LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND RALS CONSTRUCTION, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Corporation would assail a resolution
of respondent Court of Appeals of April 12, 1967 denying its motion to dismiss
an appeal of respondent Rals Construction, Inc. on
the ground that the record on appeal, on its face, failed to show that it was
perfected within the period fixed by the Rules of Court as well as its
resolution of May 31, 1967 denying its motion for reconsideration.  There was ample justification then for this
special civil action for certiorari.  As
pointed out in such motion and reiterated in its motion for reconsideration,
this Court had, without exception, considered as fatally defective appeals
vitiated by a failure to comply with that specific command of the Rules of
Court.  Respondent Court was thus called
upon to respect, certainly not to disregard, what this Court had time and time
again reiterated.  It was not duly
mindful of such an obligation.  This
petition, then, to set aside respondent Court’s orders complained of possesses
merit.

In this special civil action for certiorari filed with us on July
7, 1967, Petitioner, after the usual allegations as to parties, referred to its
motion to dismiss appeal of respondent Rals
Construction, Inc., then with respondent Court, as its record on appeal failed
to show on its face that the appeal, was perfected within the period fixed by
the Rules of Court.  The private
respondent, asked to comment on said motion, admitted that its record on appeal
lacked the necessary data as to when the decision was received by its counsel
for the purpose of determining whether or not its appeal was perfected on
time.  Nonetheless, on April 12, 1967,
respondent Court of Appeals, acting on petitioner’s motion to dismiss appeal
resolved to deny the same.  There was, on
May 10, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution.  Respondent Court did not see any occasion to
change its stand.  Its original ruling
was maintained.  Hence this petition for
certiorari.

In its answer of August 11, 1967, respondent Rals
Construction, Inc., while admitting that its record on appeal did not show on its
face when the decision thus elevated to the Court of Appeals was received by
its counsel for the purpose of determining whether or not such an appeal was
timely, would submit, however, that it was so filed within the reglementary period as shown by the certification of the
City Sheriff of Manila, which fact was given due consideration by respondent
Court in denying the motion to dismiss appeal. 
From its view of the case, there was a sound and judicious exercise of
what it considered to be a discretion vested in respondent Court under the
above circumstances.  As a matter of
fact, the denial was characterized by it as conforming to “the highest
tradition of judicial statesmanship.”

The case was set for oral argument on August 16, 1968, but both
parties decided to submit memoranda instead. 
Petitioner did submit a memorandum of arguments and authorities, but
really more of the latter, citing the previous cases relied upon of Government
v. Antonio,^[1]
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,^[2]
J. Antonio Araneta v. Madrigal & Co., Inc.,^[3]
and Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v. Progressive
Labor Association.^[4]
It is its contention that respondent Court did err in departing from the
established rulings laid down in the above cases, thus “acting without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in which case certiorari would lie.”^[5] A
realization of the force inherent in the above decisions must have led private
respondent, in its memorandum, to limit their applicability when the appellate
court “is at a loss to determine whether or not the appeal was perfected
on time on the basis of the record on appeal.”^[6]
It continued:  “There can be no
doubt that the rule was intended to appraise the appellate court to which the
appeal is taken of the timeliness of the appeal.  Where therefore, as in this case, the
appellate court is convinced that the appeal was perfected on time, there is
neither rhyme nor reason, logic or persuasion to close its eyes to the reality
of the perfection of the appeal and allow itself to indulge in technicality
which the rules itself abhors.  Were the
court to do that, it would be placing premium on language instead of substance,
purpose and reason.”^[7]

If this were a new question, the element of persuasiveness in the
above summation of private respondent cannot be completely ignored.  Perhaps respondent Court could be considered
as not completely lacking in justification in denying the motion to
dismiss.  The crux of the controversy,
however, is the failure of respondent Court to accord deference to a doctrine
repeatedly upheld by this Court.  It
would not be inaccurate, then, to assert that it did abuse its discretion and
abused it gravely.  We thus find for petitioner.

1.       It is required by the
rules of Court that the record on appeal should contain such data as will show
that it was perfected on time, a failure to do so being a ground for its
dismissal.^[8]
From Government of the Philippines v. Antonio,^[9]
the resolution dismissing the appeal being promulgated on Oct. 19, 1965, it has
been the constant holding of this Court that dismissal will be the consequence
of a failure to comply with the above procedural requirement.  As set forth by Justice J. B. L. Reyes for a
unanimous Court in the Antonio resolution: 
“The deficiencies pointed out are fatal.   For the reason that in ordinary appeals the
original record is not forwarded to the appellate court, and because the dates
when an applicant received the notice of the pertinent orders or judgment under
appeal, and of the denial of his motions for reconsideration or new trial, are
facts within the exclusive knowledge of said appellant, the Revised Rules of
Court place upon the appellant the burden of showing that his appeal is timely,
and for that purpose prescribe (Rule 41, sec. 6) that the record of appeal
shall include ‘such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.’
This requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, for unless appeal is
perfected on time the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction over the
appealed case, and has power only to dismiss the appeal (Bello
vs. Fernando, L-16970, Jan. 30, 1962; Caisip vs. Cabangon, L-14684, August 26, 1960; Espartero
vs. Ladaw, 49 Off. Gaz.
1439).  The certification of the record
on appeal by the trial court after expiration of the period to appeal cannot
restore the jurisdiction which has been lost (Alvero
vs. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 433, and cases cited).  The principle is confirmed by Rule 50,
section 1, supra (a), heretofore quoted.”^[10]
It sufficed for this Court, speaking through Justice Dizon
in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,^[11]
in dismissing the appeal, again on that ground, to refer to the above excerpt.

Then, in J. Antonio Araneta v. Madrigal
& Co., Inc.,^[12]
an attempt was made to limit the scope of the Antonio ruling by the allegation
that even if the record on appeal did not comply, if in fact there was a
perfection within the reglementary period, such a
rule need not be followed.  Nonetheless,
we adhered to the Antonio doctrine for, as noted by Chief Justice Concepcion, who penned the opinion:  “Obviously, this amendment would become
useless and its purpose completely defeated, if we gave thereto the
interpretation advocated by the main respondent herein.  In other words, we would have the same issues
and the same waste of time that were sought to be eliminated by the
amendment.  Hence, our ruling in
Government vs. Antonio * * *, which, it should be noted, was made, not in a
decision, but, in a resolution, so that the public may know immediately –
instead of waiting for the decision on the merits, which might require more
time – the effect of said amendment, and the injurious consequences of a
failure to grasp its full import could thus be minimized.”^[13]
Subsequent to the filing of the memoranda of both parties in this litigation,
adherence to the above doctrine was again manifested in the two cases of Jocson v. Robles^[14]
and Cadiz v. Secretary of National Defense.^[15]

2.       The merit of the
petition is thus apparent.  The action
taken by respondent in denying the motion to dismiss is difficult to explain,
much less justify.  It is not as if its
attention to the above decisions were not called.  Both the Antonio and the Santos rulings were
included as annexes to such motion. 
Nonetheless, the minute resolution was apparently oblivious of the force
of such decisions; it did not even refer in the most casual manner to their
peremptory character.  The fate reserved
for them was one of studied indifference and neglect.  The motion for reconsideration was sought to
be reinforced by the addition of the Araneta and the
Shell Co. decisions.  It was all in
vain.  Respondent Court could not be
budged from the stand taken by it.

The spirit of initiative and independence on the part of men of
the robe may at times be commendable, but certainly not when this Court, not
once but at least four times, had indicated what the rule should be.  We had spoken clearly and unequivocally.  There was no ambiguity in what we said.  Our meaning was clear and unmistakable.  We did take pains to explain why it must be
thus.  We were within our power in doing
so.  It would not be too much to expect,
then, that tribunals in the lower rungs of the judiciary would, at the very
least, take notice and yield deference. 
Justice Laurel had indicated in terms too clear for misinterpretation
what is expected of them.  Thus: “A
becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the
position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation.”^[16]
In the constitutional sense; respondent Court is not excluded from such a
category.^[17]
The grave abuse of discretion is thus manifest.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted, and the
resolution of respondent Court of April 12, 1967 denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss as well as its resolution of May 31, 1967 denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration, are set aside.  The
appeal taken by respondent Rals Construction, Inc. in
CA-GR No. 28297R is hereby dismissed. 
With costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., in the result.

^[1]
L-23736, Oct. 19, 1965, 15
SCRA 119.

^[2]
L-26387, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 113.

^[3]
L-26227-28, Oct. 25, 1966, 18 SCRA 446.

^[4]
L-27125, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 110.

^[5] Petitioner’s
Memorandum of Arguments and Authorities, p. 9.

^[6]
Memorandum for Respondent, p. 2.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8]
The specific sections of the Rules of Court follow:   “[Rule] 41, section 6. Record on
appeal; form and contents thereof. – The full names of all the parties to
the proceedings shall be stated in the caption of the record on appeal and it
shall include the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken, and, in
chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions, motions and all
interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed order for judgment and
necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved, together with
such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. [Rule] 50,
section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed
by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:  (a) Failure of the record on appeal to show
on its face that the appeal was perfected within the period fixed by these
rules; * **.”

^[9]
L-23736, Oct. 19, 1965, 15 SCRA 119.

^[10] Ibid,
pp. 121-122.

^[11]
L-26387, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 113.

^[12]
L-26227-28, Oct. 25, 1966, 18 SCRA 446.

^[13] Ibid,
p. 450. The Araneta decision was cited with approval
in Atlas Consolidated -Mining & Development Corp. v. Progressive
Labor Association, L-27125, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 110.

^[14]
L-23433, Feb. 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 521.

^[15]
L-25150, Sept. 30, 1968, 25 SCRA 419.

^[16]
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82 (1937).

^[17] “The
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
as may be established by law.” Art. VIII, sec. 1, Constitution.