G.R. No. L-29421. January 30, 1971
LINO ARTATES & MANUELA POJAS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS, VS. DANIEL URBI, CRISANTO SOLIVEN, ASSISTED BY HIS GUARDIAN ‘AD LITEM’, MARCELA B. SOLIVEN, REMIGIO BUTACAN AND NEMESIO OÑAT…
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan (Civil Case No. 116-T), involving
the public sale of a homestead to satisfy a civil judgment against the grantee.
The records show that in an action filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan, the spouses Lino
Artates and Manuela Pojas
sought annulment of the execution of a homestead[1]
covered by Patent No. V-12 775 issued to them by the proper land authorities on
23 September 1952, and duly
registered in their names (OCT No. P-572).
The public sale, conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of Cagayan on 2 June 1962, was made to satisfy a judgment
against Lino Artates in the
amount of P1,476.35, and awarded to Daniel Urbi by
the Justice of the Peace Court of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, in its Civil Case No. 40, for physical injuries
inflicted by Artates upon Urbi
on 21 October 1955. In the execution
sale, the property was sold to the judgment creditor, the only bidder, for
P1,476.35. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs spouses alleged that the sale of the homestead to satisfy an
indebtedness of Lino Artates
that accrued on 21 October 1955, violated the provision of the Public Land law
exempting said property from execution for any debt contracted within five
years from the date of the issuance of the patent; that defendant Urbi, with the intention of defrauding the plaintiffs,
executed on 26 June 1961 a deed for the sale of the same parcel of land to
defendant Crisanto Soliven,
a minor, supposedly for the sum of P2,676.35; that as a result of the
aforementioned transactions, defendants Urbi and Soliven entered into the possession of the land and
deprived plaintiffs of the owners’ share in the rice crops harvested during the
agricultural year 1961-1962. Plaintiffs,
therefore, prayed that the public sale of the land to defendant Urbi, as well as the deed of sale executed by the latter in
favor of defendant Soliven, be declared null and
void; that defendants be ordered to deliver to plaintiffs possession of the
land; and to pay to plaintiffs compensatory damages at the rate of P1,000.00
per agricultural year until possession is finally restored to them, the sum of
P2,000.00 as damages for maliciously casting cloud upon plaintiffs’ title on
the land, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.
The defendants[2]
filed separate answers disputing the averments of the complaint. On 29 March 1963, the court rendered judgment
upholding the regularity and validity of the execution conducted by the defendant
Provincial Sheriff, but finding that the sale of the land by defendant Urbi to the minor Soliven was
simulated, intended to place the property beyond the reach of the judgment
debtor, and that plaintiffs had offered to redeem the land within the 5-year
period allowed by Section 119 of the Public Land law for reacquisition thereof
by the grantee. Consequently, the court
declared the sale of the land by defendant Daniel Urbi
to defendant Crisanto Soliven
null and void; and Daniel Urbi was ordered to reconvey the property to the plaintiffs upon the latter’s
payment (to Urbi) of the sum of P1,476.35 plus the
sheriff’s fee incident to the sale at public auction, with interest thereon at
the rate of 12% per annum from 2 June 1961 until said amount shall have been
fully paid, and the further sum of P783.45 representing the amount paid by
defendant Daniel Urbi to the Philippine National Bank
for the release of the real estate mortgage on the land, contracted by Lino Artates, with legal rate of
interest thereon from 29 June 1961.
From this decision, the plaintiffs interposed the present appeal
assigning several errors allegedly committed by the court below, all hinged on
the validity or invalidity of the public sale of the lot involved herein.
Section 118 of the Public
Land law (Commonwealth Act 141)
provides as follows:
“SEC. 118. Except in
favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institution, or
legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the
date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable
to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said
period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations or corporations.
x x
x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x
As thus prescribed by law, for a period of five years from the
date of the government grant, lands acquired by free or homestead patent shall
not only be incapable of being encumbered or alienated except in favor of the
government itself or any of its institutions or of duly constituted banking
corporations, but also, they shall not be liable to the satisfaction of any
debt contracted within the said period[3],
whether or not the indebtedness shall mature during or after the prohibited
time.[4]
This provision against the alienation or encumbrance of public lands granted
within five years from the issuance of the patent, it has been held, is
mandatory[5];
a sale made in violation thereof is null and void[6]
and produces no effect whatsoever.
Though it may be a limitation on the right of ownership of the grantee,
the salutary purpose of the provision cannot be denied it is to preserve and
keep for the homesteader or his family the land given to him gratuitously by
the State[7],
so that being a property owner, he may become and remain a contented and
useful member of our society.[8]
In the case at bar, the homestead patent covering the land in
question (No. V-12775) was issued to appellants on 23 September 1952, and it was sold at
public auction to satisfy the civil liability of appellant Lino
Artates to Daniel Urbi,
adjudged in the 14 March 1956
decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Camalaniugan,
Cagayan. There
can be no doubt that the award of damages to Urbi
created for Artates a civil obligation, an indebtedness,
that commenced from the date such obligation was decreed on 14 March 1956. Consequently, it is evident that it can not
be enforced against, or satisfied out of the sale of the homestead lot acquired
by appellants less than 5 years before the obligation accrued. And this is true even if the sale involved
here is not voluntary. For purposes of
complying with the law, it is immaterial that the satisfaction of the debt by
the encumbrancing or alienation of the land grant was
made voluntarily, as in the case of an ordinary sale, or involuntarily, such as
that effected through levy on the property and consequent sale at public
auction. In both instances, the spirit
of the law would have been violated.[9]
Doubts have been expressed as to whether the words “debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period” (of 5 years from and after the
grant) would include the civil liability arising from a crime committed by the
homesteader. While there is no direct
Philippine precedent on this point, there are various reasons why the
non-liability of the homestead grant should be extended to extra-contractual
obligations. First and foremost,
whether it be viewed as an exemption or as a condition attached to the grant to
encourage people to settle and cultivate public land, the immunity in question
is in consonance with the definite public policy underlying these grants, which
is to “preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of
public land which the State has given to him” so he may have a place to
live with his family and become a happy citizen and a useful member of society,[10]
and the exemption should not be given restrictive application.[11]
A levy and sale of the homestead on account of extra-contractual liability
incurred would uproot the homesteader and his family and turn them into
homeless waifs as effectively as a levy for non-payment of a contractual debt. Secondly, the word “debt” in
exemption statutes,
“in its wider sense, (it) includes all
that is due to a man under any form or obligation or promise, and covers not
only obligations arising under contract, but also those imposed by law
without contract .”[12]
Considering the protective policy of the
law, it becomes apparent that “debt contracted” was used in it in the
sense of “obligation incurred”, since Webster gives the verb
to “contract” the meaning of “to bring on incur
acquire”. Finally, our public land
laws being copied from American legislation[13]
resort to American precedents reveals that, under the weight of authority,
exemption from “debts contracted” by a homesteader has been held to
include freedom from money liabilities from torts or crimes committed by him,
such as from bigamy (State vs. O’Neil, 7 Ore. 141, 11 Words and Phrases 318) or
slander (Conway vs. Sullivan, 44 Ill. 451, 452), breach of contract (Flanagan
vs. Forsythe, 50 Pac. 152, 153) or other torts (In Re Radway,
20 Fed. Cas. 154, 162).
The execution sale in this case being null and void, the
possession of the land should be returned to the owners, the herein
appellants. There would even be no need
to order appellee Urbi to
execute a deed of reconveyance thereof to the
owners. It appears that what was issued
here to the judgment creditor/purchaser was only the sheriff’s provisional
certificate, under which he derived no definite title or right until the period
for redemption has expired, without a redemption having been made[14],
or issuance of a final deed or certificate of sale. In other words, the purchaser herein has not
acquired an absolute ownership or title in fee over the land that would
necessitate a deed of reconveyance to revert
ownership back to the appellant spouses.
As things now stand, title to the property covered by OCT No. P-572
remains with the appellants, but Lino Artates shall continue to be under obligation to satisfy
the judgment debt to Daniel Urbi in the sum of
P1,476.35, with legal interest thereon accruing from the date the writ of
execution was first returned unsatisfied.
It appearing also that appellee Daniel Urbi paid to the Philippine National Bank the sum of
P783.45 to release the mortgage on the land, appellants should reimburse him of
said amount or of whatever amount appellants have actually been benefited by
the said payment.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision appealed
from is hereby reversed, and appellants are declared entitled to the return and
possession of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-572
without prejudice to their continuing obligation to pay the judgment debt, and
expenses connected therewith. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Zaldivar, Fernando, and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs with Mr. Justice Teehankee
in a separate opinion.
Castro, J., concurs in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.
Teehankee, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., dissents in separate opinion.
Villamor, J., concurs in the separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Teehankee.
[1]
Lot No. 151 of the Allacapan Public Land Subdivision,
situated in barrio Allig, municipality
of Allacapan,
province of Cagayan.
[2]
Defendant Crisanto Soliven,
a minor, was represented by Marcela B. Soliven, who
was appointed by the court as his guardian ad litem.
[3]
Francisco vs. Parsons Hardware, 67 Phil. 234.
[4]
Bautista vs. Marcos, L-17072, 31
October 1961.
[5]
Republic vs. Ruiz, L-23712, 29
April 1968, 23 SCRA 348.
[6] Eugenio vs. Perdido, 97
Phil. 41; Angeles vs. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 1006; Cadiz vs.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 1032; Santander vs.
Villanueva, 103 Phil. 1; Felices vs. Iriola, 103 Phil. 125; Del Rosario vs. Abad, L-10881, 30 Sept. 1958; Republic vs. Garcia,
105 Phil. 826; Republic vs. Ruiz, supra; Baje vs. Court of Appeals, L-18783, 25 May 1964.
[7] Manzano vs. Ocampo,
L-14778, 28 February 1961,
1 SCRA 691.
[8] Cadiz
vs. Nicolas, supra.
[9]
Beach vs. Pacific Commercial Co., 49 Phil. 765; Francisco vs.
Parsons Hardware Co., 67 Phil. 234; Gonzalo Puyat
& Sons vs. De las Ama,
74 Phil. 3; Cadiz vs. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 1032, 1039.
[10] Pascua vs. Talens, 80
Phil. 792; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church, 94 Phil. 406, 409; Cadiz vs.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 1039; Jocson vs. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375; Beniga vs.
Bugas, L-28918, 29 September 1970.
[11]
Cf. Belen vs. De Leon,
L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962, 6
SCRA 793, 795.
[12] Duling vs. Salaz, 26 Pac.
2d 1069; 22 Am. Jur. 80.
[13] Jocson vs. Soriano, 45
Phil. 375, 379.
[14]
Section 26, Revised Rule 39; 2 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
ed., page 327.
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DISSENTING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
I regret I am unable to concur in the ruling in this decision
that the provision of Section 118 of the Public Land Law which says that
“lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not x x x
x become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant” contemplates inclusively “the civil liability arising from a
crime committed by the homesteader” within said period. Indeed, I do not feel it is necessary to go
deep into the Webster’s dictionary meaning of the verb “to contract”
or to look for state court decisions in America, which could be isolated and
based on statutes not similarly phrased and oriented as Ours, to resolve the
legal issue before Us, it being sufficient, towards that end, to consider only
the basic principles that underlie the disposition of public lands under our
own laws on the matter.
I understand that the ultimate reason behind the exceptions
contained in the cited provision of the Public Land Law is to insure the
accomplishment of the double purpose of a homestead grant, which is to
encourage the development of arable lands and en their productivity in the
interest of the national economy and, at the same time, provide qualified
citizens with a piece of land which they and their families may call their own,
on which they can live and which they can work and thereby become useful
members of society. Accordingly, the
homesteader is safeguarded against his own weaknesses, imprudence and
improvidence by making it impossible for him to directly or indirectly, by his
voluntary act, dispose of or lose the land in favor of others. So also do the exceptions make it impossible
for him to allow himself to be utilized as dummy of opportunists. If this understanding of mine is correct, it
should follow necessarily that for these purposes to be achieved, a
homesteader must be, during the exempt period, in physical condition to work
the land granted to him. I cannot help
wondering how a person who has been convicted of a crime, the penalty for which
is most likely to include a period of incarceration can work on and develop his
homestead in the manner conceived in the law. That such a contingency may not be true in all instances, for there may
be punishment of crimes with imprisonment of insignificantly short duration or
even fines only, does not affect the general principle involved. I consider it implicit in all land grants by
the State that the grantees bind themselves to be loyal and useful members of
society, at least, during the period of development thereof that the law
contemplates, namely, the first five years from the grant. Surely, one who commits an offense against
the State and his fellow-citizens or other inhabitants in this country is far
from being a useful member of society. To be sure, his act of committing an offense is voluntary, but this is
not the voluntary act of imprudence and improvidence against which the law
guards the homesteader even against himself. Crime is an assault upon the sovereign people and the social order, even
if not always directly against the national security, and it is my considered
view that, in principle, one who is guilty thereof forfeits whatever rights he
might have acquired by virtue of the State’s generosity, particularly, when, as
in this case, it is a grant of a special privilege under specified circumstances
and not generally and commonly enjoyed by all citizens/inhabitants of the
country.
For these reasons, I vote to affirm the judgment of the court a
quo which, after all, recognizes the appellants’ right to redeem the
land in question under Section 119 of the Public Land Law which is the most
they should expect from the State, as thus, their right to the land is
reinstated without practically depriving the innocent victims of the crime herein
involved of their remedy for the private injury they have suffered. In other words, under the trial court’s
decision, all the ends of justice and equity are subserved, whereas it is
difficult to say the same of the decision of this Court.
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CONCURRING OPINION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
I concur in the opinion of Justice Teehankee, and vote for the affirmance
of the appealed judgment in toto. The date of the issuance of the homestead patent to appellants
was September 23, 1952. Under Section
118 of the Public Land Law the homestead could not be held liable for the
satisfaction of any debt contracted during a period of five years thereafter,
or up to September 23, 1957. The
opinion of the majority holds that since the civil obligation of appellant
Artates was adjudged on March 14, 1956, or within the said period, the
homestead cannot be held liable for its satisfaction. The obvious implication is that if the judgment had been delayed
– if for instance it had been rendered on September 24, 1957 – the result would
have been otherwise. I do not believe
that such a difference should be made to depend upon the more or less
fortuitous and irrelevant circumstance of when the judgment decreeing the
obligation was rendered. I am for
giving the word “contracted,” as used in the law, its ordinary
meaning, for after all one who contracts with a homestead patentee during the
five-year period and accepts an obligation from him does so with full knowledge
of the law’s exempting provision, which is deemed in effect a part of the
agreement. The same, however, is not
true of the victim of a tort or a crime, as in the present case, for here his
volition does not come into play, the obligation being imposed entirely by law.
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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
I vote for the affirmance in toto of the judgment
appealed from. Hence, I concur in that
portion of the decision decreeing that appellants should reimburse appellee
Urbi for the sums that Urbi had paid to the Philippine National Bank to release
the mortgage previously executed by appellants on the subject homestead land,
but I dissent from the principal decree thereof that “title to the
property . . . . . remains with the appellants, but (appellant) Lino Artates
shall continue to be under obligation to satisfy the judgment debt to Daniel
Urbi in the sum of P1,476.35, with legal interest thereon accruing from the
date the writ of execution was first returned unsatisfied.”
The issue at bar is whether the execution sale conducted in
1962 by the sheriff of Artates’ homestead lot acquired in 1952 to
satisfy a 1956 judgment against Artates in favor of Urbi (for physical
injuries inflicted by Artates upon Urbi in 1955), at which public sale
the homestead lot was sold to Urbi as the only bidder for the amount of his judgment
credit in the sum of P1,476.35 should be held null and void, as the majority
would now hold, by virtue of the prohibitory, provisions of Section 118 of the
Public Land Law. The key provision cited
is that providing that such homesteads “shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for
a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period x x .”
Under the cited provision, all sales and alienations of the
homestead property made by the homesteader within the 5-year prohibition are
null and void. Similarly, the homestead
is held not liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted by the
homesteader within the said period, even though it be contracted
that the indebtedness shall mature after the prohibited period. The law’s purpose is clear and salutary: to preserve and keep for the homesteader the
land given to him gratuitously by the State and to protect him from his own
weakness and improvidence.
But in the case at bar, the judgment debt of the homesteader in
favor of Ubi was not contracted but duly adjudicated by a competent
court in a lawful judgment for injuries inflicted by Artates upon Urbi in 1955,
which, gauging the same from the substantial amount of P1,476.35
awarded, must have been quite serious.
The happenstance that Artates’ assault on Urbi and the judgment award
occurred within the prohibitory period should not be construed beyond the law’s
text and intent to favor the wrongdoer Artates as against his victim Urbi.
We would have the anomalous situation thereby where, while
recognizing that Artates has a just and continuing obligation to pay Urbi the
judgment debt, the debt would in effect be nullified. The judgment debt was awarded since 1956
and would by now have prescribed, but the majority decision would nullify the
levy and public sale of the land to satisfy Urbi’s judgment credit conducted
in 1966 long after the expiration of the statutory five-year prohibitory
period. The majority decision bars Urbi forever
from looking to Artates homestead property for the satisfaction of his judgment
credit. Artates’ evasion of his judgment
debt to Urbi is thereby made certain.
Any later creditor of Artates, real or simulated, from one day after the
expiration on 23 September 1957 of the said five-year prohibitory period is
given sole and exclusive preference to look to the said property for satisfaction
as against Urbi beyond whose reach it is placed, contrary to the priority and
preference that Urbi would lawfully be entitled to as a bona fide
judgment creditor.
Finally, pursuant to Artates’ offer to redeem the property from
Urbi within the 5-year redemption period allowed by section 119 of the Public
Land Law, the lower court in its appealed judgment so ordered such redemption
and reconveyance. This strikes me as an
eminently fair and just judgment which should be upheld. Artates, the homesteader, is thus assured of
keeping and preserving his homestead in accordance with the spirit of the law
and the lawful judgment credit of Urbi against him is at the same time duly
satisfied.