JUAN L. CLEMENTE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND H. E. HEACOCK CO., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Juan L. Clemente, against whom a final judgment for a sum of money
was obtained in a foreclosure suit, appeals by certiorari from the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
confirming the sate at public auction of the mortgaged properties in favor of
the judgment creditor, herein respondent H. E. Heacock Company. The main
contention of petitioner is that he was not given a hearing on the merits of the
opposition to the confirmation of the sale of his properties.

On March 25, 1955, after the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
20460-R sentencing petitioner to pay respondent H. E. Heacock Co. the sum of
P9,319.21, plus interest, attorney’s fees, and costs had become final, H. E.
Heacock Co. applied for and obtained a writ of execution by virtue of which the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, on May 23, 1955, sold at public auction
petitioner’s mortgaged properties (3 parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 1182,
11773, and 19365 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal) to respondent H. E. Heacock
Co., the highest bidder, for P14,301.34, and issued to the latter the
corresponding certificate of sale.

On June 27, 1956, respondent H. E. Heacock Co. filed a motion for
confirmation of sale, with due notice to petitioner that said motion was to be
heard on June 30, 1956. On the date of the hearing, petitioner appeared by
counsel and requested that he be given 7 days within which to present his
written opposition, which the court granted. On July 6, 1956, petitioner filed
his written opposition which in part states:

“III. That the confirmation of the sale would be contrary to Art. 1619 of
Rep. Act 386 and deprive him (petitioner) of the right to extinguish the
judgment sale by reimbursing plaintiff (respondent H-E. Heacock Co.) as well as
Second Mortgagee of the price paid thereof.

“It is submitted that the foregoing grounds need not be argued. They are
self-explanatory and in themselves sufficient to inform this Honorable Court of
the rights of defendant and of which law and equity would not deprive him.

“One point however, cannot be overlooked in this case, and it is that there
is apparent collusion between plaintiff Heacock and the Second Mortgagee,
ostensibly for the purpose of defeating the chances of the defendant in
redeeming his properties, through the Motion for Confirmation of Sale. * *
*.”

The incident was thus submitted for resolution and on September 17, 1956, the
court issued the following order of confirmation of sale:

“ORDER

“After hearing and consideration of the motion for confirmation of sate,
dated June 27, 1956, filed by the plaintiff, thru counsel, and the opposition
thereto by counsel for the defendant, and the Court, finding the reasons given
in support thereof to be well-founded, hereby confirms the sale at public
auction made by the Sheriff of Rizal on May 23, 1955.

“It is so ordered.”

On October 2, 1956, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said
order of confirmation of sale, on the ground that it is contrary to law.

On November 6, 1956, respondent H. E. Heacock Co. filed an urgent motion for
writ of possession, to which petitioner filed an opposition on November 9,
1956.

On December 20, 1956, the court issued an order denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the order of confirmation of sale dated October 2, 1956.
On the same date, the court issued an order granting respondent H. E. Heacock
Co.’s urgent motion for writ of possession of November 6, 1956.

From these orders, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, and said
court, on October 31, 1958, rendered a decision affirming the same, in part
stating:

“The alleged collusion between the H.E. Heacock Co. and Amparo Helen
de Guzman was not shown. Appellant contends that he has been deprived of the
opportunity to prove it, but such contention is untenable, as the record fails
to reveal that he had even attempted to offer evidence during the
hearing held to determine whether or not the sale should be confirmed.

“The truth, after all, is that appellant definitely lost his right to redeem
the foreclosed properties when he failed to do so during the ninety (90) days
period from notice of the decision of the Court of Appeals referred to above.
Article 1619 of the Civil Code is not applicable here.

“The confirmation of the sale as sought by appellee is, therefore, due. The
writ of possession is only a sequence of the confirmation of the sale.

“There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed, without further costs.”

On December 6, 1958, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision, on the ground that the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that the
lower court held a hearing on the motion for confirmation of sale in question
and the opposition thereto. Said motion was denied and, on February 27, 1959,
petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration, on the grounds that (1)
his claim that there was no hearing on said motion for confirmation of sale, is
confirmed by the letter dated November 5, 1957, of the Clerk of Court of .First
Instance of Rizal; and (2) the court overlooked the fact that he is allowed by
law to repurchase the properties “foreclosed under equity of redemption.

Said second motion for reconsideration, having been denied by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner filed with us this present petition for certiorari.

We find no merit in the petition.

The records reveal that respondent corporation’s motion for confirmation of
the sale (dated June 26, 1956), which was set for hearing on June 30, 1956 at
8:30 a.m., was actually heard on said date, wherein the trial court, not only
heard petitioner’s oral objection thereto, but also, upon his own motion,
granted him sufficient time to prepare and submit a written opposition, which he
duly filed on July 6,1956. After filing said written opposition, petitioner had
no reason to expect another (or second) hearing on the same motion for
confirmation, especially so when he never asked for a second hearing thereon.
Indeed, he in fact expressly waived the same when he stated in his written
opposition that-

“It is submitted that the foregoing grounds need not be argued. They are
self-explanatory and in themselves sufficient to inform this Honorable Court of
the rights of defendant (herein petitioner) and of which, law and equity would
not deprive him.”

Following well-established rules of procedure, the trial court rightly
considered said motion and opposition thereto submitted for decision.

That there was in fact a hearing on the motion for confirmation of sale in
question, is evident from the trial court’s order of September 17, 1956
confirming the sale, to wit:

“After hearing and consideration of the motion for confirmation of
sale, dated June 27, 1956, filed by plaintiff (herein respondent H. E.
Heacock Co.) thru counsel, and the opposition thereto by counsel for the
defendant (herein petitioner), and the Court finding the reasons given in
support thereof to be well-founded, hereby confirms the sale at public auction
made by the Sheriff of Rizal on May 23, 1955.” (Italics
supplied.)

In this connection, respondent Court of Appeals also stated:

“The alleged collusion between the H. E. Heacock Co. and Amparo
Belen de Guzman was not shown. Appellant contends that he has been deprived of
the opportunity to prove it, but such contention is untenable, as the record
fails to reveal that he had even attempted to offer evidence during the
hearing held to determine whether or not the sale should be confirmed.”
(Italics supplied.)

In support of his stand that no hearing on the motion for confirmation of
sale was made in the trial court, petitioner makes capital of the letter dated
November 5,1957 (Annex E-1) of the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
addressed to the Deputy Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals, reading as
follows:

“In reply to your letter of the 29th ult., please be informed that no hearing
on the merits was held in this case and consequently no minutes were prepared by
the Deputy Clerk of Court in connection with the appealed orders both dated
Dee. 10, 1956, the first denying motion to set aside order confirming auction
sale, and the second directing issuance of writ of possession.” (Italics
supplied.)

But the above-quoted letter of the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, makes no reference whatsoever to the motion for confirmation of sale
dated June 27, 1956, but specifically and definitely mentions (1) the order
dated December 20, 1956 denying the motion to set aside the order confirming the
sale; and (2) the order of the same date directing the issuance of writ of
possession.

Wherefore, finding no error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals,
the same is hereby affirmed in all respects, with costs against the petitioner.
So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B.
L., Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Decision affirmed.