G.R. No. L-34674. August 06, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PABLO GONZALES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
PER CURIAM:
In Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-883-Rizal
of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, Pablo
Gonzales was charged with the crime of Murder in an
information filed against him which reads as follows:
“That on or about April 9, 1971, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa,
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused while then confined at the said
institution, armed with an improvised deadly weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and wound
therewith one MOISES MALINES,
No. 9412-D, a detention prisoner at the New Bilibid
Prison, in the different parts of the body, inflicting upon him multiple stab
wounds, while then unarmed and unable to defend himself from the attack
launched by the accused, as a result of which the said Moises
Malines died instantly.
“That the offense when committed by the accused was attended
by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and the generic
circumstance of evident premeditation.”
When arraigned on August
5, 1971, the accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. Accordingly, the court set the case for trial
on August 10, 1971.[1]
At the scheduled trial, however, counsel for the accused
manifested to the court that his client would like to withdraw his former plea
and substitute it with the plea of guilty.
Whereupon, the court ordered the accused to be re-arraigned, after which
the accused pleaded guilty to the
charge.[2] Hereunder is what transpired in the court
below:
“ATTY. GALVAN
As counsel de oficio, your Honor, The accused has intimated to me
that if the Court will permit him to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and
substitute the same with a plea of
guilty, the accused is most willing to enter a plea of guilty.
“COURT
Re-arraign the accused.
When the accused, Pablo Gonzales was re-arraigned today, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 116 of the New Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 118 thereto,
duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
Atty. Jose O. Galvan, he pleaded GUILTY.
“Q Do
you confirm the statement of your lawyer that you are withdrawing your former
plea of not guilty and you are substituting the same with a plea of guilty?
AT
THIS JUNCTURE, ACCUSED WAS PLACED ON THE WITNESS STAND, to answer the questions
of the Court.
“A Yes,
your Honor.
“Q Are
you aware that by pleading guilty you will be penalized under our existing
laws?
“A Yes,
your Honor.
“Q And
in spite of that knowledge you still insist on pleading guilty?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Are
you aware of the fact that the Court will only punish you with the penalty of
death?
“A Yes,
your Honor.
“Q Notwithstanding
the fact that you might be punished with death, you still insist on pleading
guilty?
“A Yes,
your Honor.
“ATTY. GALVAN
Your
Honor, I have informed the accused about the consequences of his plea of guilty
in Ilocano, which he understands and after informing
him of the consequence of his plea, he still insists that he is entering a plea
of guilty and that his entering into a plea of guilty is voluntary on his part.
“COURT
I
want you to present evidence under the present system, fiscal, notwithstanding
the fact that the accused pleads guilty; the doctrine laid
down by the Supreme Court in the case of People versus Epifanio
Flores.”
In compliance with said directive, the prosecution presented, as
its first witness, Cecilio de Leon, a detention
prisoner at the penal institution, who declared that at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of April
9, 1971, he was at the mezzanine floor of NP
(neuro-psycho) ward where he was then assigned to
work as an attendant. From his vantage
point, he saw three prisoners loitering outside the door of the ward, making
signs or talking in a sign language with the “mayor” of the ward, one
Felipe Llarena, who was standing near the window of
the mezzanine floor. He also saw Moises Malines, a prisoner also assigned to work as an attendant
in the ward, standing near the door of the ward. At this instant, he heard “mayor”
Felipe Llanera shout an order to those below to open
the door, to allow the “rancheros” (kitchen boys) to leave the
ward. When the door was opened, the
three prisoners outside, one of whom was the accused Pablo Gonzales, entered
the ward, with improvised bladed
weapons in hand. He saw Moises Malines go towards the
living quarters of the attendants of the ward.
Soon thereafter, he heard a commotion (“kalabugan“)
inside and, just as swiftly as they came, the intruders left the ward with bloody weapons in hand. After the accused and his companions had
gone, the “mayor” of the ward went downstairs and closed the door of
the ward.
The next witness was Brigildo Amon, another prisoner in the penal institution and also
assigned to work as an attendant in the “NP” ward, who testified that
he was about three (3) meters from the door of the ward and saw the accused and
his companions loitering outside the ward and that he ran upstairs when the
accused and his two companions entered the ward, brandishing their
weapons. Like Cecilio
de Leon, he did not also see the accused and his companions attack the deceased
Moises Malines. He saw Malines
lying down at the passage of their “tarima”
after the accused and his companions had left the ward.
Dr. Ernesto Brion, the NBI Assistant Director for Medicine, was also presented to
identify the necropsy report made on the cadaver of Moises
Malines.[3]
He also stated that the deceased
sustained 22 stab wounds, all of which contributed to cause the death of Moises
Malines.
The last witness was Jesus Tumagan, an
employee of the Bureau of Prisons who investigated the stabbing incident in
question and identified the weapon used in the killing of Moises
Malines,[4]
as well as the extra-judicial confession of the accused Pablo Gonzales,[5]
wherein the accused stated that he and his companions stabbed Moises Malines alias “Armalite” in order to avenge
the death of a member of their prison gang who was slain the day before.
At the close of the proceedings, counsel de oficio
objected to the reception of the extra-judicial confession of the accused on
the ground that the same was taken against
the will of the accused and announced that he was reserving their right to
present evidence. He also asked the
court that “he be given a chance to file a motion
to dismiss” to which the court acceded.[6]
Counsel, however, did not file such motion; nor did he
present evidence.
On September 9, 1971, the court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of death; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Moises
Malines the amount of P12,000.00;
to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs.
Able counsel appointed for the accused now contends that the
acceptance of the substituted plea of guilty was precipitate as it did not meet
jurisprudential requirements to assure that the accused was aware of the
consequences of his plea of guilty and that he fully understood the significance
and meaning thereof. Wherefore, he prays
that the case be returned to the court below for proper proceedings.
The norm that should be followed where a plea of guilty is
entered by the defendant, especially in cases where the capital penalty may be
imposed, is that the court should be sure that defendant fully understands the
nature of the charges preferred against him and the character of the punishment provided by law before it is
imposed.[7] For this reason, the Court has deemed it
advisable that in every case under the plea of guilty, where the penalty may be
death, the trial court should call witnesses for the purpose of establishing
the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant,[8] and “not only to satisfy the trial
judge but to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether accused really and
truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea.”[9]
In the instant case, the court, before accepting the modified
plea, satisfied itself that the accused fully understood the meaning of his
plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. It also required the taking of testimony as
to the circumstances under which the crime was committed, thus complying with the strictures set forth before imposing
upon the accused the penalty of death.
There is, thus, no merit in the claim that the acceptance of the
substituted plea of guilty was precipitate or
inordinate.
Counsel also contends that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not warrant, nor support, the finding that the commission of
the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, since the prosecution failed
to present any eyewitness who directly saw the killing of Moises
Malines.
The contention is untenable.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, treachery could be
inferred from the following facts: (1)
that as soon as the door of the neuropsycho ward was
opened, the appellant together with his two companions suddenly entered the
door and took their knives from their waists and followed Moises
Malines who was walking inside the wards and after a
few seconds, a commotion took place inside; (2) that a few moments thereafter,
the appellant together with his two companions went out of the ward still
holding their knives now dripping with blood; (3) that, thereafter, the
attendants found Moises Malines
at the passage of their “tarima” already dead; (4) that the necropsy report
issued by the Medico Legal of the NBI shows that the
deceased sustained 22 stab wounds, two of which were fatal; and (5) that these
wounds could have been inflicted simultaneously and successively by more than
one person and his multiple stab wounds at his right chest show that his
assailant was behind him and slightly to the right.[10]
Evident premeditation was likewise present in the commission of
the crime. Appellant himself admitted in
his extrajudicial confession that he and his two companions planned the killing
of the deceased after taking their lunch the day before the incident, in order
to avenge the death of their gangmate.[11]
The appellant, therefore, had ample opportunity to desist from executing the
crime but he persisted and perpetrated the killing of the deceased.
At any rate, when appellant pleaded guilty to the charge, he is
deemed to have admitted all the material facts alleged in the information. By his plea, he admitted not only the
commission of the crime but also the circumstances surrounding its commission, including the attendant
circumstances qualifying or aggravating the crime.[12]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court, being in
accordance with the law and the evidence, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ.,
concur.
Fernando, C.J., and Abad Santos, J.,
did not take part.
Santos, J., on leave.
[1]
p. 29, Original Record.
[2]
p. 27, Original Record; also pp. 2-3, t.s.n.
[3]
Exhibit “C”.
[4]
Exhibit
“A”.
[5]
Exhibit “D”.
[6]
p. 31, t.s.n.
[7]
People vs. Flores, L-32692, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 230.
[8]
US vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541; People vs. Solacito, 29 SCRA 61;
People vs. Simeon, 47 SCRA 129; People vs. Daeng, 49 SCRA 221; People vs. Ricalde,
49 SCRA 228; People vs. Martinez, 50 SCRA 509; People vs. Busa,
51 SCRA 317; People vs. Undong, 66 SCRA 386.
[9]
People vs. Estabia, 40 SCRA 9; People vs. Lacson,
55 SCRA 589.
[10]
pp. 11-12, Appellee’s Brief.
[11]
Exhibit “E”, Record.
[12]
People vs. Perete, 1 SCRA 1290.