appeal in due time. Since the cause of action and the relief prayed for had already been adjudicated, and the parties were identical, the action was barred.

Doctrine

First, jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the litigation and the law that defines it, not by the identity of the judge or branch of court involved. A Court of First Instance has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, and an action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice belongs to that category. A judge of one branch may therefore entertain such an action even as against a judgment or order of a judge of another branch of the same court.

Second, the principle of res adjudicata, meaning a matter already judged, bars a subsequent action where the cause of action and the relief prayed for have already been adjudicated in a prior case and the parties are identical. A party who lost the opportunity to appeal in due time cannot revive the same cause of action through a separate complaint for annulment.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, although upon a ground other than that stated in the order, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant, so the defendant prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a Court of First Instance may annul the judgment of a co-equal branch because jurisdiction depends on the nature of the litigation, but res adjudicata will still bar the action if the same cause of action and relief were already adjudicated between the same parties. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between jurisdiction over an annulment action and the separate, substantive bar of a prior final judgment.