PERFECTO FAYPON, PETITIONER, VS. ELISEO QUIRINO, RESPONDENT.

A petition for quo warranto under section 173 of Rep. Act
No. 180, as amended, was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. By a petition
for a writ of certiorari under Rule 46 the last judgment is now before us for review.

The ground for the quo warranto petition is the
respondent’s ineligibility for the office of Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Sur to which he was proclaimed elected by the provincial board
of canvassers in the elections held on 13 November 1951. It is alleged
that he lacks the residence in the province, as required in section
2071 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The error claimed to have been committed by the trial court in
refusing; admission of an amended petition, presumably to allege an
additional ground for disqualification of the respondent is no longer
urged, the attempt to file such petition having been made on the day
set for the hearing of the case.

The second point raised is the irregular constitution in the Court
of Appeals of the division of five members that rendered the judgment
in the case. It is claimed that when the unanimous concurrence of the
division of three could not be had, the Presiding Justice chose or
designated two additional Associate Justices in violation of the
resolution of the Court in bane promulgated on 15 September 1952 which
required that it be by rotation in the order of seniority. The alleged
violation of the resolution does not affect the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to hear and decide the case before it on appeal. If
the alleged irregular designation be a sufficient ground for the
setting aside of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals and
remanding the case to it for further proceedings, it would
unnecessarily delay the disposition of this case to the detriment of
public interest. As the judgment rendered in the case is being
reviewed, the hearing and consideration of the case by this Court
sufficiently guarantee and protect the petitioner’s right and interest.
Also, the fact that after the designation of two additional Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals to form a division of five, as
provided for in the Judiciary Act of 1948, no heading was held, is not sufficient to render the
judgment void, because section 1, Rule 53, allows the consideration and
adjudication of an appealed case; “by any and all of the Justices who
are members of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for
consideration and adjudication, whether such justices were or were not
members of the court and whether they were or were not present at the
date of submission * * *.”

The third point is the alleged respondent’s lack of residence as
required by law—section 2071 of the Revised Administrative The Court of
Appeals found the following facts:

… That respondent-appellee was born in Cagayan,
Ilocos Sur, in June, 1395; that he went to the United States in 1919 to
study and returned to the Philippines in 1923; that on his return, he
taught as professor in the University of the Philippines for four
years. He became owner and editor of the Intelligences, a newspaper
published in Manila. He went to Iloilo as editor of the lloilo Times.
He became executive secretary and general ‘manager of the NEPA
(National Economic Protectionism Association) from 1936 until December
31, 1951 (Exhibits G, G-1 to G-3). He was editor of Commerce, an
official organ of the Chamber of Commerce in Manila (Exhibits F, F-1 to
F-11). He registered as a voter in Pasay City in 1946-1947 (Exhibit A).
He owns a house and resides at 55-11th Street, Quezon City (Exhibits
H-H-1).

There is no question then that he was born in the municipality of
Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, in June, 1895; came to Manila to pursue his
studies: went to the United States for the same purpose; returned to
the Philippines in 1923; lectured in the University of the Philippines;
and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, Iloilo and later on again
in Manila. There is also no question that the respondent was proclaimed
by the provincial board of canvassers elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur with 49,017 votes cast for him as
against 19,1466 votes cast for the petitioner.

The crucial and pivotal fact upon which the petitioner relies to
have the judgment under review reversed and set aside is the
registration of the respondent as voter in Pasay in 1946 and 1947. In
several cases we have ruled that absence from one’s residence of
origin—domicile— to pursue studies, engage in business, or’ practice
his avocation, not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence It is contended, however, the respondent’s registration in
Pasay City in 1946 1947 in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution and laws on the subject, implies and means that he was a
resident thereof during the six months immediately preceding such
registration and of the Philippines for one year;^[1] and that such being the case he was ineligible for the office which he was elected, because—

No person shall be eligible to a provincial office
unless at the time of the election he is a qualified voter of a
province, has been a bona fide resident therein for at least one year prior to the election, and is not less than thirty years of age.^[2]

Did the respondent’s registration as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and
1947 constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin? The
determination of a person’s legal residence or domicile largely depends
upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and
utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or lost
his residence or origin must show and prove preponderantly such
abandonment or loss. If we are to take literally the meaning of a
voter’s oath^[3] which he files
with the board inspectors of his registration as such, there is no
doubt that the respondent having registered in 1946 and 1947 as voter
of Pasay City must have acquired residence of origin. But in several
decision we have laid down the rule that a previous registration as
voter in a municipality other than that in which he is elected is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of
origin. In Yra vs. Abaño, 52 Phil. 380, the election of the
protestee to the office of municipal president of Meycauyan, Bulacan,
was upheld, notwithstanding the fact that he had registered as voter in
Manila. In Vivero vs Murillo, 52 Phil. 694, where the protestee had
registered as voter in the municipality of Burauen, Leyte, we held that
such registration had not caused the loss of his residence of origin
(La Paz, same Province), where he was elected municipal president . In
Larena vs. Teves, 61 Phil. 36, 28, we upheld the election of
Pedro Teves to the office of municipal president of Dumaguete where he
was born, because he has not lost his residence of origin which was
Dumaguete, “notwithstanding the fact that in the year 1919 he
registered in the list of voters of the municipality of Bacong; ran for
representative for the second district of Oriental Negros to which said
municipality of Bacong belongs; again ran for reelection in the year
1922; and launched his candidacy for member (membership) of (in) the
provincial board of Oriental Negros in 1925, stating under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he was a resident of said municipality of
Bacong, Oriental Negros, without having ever registered as sector in
any of the precincts of the municipality of Dumaguete from said year,
1919, up to the present, and having ordered the cancellation of his
name in the list of voters of said municipality of Bacong only on April
5, 1934.” And, in the case of Gallego vs. Verra, 73 Phil.
453, where it appears that Pedro Gallego worked in several provinces
other than his native twon (Abuyog, Leyte), registered as elector and
voted in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in 1938, took his residence certificate
in Malaybalay in 1940 where it appeared that he had resided in that
municipality for one and a half years, we held that he had not lost his
residence of origin and the protest against his election in 1940 to the
office of municipal mayor of Abuyog was dismissed.

The rule laid down in the foregoing cases is not devoid of reason
and justification. A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look
for “greener pastures,” as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and
that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of his
avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return
to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the
place of his professional or business activities; so there he registers
as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to chose the officials who are to run
the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile of residence of origin, has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to the place of
his birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one’s
birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

Counsel for the petitioner argues that in addition to other
qualifications residence for at least one year in the municipality
where the municipal officer is elected, as provided for in section 2147
of the Revised Administrative Code, is sufficient; whereas the
residence requirement for a provincial officer such as that of the
provincial governor must be a bona fide residence in the
province for at least one year prior to his election, and concludes
that the rule laid down in the cases cited and invoked is not
applicable to and does not and cannot benefit the respondent. We fail
to see the difference between the requirement of not less than one year
residence for municipal officers and of not less than one year boan fide residence for provincial officers. If any interference is to be drawn from the words “bona fide,” it
is in the case of a municipal office in addition to other
qualifications an actual residence in the municipality for at least one
year of a candidate for municipal office would be sufficient to make
him eligible for such office; whereas in the case of a provincial
office in addition to other qualifications a residence in good faith in
the province for not less than one year of a candidate for provincial
office, although he may not actually be present therein, would be
enough to make him eligible for such office. But this would be a
hair-splitting differentiation. The residence requirement for elective
provincial and municipal officials is the same; and the rule that a
previous registration a voter of a municipal mayor-elect in a
municipality other than the one in which he is elected is no ground for
disqualifying him because of alleged loss or abandonment of his
residence of origin in the municipality where he is elected, applies
with equal force to elective provincial officials.

The case of Tanseco vs. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227, upon which
the petitioner relies cannot be invoked as authority to reverse the
judgment under review, because apart from a long stay in Manila, where
he had engaged in the practice of his profession, Arteche, elected
provincial governor of Samar, admitted in a brief submitted by his law
firm in his behalf in a criminal case where he was charged of serious
slander, that he had been a bona fide resident of the City of
Manila years before he ran for the office of Governor. This fact is
stated twice in the decision of this Court on p. 234, supra.
So, he admitted that he had lost and abandoned his residence of origin
in the province of Samar and acquired another in Manila. The
abandonment or loss of his residence of origin was not denied but
admitted and the only point decided was that he did not reacquire his
residence of origin. Two Justices dissented and were of the opinion
that he did not loss his residence of origin in the province of Samar.
In the case before us there is no such admission.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, referred to in Tanseco vs. Arteche, supra,
there was no question as to the intention of protestee Guray to change
his residence from Luna to Balaoan, and the only point decided was that
he did not reacquire his residence of origin in Luna one year before
his election to the office of municipal president in the latter
municipality.

Upon the authority of cases decided by this Court, we are of the
opinion and so hold that on the evidence found by the Court of Appeals,
the respondent has not lost his residence of origin.

The judgment under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur

Mr. Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, took no part.

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^[1] Section 1, Article V of the Constitution; Section 98 and 109, Revised Election Code, Rep. Act No. 180, as amended.

^[2] Section 2071, Revised Administrative Code.

^[3] Section 109, Revised Election Code, Rep. Act No. 180, as amended.