ADELAIDA TANEGA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, AND THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF QUEZON CITY, …

Tanega versus Masakayan

The Case

This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Adelaida Tanega against Judge Honorato B. Masakayan, in his capacity as judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch Five, and the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Tanega had been convicted by final judgment of slander and sentenced to a light penalty, but she was never taken into custody; years later she moved to quash the warrants for her arrest on the ground that the penalty had prescribed. The case matters because it fixes the precise starting point of the prescriptive period for penalties of imprisonment, a point every criminal law examinee is asked to state.

Procedural History

Tanega was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City. She appealed, and the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch Five, again found her guilty, imposing twenty days of arresto menor, an indemnity of one hundred pesos with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court declined to review it on certiorari, so the judgment became final.

Back in the Court of First Instance, execution of the sentence was set for January 27, 1965, then deferred on her motion to February 12, 1965 at eight thirty in the morning. She did not appear. The respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest on February 15, 1965, and an alias warrant on March 23, 1965, but she was never arrested. On December 10, 1966, she moved to quash both warrants on the ground that the penalty had prescribed. On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge rejected the plea of prescription and directed the issuance of another alias warrant. Tanega then came to the Supreme Court by original petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Facts

Adelaida Tanega was charged with slander at the instance of the offended party, Pilar B. Julio. She was convicted by the City Court of Quezon City, convicted again on appeal by the Court of First Instance, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied her petition for certiorari, and the sentence became final.

When the case returned to the trial court for execution, the setting was moved to February 12, 1965 at her own request. She failed to appear at the appointed day and hour. The court issued a warrant of arrest on February 15, 1965, and an alias warrant on March 23, 1965, yet she was never arrested and never placed in confinement.

Almost two years after the first warrant, on December 10, 1966, she moved to quash the warrants, arguing that the penalty had prescribed. The respondent judge refused, ruled that the penalty had to be served, and ordered another alias warrant. Hence the petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the penalty of arresto menor and a fine imposed by final sentence had prescribed when Tanega moved to quash the warrants of arrest.
• Whether or not, for the prescription of a penalty of imprisonment to begin to run, the convict must first have evaded service of sentence by escaping during the term of her imprisonment.

Applicable Provisions

Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben: Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte; Las leves, al año.

This fixes the one year period for light penalties, which the Court held applies to arresto menor and a fine.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o desde el quebrantamiento de la condena, si hubiera esta comenzado a cumplirse.

The Court noted that the words on personal notification of the final sentence were deleted from the present Article 93, leaving only the breach of sentence, or quebrantamiento de la condena, as the starting point.

Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

This defines evasion of service of sentence, which the Court used to construe the phrase quebrantamiento de la condena in Article 93.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the penalty had not prescribed. Arresto menor and a fine of one hundred pesos constitute a light penalty under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, and light penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe in one year under Article 92. But under Article 93, the period commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.

On the second issue, the Court held that evasion of service of sentence requires three elements: the offender is a convict by final judgment; she is serving her sentence, which consists in deprivation of liberty; and she evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of her sentence. The Court stressed that escape should take place while serving sentence, and that evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term jail breaking.

The Court drew on the Penal Code of Spain of 1870, from which Articles 92 and 93 originated, and noted that the words on personal notification of the final sentence were deleted from the present Article 93. What remains is solely quebrantamiento de la condena, and quebrantamiento or evasion means escape. Reason dictates that one can escape only after he has started service of sentence. The Court therefore ruled that for prescription of a penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.

On the facts, Tanega was sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment but was never placed in confinement. Prescription of the penalty, then, does not run in her favor.

Doctrine

For the prescription of a penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the convict must first evade service of sentence by escaping during the term of her imprisonment. Until she is placed in confinement and escapes, the prescriptive period under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code does not begin. Light penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe in one year under Article 92, but that year counts only from the evasion of service of sentence.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, without costs, so the respondent judge prevailed and the warrants of arrest stood.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: prescription of a penalty of imprisonment runs only from the convict's escape during the term of her imprisonment, not from the finality of the judgment. Examiners use this case to test the starting point of prescription of penalties under Articles 92 and 93, and the elements of evasion of service of sentence under Article 157.