CELERINA RECAIDO MANLAPAZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. QUINTIN PAREDES MANLAPAZ & REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANDALUYONG CITY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
CORALES, J.:
The Antecedents
Celerina, a Filipino, and defendant-appellee Quintin P. Manlapaz (Quintin), a naturalized American citizen, got married on July 9, 1985 in Rockville, Maryland, United States of America. After obtaining a divorce decree in Nevada, United States of America on April 16, 1998, Celerina bought a parcel of land with buildings and improvements located at #133 C, Pinatubo Street, Mandaluyong City as shown by a deed of absolute sale[3] dated June 3, 1998. Title was later on registered in the name of “Celerina R. Manlapaz, married to Quintin P. Manlapaz” under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No-13938.[4]
On October 12, 2004, Celerina filed before the RTC an amended complaint[5] for quieting of title, recovery of damages, accounting, collection of sum of money with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) against Quintin and Edna Ocampo (Edna), docketed as Civil Case No. MC-04-2558. The complaint alleged that Celerina bought the property out of her exclusive funds but Quintin wrongfully inserted the phrase “married to Quintin P. Manlapaz” in the deed of absolute sale despite knowledge that he had been divorced from her. She also claimed that by means of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, Quintin, through Edna, collected rentals on the apartment built on the property. Despite written demand, Quintin failed to return the rentals. Celerina prayed that Quintin’s name be stricken out in TCT No. 13938 and the latter be ordered to account for all the rentals he misappropriated, which is not less than P500,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum until full satisfaction and pay moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Thereafter, and upon Celerina’s motion,[6] the RTC directed the tenants of the apartment to deposit their monthly rentals in court.[7] However, Celerina informed the RTC of the tenants’ non-compliance with its order,8 but the RTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over them because they were not impleaded in the case, consequently, it cannot order them to explain their failure to deposit the rentals with the court.[9]
Quintin filed his Answer[10] admitting that Celerina owns the parcel of land but claiming the 8-door apartment built thereon as his exclusive property. According to Quintin, before Celerina purchased the land, they agreed that he would invest in the property by partly contributing in the purchase price and by financing exclusively from his own resources the construction of an apartment. He would then use the initial rentals to recover the expenses of the construction and upon its full settlement, Celerina could have her share, unless she had already ceded the land to Quintin’s business associate for $100,000. Quintin further claimed that Celerina caused the inclusion of the words “Married” and “with my marital consent – Quintin P. Manlapaz” in the deed of absolute sale in order to facilitate the infusion of his investments in the property and she signed and acknowledged this deed of absolute sale before a notary public. As compulsory counterclaim, Quintin sought the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of litigation.
In her Reply,[11] Celerina denied Quintin’s allegations as to the construction of the apartment and insisted that the same was already existing at the time of her purchase. She also averred that Quintin has no resources which he could have invested in any business prospect.
It appears from the records that Edna failed to file any responsive pleading due to improper service of summons.[12] Celerina moved that she be declared in default but Edna filed a counter-motion seeking the dismissal of the complaint against her.[13] The RTC ruled in favor of Edna and dismissed[14] the complaint against her because she has no privity of contract, express or implied, with Celerina.
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, that:[15]
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- That based on the Joint Petition for Summary Divorce, the petitioners are the parties in this case;
- That the property in question was purchased by the plaintiff [Celerina] after the Decree of Divorce;
- That the title, as well as the tax declaration and real estate taxes over the property in dispute are all in the name of plaintiff;
- The existence of the Deed of Sale in favor of Celerina Manlapaz executed by the former owner of the Mandaluyong property;
- That the property in question was rented out by the defendant (Quintin) to third parties for monthly rentals;
- That the rentals over the premises were entirely taken and kept by the defendant without remitting any amount to the plaintiff;
- That it is Edna Ocampo who collects the rent on behalf of defendant;
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Emmanuel Pangan (Emmanuel), an employee of the Mandaluyong City Engineering Office, and Eufronia Martinez-Recaido (Eufronia), Celerina’s sister, testified to support the allegations in the complaint. Emmanuel identified the certification[16] from his office that no building permit was issued on the property.[17] On the other hand, Eufronia claimed that Quintin has no source of income because he has been on disability for many years in the United States of America. However, she admitted on cross-examination that she was in Milan during the sale of the property and her knowledge of the transaction was based only on the information relayed to her by Celerina.[18]
After several postponements and re-settings,[19] Quintin still failed to present his evidence prompting the RTC to issue its December 6, 2010 Order[20] which deemed waived Quintin’s right to do so and submitted the case for decision.
The case was not immediately resolved because the presiding judge[21] and the other judges to whom the case was re-raffled either recused themselves or refused to accept the case.[22] However, the Supreme Court later on set aside the inhibition of the presiding judge and directed him to decide the instant case.[23]
The Ruling of the RTC
On February 1, 2012, the RTC dismissed[24] Celerina’s amended complaint because she failed to testify to substantiate her claim and present the original copies of her documentary evidence. It noted that except for Eufronia’s Judicial Affidavit, all other evidence on record are plain photocopies. The RTC ruled in this wise and disposed the case as follows:
In the case at bar, the plaintiff failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the photocopy documents were made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted rule [Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court]. Hence, this court cannot accept the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption. Accordingly, plaintiff [Celerina] having failed to prove the due execution and genuineness of her purported evidence which made it without weight hence, the same cannot be given consideration. Where the best evidence cannot be submitted secondary evidence may be presented however, the plaintiff failed to do so the same.
In addition, the existence of the original documents were not established by the photocopies or through the testimony of the plaintiff since she failed to come to court and substantiate her allegations. She failed to prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence and good faith. The non presentation of the original documents affected the weight of the evidence intended by plaintiff to establish her prayer in her Complaint. The mere submission of photocopied documents will not suffice to prove her claim in this case.
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Next the plaintiff was only able to present as witness her sister and that she failed to testify in this case.
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This court finds the testimony given by the sister of the plaintiff as hearsay since the same is not based on personal knowledge but derived from some other person. The facts and circumstances relayed by the sister of plaintiff in court during the time she testified anent the previous relationship of the plaintiff and defendant originated from other persons and some were merely relayed to her by the plaintiff. It is only the plaintiff who has personal knowledge of all the facts stated in her complaint who can prove the same in court.
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, this complaint filed by plaintiff, Celerina Recaido Manlapaz, and the counterclaim of defendant, Quintin Paredes Manlapaz, are both DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Celerina lodged the instant appeal raising the following issues:
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT/HON. JUDGE CARLOS A. VALENZUELA ERR IN FACT AND IN LAW IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IS WITH THE PLAINTIFF, AND IN ARBITRARILY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT?
II. DID THE PONENTE JUDGE VALENZUELA ERR IN DISREGARDING THE ADMISSIONS IN THE PLEADINGS, IN THE PRE-TRIAL AND IN HIS ORDERS (DATED JAN. 29, 2010 AND MARCH 15, 2010) ADMITTING ALL THE EXHIBITS?
III. DID THE PONENTE JUDGE VALENZUELA ERR IN ALLOWING HIS EMOTIONS, PREJUDICES, IRE AND BRUISED EGO TO PREVAIL OVER HIS DUTY TO RENDER A FAIR, EQUITABLE AND JUST DECISION?
IV. IS THE APPEALED DECISION CONTRARY TO THE FACTS ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCES, THE ADMISSIONS IN THE PLEADINGS, THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER, THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OFFERED AND ALREADY ADMITTED IN THE ORDER RESOLVING THE FORMAL OFFER?
V. DID THE TRIAL COURT A QUO/JUDGE VALENZUELA DECIDE A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE (IN THIS CASE), IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT? AND
VI. DID THE TRIAL COURT A QUO DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION?
Thus, the pivotal issue in this case is whether or not there is preponderance of evidence to prove Celerina’s claim that she is the exclusive owner of the parcel of land and improvements registered under TCT No. 13938.
This Court’s Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
An action for quieting of title is governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the New Civil Code (NCC). Under Article 476, quieting of title is proper whenever there is a cloud on the title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. To successfully maintain an action for quieting of title, Article 477 provides that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.[25]
Simply put, in order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, these requisites must concur, to wit: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.[26]
It is also an equally settled rule that in civil cases, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff therein, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of the trial, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.[27] Corollary thereto, if the defendant alleges in his Answer an affirmative defense, which is not the denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one which if established will be a good defense, the burden of proof lies on the defendant to prove such affirmative defense.[28] Thus, the party having the burden of proof must produce preponderance of evidence thereof or that evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, preponderance of evidence means probability of truth.[29]
Guided by the foregoing principles, We are behooved to reverse and set aside the ruling of the RTC.
Celerina’s Legal Title Proven By Judicial Admission
Although Celerina failed to testify in court and her documentary evidence were mere photocopies, the court a quo should not have disregarded Quintin’s judicial admission in his Answer and during the pre-trial conference that Celerina is the sole owner of the litigated parcel of land. It bears stressing that stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admission[30] which is evidence of the highest order.[31] Its veracity requires no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made.[32] This is clearly provided in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admiission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Here, Quintin neither claimed any palpable mistake in the Answer that he filed nor denied the admission made by his counsel during the pre-trial conference. An act performed by counsel within the scope of a general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client which renders Quintin in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.[33] No other proof is therefore necessary to establish Celerina’s ownership of the disputed parcel of land. The admission made by Quintin’s counsel is conclusive as to him and no amount of rationalization can off-set it.
Thus, the RTC should have given probative value to the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial that the “property in question was purchased by plaintiff [Celerina] after the Decree of Divorce” and “the title, as well as the tax declaration and real estate taxes over the property in dispute are all in the name of the plaintiff”. Pre-trial forms part of the proceedings, and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless.[34]
Accordingly, Celerina’s legal title to the litigated parcel of land, the first requisite for a quieting of title case, has been sufficiently established. Therefore, as an owner of the property, she has a right to the improvements and rents thereof in accordance with the rule on accession. The right of accession or the accessory follows is recognized in Articles 440,445 and 446 of the NCC, viz.:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right of accession to everything which is produced thereby, or everything which is incorporated or attached thereto.
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or repairs made thereon belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles.
Art. 446. All works, sowing and planting are presumed made by the owner and at his expense, unless the contrary is proved.
Quintin claimed that he financed the construction of the 8-door apartment pursuant to his agreement with Celerina but he failed to substantiate the same. To reiterate, the stipulation during the pre-trial conference that Celerina owns the land makes a prima facie case in her favor as to the right to collect the rentals. Thus, and contrary to the findings of the RTC, it is Quintin who must prove with preponderance of evidence his claim that he owns the building in the land owned by Celerina. He, however, failed to discharge this burden. Quintin did not attach any documentary evidence in his Answer or present any in court to support his affirmative defense that he spent for the construction of the building. His right to present evidence was in fact deemed waived by the court a quo and he neither testified nor formally offered his exhibits during trial. Hence, Quintin failed to substantiate his claim over the apartment and his right to collect the rentals thereof has no leg to stand.
To reiterate, Celerina, as the owner of the land is entitled to its improvements and income absent any proof to the contrary. Accordingly, she has the right to demand the return of all the rentals that had been collected by Quintin which could be determined only after a proper accounting which was not done by the court a quo.
Description on TCT No. 13939 Cast Doubt on Celerina’s Title
The cloud on Celerina’s title is also apparent on the face of her TCT No. 13938. The inclusion of the phrase “married to Quintin P. Manlapaz” in TCT No. 13938 was due to the intercalations made in the deed of absolute sale notwithstanding the fact of Celestina and Quintin’s divorce prior to the purchase of the property. It bears stressing that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted, by both parties. Neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. We also note that Quintin admitted during the pre-trial conference that the land was acquired after the decree of divorce, thus, there is no reason for Us not to order the cancellation of his name in Celerina’s TCT No. 13938. Although the words “married to” preceding the name of a person are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner,[35] these may be utilized to convince third persons of a co-ownership between Celerina and Quintin which is not actually existing. Fittingly, the deletion of the wrongfully inserted words “married to Quintin P. Manlapaz” in TCT No. 13938 is proper because they cast cloud on Celerina’s title.
No Proof of Damages and Bad Faith to Justify Attorney’s Fees
However, Celerina failed to prove her claim for moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be granted only upon clear showing that the pleader actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings or similar injury.[36] No other person could have proven such damages except Celerina herself as the same are extremely personal to her, but she failed to testify on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering she purportedly suffered as a result of Quintin’s act. Well-settled is the rule that mere allegations of moral suffering do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.[37] “If the court has no proof or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, such indemnity could not be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with respect to the award of exemplary damages where it must be shown that the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.”[38] Moreover, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the claimant has satisfactorily shown his entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory damages,[39] which is not the situation in the case at bench.
With respect to attorney’s fees, it is not the fact of winning alone in the litigation that entitles recovery of such item. While Article 2208[40] of the NCC allows attorney’s fees to be awarded if the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought, there must be a showing that the losing party acted willfully or in bad faith and practically compelled the claimant to litigate and incur litigation expenses.[41] As such, Celerina’s mere allegation that she was compelled to litigate against Quintin without proof of the latter’s bad faith will not suffice to warrant an award of attorney’s fees in her favor.
Lastly, Celerina’s imputation that the presiding judge of the court a quo allowed his emotions, prejudices, ire and bruised ego to prevail over his duty to render a fair, equitable and just decision are mere surmises unsupported by sufficient proof that does not deserve this Court’s consideration. It must be emphasized that before a judge could be declared as biased and partial in favor of a party, the Court has to be shown acts and conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is not enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge.[42]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The February 1, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 213, Mandaluyong City in Civil Case No. MC-04-2558 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City is directed to cancel TCT No. 13938 and a new one be issued solely in the name of Celerina R. Manlapaz.
Further, the case is REMANDED to the RTC for the conduct of a full and accurate accounting of all the rents and profits that Quintin P. Manlapaz may have obtained from the property which should be subject to 6% annual interest[43] from the time of the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction. To forestall any further delay in the final resolution of this case, the RTC is directed to proceed with the required accounting within six (6) months from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Castillo, M.J., Chairperson and Lazaro-Javier, A. JJ., concur.
[1] See Notice of Appeal in relation to the March 2, 2012 Order of the RTC giving due course to said appeal, records (Volume IV), pages 215-216 and 219, respectively.
[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela, rollo, pages 21-45.
[3] Records (Volume I), page 123.
[4] Ibid., page 120.
[5] Ibid., pages 47-86.
[6] See Ex-parte Motion to Order Tenants to Deposit Rentals in Court, ibid., pages 130-132.
[7] See October 22, 2004 Order, penned by Judge Amelia F. Dy, ibid., page 135.
[8] See Ex-parte Motion to Order Tenants to Explain why Rentals are not Deposited in Court, ibid., pages 412-414.
[9] See September 27, 2005 Order, penned by Acting Presiding Judge Marissa M. Guillen due to the retirement of Judge Amelia F. Dy, ibid., page 447.
[10] Ibid., pages 138-144.
[11] Ibid., pages 226-238.
[12] See May 3, 2005 Omnibus Order, ibid., pages 408-410.
[13] See Opposition to Motion to Declare Edna Ocampo in Default and Countermotion to Dismiss Complaint Against Her, ibid., pages 387-389.
[14] See May 3, 2005 Omnibus Order, supra, at note 12.
[15] See Pre-trial Order, penned by Presiding Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela, records (Volume II), pages 193-195.
[16] Issued by City Government Department Head II Engr. Crisanto W. Roxas, ibid., page 301.
[17] TSN, Emmanuel Pangan, November 28, 2008, pages 41-63.
[18] TSN, Eufronia Martinez-Recaido, July 3, 2009, pages 88-102.
[19] See March 15, 2010 and April 5, 2010 Orders, records (Volume IV), pages 10 and 15, respectively.
[20] Ibid., page 58.
[21] See April 12, 2011 Order of Presiding Judge Carlos Valenzuela of RTC, Branch 213, Mandaluyong City, ibid., pages 147-149.
[22] See Letter of Presiding Judge Esteban Tacla Jr. addressed to the Executive Judge Monique Quisumbing-Ignacio refusing to accept the case on the ground that Judge Carlos Valenzuela’s inhibition was groundless and the June 16, 2011 Order of Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali inhibiting herself from resolving the case, ibid., pages 157 and 166-167, respectively.
[23] See October 17, 2011 Resolution of the Supreme Court Second Division in A.M. No. 11-8-158-RTC RE: Letter of Executive Judge Monique Quisumbing Ignation seeking assistance relative to the inhibition in Civil Case No. MC-04-2558, ibid., pages 186-187.
[24] See February 1, 2012 Decision, supra, at note 2.
[25] Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005.
[26] Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio, et al., G.R. No. 167391. June 8, 2011, citing Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289. February 17, 2010.
[27] See Jison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998.
[28] Mavest v. Sampaguita Garment Corporation, G.R. No. 127454. September 21, 2005.
[29] See Dantes v. Maghinang, Jr., G.R. No. 191696. April 10, 2013.
[30] See Cuenco v. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, G.R. No. 174154. October 17, 2008.
[31] See See Azul v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 172401. October 30, 2006.
[32] Cuenco v. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, supra, at note 30.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Acre v. Yuttikki, G.R. No. 153029 . September 27, 2007.
[36] See Mahinay v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 152753. January 13, 2004.
[37] See Aoanan, Sr. v. Aoanan, Jr., G.R. No. 164220. April 27, 2007.
[38] See Mahinay v. Velasquez, ibid.
[39] See Article 2234 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
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[40] Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered except:
1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
6) In actions for legal support;
7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation could be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
[41] Buñing v. Santos, G.R. No. 152544. September 19, 2006.
[42] Opis v. Judge Dimaano, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1942. July 28, 2005.
[43] See Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871. August 13, 2013.