LEONIDES S. ASUNCION AND AMADO CASTRO, PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. CELESTINO DE LA CRUZ, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

The above-entitled proceedings originated with a petition presented in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the summary settlement of the estate of
the deceased Benedicta de la Cruz. The petition alleges that said deceased left
at the time of her death five parcels of land all with original certificates of
title in the name of the said deceased. When the petition was called for
hearing, Celestino de la Cruz moved to dismiss the proceedings on the ground
that the said oppositor had filed claims in the cadastral proceedings for three
of the parcels of land mentioned in the petition. Subsequently the same
oppositor filed another opposition on the ground that the said properties did
not belong to the deceased Benedicta de la Cruz but to oppositor’s father; that
if the deceased had any rights over the three parcels of land the same had
already been transferred by her to the oppositor; that an undivided two-thirds
of the other two lots had also been ceded to the oppositor for a valuable
consideration and the said decedent had not repurchased the same; etc. After
hearing the said opposition the court found that two of the lots mentioned in
the petition had been mortgaged to one Juan Cojuangco and another mortgaged also
to one Santiago Nicolas, and for this reason the court denied the petition for
summary settlement. But a motion for reconsideration was presented, and in
accordance therewith the court reconsidered its order of dismissal and granted
the summary distribution prayed for, declaring the children of the decedent as
her heirs and assigning to all of them in equal shares, a one-half undivided
interest in each of the parcels mentioned in the petition. A motion to
reconsider the above order having been denied, an appeal from the order of
summary distribution was taken to this Court. It is claimed that the lower court
erred in finding that the three lots were owned by the deceased and ordering
their distribution to her heirs, in the face of the claim of ownership asserted
by the oppositor-appellant; that it erred in giving course to the settlement in
spite of the fact that the petition in cadastral proceedings had been presented
wherein the oppositor-appellant had claimed the three parcels of land in
question; and that it erred in not denying the summary settlement in so far as
the three lots claimed by the oppositor-appellant are concerned.

It is claimed in support of the first alleged error that the trial judge had
no power to declare that the properties mentioned in the petition are properties
of the deceased. A study of the order, however, shows that it did not make a
definite finding or conclusion to that effect as against the
oppositor-appellant. The court only went to say that there was a presumption
that said properties wore still owned by the deceased at the time of her death
and are free from all incumbrances; but it makes the reservation in favor of the
oppositor’s claim of the right to a separate action if he claims proprietary
rights over said properties. The court states thus in its order:

“If Celestino de la Cruz claims some proprietary rights over these
properties, he can pursue his remedy in a separate and ordinary action which he
should bring against the proper parties.”

The next contention of the oppositor-appellant is that as the lower court had
no jurisdiction to declare the decedent as the owner of the properties in
question, it can not legally distribute and deliver them to her heirs in the
exercise of its probate jurisdiction; that such distribution and delivery of the
properties is an unjust deprivation of the appellant’s rights and interests over
the same. The above argument is based on the mistaken concept of the proceedings
for the distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

The purpose of a summary settlement is to proceed summarily with the
“allowance of a will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally
entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them
after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be
due; and such persons * * * shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter
into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. * * *.” (Section 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) As held in the cases
of Intestate of the late Januaria Gonzales, Abarro vs. De Guia, 72
Phil., 245 and Intestate of Jimenez, Jimenez vs. Jimenez, 67 Phil.,
263, in a summary distribution the estate of the deceased is valued; his debts,
if any, are paid; his will, if any, is allowed; the heirs and legatees are
declared, and distribution is made, * * *. (II Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1952 ed., p. 345. In distribution proceedings, the court has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part
of the estate by the heirs and distributees and also claimed by third parties.
(Mallari, et al. vs. Mallari,^[1]
40 Off. Gaz., No. 2, p. 503). In the same manner that the court in an
administration proceeding determines only in a prima facie manner if a
property alleged to belong to the state really belongs to the decedent (Cordova
Vda. de Mañalac vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil., 661; Baquial vs.
Amihan,^[2] 49 Off. Gaz., No. 2, p. 511),
so also the court in a summary settlement proceeding only determines prima
facie the ownership and possession of the properties; but such
determination does not prevent the heirs or third parties from claiming title
adverse to the decedent’s, which title or claims must be decided in a separate
suit. (Intestate estate of Miguel Guzman. Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, 37
Phil., 61.) In consonance with these principles the orders appealed from found
prima facie that the lots sought to be distributed among the heirs of
the decedent belong to and were in the possession of the said decedent at the
time of her death. The orders do not deprive the oppositor-appellant of his
right to claim said properties as his own and to institute a separate action to
assert his title thereto as against the decedent or her heirs. The claim of the
appellant that the trial court had no power to enter the decree of distribution
is, therefore, without merit.

The appeal is hereby dismissed and the order appealed from affirmed, with
costs against oppositor-appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

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^[1] 92 Phil., 694.

^[2] 92 Phil., 501.