NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND ROSARIO MARTIN VDA. DE MALLARI, RESPONDENTS.

For the death of Milagros Mallari
due to pulmonary tuberculosis her mother, respondent Rosario Martin Vda. de Mallari,
obtained an award of death compensation benefits in the sum of P2,196.48, plus
burial expense reimbursement of P200.00, against the erstwhile employer, the
National Development Company.  The award
is the subject of this re­view by certiorari.

The two issues posed by the petitioner are:  (1) that the death of Milagros Mallari was not compensable, either under the theory of
work-connection or aggravation of illness; and (2) that the claim for
compensation did not comply with the requirements of Section 24 of Act No.
3428.

We take up the second issue, which we believe is decisive of this
case.

The late Milagros Mallari was an
apprentice weaver, later on a spare weaver, in the National Development Company
since 1947.  During her employment she
was afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis, minimal stage.  On December
21, 1951 “she spat blood while operating the machine,”
was advised by the work supervisor to rest, was taken to the company
dispensary, and failed to report the following day.  Nor did she return thereafter.  There is an allegation in the peti­tion for
review, not denied by respondent, that on the date aforesaid Milagros Mallari was separated from the service and given the
corresponding gratuity.  The sickness
must have progressively become worse since then, for she died on July 12, 1953, when she was no longer
an employee.

The deceased’s mother, respondent here, first filed a claim in
the Court of First Instance of Manila on August 29, 1960. 
The claim was dismissed and the dismissal was subsequently sustained by
this Court.  Another claim was filed with
Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor on January 25, 1963. 
Petitioner herein put up the defense that the claim was time-barred
under section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (No. 3428), which provides
that “no compensation proceedings under this Act shall prosper … unless
a claim for compensation was made not later than two (2) months after the date
of the injury or sickness or in case of death, not later than three (3) months
after death…”

The claim here was filed in the Court of First Instance more than
seven years, and in the Department of Labor more than
nine years, after death.  The defense,
however, was turned down both by the Referee and sub­sequently by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission itself on the ground that “despite respondent’s
(petitioner here) knowledge of Mallari’s death it
miserably failed to con­trovert the claimant’s right to compensation, thereby
for­feiting by operation of law (Section 45 of the Act) all the defenses it
might have against the claim, including the defense that it was filed out of
time.”

Although as a general rule findings of fact by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission are not reviewed by this Court, the peculiar
circumstance that the claim here was not formally asserted until after the
lapse of more than seven years constrains us to take a closer look into the
factual background of the ruling appealed from. 
Failure to controvert indeed constitutes an implied waiver of defenses,
including prescription, as pointed out by the Commission.  But such waiver presupposes that the
respondent had knowledge of the sickness, injury or death upon which the claim
is predicated.  In this case it should be
noted that when Milagros Mallari died she was no
longer in the service of respondent below, now petitioner, and had been out of
the service for almost two years. 
Knowledge of her death on the part of petitioner cannot be presumed from
any employer-employee relationship.  The
only evidence on the point is the testimony of the claimant herself that while
her daughter was still lying in state she went to a certain Francisco Lopez,
assistant manager of the textile mills of the company, requested from him some
financial aid for burial expenses and also demanded other benefits that might
be due to the deceased, but that the same were denied.  This evidence is disputed by the company,
through its administrative officer, who said that Francisco Lopez had left the
service and, his whereabouts being unknown, was no longer available to rebut
the claimant’s testimony; but that if it were true that the claimant had made
such a demand it would have appeared in the record of the company, and no
record there­of existed.

Ordinarily such negative evidence would not preponderate over the
claimant’s positive statement; but in determining the question of evidentiary
weight and credibility the following circumstances must be considered:  that death occurred almost two years after
the employee had left the service; that the alleged demand for com­pensation
benefits was not made of record; that it was not followed up after it was
verbally denied, especially at a time when the claimant was presumably in
urgent financial need; and that the claim was not formally filed until over
seven years later – over nine years, in fact, before the proper office.  The law requires that the claim for com­pensation
must be made within two months in case of sickness or the injury, and within
three months in case of death.  These
peremptory periods are fixed not merely to prevent stale claims but also to
ensure that the case is really compensable, for which purpose it is necessary
that the employer be given a reasonable opportunity to investigate while the
facts are still accessible and to avail of witnesses who have personal
knowledge of them.  Of course if a timely
claim is filed or if the employer has knowledge of the injury, sickness or
death, and he fails to file a notice of controversion he is deemed to have waived his
defenses.  But it is quite dangerous and
unfair to the employer to accord unqualified credence to the self-serving
statement of a claimant that is entirely unsupported by the record and made
years after the time the claim should have been formally presented.  The employer, with evidence to the contrary
no longer available, would be virtually at the claimant’s mercy in such a situa­tion.  To be sure, there are cases where a mere
verbal notice of injury or death and claim for compensation has been held
sufficient, but those are cases in which the evidence there­of is clear and
convincing.  The present instance is not
one of them.

Wherefore,
the decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Dizon, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), in the result.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.