ROYAL INTEROCEAN LINES, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Royal Interocean Lines versus Court of Industrial Relations

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Royal Interocean Lines, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines with its head office in Hongkong, against the Court of Industrial Relations and its former employee, Ermidia A. Mariano. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to set aside the order of the Court of Industrial Relations finding it, together with its Manila branch manager Kamerling, guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of the respondent with backpay. The case matters because it fixes the boundary of the unfair labor practice of retaliatory dismissal: the protection covers an employee punished for charges or testimony connected with labor and union matters, not every complaint an employee may file against a superior.

Procedural History

Ermidia A. Mariano charged Royal Interocean Lines and Kamerling with unfair labor practice under section 4, subsection (a), paragraph 5 of Republic Act Number 875 before the Court of Industrial Relations. The Court of Industrial Relations found the petitioner and Kamerling guilty, ordered the respondent's reinstatement, and awarded backpay from the date of her dismissal. The petitioner then came to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari, and the Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision.

Facts

Ermidia A. Mariano had worked for Royal Interocean Lines since the fifth of January, 1932, serving in the Manila branch office. In or about October 1953, she and the manager of the Manila branch, Kamerling, developed a strained relationship.

That strain led her to lodge a complaint against Kamerling with the managing director in Hongkong. Kamerling, with the approval of the head office in Hongkong, dismissed her on the twenty-third of October, 1953.

She then charged the petitioner and Kamerling with unfair labor practice under section 4, subsection (a), paragraph 5 of Republic Act Number 875. The charges she had filed against Kamerling were not connected with, and did not necessarily arise from, union activities.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing the respondent because she had filed charges against Kamerling, where those charges were not connected with or did not arise from union activities.
• Whether or not section 4, subsection (a), paragraph 5 of Republic Act Number 875 covers the dismissal of an employee for having filed any charge against the employer, or only charges related to the employee's right to self-organization and collective bargaining.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4, subsection (a), paragraph 5 of Republic Act Number 875, the Magna Charta of Labor, provides:

Section 4. Unfair Labor Practice. (a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer: (5) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony under this Act.

This is the very provision under which the respondent charged the petitioner, and its reach decides whether her dismissal was an unfair labor practice.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner was not guilty of unfair labor practice. The respondent's dismissal had no relation to union activities, and the charges she filed against Kamerling had nothing to do with, and did not arise from, her union activities. The Court therefore reversed the appealed decision and revoked the directive for her reinstatement with backpay.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the broader construction adopted by the Court of Industrial Relations, which had read the provision as covering dismissal for the filing of any charge against the employer with the court or elsewhere. The Court reasoned that the enumeration in section 4 is nothing more than a detailed description of an employer's acts that may interfere with the right to self-organization and collective bargaining. The employer still retains his inherent right to discipline his employees and his normal prerogative to hire or dismiss them; the prohibition is directed only against the use of that right as an instrument of discrimination, interference, or oppression because of one's labor or union activities. Turning to the statutory language itself, the Court said:

Under subsection 5 of section 4 (a), the employee's (1) having filed charges or (2) having given testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are modified by "under this Act" appearing after the last item.

The Court added that the three acts must have reference to the employee's right to self-organization and collective bargaining, because the element of unfair labor practice is interference in that right, and that it would be redundant to repeat "under this Act" after each item connected by the disjunctive conjunction "or".

Doctrine

Under section 4, subsection (a), paragraph 5 of Republic Act Number 875, the filing of charges, the giving of testimony, and the being about to give testimony are all qualified by the phrase "under this Act". To constitute unfair labor practice, the dismissal must be shown to have been caused by the employee's labor or union activities, that is, acts connected with the right to self-organization and collective bargaining. The employer retains his inherent right to discipline, hire, and dismiss employees; the law forbids only the use of that right as an instrument of discrimination, interference, or oppression on account of union activities. A dismissal prompted by a personal complaint against a superior, unrelated to union activities, is not an unfair labor practice.

Disposition

The petition was granted: the appealed decision was reversed, the directive for the respondent's reinstatement with backpay was revoked, and no costs were pronounced.

Remember This

Memorize the rule that the phrase "under this Act" qualifies all three acts in section 4, subsection (a), paragraph 5, so retaliatory dismissal is an unfair labor practice only when the charge or testimony relates to union activities. Examiners use this case to test the employer's management prerogative to discipline and dismiss against the statutory protection of the right to self-organization.