BELEN CRUZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EXEQUIEL CASTILLO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First In­stance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No.
3946.

Plaintiff’s poorly drafted complaint, liberally construed so as
to do substantial justice, stated a cause of action by the mother representing
her recognized na­tural child for compulsory recognition and support of the
child by the defendant father.  The acknowledging
parent who exercises parental authority over the ack­nowledged
natural child (Article 311, Civil Code) has the duty to represent the child in
all actions which may redound to the child’s benefit (Article 316[1]).  The reason for the law is stated by a member
of the Code Commission that drafted the New Civil Code in his com­ment on
Article 316 thus:

“The duty of the parents to represent their unemancipated children in all actions which may redound to
their benefit (which had been held impliedly repealed by Section 553, Act 190
in Palet vs. Aldecoa,
15 Phil. 232) was revived by the Code Commission in order to maintain the
principle of family solidarity consecrated in the new Code.” (Capistrano,
Civil Code of the Phil. with Comments and Annotations, Vol. I, pp. 297-298.)

Defendant’s answer denied paternity of the child and liability to
support said child.

After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on July 27,
1964 containing the following findings:

“The evidence for the plaintiff shows that on October 4 up to
November 13, 1959, the plaintiff lived as housemaid in the house of Anselma de Leon, mother of the defendant, in the City of Cabanatuan wherein the defen­dant also lived; that at that
time the plain­tiff and the defendant were both single; that on October 5,
1959, the defendant embraced her and by force and threat she surrendered her
womanhood because he would kill her if she did not accede to the wishes of the
defendant; that she had sexual intercourse with the de­fendant on October 5,
12, 21, and 23, 1959; that on July 11, 1960 she gave birth to a child which was
baptized Anselma Armi Cas­tillo;
she gave that name to her child be­cause that was the name of the baby’s grand­mother,
Anselma de Leon, who is the mother of the defendant;
that when Anselma de Leon, the mother of the
defendant, noticed that she was conceiving, she drove the plaintiff away; that
she was asked at first to go to the market ‘to sell’ (to attend to the store of
de­fendant’s mother) and during her absence one of the sons of the mother of
the defendant was ordered to bring all her belongings to the house of the
brother of the defendant’s mo­ther; that Exhibit A is the baptismal certi­ficate
of the child Anselma Armi
Castillo wherein it appears that Edgardo Castillo,
who is the brother of the defendant, stood as one of the sponsors, that she
demanded from the defendant support for her child in the amount of P40.00 a
month but the defendant refused to give support to her child; that to maintain
her child she used to sell assorted goods in the market; that the defendant is
now married and they own a big store in the public market with a car of their
own and a television set; that she contracted her lawyer for P300.00.  * * *.”

The trial court, for the reasons stated in its de­cision, gave
credence to the plaintiff’s evidence.

Judgment was rendered as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders its decision:

(a)   
Declaring Anselma
Armi Castillo the natural child of defendant Exequiel Castillo;

(b)   
Ordering the defendant to give sup­port
to the child Anselma Armi
Castillo in the sum of P30.00 per month from the date of the filing of the
complaint;

(c)   
Further ordering the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P300.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the costs
of the suit.”

Defendant appealed from the judgment to the Court of
Appeals.  Said court, however, certified
the case to this Court on the ground that it involves only questions of law.

In appellant’s brief, it is admitted that Anselma
Armi Castillo is appellant’s natural child.  Appellant, however, contends that the lower
court erred in ordering him to give support to the child from date of the
filing of the complaint.  The contention
is tenable insofar as the giving of the support was to begin from the time of
the filing of the com­plaint.  The fact
of the child being natural is distinct from the fact of the child’s
recognition.  A natural child not
recognized by the father has no rights whatever, not even to support.  This doctrine, laid down as early as
fifty-one years ago in Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 736, has been followed in later
decisions.  It is the fact of
recognition, voluntary (by any of the four means specified in Article 278,
Civil Code) or compulsory (in any of the cases mentioned in Article 283), that
gives the natural child the rights of support and succession.  In the case at bar, the defendant father not
having voluntarily recog­nized his natural child by any of the means specified
in Article 278 of the Civil Code, he had no obligation to support said child
until after judgment was rendered by the lower court declaring that he was the
father of the child.  The distinct
effects of voluntary recognition and compulsory recognition may be further
clarified with examples.

(1)  The birth certificate
giving the names of the unmarried father and mother of the newly born child was
sworn to by both parents (Sec. 5, Act No. 3753).  Subsequently, the father refused to support
the child.  In such case an action for
support (not for recognition) of the child maybe brought against the father
founded upon his voluntary act of having recognized the child in the record of
birth.

(2)  Suppose in the first
example, the father who has refused to support his natural child did not
recognize the child in the record of birth. 
In such case the child is not entitled to support, but a combined action
for compul­sory recognition and for support may be brought against the father,
and the court may render judgment ordering the de­fendant father to recognize
the child as his natural child and to give support to the child from the date
of the judg­ment.  The support should
commence from the date of the judg­ment because it is the judgment compelling
recognition that gives rights to the child.

 Appellant contends that
the lower court erred in de­claring that he is the father of the natural child
on the ground of physical resemblance between him and the child.  The contention is unmeritorious.  The finding of close re­semblance between the
child and the defendant was a minor one. 
It was not even mentioned in the trial court’s con­clusion as follows:

“After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in
this case, the Court is convinced that the defendant really had sexual
relations with the plaintiff on October 5, 12, 21, and 23, 1959, at first with
force and intimidation but the subsequent sexual relations were done without
force.  As a con­sequence thereof, the
plaintiff conceived and gave birth to a baby girl on July 11, 1960 who was named Anselma
Armi Castillo. 
At that time, the plaintiff and the defendant were both single and had
no impe­diment to marry each other.”

In addition, counsel for appellant
admitted in appellant’s brief that appellant is the father of Anselma Armi Castillo.  In the case of Navarro vs. Bacalla, G.R. No. L-20607, October 14, 1965, this Court said that
“once the fact of paternity of a natural child is found to have been
established by evi­dence and is no longer disputed by the father, he should be
compelled to recognize the child as his own.”

The appealed judgment merely declared Anselma
Armi Castillo the natural child of defendant Exequiel Castillo. 
It should be modified by ordering said defendant to recognize the child
as his natural child and to give the child support in the sum of P100.00 per
month, considering that the child is now of school age and that the defendant
father has the means, from July 27,
1964, the date the lower court’s judg­ment was promulgated.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed
judgment is modified so as to read as follows:

(a) Declaring Anselma Armi Castillo the natural child of defendant-appellant Exequiel Castillo, and ordering said appellant to recognize
said child as his natural child and to give her support in the amount of P100.00
per month from July 27, 1964; and

(b)  Ordering
defendant-appellant to pay plaintiff-appellee the sum
of P500.00 as counsel fee.

Costs against defendant-appellant also in this
instance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.

Dizon, J., did not take part.