ATANACIO ROBIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. SUSANA CASPE AND IRENEO ARAW, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

The plaintiff-appellant asks for reversal of the decision of the
Samar court of first instance that absobed the defendant-appellees from
his complaint seeking recovery of a parcel of land. Said defendants had
duly answered, setting up the judgment in their favor in a previous suit
between the same parties, but at the trial failed to appear, and
plaintiff established the following facts, summarized by the court a
quo:

“That the land described in the complaint was originally a public
forest when Ceferino Oligario occupied and cleared it in 1932; that in
1947 said land was declared for taxation purposes by Ceferino Oligario
in his name (Exhibit B); that in 1948 the plaintiff herein declared the
same land in his own namefor taxation purposes (Exhibit C), and paid the
corresponding land taxes for the years 1947 and 1949 (Exhibit D and
D-1); that on April 15, 1940, the plaintiff, by virtue of the rpivate
document of sale ( Exhibit E), bought said land from Ceferino Oligario;
that on May 27, 1941, Ceferino Oligario executed another deed of sale of
the same land before Notary Public Marcelino Libanan in favor of the
plaintiff (Exhibit F); that the possession ofthe land in question was
litgated in Civil Case No.222 for Forcible Entry, entitled Atanacio
Robis vs. Ireneo Araw and Susan Caspe, before the Justice of Peace of
Dolores, Samar, wherein a decision was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Atancio Robis on June 23, 1946 (exhibit G), from which
decision the defendants appealed to this Court of First Instance and
said case was docketed in this Court as Civil Case No.37, and was
decided on May 22, 1951 by this Court condemning the plaintiff, Atanacio
Robis, to restore and deliver the land now in question to the present
defendants; and, that on february 20 or 26, 1952 the Deputy Provincial
Sheriff, Mr. Jose R. Amores, in compliance with the order of execution
issued in said Civil Case No. 37, delivered to the defendants herein the
land now in question (Exhibit H).” (Record on Appeal pp.5-7)

From the above facts, the trial judge concluded that possession of
the land was “res adjudicata” on defendants’ side, and therefore
plaintiff “is estopped” from asserting -as basis of his action- that he
was in possession of the land in December 1945 when defendants ejected
him by force.

The appellant argues here that ” res adjudicata” does not apply,
because although the parties and the subject-matter in this and in
previous Civil Case No. 37 are the same, there is no identity of cause
of action, the present litigation being for the recovery of dominion
while the former involved possesion only. It appears, however the
plaintiff proved no title or ownership either in himself of in Cefrino
Oligario, inasmuch as merely clearing a public forest in 1932 and paying
taxes thereon for three years (1947-1949) does not constitute ant
title. Consequently the debate is reduced -as it must be- to rights of
possession; and the decision for defendants in the forcible-entry
litigation will have to prevail, especially because the basic contention
of plaintiff at present is that in December 1945 “defendants by means
of force and intimidation turned plaintiff out of possession of the land
in question” – a point decided against him in the previous judicial
controversy (Exh. G) wherein maintained vainly that defendants had
grabbed the land in the same month.

“A fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was
there judicially passed on and determined by a domestic court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein,
as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity
with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties, or privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jusrisdiction, on either the same or different cause of
action.” (C.J.S. p. 141) (Italics ours)

“Conclusiveness of a judgment is distinguishable from bar a former
adjudication in that it may apply in a second action on a cause of
action different from the first action, but does not extend beyond the
matters actually litigated and determined in the first action.” C.J.S.
p. 143) (Italics ours)

To contend -as appellant does- that said former judgment for
defendants had not been rendered on the merits because it was the result
of plaintiff’s default, is to ignore sec. 3 rule 30, Rules of Court,
which provides that such dismissal “shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits” unless otherwise provided.

Wherefore, considering that every possessor has a right to be
respected in his possession (Art. 539 New Civil Code) we hold that the
trial judge committed no error in denying relief to herein
plaintiff-appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. So Ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur.