FELIX LIMON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. (MRS.) ALEJO CANDIDO, PETRONILA CANDIDO, AND THE HEIRS OF ALEJO CANDIDO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

On July 5, 1963,
the day set for the initial hearing of Civil Case No. Q-6951* of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch V, Quezon City), only the counsel for
the plaintiff appeared.  And because his
client (herein plain­tiff-appellant) was not in court that day, counsel
manifested before the lower court that he was not ready to go to trial.  In view of plaintiff’s absence, counsel for
the defendants moved for the dismissal of the case.  The lower court, viewing plaintiff’s
non-appearance as indicative of lack of interest since “(T)here is
actually no reason for plaintiff to be absent from the courtroom now inasmuch
as this case is set for today and as early as May 23, 1963 counsel for the
plaintiff was notified thereof,” found defendants’ motion to dismiss
well-taken.

Plaintiff asked for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal
on the main ground that his failure to appear on the day of the trial was due
to sickness as evidenced by a medical certificate attesting to such fact.  Furthermore, he asserted that he had a good
cause of action as shown by the fact that he was sustained by the inferior
court in his claim.  Besides, plaintiff
argued that since the trial set for July
5, 1963 was the initial hearing, the postponement sought by his
counsel was neither unreasonable nor remotely suggestive of lack of
interest.  On July 20, 1963 the lower court denied
reconsideration.  On July 24, 1963 plaintiff again moved to set aside
the order denying his motion for reconsideration, reiterating the grounds he
alleged in his motion for reconsideration. 
This was again denied on August
28, 1963.  Hence
this appeal.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the lower court
gravely abused its discretion in denying counsel for the plaintiff’s motion for
continuance of the initial hearing, thus dismissing the case, and in denying
later the subsequent motions for reconsideration filed by plaintiff.

Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree with the
conclusion reached by the lower court that the absence of plaintiff at the
initial hearing of the case – though his counsel was there – was a positive
“manifestation of lack of interest.” If there was anyone who would
want an early termination of this case, that would be the plaintiff; he would
naturally be the last person to delay this case not only because he had already
won in the inferior court but more so because defendants had been in possession
of the premises in question up to this time.** The assumption therefore that
plaintiff had lost interest in the case just because of his non-appearance at
the initial hearing thereof does not appear to be indubitable nor logical.  Besides, the explanation later submitted by
plaintiff as to why he was unable to attend does not appear to be unreasonable
or so far from the truth that it should not be considered sufficient to excuse
plain­tiff’s non-appearance.

It is true that the allowance or denial of motions for
postponement and the setting aside of orders previously issued rest principally
upon the sound discretion of the court to which the same are addressed; but
such discretion should always be predicated on the consideration that more than
the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case the ends of
justice and fairness would be served thereby. 
When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is
not manifest, the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been
filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same (Panganiban vs. Vda. de Sta.
Maria, L-25529, February 29, 1968).  And
if such motion is denied because the reason therefor
does not appear indubitable, a subsequent plea for reconsideration on a valid
ground such as that invoked in this case, namely, sickness of the party duly
attested by a physician, should not be lightly ignored.  At this point it is pertinent to quote what
this Court noted in the case of Macasa, et al. vs.
Herrera, (101 Phil. 44, 48);

“Inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not
constitute a panacea nor a solution to
the congestion of court dockets; while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency
to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning
between the parties.  In the absence of
clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a
brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases
before the court.”

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal is hereby
set aside and this case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.  No pronouncement as to
costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., on
official leave.

Capistrano, J., did not take
part.

*
Civil Case No. Q-6951 is actually an appeal taken by
the defendants from the decision of the City Court of Caloocan
in an ejectment case (Case No. 4366) adverse to them.

**
Plaintiff had earlier moved for the execution of the judgment of the inferior
court pending appeal but the court a quo denied the same on June 5, 1963.