RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH

Argosino, Re: Petition to Take the Lawyer's Oath

The Case

This is the case of Al Caparros Argosino, who passed the 1993 bar examinations but whose oath-taking the Supreme Court deferred because of a previous conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The case is not a contest between private parties in the ordinary sense. It is an inquiry by the Supreme Court into its own gatekeeping power: whether a bar candidate who has committed a grave wrong may nonetheless satisfy the requirement of good moral character and be admitted to the practice of law. It matters because it tells us what the moral requirement of the lawyer's oath actually demands, and how the Court weighs a candidate's past against his atonement.

Procedural History

Argosino passed the 1993 bar examinations, but the Supreme Court deferred his oath-taking because of his prior conviction. The criminal case had proceeded in the trial court, where he and seven others were originally charged with homicide, entered pleas of not guilty, later withdrew those pleas, and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On the basis of those pleas, the trial court rendered judgment on 11 February 1993 imposing on each accused imprisonment of from two years four months and one day to four years. The trial court later granted Argosino's application for probation, and on 11 April 1994 issued an order approving the probation officer's report recommending his discharge from probation. On 14 April 1994, Argosino filed with the Supreme Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on that discharge. On 13 July 1995, the Court required him to submit evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character. He complied, and the Court then required the father of the hazing victim to comment. The matter was resolved by the Supreme Court itself as an original petition.

Facts

Sometime in September 1991, a neophyte named Raul Camaligan died during fraternity initiation rites. Argosino and seven other accused were charged with homicide. They initially pleaded not guilty, but later withdrew their pleas and, upon re-arraignment, all pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The trial court sentenced each of them to imprisonment of from two years four months and one day to four years.

Argosino applied for probation, which the trial court granted. On 11 April 1994, the trial court approved the probation officer's report recommending his discharge from probation. On the strength of that discharge, Argosino asked the Supreme Court to allow him to take the lawyer's oath.

In response to the Court's resolution requiring proof of good moral character, Argosino submitted no less than fifteen certifications and letters, executed by, among others, two senators, five trial court judges, and six members of religious orders. He also showed that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan through the joint efforts of the victim's family and the eight accused. Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, the victim's father, filed a comment stating that he still believed the injuries were deliberate, that he had consented to the plea of guilt only out of pity for the mothers and a pregnant wife who begged for forgiveness, that as a Christian he had forgiven the accused, but that he still felt the pain of his son's death and was not in a position to say whether Argosino is now morally fit. He submitted the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

Issues

• Whether or not Al Caparros Argosino may be regarded as possessing the good moral character required for admission to the bar, notwithstanding his conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
• Whether or not his discharge from probation and his subsequent efforts at atonement are sufficient to purge the deficiency in moral character earlier noted by the Court.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a specific codal provision in full; it rests on the constitutional and statutory requirement of good moral character for admission to the practice of law, which the Court describes as a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers. The Court's own prior resolution, quoted in the decision, states the standard it applies:

Participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

This standard bears directly on the case because it is the benchmark against which Argosino's past conduct and his later atonement are measured.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court acknowledged that the senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted an evident absence of the moral fitness required for admission to the bar, being totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for. But the Court held that this did not forever disqualify him. It stated that the practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers, and that it is the sworn duty of the Court not only to weed out lawyers who have become a disgrace to the profession but also to prevent misfits from taking the lawyer's oath.

On the second issue, the Court resolved to allow Argosino to take the lawyer's oath. It recognized that he is not inherently of bad moral fiber, noting the certifications showing him to be a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. It was persuaded that he had exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan, and it gave him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. The Court stressed that the lawyer's oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law, and that every lawyer should at all times weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the oath.

Doctrine

The practice of law is a privilege, not a right, granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers. Good moral character is a continuing requirement, and participation in prolonged and mindless physical behavior renders impossible a finding that the participant then possessed it. Yet the Court may consider de novo whether a candidate has purged himself of an obvious deficiency in moral character. Atonement, evidenced by genuine efforts to make amends and by a life of public service, may suffice to restore moral fitness. The lawyer's oath is not a mere ceremony or formality; every lawyer must at all times weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking it.

Disposition

The Supreme Court allowed Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys, and thereafter to practice the legal profession.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers, and that the lawyer's oath is not a mere ceremony or formality. Examiners like to use this case on the moral character requirement for admission to the bar, on the effect of a criminal conviction on fitness to practice, and on the Court's power to weigh atonement and rehabilitation.