EDUARDO R. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, RESPONDENT.

The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil
Case No. 90-1706, an action for unlawful detainer commenced on 5 May 1990 with
the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, while the respondent is the
presiding Judge of the said court. In
his verified complaint filed through the Office of the Court Administrator on
18 March 1993, the complainant charges the respondent with gross ignorance of
the law and gross incompetence. The
complainant supports his charge with the allegation that after the answer in
the said case was filed and “without notice and hearing,” the latter rendered a
decision on 28 June 1991,^[1] the
decretal portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is hereby
respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with plaintiff’s
prayer in their Complaint in the above-entitled case.

SO ORDERED.”

He further alleges that Branch 18 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its Order of 19 January 1993 in Sp. Civil
Action No. 03-M-93^[2]
— a petition for certiorari filed
by the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706 — had already opined that the said
decision is void upon its face
because it:

“x x x would be
impossible to be implemented for the simple or obvious reason that the same
cannot be considered a decision at
all. Instead of deciding or ordering
something to be done, it merely prays that judgment be rendered.”

but despite this, the respondent still
“changed and amended [his] final decision [of 28 June 1991] in order to nullify
the order of a superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan” via a new decision in Civil
Case No. 90-1706^[3]
promulgated on 25 January 1993. The
dispositive portion of this new decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff by:

1.   Ordering defendants and persons claiming any
rights under them to vacate the premises occupied by them, more particularly
the portion on which are erected their
respective dwelling structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot
of plaintiff aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling structure/units from
said subject premises of plaintiff;

2.   Ordering defendants individually to pay the
sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency, per month by way of monthly rental
commencing from May 16, 1990, and thereafter until they shall have vacated the
premises of the plaintiff;

3.   Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and
severally the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine currency, on account of plaintiff’s attorney’s fees (retainer) and P500.00,
Philippine Currency, for every hearing/trial attended by said attorney before
this Honorable Court; and

4.   Ordering the defendants to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.”

According to the complainant, the
dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision exhibits the respondent’s
gross ignorance in “decision preparation,” and that the respondent’s “haste to
amend the same
to favor plaintiff was both apalling (sic) and downright improper.” The
complainant then prays that the respondent “be removed from office if only to
save the integrity of the judiciary.”

In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993,^[4] the
respondent denies the imputations and alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the complainant was not the original
counsel for the defendants but one Atty. Adriano Javier, Sr. who represented
the latter until the time that the parties were directed to file their
respective position papers, specifically until 29 November 1991 when Atty.
Javier filed a
motion to withdraw his appearance and the complainant filed his notice
of appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2) the Decision of 28 June 1991 was rendered only after a
preliminary conference was held where the parties with their respective
counsels discussed the possibility of an amicable settlement and after the
defendants failed to comply with the 16 November 1990 Order for the parties to
submit in writing their “respective position statements setting forth the law
and the facts relied upon by them and to submit the affidavits of their
witnesses and other evidences in support thereof within fifteen (15) days from
receipt” thereof, prompting the plaintiff to file on 5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion
praying that judgment be rendered in the case; (3) the defendants did not
appeal from the 28 June 1991 Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for
execution on 2 September 1991, which the defendants did not oppose; instead
they filed a motion for reconsideration and to declare the decision null and
void on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and
there was no valid pre-trial order; (4) on 4 December 1991, the plaintiff’s
motion for execution was granted and a writ of execution was issued, a copy of
which was sent to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Malolos for service; (5) on
5 January 1991,^[5]
he received an order from Branch 18 of the RTC of Bulacan directing him to
desist from implementing the
writ of execution; (6) the presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge Demetrio B.
Macapagal, Sr., issued on 19 January 1993 its order disposing of Sp. Civil
Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter, he (respondent) handed down a new decision
in Civil Case No. 90-1706 on 25 January 1993 that contained “completely the
missing sentences needed in the dispositive portion” of its earlier decision; (8) instead of appealing
therefrom, the defendants filed on 4 February 1993 a motion to set aside the
decision, which the court set for its consideration and to which the plaintiff
filed its opposition on 8 February 1993 together with a motion for immediate
execution; (9) on 22 March 1993, the complainant filed a motion to inhibit the
respondent but the former did not appear on the date it was set for
consideration. He finally contends that
the issue regarding the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision was
rendered moot and academic by the corrections made in the Decision of 25
January 1993; that the charge of gross ignorance is contemptuous and unfounded;
and the complainant’s sweeping conclusions show his disrespectful attitude.

In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July 1993,^[6]
the complainant reiterates his charge that the respondent is incompetent
because he lacks the “ability to prepare a sensible and credible decision,” and maintains that the respondent’s attempt
to convince this Court that the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991
Decision is permissible and proper shows “gross ignorance.” Further, that the
respondent believes that “he could correct the decision after its finality” and
after the RTC of Bulacan had declared it to be null and void upon its face
clearly manifests his “patent ignorance of our laws and jurisprudence.”

In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 1993,^[7] the
respondent argues that while the 28 June 1991 Decision “could hardly be
enforced for the reason that there is some
sort of ambiguity or ommission (sic) in its dispositive portion,” he was not
prohibited from having the defect “timely corrected and clarified,” which was
what he had in fact done, and that the “clarified decision” did not prejudice
“the substantial rights of the parties” since they “were given their day in
court and passed through the usual course of the proceedings.” Accordingly, he
could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of lack of competence.

Wanting to have the last word, the complainant filed a Reply to
Sur-rejoinder and Manifestation on 28 July 1993.^[8] Not
to be outdone, the respondent filed a Manifestation to Reply on 9 August 1993.^[9]

The Court referred this case to the Office of the court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator
submitted its Memorandum containing its evaluation, report and
recommendation. After summarizing the
antecedent facts, the said office submitted that the instant complaint is
meritorious, and made the following findings:

“It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have
overlooked the missing dispositive portion of his original decision which is
considered the executory portion
thereof. The only ineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision before he signed the
same. If only he devoted even only a
little time to read the same, such a missing portion considered to be the most
important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention. The alleged dispositive portion was a
prayer. It did not have the effect of
finally disposing the case. Presumably,
this must have been simply copied from plaintiff’s complaint.

True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his
original defective decision since the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari
although Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what was rendered by Judge Paguio ‘can
not be considered a decision at all’. It took respondent Judge 1-½ years to
discover and correct his error; the error could have easily been discovered at
the time the Motion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But the writ was nonetheless issued on
December 4, 1991. Hence the belated
correction would not mitigate his liability. There is no denying that the quality of a
decision rendered by the judge such as herein respondent, is a reflection on
the integrity of the court in dispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very least careless in
failing to read carefully the decision that he signed. In fact, both the original and amended
decisions still contained errors in grammar and syntax indicating that there
was no adequate editing of the decision that was signed by him. If he had been more careful, he would have avoided
such fractured phrases as:

‘1.  Plaintiff on being
opposed to this motion, countered as
follows: (Page 5, Decision, June 28,
1991);

2.  For
a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid);

3.  And
defendants seems that they are not really
sincere (Ibid);

4.  But
nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract of lease of which right becomes
one of a detainer
plain and simple (page 6,
Ibid);

5.  That
being the case to allow them will mean ownership
over the property (Ibid)’.

It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for
their fractured constructions have no place in a court decision. Careful editing and rewriting should have
been done.”

and recommends that:

“x
x x a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that
any repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be meted with a more
severe penalty of dismissal from the service. He is also admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his
decisions.”

We find the above observations of the Office of the Court
Administrator to be sufficiently supported by the pleadings submitted by the
parties in this case.

After a careful examination of the respondent’s “Decision” of 28
June 1991, we do find its body to be flawed with grammatical and syntactic
errors. Its “dispositive portion”
disposes of, resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot even be called a dispositive or decretal portion at all. It is obviously a prayer lifted from a
pleading of the plaintiff, such as a Memorandum or the ex-parte manifestation
and motion praying that judgment be rendered filed after the defendants failed
to file their position paper, although not from the complaint as suspected by
the Court Administrator. How it gained
entry into what should have been the fallo is an arcanum. Any
attempt to unravel the mystery may only complicate the matter against the
respondent who is only charged herein with gross ignorance or incompetence.

There can, however, be no dispute that behind the errors of
grammar and syntax and the fatally infirmed “dispositive portion” is the
inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of the respondent
betraying absence of due care, diligence, conscientiousness and thoroughness —
qualities which Judges must, among others, possess. Respondent could have easily avoided the errors and the defects
had he taken a little more time and effort to at least read its original copy
before he finally affixed his signature thereon. While this Court cannot expect every Judge to be an expert on the
English language or an authority in grammar, he must, however, do everything he
can, through constant study,
extraordinary diligence, and passion for excellence, to produce a decision
which fosters respect for and encourages obedience to it and enhances the
prestige of the court.

As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two
standards of conduct prescribed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, namely: that “[h]e should exhibit an industry and
application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him”^[10]
and that he should be conscientious, studious and thorough.^[11]

Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed
“decision,” he even granted the motion for its execution and issued the
corresponding writ with full knowledge that there was nothing to execute. He could not have feigned ignorance of such
nothingness for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its execution, exhibiting once more his
inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even his incompetence.

We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must
be blamed for such unmitigated faux pas. The
counsel for the parties in the case
knew or ought to have known the fatal defect of the dispositive portion and the
obvious inefficacy of any writ for its execution, yet, the plaintiff’s
counsel still filed a motion for execution, while the counsel for the
defendants — the complainant herein —
merely filed a motion for reconsideration based solely on the ground that the
plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and that there was no valid pre­-trial
order. Obviously, the complainant
initially believed in the completeness of the decision. As a matter of
fact, when he assailed the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged that what was
amended was a “final decision,”
a position totally inconsistent with his claim that the latter was void as
declared by the RTC of Bulacan. As
officers of the court who owe to it candor, fairness and good faith,^[12] both attorneys should have called the
court’s attention to the glaring defect of the “dispositive portion” of the 28
June 1991 Decision.

We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the
very least, inefficiency, neglect of duty and the violation of Canons 5 and 31
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He
could not, however, be liable for ignorance of law and jurisprudence or for
incompetence when he handed down a new decision on 25 January 1993. The 28 June 1991 Decision was “incomplete”
since, for all legal intents and purposes, it had no fallo and could
not attain finality, hence the respondent had the power to amend it to make it
conformable to law and justice.^[13] It
is not therefore correct to say, as the
complainant suggested, that the order of the RTC of Bulacan in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating that the
respondent’s Decision of 28 June 1991 is “void upon its face” forever bars the
respondent from rendering a new or amended decision in the ejectment case.

We take this opportunity to stress once again that the
administration of justice is a sacred task and all those involved in it must
faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly
enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust and all
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and
act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.^[14]
Every Judge should never forget that he is the visible representation of the
law and, more importantly, of justice.^[15]
Therefore, he must constantly be the embodiment of competence, diligence,
conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency, and integrity so as to preserve,
promote and enhance the people’s confidence in the Judiciary.

A few words must also be made of record regarding the
complainant. We note that in his
complaint in this case he alleged under oath that after the defendants filed
their answer, the respondent “without any hearing,
or at least this counsel was never notified of any such hearing,”
rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of course inaccurate, if not outright false. What the complainant conveniently left out
in his complaint was that, as disclosed in the Comment which he did not refute,
after the defendants’ answer with counterclaim was admitted by the court, the
case was set for preliminary conference and thereafter the parties were
required to submit their position papers and the affidavits of their witnesses
and other evidence. We find that the
case was properly placed and considered under the Rule on Summary Procedure
and, accordingly, the court could decide the case on the basis of the submitted
position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence. Complainant further suppressed the fact that
he entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants only after the court
had conducted the preliminary conference and issued the order for the
submission of the foregoing pleadings and documents. He was not, therefore, entitled to any notice before then.

The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended
by the complainant to give his complaint a strong prima facie case against
the respondent. While he is entitled to
adopt certain strategies in his pleadings, he forgot that he owes to this Court
absolute candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it
through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing on its
initial action. Complainant should,
therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere to the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting
to a violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent
Judge ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). He is further warned that
a repetition of the same or similar infractions shall be dealt with more
severely.

Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED
to be more careful in the drafting of pleadings, always keeping in mind his
duty under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on official
leave.

^[1]
Annex “A” of Complaint; Rollo, 17-25.

^[2]
Annex “D” of Petition; Rollo,
26-27. Per Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal,
Sr.

^[3]
Annex “C” of Comment; Id., 50-57.

^[4]
Rollo, 29-40.

^[5]
Should be 1993 (as appearing in Annex “A” of Comment; Rollo, 45).

^[6]
Should be Reply; Rollo, 69-72.

^[7]
Should be Rejoinder; Id., 82-86.

^[8]
Should be sur-rejoinder only; Rollo,
88-92.

^[9]
Unpaginated in the rollo.

^[10]
Canon 5.

^[11]
Canon 31.

^[12]
Canon 10, Code of Professional
Responsibility.

^[13]
Section 5(g), Rule 135, Revised Rules
of Court.

^[14]
Sy vs. Academia, 198 SCRA 705 [1991].

^[15]
De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 [1975].