B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES, NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL; AND ANTONIO MARI…

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with
prayer for preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution dated 10 November
1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R denying
petitioner’s motion to reinstate its appeal, earlier dismissed for failure to
file the Appellant’s Brief.

The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the
pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.

Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased,
filed an action for damages with
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines
and petitioner herein, B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
757-R.^[1]

On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding
petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other defendants.^[2]

Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and
Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R.^[3]

During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee
therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon
prior leave of the respondent Court, he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique
N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Reyes
— who are now the private respondents in this present petition.

On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record,
received notice to file Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt
thereof. It had, therefore, until 5
April 1974 within which to comply.

Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July
1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s
Brief within the reglementary period.^[4] A
copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974.^[5]

As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution,
respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued another Resolution this time
dismissing petitioner’s appeal:

“It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed (for failure to file the
appellant’s brief within the reglementary period which expired on April 5,
1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9, 1974,
copy of which was received by said counsel on July 17, 1974; x x x”^[6]

On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW
OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration^[7] of
the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of
Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty.
Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having
established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer
who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also
attended to the preparation of the Appellant’s Brief but failed to submit it
through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.

In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the
motion for reconsideration, stating that:

“Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for
defendant-appellant, praying, on the grounds therein stated, that the
resolution of September 9, 1974, dismissing the appeal, be set aside, and that
appellant be granted a reasonable period of time within which to file its
brief: considering that six (6) months
had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and
one-half (2-½) months since counsel received copy of the resolution requiring
him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file
brief; Motion Denied.”^[8]

No action having been taken by petitioner from the above
Resolution within the period to file a petition for review, the same became
final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded to the court of
origin for execution.

The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975.^[9]
Pursuant thereto, respondents Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff attached
petitioner’s Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5
November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November
1975 at 10:00 o’clock in the morning, the auction sale thereof.^[10]

On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a
Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction^[11]
dated 5 November 1975, and containing the following allegations;

“1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court
has the inherent power to modify and set aside its processes, in the interest
of justice, especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account
of the untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas, counsel of BRSEI (B.R.
Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).

2. That
to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant’s brief owing to the
untimely death of the late Atty. Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to
denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is,
therefore, a clear and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of
BRSEI.

3. That to reinstate BRSEI’s appeal would not
impair the rights of the parties, since all that BRSEI is asking for, is a day
in court to be heard on appeal in order
to have the unfair, unjust and unlawful decision, set aside and reversed.”

The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of
10 November 1975:^[12]

“x x x it appearing that appellant was represented by the law
firm of Baizas, Alberto & Associates, and while Atty. Baizas died on
January 16, 1974, his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice
to file brief on February 19, 1974, and the copy of the Resolution of July 9,
1974, requiring appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed
was received by the law firm on July 17, 1974 and no cause was shown; x x
x”

Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original
petition^[13]
in this case against the Court of Appeals; Eulogio B. Reyes, Nicanor G.
Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and Antonio Marinas, as Deputy
Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining Order.^[14]

On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the
Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings^[15]
on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead and his lawful
heirs had already been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the
appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals.

In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered
petitioner to amend its petition within ten (10) days from receipt of notice,
and suspended the filing of respondents’ Comment until after the amendment is
presented and admitted.^[16]

In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it attached the said
Amended Petition.^[17] The
amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. Reyes with his heirs.

This Court admitted the Amended Petition^[18]
and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from notice
thereof, which they complied with on 5 April 1976.^[19]
Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976.^[20]

In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition
for lack of merit:^[21]

“L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al.). – Considering the
allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents’ comment
thereon, as well as petitioner’s reply to said comment, the Court Resolved to
DENY the petition for lack of merit.”

However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its
reconsideration^[22]
claiming that since it was deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its
part, the petition should be given due course.

Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment^[23]
to said Motion for Reconsideration.

On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider^[24]
its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to submit
simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice
thereof.

Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976^[25]
while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November 1976.^[26]
On 29 November 1976, this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision.^[27]

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion
to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant’s Brief.

Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on respondent
Court’s authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the
decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs.
Court of Appeals, et al,.^[28]
Indeed, in said case, this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the
appellants therein to file their brief, and after entry of judgment and remand
of the records to the lower court — and cancelled the entry of judgment,
requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and
admit appellant’s brief. Said case,
however, had a “peculiar or singular factual situation” which
prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court found sufficient
to justify such action. As this Court,
through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino, said:

“We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular
factual situation in this case and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the
resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld.

That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken
belief that they had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to give to
their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing their brief.

But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might
have been practised on
appellants Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record
on appeal. In (sic) sensed that there
was some irregularity in the actuations of
their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing
the appeal.

Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of
his motions for extension of
time to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had
been apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their
brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the
Court. Counsel could have moved in the
Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the
Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of
prosecuting their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs. Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728). Since counsel did none of those things, his
representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing
their appeal is difficult to
believe.

If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in
reinstating an appeal, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case
and the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February
10, 1968, 22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 62 Phil.
275; Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).

But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by
reason of the remand of the record to the lower court, it, nevertheless, has
the inherent right to recall the remittitur
or the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a
decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon
it. Such a right is not affected by the
statutory provision that after the record has been remanded, the appellate
court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur 2nd 433 citing
Lovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34
Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279).”

In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtains is simple
negligence on the part of petitioner’s counsel, which is neither excusable nor
unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.

As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al.,^[29] and
reiterated in Negros
Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,^[30] We said:

“Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal
that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion
to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a
showing of good and sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or discretion
vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of
briefs. There must be such a showing
which would call for, prompt and justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld.”

To justify its failure to file the Appellant’s Brief, petitioner
relies mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas and the supposed confusion
it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. It says:^[31]

“Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged
the services of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case No.
757-R; however, it appears that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner’s case as a
case to be handled by his law firm operating under the name and style ‘Crispin
D. Baizas & Associates.’ Hence, the Answer to the complaint, Answer to
Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party Complaint filed for petitioner in said
case, evince that the law firm ‘Crispin D. Baizas & Associates’ represents
petitioner in the action.

After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court,
petitioner’s counsel appears to have changed its firm name to ‘Baizas, Alberto
& Associates.’ The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm
‘Baizas, Alberto & Associates.’

On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a
brief heart attack. In consequence
(sic) of his death, the law firm ‘Baizas, Alberto & Associates’ was in a
terribly confused state of affairs. In
effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left
the dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their
own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of deceased
Crispin D. Baizas, took over the management of what may have been left of his
father’s office, it appearing that some, if not many, cases of the defunct
office were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its
dissolution.

But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the
dissolved law firm filed the required appellant’s brief for herein petitioner
in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. No notice was served upon petitioner by any
of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant’s brief
was due for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that none of
the lawyers therein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of
petitioner. x x x

The circumstances that the law firm ‘Baizas, Alberto &
Associates’ was dissolved and that none of the associates took over
petitioner’s case, and no notice of such state of affairs was given to
petitioner who could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute
its appeal before respondent Court, constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY
that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On the other hand, the non-dissolution of said law firm ‘Baizas,
Alberto & Associates’ will not defeat petitioner’s claim for relief, since,
in such event, the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner’s cause, which act
constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is
deprivation of petitioner’s day in court. In the above?mentioned Yuseco case, this Honorable Court had
emphatically and forcefully declared that it will always be disposed to grant
relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and
downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their
day (sic) in court.”

We find no merit in petitioner’s contentions. Petitioner’s counsel was the law firm of
BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not
extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.

In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals,^[32]
the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf
of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites enumerated in the
Rules of Court; the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of
Atty. Crispin Baizas. This Court held
therein that:

‘The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of
his associates for not attending
to Alvendia’s appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing
Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually
collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia’s case. He did not file a
formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.’

Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of
petitioner’s counsel in failing to file the Appellant’s Brief. As revealed by the records, petitioner’s
counsel, the BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to
file Brief on 19 February 1974. It
failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court’s
Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to
show cause why the appeal
should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary
period. Petitioner chose not to comply
with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a
Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also
received. Then on 28 September 1974,
the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for a reconsideration of the
said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October
1974. Nothing more was heard from
petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant
petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court
following receipt of the records from
the respondent Court.

The “confusion” in the office of the law firm following
the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure
to file the Brief. With Baizas’ death,
the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel
remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner
provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law
firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate
courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an
associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office after
the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have
replaced him. Upon receipt of the
notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another
associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the
Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new
lawyer.

In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:

“The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be
considered excusable, nor (sic) is it unavoidable. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a
system of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working therein
receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they will
always be informed of the status of their cases. The Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which
adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.”

Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW
OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion to reconsider the
Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further appropriate action after
the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is presumed
to be duly authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance.

The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client.^[33]

Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from
counsel regarding its case. As pointed
out by respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the
intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the latter must
have been known to the former.^[34] This
fact should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at
bar. Petitioner failed to act with
prudence and diligence; thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to
procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy.^[35]

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to
show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement of
petitioner’s appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not then commit any
grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to reinstate its
appeal.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted.

Costs against petitioner.

IT IS SO
ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 76; 141.

^[2]
Id., 77.

^[3]
Id.

^[4]
Rollo, 79.

^[5]
Appendix “K” and paragraph X, Amended Petition.

^[6]
Appendix “B”, Id.

^[7]
Op. cit., 101.

^[8]
Rollo, 105; Appendix “F”, Amended Petition.

^[9]
Id., 302.

^[10]
Id., 106; Appendix “G”, op cit.

^[11]
Id., 110; Appendix “H”, Id.

^[12]
Rollo, 126; Appendix “I”, Amended Petition.

^[13]
Id., 1.

^[14]
Rollo, 51.

^[15]
Id., 63-65.

^[16]
Id., 72.

^[17]
Id., 73-75.

^[18]
Rollo, 128.

^[19]
Id., 139.

^[20]
Id., 174.

^[21]
Id., 180.

^[22]
Id., 183.

^[23]
Id., 204-206.

^[24]
Rollo, 241.

^[25]
Id., 273.

^[26]
Id., 295.

^[27]
Id., 311.

^[28]
G.R. No. L-38690, 12 September 1975, 67
SCRA 22.

^[29]
108 Phil. 9.

^[30]
162 SCRA 371.

^[31]
Rollo, 274-276; 283-284.

^[32]
61 SCRA 87, 91.

^[33]
Manila Electric Co. vs. Court of
Appeals, 187 SCRA 200.

^[34]
Rollo, 306.

^[35]
Florendo vs. Florendo, 27 Phil.
432; Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 46.