KATIPUNAN NG TINIG SA ADHIKAIN, INC. (KATIHAN) BY GODOFREDO S. BONGON, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE LUIS ZENON O. MACEREN, SHERIFF ANTOLIN ORTEGA CUIZON, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRA…
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Katipunan ng Tinig sa Adhikain versus Judge Maceren and Sheriff Cuizon
The Case
This is an administrative case. Katipunan ng Tinig sa Adhikain, through Godofredo Bongon, filed a complaint against Judge Luis Zenon Maceren and Sheriff Antolin Ortega Cuizon of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The complainants were informal settlers who were ejected from land they occupied under a writ of execution enforcing a compromise agreement to which they were never parties. They charged that they were removed without due process, and that the sheriff issued a notice of demolition without any authority from the court. The case matters because it fixes the boundaries of a sheriff's power in execution: a sheriff executes judgments, but he does not demolish homes on his own say-so, and he does not sit on his reports to the court.
Procedural History
The complaint began as an administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator. The Supreme Court, in a Decision dated August 17, 2007, dismissed the complaint against Judge Maceren for lack of merit, but found Sheriff Cuizon administratively liable and suspended him for three months without pay, with a warning. Sheriff Cuizon filed a Motion for Reconsideration, insisting he committed no infraction. The Court resolved that motion in the present Resolution, modifying its earlier Decision by lowering the penalty.
Facts
The complainants were among the unlawful occupants of parcels of land owned by Carmen Lopez, which were later sold to Efrain Limsui. Limsui filed an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila against two associations of informal settlers. The complainants' group was not impleaded as a respondent in that complaint.
Summonses were served on the defendant associations, but no answer was filed. Instead, a Compromise Agreement was executed and presented to the court. Under it, the defendant associations consented to vacate the property voluntarily and remove their structures, in exchange for financial assistance from Limsui. The court rendered judgment based on that compromise. The complainants then filed a Verified Manifestation and Motion, stating that they too were residents of the land and were in danger of being evicted without due process. The judge merely noted the motion, since the complainants were not parties to the case.
The court then granted a writ of execution, and the sheriff issued a notice to vacate. Later, without any authority from the court, the sheriff issued a final notice of demolition. He submitted his Sheriff's Report only after almost eight months from the issuance of the writ of execution.
Issues
- Whether or not Sheriff Cuizon may be held administratively liable for issuing a final notice of demolition without a special order from the court, notwithstanding that the compromise agreement itself sanctioned the removal of the structures.
- Whether or not Sheriff Cuizon may be excused from his failure to submit periodic reports on the progress of the execution within the period fixed by the Rules of Court.
Applicable Provisions
Section 10, paragraph (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
This is the provision the sheriff violated: it forbids demolition of improvements except upon a special order of the court, which he never obtained.
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. - The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.
This is the provision the sheriff ignored: it required him to report within thirty days and every thirty days thereafter, which he failed to do.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that even granting that the demolition was sanctioned by the decision based on the compromise agreement, an outright removal is not allowed by the Rules. The sheriff is specifically mandated not to destroy, demolish, or remove improvements except upon a special order of the court. Thus, aside from the writ of execution implementing the compromise decision, another writ or order from the court was needed specifically allowing the removal of the improvements. The sheriff exceeded his authority.
On the second issue, the Court held that the sheriff's excuse was utterly devoid of merit. The writ of execution was issued on November 30, 2005, and the notice to vacate was issued the same day. It was therefore incumbent upon him to submit a report on December 30, 2005, stating why the judgment was not satisfied in full, and every thirty days thereafter. His claim that Limsui's counsel assured him on July 3, 2006 that the associations would remove the structures voluntarily did not excuse him. The Court stressed that the submission of returns and periodic reports is not a duty to be taken lightly: it updates the court on the status of execution and ensures speedy execution of decisions. A sheriff's failure to make a return within the allowable period constitutes inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The sheriff was thus guilty of simple neglect of duty, a less grave offense carrying suspension of one month and one day to six months for a first offense. Considering that he had no previous administrative case, the Court lowered the penalty.
Doctrine
A sheriff may not destroy, demolish, or remove improvements on property subject of execution except upon a special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the judgment obligor has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. A compromise agreement authorizing removal does not dispense with this special order. Compliance with the Rules of Court on the return of the writ and periodic reports is not merely directory but mandatory, and failure to comply constitutes simple neglect of duty, punishable by suspension.
Disposition
The Court modified its earlier Decision and suspended Sheriff Cuizon for one month and one day without pay, with a stern warning, while the complaint against Judge Maceren remained dismissed.
Remember This
Memorize this line: a sheriff's compliance with the Rules of Court is not merely directory but mandatory, and demolition of improvements requires a special order of the court. Examiners use this case to test the limits of a sheriff's authority in execution and the administrative consequences of neglecting the return of the writ.