🎧 Case Brief Lecture

SPS. EFREN & ZOSIMA RIGOR, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. WESTMONT BANK & ATTY. MAXIMO B. SILAO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

April 19, 1996

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Rigor versus Westmont Bank

The Case

This is a case about a mortgage that carried a promise to give up the right of redemption. Spouses Efren and Zosima Rigor borrowed from Westmont Bank and secured the loan with a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land in Tarlac. When they defaulted, the bank moved to foreclose extrajudicially through Atty. Maximo Silao, and the spouses went to court to stop the sale. They argued that the mortgage was void because it was a contract of adhesion, because it contained a pactum commissorium — a stipulation allowing the creditor to appropriate the mortgaged thing automatically upon default — and because the waiver of the right of redemption was contrary to law and public policy. The case matters because it draws the line between two very different clauses: a clause that lets the bank take the property without foreclosure, which is void, and a clause that merely waives redemption after a lawful foreclosure, which is also void but does not drag the whole mortgage down with it.

Procedural History

The spouses filed a complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage, the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, damages, and preliminary injunction with prayer for a restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the real estate mortgage valid, declaring the waiver of the right of redemption null and void, and allowing the spouses to redeem within one year from registration of the certificate of sale, or if that period had lapsed, within one year from the finality of the judgment. It dismissed the counterclaim and imposed no costs. The spouses appealed, assigning as errors the ruling that the mortgage was valid, the ruling that there was no pactum commissorium, and the ruling that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Act Number 3135 on extrajudicial foreclosure. The appeal reached the Supreme Court, which decided the case through a Decision penned by Justice Mendoza.

Facts

On April 19, 1996, Westmont Bank granted the spouses a loan or credit accommodation of 2,300,000 pesos. To secure payment, the spouses executed a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land, including the buildings and improvements, situated in Barangay Binauganan, Tarlac, Tarlac. The mortgage was on a prepared form of the bank. Paragraph 5 of that contract authorized the bank, upon default, to foreclose in accordance with Act Number 3135, and further provided that any sale, whether to the mortgagee or to any other person, would be made free from any right of redemption, which the mortgagors expressly waived.

The spouses defaulted. Upon the bank's application, Atty. Maximo Silao, as notary public, proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure, with the sale scheduled for April 17, 1998 at two o'clock in the afternoon. The spouses then sued, claiming that the mortgage was void and illegal because it stipulated that ownership would automatically pass to the vendee, and that the foreclosure was resorted to precisely to circumvent the prohibition against pactum commissorium by stripping them of their right of redemption.

The bank answered that paragraph 5 did not provide for automatic appropriation, since the properties still had to be foreclosed according to law, and that the essence of pactum commissorium is that ownership passes to the mortgagee by mere default. It added that the right of redemption, being a consequence of foreclosure, may be waived, and that even if the waiver were void, only that portion of the mortgage would fall. On the foreclosure requirements, the bank maintained that notices were posted in three public places, published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, and that a public auction was held on April 17, 1998.

Issues

  • Whether or not the real estate mortgage is valid despite being a contract of adhesion, despite the alleged obscurity of its terms, and despite containing a waiver of the right of redemption.
  • Whether or not the real estate mortgage is a pactum commissorium because of an alleged automatic appropriation clause.
  • Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements of Act Number 3135 on extrajudicial foreclosure, particularly on posting and publication of notices.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2085 of the Civil Code, which the Court used to test the essential requisites of the mortgage, provides:

Article 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage: (1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged; (3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for that purpose. Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property.

The Court found all of these requisites present, which is why it sustained the mortgage as a valid security contract.

Article 2088 of the Civil Code, the provision that prohibits pactum commissorium, provides:

The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

The Court examined paragraph 5 against this prohibition and found no automatic appropriation, because the bank still had to foreclose under the procedure laid down by law.

Section 78 of the General Banking Act, which the Court held the waiver violated, provides:

In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan granted before the passage of this Act or the provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold at public auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to any bank, banking or credit institution, within the purview of this Act shall have the right, within one year after the sale of the real estate mortgage as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order or execution.

This is the statutory right of redemption that the mortgage clause purported to waive, and the Court held the waiver void as contrary to law and public policy.

Article 1420 of the Civil Code, on divisible contracts, provides:

Article 1420. In case of a divisible contract, if the illegal terms can be separated from the legal ones, the latter may be enforced.

This is the basis for saving the mortgage while striking down only the waiver.

Section 3 of Act Number 3135, on publication of notices, provides:

Section 3. Publication of notices. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.

The Court measured the foreclosure against these posting and publication requirements and found substantial compliance.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the mortgage valid. All the essential requisites under Article 2085 were complied with. The spouses admitted executing the mortgage voluntarily and admitted defaulting. The fact that the provisions were not explained to them did not matter, since they could have asked the bank, their own lawyer, or any knowledgeable person about provisions not clear to them, and there was no coercion. On the claim of adhesion, the Court held that a contract of adhesion is one whose terms are fixed by one party and which the other may merely take or leave, and that such a contract may be struck down when the dominant party's will is imposed on the weaker party. But contracts of adhesion are not strictly against the law; the other party is free to reject it, and if he adheres, he gives his consent. The Court nonetheless stressed that such contracts call for greater strictness and vigilance by the courts to protect the weaker party. In this mortgage, however, there was no obscure or ambiguous provision needing interpretation; even the waiver clause was clear.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no pactum commissorium. Paragraph 5 did not grant automatic appropriation, because the bank would still have to foreclose under the procedure laid down by law, specifically Act Number 3135. The Court quoted with approval the trial court's reasoning that the mortgage did not authorize the bank to immediately appropriate the property, but required foreclosure in case of failure to pay, and that the bank in fact applied for extrajudicial foreclosure through the notary public.

On the waiver of redemption, the Court agreed with the trial court that it violated the law and public policy, citing Section 78 of the General Banking Act and the policy favoring redemption as a last ditch effort to retain the property. But the invalidity of that clause did not void the entire mortgage. Under Article 1420, if the illegal terms of a divisible contract can be separated from the legal ones, the latter may be enforced. The Court found the mortgage divisible: the security is the principal stipulation, while the waiver of redemption is merely secondary, referring to the mortgagors' rights after foreclosure. The two exceptions to divisibility did not apply, since the nature of the contract did not require indivisibility and there was no clear evidence that the parties intended the contract to be entire. The spouses failed to show that the waiver was an indispensable consideration of the agreement.

On the third issue, the Court held that there was substantial compliance with Act Number 3135. The affidavit of posting failed to identify the places where the notices were posted, but this was not fatal, because the notary public testified that he and the personnel of the law office actually posted the notice at the municipality, the bank, and the court premises, and this was not satisfactorily refuted. The spouses' witnesses checked the municipal bulletin board only on April 17, 1998, when more than twenty days had lapsed from the posting on March 9, 1998. The absence of a certificate of posting was of no moment, because what is essential is the actual posting of the notice of sale, not the execution of the certificate.

Doctrine

First, a real estate mortgage is valid when it complies with Article 2085 of the Civil Code, and the fact that it is a contract of adhesion does not render it void per se; the party adhering gives consent, though courts will scrutinize such contracts with greater vigilance to protect the weaker party.

Second, there is no pactum commissorium under Article 2088 where the mortgage does not authorize the creditor to appropriate the property automatically upon default but requires foreclosure under the procedure laid down by law.

Third, a waiver of the right of redemption under Section 78 of the General Banking Act is void for being contrary to law and public policy, since the State favors redemption.

Fourth, under Article 1420, the invalidity of the waiver clause does not void the entire mortgage, because the security is the principal stipulation and the waiver is merely secondary and separable, absent proof that the parties intended an indivisible contract.

Fifth, on foreclosure, what is essential is the actual posting of the notice of sale, not the certificate of posting, and substantial compliance with Section 3 of Act Number 3135 suffices.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision, sustaining the validity of the real estate mortgage, declaring the waiver of the right of redemption null and void, and allowing the spouses to redeem within the periods fixed by the trial court.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a waiver of the right of redemption is void, but it does not void the mortgage, because the security is the principal stipulation and the waiver is a separable secondary one. Examiners use this case to test pactum commissorium against a lawful foreclosure clause, the validity of contracts of adhesion, and the application of Article 1420 on divisible contracts.