G.R. No. L-31494. January 23, 1978
PASTOR LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND JESUS R. MARTIN, RESPONDENTS.
GUERRERO, J.:
“WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered declaring false and
apocryphal, null and void, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated May 18,
1948, being Document No. 189, Page 2, Book II, Series of 1948 of the
notary public ex-officio, Simeon Rico; ordering the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P280.00 as value of the shingles and another
sum of P40.00 a year until the land described in paragraph 3 of the
complaint is delivered to the plaintiff; ordering the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P840.00 as rental of the house built on the
parcel of land described in paragraph 4 of the said complaint; and
another sum of P10.00 a month from today until the said house shall have
been delivered to the plaintiff; adjudging the defendant to be the
owner of the parcel of land described in paragraph 7 of the complaint;
adjudging the plaintiff to be the owner of the parcel of land described
in paragraph 3 of the complaint and the house existing therein and
described in paragraph 4 of the same complaint; ordering the defendant
to vacate the land and the house mentioned above and deliver them to the
plaintiff; and ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit.SO ORDERED.
Done at Lingayen, Pangasinan, this 8th day of June, 1963.
(SGD.) ELOY B. BELLO
Judge”
On July 11, 1957, respondent Jesus R. Martin filed the complaint
against petitioner Pastor Lopez in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan seeking principally the recovery of two (2) parcels of land
described in paragraphs 3 and 7 of the complaint, and the declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale dated May 18, 1948 allegedly executed by
one Gervacio Resoso conveying to the petitioner the said land described
in paragraph 3 of the complaint, with damages, attorneys fees and costs.
On August 12, 1957, petitioner Pastor Lopez, the defendant below,
filed his answer, alleging that he is the owner of the parcels of land
in question as well as the improvements thereon by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale duly executed by said Gervacio Resoso over the parcel of
land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint, and also by virtue of a
deed of absolute sale executed by Zacarias Resoso over the parcel of
land described in paragraph 7 of the complaint.
The evidence adduced by Jesus R. Martin shows that he is the
grandson and sole heir of the deceased Gervacio Resoso and Marta
Manaois, being the only son of their daughter, Juana Resoso, married to
Aurelio Martin; that the said two (2) parcels of land and the house
constructed on the residential land described in paragraph 3 of said
complaint had been in the continuous possession of Gervacio Resoso until
his death; that after the death of Gervacio Resoso in 1956, Pastor
Lopez illegally took possession of the said parcels of land and drove
the respondent Jesus R. Martin from the house constructed on the
residential land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint; that the
deed of absolute sale, dated May 18, 1948 allegedly executed by Gervacio
Resoso conveying to the petitioner the land described in paragraph 3 of
the complaint is “fictitious, simulated and fraudulent,” the signature
of Gervacio Resoso appearing thereon not being his genuine signature.
On the other hand, Pastor Lopez claimed that he is the stepson of
the late Gervacio Resoso, being the child by another man of Gervacio’s
second wife, one Filomena Lopez; that he bought the parcel of land
described in paragraph 3 of the complaint on May 18, 1948 and that he
paid the consideration of P100.00 in the presence of Judge Simeon Rico,
Justice of the Peace of Labrador, Pangasinan, who prepared and notarized
the disputed deed of sale and in the presence of the two witnesses to
the contract of sale; that thereafter he declared for taxation purposes
the said parcel of land in his name and since then, he had been paying
the taxes thereon; that it was he who built the house existing on the
land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint; and that he bought the
parcel of land described in paragraph 7 of the complaint from one
Zacarias Resoso, brother of the deceased owner.
At the trial below, Pastor Lopez presented as witnesses Judge
Simeon Rico, the Notary Public, and the two alleged subscribing
witnesses to the said deed, Antonio Marayag and Feliciano Soliven, who
all affirmed the genuineness of the said document. On the other hand,
Jesus R. Martin presented Antonio Rotor, an NBI examiner of documents,
who testified that the signature on the deed of sale did not appear to
be the same signature of the vendor appearing on other documents bearing
his undisputed signature. The testimony of the NBI documents examiner
is hereunder reproduced:
“My basis of my conclusion is the spelling of the name Gervacio
Resoso, sir. In the standard, Gervacio Resoso is spelled as “B” and in
the letter “R” with RIS in all the sample signatures, sir. In the
questioned signature, Gervacio, it is “V” and in Resoso, it is spelled
as letter “E” and not letter “I”, one of the signs of capital letters
“D” and “R”. The sign of letter “G” in the standard is different from
the genuine of the capital letter in the questioned. But in the sign of
capital letter “R” in Resoso, there is a mistake of terminal stroke of
capital letter “R”; it curves or there is a curve of capital letter “R”
and it is found in all the standard type which shows the characteristics
or permanent characters of the writer, sir. In the last signature
there is a curve but it does not touch the extent of the letter, it is
outside but it is the characteristic curving of the internal stroke. In
the questioned signature, there is no curve. It is just a simple curve
to the right. The standard basis of my findings are the sizes of the
letters, sir. The letters or standard in exhs. “E-1” to “E-6”, the
tendency of these letters is narrower and in the questioned document
Exh. A, the letters are broad instead of narrower and in the terminal
stroke of the letter “V”, there is a pause which indicates the stroke or
rather there is a pause there.Also in the terminal stroke of exh. “E”, there is a pause indicated
by a broad stroke. It is also an indication that the writer paused and
unlike the standard signatures, there is a steady movement of the
writer. The pause which is found or are found in the questioned
documents are never found in the standards. In Exh. “A”, sir, the
writer makes a cross and there is an overwriting here of the letters and
then before he makes the connection to the next letter, there is a
hesitation as indicated by the stroke here. (The witness indicating the
line between the letters, “E” and “S” in Exh. “A”) Another
characteristics is terminal letter “O” in the word, Resoso to the
preceding letter “S”. These are the tendency of these letters in the
sample signature, Exhs “1” to “E-6” are smaller than the preceding
letter “S” and which is different in the questioned signature Resoso in
Exh. “A”. And with this findings, my conclusion is that the writer of
the questioned signature in Exh. “A” is not the same writer who
submitted his standard which are marked Exhs. “E-1” to “E-6″, sir.”
(sic)[2]
In its Decision, the lower court held and declared “false and
apocryphal, null and void, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated May 18,
1948, being Document No. 189, Page 2, Book II, Series of 1948 of the
notary public ex-officio, Simeon Rico.”
With respect to the parcel of land described under paragraph 7 of
the complaint, the lower court found that the said land had been sold
by Zacarias Resoso to Pastor Lopez, with the conformity and the
knowledge of Gervacio Resoso.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Pastor Lopez limited his
appeal to the decision of the lower court declaring Jesus R. Martin as
the true owner of the parcel of land described in paragraph 3 of the
complaint on the ground that the deed of sale conveying the same to
Pastor Lopez is a falsity.
On the basis of the evidence, the appellate court found the
signature of Gervacio Resoso appearing on the disputed document a
forgery and affirmed the decision of the lower court. On July 26, 1969,
Pastor Lopez filed a motion for reconsideration, and again on July 28,
1969 filed an urgent motion setting the said motion for reconsideration
for oral argument. On December 13, 1969, the appellate court denied
both motions in a minute resolution.
Hence, this present recourse on the following assignment of errors:
I. The court erred in not applying the rule that public
documents are presumed genuine and regular and that it requires not
merely preponderance of evidence but clear, strong, and conclusive
evidence to overthrow this legal presumption.II. The court erred in disregarding the inflexible rule that
gives priority to subscribing witnesses in the order and quality of
evidence to prove a handwriting.III. The court deviated from accepted rules in not taking into
account the testimony of the judge-notary and two subscribing witnesses
who gave uncontradicted testimony as to the genuineness of the signature
in the Deed of Sale which they personally witnessed.IV. The court erred in not taking into account the rule that
the opinion testimony of an expert is the most unreliable, the weakest,
and the lowest order of evidence known to law.V. The court erred in not taking into account that petitioner
reasonably explained the differences in the signatures as reported by
the witness and observed by the court.VI. The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the finding of the
lower court on the alleged “unusual” procedure of payment when the same
is grounded entirely on conjecture and not based on evidence of record.VII. The court erred in sustaining award of damages which is without basis in fact and law.
The first five errors assigned by petitioner all assail the finding
of the appellate court that the deed of sale, Exh. A, is a forgery.
Considering each and every one of them and all of them together, We find
the contentions of petitioner to be without merit. It is true that
public documents are presumed genuine and regular under the provisions
of the Rules of Court but this presumption is a rebuttable presumption
which may be overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, not
conclusive evidence as petitioner asserts in the first assignment of
error.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals relied not merely on the
expert testimony given by Antonio B. Rotor, the NBI handwriting expert,
who examined the questioned signature appearing on the deed of sale,
Exh. A, then compared them with standard signatures of Gervacio Resoso
and concluded that the questioned signature was not written by the same
person who made the standard signatures. Apart from this expert
evidence, the Court of Appeals made its own observation and comparison,
and arrived at its own finding and conclusion, which states:
“We have made a comparative analysis of the questioned signature
appearing on the deed of sale with the admittedly genuine signatures of
Gervacio Resoso (Exh. B-1, to B-4 and C) and the conclusion is
inevitable that the signature in question is indeed a falsified one.
Apart from the finding of Antonio B. Rotor, an NBI handwriting expert,
that the writer of the questioned signature is not the same writer of
that appearing on the specimens of genuine signatures of Gervacio
Resoso, by mere glance of the questioned signature and the specimens the
marked difference and distinction is patently discernable. In the
questioned signature the strokes of the writer are not natural. In fact
there are added strokes in the capital letter “G”. In the said genuine
signatures, the late Gervacio Resoso had the natural characteristics of
using letter “b” instead of letter “v” in Gervacio and letter “i”
instead of “e” in Resoso. Even in inclination of the strokes and the
usual habit of connecting the letters by the writer there indeed appears
to have a marked distinction between the writer of the questioned
signatures and the writer of the genuine signatures.” (Rollo, pp. 22-23, Decision, CA)
The above conclusion of the respondent appellate court is the same as
that found and concluded by the trial court’s ruling, thus:
“One does not need to be an expert to see the very divergence and
distinction between the signatures appearing in Exh. A-1 and those
appearing in Exhs. B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 and C. Because of this, this
Court is inclined to believe and to hold that the signatures of Gervacio
Resoso appearing in Exhs. A, 1 and 2 are not the genuine signatures of
said Gervacio Resoso. As well pointed out by the expert, it will be
seen in the signature of Gervacio Resoso in Exh. A and Exhs. 1 and 2
there is a tendency to imitate; in other words, the stroke there is not
natural. As a matter of fact, there are added strokes in the letter
capital “G”. Add to that, the finding that the late Gervacio Resoso
always used the letter (b) in Gervacio and did not use the letter (e) in
signing but the letter (i) which is a characteristic common in the
province of Pangasinan among the Pangasinan people. In the light of all
these, this Court is constrained to hold as it hereby holds that the
Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhs. A and Exhs. 1 as well as its copy, Exh. 2,
is an apocryphal document, forged and falsified by whoever was
interested in said land.” (p. 60, Record on Appeal)
For our own verification and satisfaction, this Court likewise made a
close examination, comparison and analysis of the questioned and
standard signatures, aided by the testimony of the NBI witness, and We
have come to the same finding, the same conclusion arrived at by the
lower courts. The differences pointed out by the NBI witness altogether
paint a picture of general dissimilarity between the standard signature
and the questioned signature.
There is no inflexible rule as claimed by petitioner under Sec.
23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that gives priority to
subscribing witnesses in the order and quality of evidence to prove a
handwriting. The rule referred to above merely enumerates the means or
methods by which the handwriting of a person may be proved, which may
either be by: 1- any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person, and has seen the person write; 2- or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person; 3- by
comparison made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. The law makes
no preference, much less distinction among and between the different
means stated above in proving the handwriting of a person.
Under the above-cited section, Sec. 23, Rule 132, Revised Rules
of Court, it must be noted that the court may also make a comparison
between the questioned and standard signatures before it, and since the
Judge or the Magistrates must make use of their physical senses to
conduct an ocular inspection of the signatures where the signatures
appear as they are, and not merely described by witnesses testifying
about them, the result of such inspection by the Judge or the
Magistrates becomes the ultimate judgment of the Court. Plainly, the
signatures speak for themselves. Res ipsa loquitur.
Petitioner contends that the testimonies of the judge-notary and
two subscribing witnesses who gave uncontradicted testimony as to the
genuineness of the signature on the deed of sale should have been given
credence and credit, since the opinion testimony of an expert is the
most unreliable, the weakest and the lowest order of evidence known to
law.
We disagree. It can hardly be expected of the notary public to
dispute the authenticity of the very deed he had notarized since he was
paid his notarial fees therefor, much less of the two subscribing
witnesses to deny their participation because being local politicians as
vice-mayor and barrio lieutenant, they are likely to affix
their names to every paper and deed asked of them to act as witnesses by
a school principal and/or the town judge as in this case. On the other
hand, Mr. Rotor, the NBI expert had been an examiner of questioned
documents of the NBI for more than 5 years. In the report rendered by
him, Exh. F, it shows that the handwriting examination was requested by
the Presiding Judge himself, Judge Eloy Bello, who was trying the case
itself. The said report bears also the approval by the Asst. Director,
Felipe P. Logan. And there is no proof that the NBI witness was paid by
the interested party or that he was motivated with bias or prejudice or
interest in making the report. As a government witness fulfilling an
official function requested by the Court, his testimony on a technical
matter must be viewed as a public duty impressed with and entitled to
credence and faith.
On the petitioner’s explanation that the signature “GERVACIO
RESOSO” was written because the name as typewritten was “GERVACIO
RESOSO”, suffice it to say that the same contradicts petitioner’s
evidence marked Exhs. 3-B, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, where the names as typewritten
were also “GERVACIO RESOSO” but the signatures signed over them reads:
“GERBACIO RISOSO.” Petitioner also marked as his own evidence Exh. 6,
Exh. 7, 7-a and 7-b where the typewritten names read GERVACIO RESOSO and
the signatures above spell: GERBACIO RISOSO. All these repudiate
petitioner’s explanation. Petitioner cannot now repudiate his own
evidence for he is bound by the same.
Anent the sixth assignment of error attacking the finding of the
lower court on the “unusual” procedure of payment which the petitioner
claims to be grounded on conjecture and not based on evidence of record,
the appellate court itself approved the observation of the trial court,
affirming it to be well-founded “in the sense that the transaction
being between a step-father and step-son, the natural course of things
would be that there would be no need for the vendee to show the payment
of the P100.00 to the vendor. And if the defendant has dared to give
such an exaggerated, not to say, false evidence before this Court, it
was only with the purpose of trying to hide a nefarious and illegal act,
that is, the falsification of the deed of absolute sale, Exh. A and
Exhs. 1 and 2.”[3]
We find other exaggerated claims and acts of petitioner which run
counter to the natural course of things, inconsistent with the
contention of the petitioner that he bought the property in question
from Gervacio Resoso on May 18, 1948. Thus –
- Petitioner contends that he has been in possession of the
land “in good faith and in concept of owner, openly, publicly,
adversely, peacefully, actually and continuously for more than thirty
years now.” (Brief of the petitioner, p. 4) Since the alleged sale took
place on May 18, 1948, it is not only exaggerated but “apocryphal and
false” as the deed itself to assert that he had been in possession for
more than 30 years already. This cannot be merely a clerical error for
said allegation of possession is averred in par. 25 of the Answer dated
August 12, 1957 under the caption Special Defense to the First Cause of
Action (Record on Appeal, pp. 26-27) and is once more repeated in par.
27 of the Answer under the caption Counterclaim. (Record on Appeal, p.
30) For the third time, petitioner alleges 30 years possession in its
Reply Brief, p. 5. If the claim of possession were true, then he would
have acquired the land in 1927, not on May 18, 1948. The shallow
pretense and the empty extravagance of petitioner’s claim is at once
palpable and must fall from its inherent improbability of time and
period.- Petitioner claims that he built his house on the land in
controversy in 1937, as testified to by his witness, Timoteo Molano, the
carpenter who took 4 weeks to build the house with 8 workers whose
wages were paid by the petitioner, the latter paying the materials used
in the construction. (t.s.n., pp. 72-75, hearing of March 11, 1963).
Again, this is exaggerated, if not false for petitioner supposedly
bought the land in 1948 yet he built his house on the land in 1937.
Assuming that he built his house on the land in 1937, yet he declared
the house for taxation purposes only in November 10, 1948, as shown in
Exh. 8-b, Tax Dec-laration No. 15125, some eleven (11) years thereafter,
which again is irregular and out of the ordinary course of events.- The act of the petitioner in registering the deed of sale,
Exh. A, allegedly executed on May 18, 1948, in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan only on July 22, 1957, which was after
the filing of the complaint on July 11, 1957 (Record on Appeal, p. 1) is
very suspicious. This registration, as shown on the reverse side of
Exh. 2, was caused by petitioner 8 months after the death of the vendor,
Gervacio Resoso, and 9 years after the execution of the instrument
itself. These posterior acts of the petitioner indicate a questionable
and doubtful design to cover up a suspicious, if not nefarious
transaction curing the lifetime of the supposed vendor to hide the
transfer of the property to the petitioner.- It appears in the deed of sale, Exh. A, that the land which is described therein as
“A parcel of residential land containing an area of 1,456 square
meters more or less. Bounded on the North by Agno River; on the East by
property of Martin Resoso; on the South by Carretera and on the West by
property of Cristobal Martin and assessed at P150.00 as described by
Tax Declaration No. 13119 for the current year. It is visible by means
of fences on all sides.”
was sold for only One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) Philippine Currency.
Considering that the area of the land (1,456 sq. meters, more or less);
the nature of the lot it being urban and residential; its classification
(2nd); and its assessed valuation by the provincial assessor at P150.00
for taxation purposes, which is usually 15%-20% of the actual market
value, it becomes evident that the consideration was grossly inadequate.
And if We take into account the value of improvements existing on
the land such as a granary and the trees growing thereon, like
coconuts, bamboos, caimito, avocado, santol, and nipa palms that are
made into shingles and sold commercially, the price paid was plainly
unconscionable. These are badges of fraud which reveal the falsity of
the alleged sale.
In sum and substance, where petitioner’s claims, defenses and
acts are highly improbable, exaggerated and inconsistent with the
regular norm of human conduct and the normal course of events, such as a
claim that his possession and ownership of the property is more than
thirty (30) years when the said property supposedly acquired and
purchased only nine (9) years back; that the improvement (house) was
built by him in 1937 when the land was sold to him eleven (11) years
thereafter and he declared the house for taxation purposes only after
eleven (11) years; that he registered the deed of sale nine (9) years
after its execution, and after the complaint for its cancellation had
already been filed, and finally, the gross inadequacy and
unconscionableness of the consideration, petitioner’s posture becomes a
misrepresentation that cannot be believed or sustained.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
________________________________________
[1] First Division, Concepcion, Jr., J. ponente, with Villamor, P.J., Mojica, J., concurring.
[2] Record on Appeal, pp. 56-59.
[3] Records, p. 23.