THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AUGUSTO F. GALLANOSA, JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Gallanosa versus People

The Case

This is People of the Philippines versus Augusto Gallanosa, Junior, a criminal appeal in which the State sought to hold the accused liable for two killings that took place on a single afternoon in a barangay in Matnog, Sorsogon. The accused admitted that he stabbed both victims, but claimed he acted in self-defense. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the whole architecture of murder and self-defense: the elements of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites of self-defense under Article 11, the rule that unlawful aggression is indispensable, the appreciation of treachery even against a forewarned victim, and the effect of voluntary surrender where the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties.

Procedural History

Two separate Informations for murder were filed against the accused before the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Sorsogon, Branch 55, one for the killing of Nonilon Frencillo and one for the killing of Dante Frencillo. Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, the accused pleaded not guilty, and trial on the merits followed. The trial court convicted him of two counts of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each count, with awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, actual damages, and loss of earning capacity. It acquitted his co-accused Luzviminda Gallanosa for lack of evidence and ordered the arrest of the other accused who remained at large. The accused moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and he then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by appeal, assigning as his lone error that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite proof of the legitimate exercise of self-defense.

Facts

At about three o'clock in the afternoon of 6 November 2002, Dante Frencillo and his wife Maricel were walking toward a wedding celebration in Banogao, Matnog, Sorsogon, when they passed by the house of the accused. Suddenly, relatives of the accused stoned Dante. After Dante was hit, the accused appeared and stabbed him on the left abdomen. Dante fell to the ground and died on the spot.

Nonilon Frencillo then came to assist his brother Dante, but he too was stoned, by Augusto Gallanosa, Senior. Nonilon ran, but the accused chased him and caught up with him after he slipped. Kneeling and with his hands raised, Nonilon said, "I will not fight you." Even so, the accused hacked his hands and stabbed him in the chest, then circled him several times, stabbing him again each time.

The defense told a different story: that Dante had come to the house of Medel Gallanosa challenging him to come out and throwing rocks, that Dante lunged with a knife at Augusto Gallanosa, Senior, and later at the accused, who evaded and stabbed him, and that Nonilon chased the accused with a piece of wood and was stabbed first. The accused then surrendered to a barangay tanod, who brought him to the barangay captain, from whom the police took him.

Issues

• Whether or not the accused established all the requisites of self-defense, particularly unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, so as to justify the killings.
• Whether or not the killings were attended by treachery, qualifying them as murder.
• Whether or not the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the absence of stoning injuries destroy their credibility.
• Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated, and whether it changes the penalty.
• Whether or not the civil liabilities were properly awarded.

Applicable Provisions

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes murder:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

This is the provision under which the killings were qualified, treachery being the circumstance the Court found attendant.

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, invoked by the accused, exempts from criminal liability one who acts in defense of his person or rights:

Any person who acts in defense of his person or rights do not incur any criminal liability provided that the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The accused bore the burden of proving all three requisites by clear evidence, and his failure on the first defeated the defense.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the accused failed to prove unlawful aggression, which it described as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, a condition without which the defense cannot stand; without it, the accused has nothing to prevent or repel, and there is no basis for appreciating the other two requisites. Since the accused admitted the killings, he had to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's. The Court found the defense witnesses' testimonies replete with glaring improbabilities: that Dante was still carrying a pig-butchering knife at three in the afternoon when the pig had been butchered before eleven in the morning; that a certain Junior Garduque recovered the knife but was never subpoenaed; that the accused rushed out carrying a bolo to help his mother, though the bolo would have impeded him; and that the defense accounts of Nonilon's weapon and of Bigo Frencillo's bamboo stick contradicted each other. The prosecution witnesses, by contrast, were in unison that Dante was merely on his way to the wedding when he was suddenly attacked.

On the second issue, the Court held that treachery qualified both killings. The sudden and unexpected attack on Dante gave him no time to offer an effective defense. As for Nonilon, the Court ruled that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger, because what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. A victim on his knees with his hands raised, pleading that he would not fight, posed no risk to his assailant.

On the third issue, the Court held that the alleged inconsistencies were superficial, that whether Dante was killed in front of one house or another was insignificant since the houses were only four to six meters apart, and that the absence of stoning injuries was never explored with the medico-legal officer. It reaffirmed that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province of trial courts and is binding on appeal absent overlooked facts of weight and substance.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the trial court should have appreciated voluntary surrender, since the accused surrendered immediately to a barangay tanod on the same date. But the penalty does not change: murder prescribes two indivisible penalties, and where a mitigating circumstance exists the lesser penalty is imposed, which is still reclusion perpetua for each count.

On the fifth issue, the Court reviewed the civil liabilities, and its disposition reflects the adjustments it made to the awards.

Doctrine

• Self-defense under Article 11 requires the concurrence of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation; unlawful aggression is indispensable, and without it the defense collapses.
• An accused who pleads self-defense admits the killing and must prove the justifying circumstance by the strength of his own evidence, not by the weakness of the prosecution's.
• Murder under Article 248 requires that a person was killed, that the accused killed him, that the killing was attended by a qualifying circumstance such as treachery, and that the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.
• Treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
• Voluntary surrender is mitigating, but where the crime prescribes two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty is still imposed, so the mitigation does not reduce the penalty below reclusion perpetua.
• Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are binding on appeal unless facts or circumstances of weight and substance were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.

Disposition

The appeal was partially meritorious: the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for two counts of murder and the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, appreciated voluntary surrender without changing the penalty, and modified the awards of civil liability accordingly.

Remember This

Memorize this line: unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non of self-defense, and treachery is present whenever the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate, even if he was forewarned. Examiners use this case for the requisites of self-defense, the elements of murder, treachery against a kneeling and pleading victim, and the rule that voluntary surrender cannot lower a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties.