PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TIRSO ACOL Y BARNUBAL AND PIO BOSES Y DOLFO, DEFENDANTS, PIO BOSES, APPELLANT.

Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly staged
a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to court,
not for the felonious asportation, but for possession of the two unlicensed
firearms and bullets recovered from them which were instrumental in the
commission of the robo (pp. 7-8, Rollo.)

Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed an appeal
from the trial court’s judgment (p. 23, Rollo) inasmuch as Tirso Acol y
Barnubal had escaped from incarceration (p. 5, Brief for the Accused-Appellant,
p. 60, Rollo) thereby abating any review of his culpability for the misdeed.

The People’s inculpatory accusations during the joint trial were
to the effect that at around 3:45 in the morning of September 29, 1990, when
Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in
Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road,
the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop
the Magallanes interchange where the other passengers were divested of their
personal belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the
Shell Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival
Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track
down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta
who went with the responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of
whom was wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio,
told the police authorities to accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men
scampered to different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio
Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed
.38 caliber revolver with bullets. After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were
identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who ganged up on the accused.

To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of firearms,
Sgt. Garcia presented a certification (Exhibit I) issued by the Firearms and
Explosives Unit stating that the accused are not licensed firearm holders.

On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to
the charges levelled against them, proferring a general denial.

Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness stand that
after establishing his residence at Pasay City for about six months, he engaged
in the business of vending “balut”. During the incident in question, he recalled that while so engaged in
his trade, three persons allegedly acosted him, took his money,
“balut” and “penoy”, and that he was thereafter brought to
a cell where he was forced to confess ownership of one gun which was shown to
him. He nonetheless denied
participation in the hold up.

For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having
resided in Metro Manila for about two months, recollected that he spent the
night at his cousin’s house in Paranaque on September 28, 1990, and that he
left Paranaque at around 5 in the morning of September 29, 1990. According to him, the jeepney he was then
riding developed engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was arrested for no
apparent reason. When he was brought to
the cell, he was allegedly coerced into admiting possession of the other
gun. Just like his co-accused, he too,
denied knowledge of the hold up.

The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general denials,
observing:

As can be gathered from the foregoing testimonies of the
accused, the line of defense they have adopted is one of denial. Indeed, they denied that the firearms and
ammunition in question were found in their persons in the early morning of
September 29, 1989. They also denied
the truth of the testimonies of Sgt. Faltado, Percival Tan, and Rene
Araneta. The defense however did not
cite any valid reasons for the Court not to give credence to the testimonies. In the circumstance, the Court is
constrained to consider the testimonies of the accused to be self-serving. In the face of the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, the Court can only take their denials with the
proverbial grain of salt. Verily, it is
simply hard for the Court to believe that the accused are simple provincial who
are lost in the big city; that accused Pio Boses who is a resident of Pasay
City, does not know well-known places in Metro Manila such as the South Super
Highway and the Fort Bonifacio-Nichols interchange; that he did not know the
streets where he plied his trade as a balut vendor. Indeed, how can this be true when he himself admitted that from
7:00 p.m. of September 28, 1989, he spent his time walking in the street in the
area and yet he never claimed he had ever lost his way.

The same is true with accused Tirso Acol. The Court is convinced that he lied on the
witness stand. He claimed that he was
in the place where he was arrested because he had just come from the residence
of his cousin, Genny Acol, and the passenger jeepney he had boarded on his way
home just happened to break down at that place. In the mind of the Court this alibi of the accused is too much of
a coincidence, and too convenient an excuse, for the Court to believe. In this connection, the Court notes his
testimony on cross examination that he was unable to get in touch with his
relatives, including Genny Acol, for possible assistance and to get Genny Acol
to corroborate his testimony, because the latter had already left for the
province and that none of his other relatives knew that he had been charged in
this case. But when queried how he was
able to say this, he testified that he had written to his Uncle and that he
received a reply letter from him and that it was from this reply letter of his
uncle that he learned that Genny Acol had already left for the province. This testimony of accused Tirso Acol, if it
accomplished anything, helped convinced the Court that he is given to lying. For sure, if he had written to his uncle and
that the latter had replied to him, it is plain that he must have informed his
uncle about the case and that the latter knew about the case and the fact that
he was in jail and needed help. In any
event, established jurisprudence dictates that between the positive testimonies
of prosecution witnesses and the denials of the accused the Court must place
its reliance on the former. As a matter
of fact, jurisprudence also indicates that greater weight must be given to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when they are officers of the
law. (People vs. Mostoles, Jr.,
124 SCRA 906; People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 129).

(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

As initially
intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped from detention during the trial below,
thus obviating any review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had appealed
and thereafter escaped, he would be considered as having abandoned his appeal (People
vs. Quinitan, 197 SCRA 32 [1991]; Section 8, Rule 124, Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure).

With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his protestation
of innocence by claiming that the trial court below erred:

I

. . . IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE URGENT MOTION OF ACCUSED
PIO BOSES TO REOPEN THE CASE HENCE DEPRIVING HIM TO PRESENT HIS WITNESSES WHOSE
TESTIMONIES WOULD HAVE BEEN MATERIAL TO HIS DEFENSE THEREBY AMOUNTING TO A
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

II

… IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF BOTH ACCUSED
PIO BOSES AND TIRSO ACOL; INSTEAD, IT RELIED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES.

III

… IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF
EXHIBITS “E”, “F”, “F-1” TO “F-5,
“G”, “G­-1” TO “G-5”, SINCE THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS ADMITTED THEY WERE NOT ARMED WITH A WARRANT OF ARREST, NOR A SEARCH
WARRANT WHEN THEY CHASED AND FRISKED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND PROCEEDED TO ARREST
THEM.

IV

. . . IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AS THERE WAS NOT CLEAR SHOWING
THAT EXHIBITS “F”, “F-1” TO “F-5”, “G”,
“G-1” TO “G-4” WERE THE ONES USED BY THE ROBBERS IN
COMMITTING THE CRIME OF ROBBERY/HOLD UP.

(p. 1, Appellant’s Brief; p. 60, Rollo.)

But the appeal leaves much to be desired.

It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein
accused-appellant can not feign denial of due process where he had the
opportunity to present his defense, through his own narration on the witness
stand (Domingo vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766
[1992]; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]. Withal, and as correctly pointed out by the
People, the omission of a party to present witnesses to corroborate the
principal basis for exculpation; on account of the witnesses’ admitted
tardiness in arriving in court, is a puerile proposition to support re-opening
of the case.

In regard to the second ascription aired by the
accused-appellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that the court a quo
should have relied more on the explanation offered by the defense rather than
giving credence to the testimony of the People’s witnesses. For one thing, accused-appellant asseverates
that they could not have been positively identified by Percival Tan and Rene
Araneta considering that it was then still dark when the accused boarded the
jeep, up to the time they were apprehended. But counsel for accused-appellant concedes that the jeep was lighted
subject to the caveat that it was not well lighted (p. 12, Brief
for Accused-Appellant) which does not entirely foreclose positive
identification of the culprits who admittedly shared a ride with their victims
and were thus seated within the closed quarters of the jeepney. Moreover, it was established by the
prosecution that Rene Araneta’s jacket was one of the items which was asported,
that it was worn by one of the felons, and that the jacket was recognized by
Rene Araneta from a distance of 1-1/2 meters (p. 7, Brief for
Accused-Appellant). To lessen the
impact of the affirmative statements uttered against accused-appellant, it is
argued that the immediate propensity of a criminal is to move out from the
scene of the locus criminis and not merely to walk casually within the
vicinity. We said in People vs.
Ocampo (G.R. No. 80262, September 1, 1993) that indeed, there can be no
legal dispute to the legal proposition that flight from the scene of the felony
is one of the indicia of a guilty conscience,
but it is equally true, we proceeded to say, that culprits, in
exceptional cases, have become bolder by returning to the scene of the crime to
feign innocence. At any rate, it has
been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the factual findings of the trial
court and the conclusions drawn therefrom are accorded utmost respect since the
magistrate at the court of origin had the first hand impression of the demeanor
and deportment of witnesses (People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176 [1992]; People
vs. Castillo, 208 SCRA 62).

With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant, we are of the view that the search falls within the purview
of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the requisite
warrant prior to arrest:

When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

inasmuch as the police team was formed
and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on account of
the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just
been robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs.
Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And since accused-appellant’s arrest was lawful, it follows that the
search made incidental thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA
671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed
firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the
robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (People
vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The
principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of
this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:

. . . When, in
pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the
offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the
corpus delicti.

Nonetheless, the penalty of “reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment”, as erroneously imposed by the lower court must be modified
to read only as reclusion perpetua, as provided by Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, said penalty being distinct from life imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed with the slight modification that the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. Further, the court orders
the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental paraphernalia in favor of
the Philippine National Police to be disposed of in accordance with law.

No pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Vitug, JJ., concur.