ALLIED BROKERAGE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Allied Brokerage Corporation seeks the reversal of a
decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissing its action for the
refund of the amount of P35,227.00 paid to the Customs
Arrastre Service allegedly in excess of what was due
under the Tariff and Customs Code. 
Respondent Commissioner of Customs contended before respondent Court
that petitioner lacked a cause of action as it did not pay under protest the
charges collected and it did not exhaust the administrative remedies.  Such an argument was found meritorious by
respondent Court.  Hence its decision now
sought to be reviewed.  It being
undisputed that the steps required by law to be fulfilled before respondent
Court could act on a claim for refund were not
complied with, no legal ground exists to call for a reversal.  We affirm.

The facts were stipulated. 
After an allegation that petitioner “is duly licensed to engage in
the customs brokerage business”, its main function being to obtain the
clearance and release from the custody of the Bureau of Customs merchandise or
goods consigned to importers who are its clients, Section 3102 of the Tariff
and Customs Code was cited:  “At the
Port of Manila * * * e.  Heavy Cargo.  – On any
single package of import, export, transit cargo, weighing more than two (2)
tons handled on a pier or wharf, the charge shall be, per ton or any fraction
thereof – P13.50, Provided, that this charge shall not apply to automobiles,
motor trucks and transit cargo for coastwise ports.”^[1]
Mention was then made of an unnumbered customs memorandum order issued by the
then Commissioner of Customs, Norberto Romualdez,
Jr., on April 30, 1963 which, insofar as pertinent, reads thus:  “The arrastre
charge for ‘Heavy Cargo’ as prescribed under Section 3102 (e) of the Customs
and Tariff Code, viz.:  (e) Heavy Cargo –
On any single package of import, export, transit cargo, weighing more than two
(2) tons, handled on a pier or wharf, the charge shall be, per ton or any
fraction thereof – P13.50, shall be applied to mean that one ton shall be
equivalent to 1,000 kilos or 40 cubic feet volume, which­ever is higher.”^[2]

The ensuing paragraphs of such a stipulation of facts
follow:  “That on May 7, 1963, the
President of the Association of Customs Brokers, Inc. addressed a letter of
protest to respondent protesting the enforcement of the said Memorandum Order
under which the arrastre charges are collected based
on 1,000 kilos or 40 cubic feet volume’ per ton, whichever is higher; That the
petitioner on May 25, 1964 filed with respondent a claim for refund of the
amount of P20,658.85 representing the amounts collected by the Customs Arrastre Service from the petitioner during the period from
April 30, 1963 to May 25, 1964; That petitioner, after several representations
in writing to the Commissioner of Customs, received a letter from the latter
dated October 26, 1964, disapproving petitioner’s claim; That on February 18,
1965, the Chief of the Law Division in his 3rd Indorse­ment
addressed to the Commissioner of Customs recommended the immediate repeal or
abrogation of the unnumbered memorandum order under consideration.  * * *.^[3]

The decision proceeded to set forth the issues as raised by the
parties:  “Petitioner assails the
validity of the unnumbered Customs Memorandum Order dated August 30, 1963, for the reasons that it is
contrary to law; that it contravenes established international shipping
practices; and that it is void ab initio.  On
the other hand, respondent interposed the defense of petitioner’s lack of cause
of action.”^[4] The
defense of a lack of cause of action struck a responsive chord.  The decision proceeded to explain why:  “It appears that petitioner did not file
any protest with the Collector of Customs at the time of collection of the
charges, but instead filed its claim for refund directly with the Commissioner
of Customs.”^[5]
After setting forth the pertinent provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code on
the matter of refund, Sections 2308,^[6]
2309^[7]
and 2313^[8]
and the decision of this Court in Sampaguita Shoe and
Slipper Factory v. Commissioner of Customs^[9]
and CMS Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs,^[10]
respondent court concluded:  “Under
the afore-quoted provisions of law and the cases cited above, the filing of a
written protest with the proper Collector of Customs within the statutory
period is mandatory and a condition precedent for the recovery of customs
duties, fees and other charges allegedly erroneously or illegally collected and
noncompliance therewith bars and is fatal to the action.”^[11] Hence, its decision dismissing the petition for review.

It is thus plain, as mentioned at the outset, that the above
decision calls for affirmance.  The Tariff and Customs Code has indicated in
a manner definite and certain how a challenged actuation of a collector of
customs may be elevated to respondent Court. 
The party adversely affected “may protest such ruling or decision
by presenting to the Collector at the time when payment of the amount claimed
to be due the government is made, or within thirty days thereafter, a written protest
setting forth his objections to the ruling or decision in question, together
with the reasons therefor.”^[12]
It is stressed in the next section that the interested party who desires such a
review of the action taken by the Collector “shall make a protest,
otherwise, the action of the Collector shall be final and conclusive against
him, * * *.”^[13]
Then, there is the explicit provision that such an aggrieved party in any
matter presented by protest “may, within fifteen days after notification
in writing by the Collector of his action or decision, give written notice to
the Collector of his desire to have the matter reviewed by the
Commissioner.”^[14]
Time and time again this Court has stressed that where a provision of law
speaks categorically the need for interpretation is obviated, no plausible
pretense being entertained to justify non­compliance.  All that has to be done is to apply it in
every case that falls within its terms.^[15]
So it must be in this litigation. 
Respondent Court then had no other choice but to dismiss the case in
view of the fatal omission of petitioner.

It is to be admitted that the cases referred to by respondent
Court, the Sampaguita Shoe and Slipper Factory
decision, arising from a seizure and forfeiture proceeding, and the CMS Estate
ruling, dealing with the collection wharfage dues,
are not precisely in point.  They are,
however, illustrative of a principle which governs this particular
situation.  To make clearer however that
respondent Court is not in any wise to be faulted for the decision reached,
reference may be made to Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corp. v. Secretary of
Finance.^[16]
That was an action to nullify an arrastre
contract.  One of the defenses raised was
plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, not to mention the
jurisdictional defect of having filed a case with the Court of First
Instance.  In sustaining a lower court
order dismissing the complaint, this Court in the opinion by the Chief Justice
declared:  “It is true that,
pursuant to section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, the Tax Court cannot exercise
its jurisdiction except on appeal from a decision of the Com­missioner of
Customs, and that no such decision exists. 
This is, however, due to the fact that plaintiff has not taken the steps
prescribed by law therefor, namely:  payment of the charges in question coupled
with a written protest against said charges, and, upon rendition of the
decision thereon of the Collector of Customs of Davao,
an appeal therefrom, if adverse to the plaintiff, to
the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision in such appeal may, in turn, be
reviewed by the Court of Tax Appeals, to the exclusion of other courts.  Indeed, the absence of such decision of the
Commissioner of Customs merely underscores plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and suggests a lack of cause of action.”^[17]

To the same effect is this pronouncement from an earlier
decision, the opinion being penned by Justice J. B. L. Reyes.  Thus: 
“In the absence of any decision or ruling which may be the subject of
an appeal or petition for review to the Court of Tax Appeals, said court has no
case to take cognizance of * * *.  So
that the lower court correctly dismissed the petition for review of petitioner
for being premature or for not stating a cause of action.”^[18]

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals
of April 29, 1967 is
affirmed.  With costs
against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals, Annex L, Petition, paragraphs 2
and 3 of the Stipulation of Facts.

^[2] Ibid,
paragraph 4.

^[3] Ibid,
paragraphs 5 to 8.

^[4] Ibid, p. 3.

^[5] Ibid.

^[6]
Section 2308 provides:  “Protest
and Payment upon Protest in Civil Matters. 
– When a ruling or decision of the Col­lector is made whereby liability
for duties, fees, or other money charge is determined, except the fixing of
fines in seizure cases, the party adversely affected may protest such
ruling or decision by presenting to the Collector at the time when payment of
the amount claimed to be due the Govern­ment is made, or within thirty
days thereafter, a written protest setting forth his objections to the ruling or
decision in question, together with the reasons therefor.  No protest shall be considered unless payment
of the amount due after final liquidation has first been made.”

^[7]
Section 2309 provides:  “Protest
Exclusive Remedy in Protestable Case.  – In all cases subject to protest, the
interested party who desires to have the action of the Collector reviewed,
shall make a protest, otherwise, the action of the Collector shall be final and
conclusive against him, except as to matters correctible for manifest error in
the manner prescribed in section one thousand seven hundred and seven
hereof.”

^[8]
Section 2313 provides:  “Review
by Commissioner.  – The person
aggrieved by the decision or action of the Collector in any matter presented
upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen days
after notification in writing by the Collector of his action or decision, give
written notice to the Collector of his desire to have the matter reviewed by
the Commissioner.  Thereupon the Collector
shall forthwith transmit all the records of the proceedings to the
Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or reverse the action or decision of
the Collector and take such steps and make such orders as may be neces­sary to
give effect to his decision.”

^[9] 102 Phil. 850 (1958).

^[10] L-18773, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 164.

^[11] Decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals, Annex L, p. 5.

^[12] Section 2308, Tariff and Customs Code.

^[13] Section 2309, Ibid.

^[14] Section 2313, Ibid.

^[15]
Cf. People v. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, L-21881,
March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 917; Dequito v. Lopez,
L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla v. City of Pasay, L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349; Garcia v.
Vasquez, L-26808, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 505; La Perla
Cigar & Cigarette Factory v. Capapas,
L-27948 & 28001-11, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1085; Mobil Oil Phil., Inc. v.
Diocares, L-26371, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111; Vda. de Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company, L-27489, April 30, 1970,
32 SCRA 553; Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs,
L-28463, May 31, 1971; Maritime Company of the Philippines v.
Reparations Commission, L-29203, July 26, 1971.

^[16] L-24797, October 8, 1968, 25 SCRA 452.

^[17] Ibid, p. 456.

^[18] Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-20462, June 30, 1965,
14 SCRA 599, 604.