DOÑA NENA MARQUEZ AND VICENTE NOZA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. TOMAS P. PANGANIBAN, AS ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, AURELIO CERRODO AND JULIA VINAS, RESPONDENTS.

On May 4, 1959, Hon. Jose R. Cabatuando, vacation Judge in the Fifth and
Sixth Regional Districts of the Court of Agrarian Relations, rendered a decision
in CAR Case No. 108-Quezon ’57, entitled “Aurelio Cerrodo, et al. vs.
Nena Marquez, et al., setting forth the following facts:

“DECISION

“This is a petition for delivery of shares, reinstatement, damages,
attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation. Respondents’ main defense is that
petitioners have never been tenants on the landholding in question.

“It appears from the evidence that petitioner-spouses Aurelio Cerrodo and
Julia Vinas were instituted as tenants by refspondent Nena Marquez in two
parcels of coconut land with an aggregate area of 4% hectares, more or less,
situated at Ibabang Talim, Lucena, Quezon, sometime in November, 1955- Acting as
the landholder’s overseer was respondent Vicente Noza. The agreed crop sharing
was 60-40 in favor of the respondent-landholder. As tenants, petitioners cleaned
the land, gathered the nuts and piled and husked the same. Petitioners made
harvests at intervals of 45 days- Notwithstanding the 60-40 sharing arrangement
between respondent-landholder and the petitioners, 7% of the latter’s share had
always been deducted every harvest and paid to respondent Vicente Noza as
compensation for his services as overseer, and the average amount usually
received by petitioner-spouses as their share every harvest was P70.00. From
November, 1956 to July, 1957, within which period five harvests were made,
respondent Vicente Noza on his own account withheld one half of petitioners’
share of the harvest. Sometime in August, 1957, when petitioners demanded from
respondent Vicente Noza the return to them of the withheld shares and of the 7%
being deducted as the latter’s compensation as overseer, respondent Vicente Noza
got mad and ordered them to leave the coconut land.

“Soon after their ejectment, petitioner-spouses hired the services of counsel
and the latter filed the instant case on September 30, 1957. For counsel’s
services, petitioners agreed to pay P500.00. To discourage petitioners from
further prosecuting this case, respondents filed a criminal case before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Lucena, Quezon, against petitioner Aurelio
Cerrodo, charging him with qualified theft of coconut fruits which he allegedly
took from the landholding involved in this case, and it was on Hie occasion of
the first hearing of this ease, when petitioners were about to present their
evidence, that petitioner Aurelio Cerrodo. was arrested on the, strength of the
warrant of arrest issued in said criminal case. Petitioner Aurelio Cerrodo was
then hustled to jail, and the trial had to be postponed because of this
incident. To add to petitioners’ misfortune, on the nigrht of the very same day
petitioner Aurelio Cerrodo was arrested and lodged in jail, their house erected
on the land-holding was mysteriously burned to the ground.

“The facts here related unfold a story of naked-abuse and persecution.
Petitioner-spouses, perhaps because of the necessity of making a bare living,
agreed to work as tenants of respondent Doña Nena Marquez’ land on the 40-60
sharing ratio in favor of the latter, although in the numerous cases brought to
the attention of this Court, the usual or customary sharing arrangements
between, landholders and tenants in coconut lands in Quezon Province is 50-50.
But even the 40-60 sharing arrangement between the petitioner-spouses and the
respondent-landholder was only on the surface. Petitioners had to give a cut of
6% of their share to respondent Vicente Noza, allegedly as compensation for the
latter’s services as overseer. This is altogether immoral and iniquitous,
because the tenants are made to pay for the services of an employee of the
landholder whose main concern is to look after and protect the latter’s
interests. As if this iniquity were not enough, the self-same overseer withheld,
for five harvests, one half of the share corresponding to the long-suffering
tenants, and when the latter finally mustered enough courage to seek an end to
the abuse, they were unceremoniously told to vacate the landholding. The
subsequent prosecution of petitioner Aurelio Cerrodo for the alleged crime of
qualified theft before the Justice of the Peace Court of Lucena, Quezon, after
the instant case has already been filed, and his dramatic arrest and
incarceration on the very day this case was scheduled to be tried, followed the
pattern. And the mysterious burning of petitioners’ humble abode while
petitioner Aurelio Cerrodo was languishing in jail, completed the story.

“We shall now apply the law to the facts.”

After considering the applicable law, the court rendered judgment in favor,
of Aurelio Cerrodo and Julia Vinas (herein respondents) ordering Nena Marquez
and Vicente Noza (herein petitioners) to pay sums of money, and to reinstate
them as tenants in petitioner’s 4-1/2 hectare landholding.

In accordance with Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1267, as amended, the Chief
of Police of Lucena was directed to serve the notice and copy of said decision
upon petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Edgardo V. Guevarra, whose address, as
appearing: from the records of the case, was Lucena, Quezon. The return of
service of the Office of the Chief of Police of Lucena, showed that said notice
and copy of the decision were duly served upon said petitioners’ counsel on May
12, 1959.

On June 3, 1959, petitioners filed by registered mail, a motion for
reconsideration of said decision, alleging as grounds therefor that the decision
has no basis in law and in fact, and that the court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the case. To this motion, respondents Gerrodo and Vinas filed an
opposition. On the same date, June 15,1959, they filed an ex parte
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision.

On July 3, 1959, respondent Judge (Hon. Tomas P. Panganiban), who had already
resumed his post as presiding judge of the Fifth Regional District after his
summer vacation, issued an order denying said motion for reconsideration on the
ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing the
same^[1] and, consequently, the decision
had already become final and executory.

On July 17, 1959, petitioners’ counsel filed a petition- which is actually a
second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated May 4 alleging that
white according to the records of the case, he received a copy of the decision
on May 12,1959, he actually received it only on May 29,1959; that although one
Felicitas Pabellano, received it for him, he never authorized her to do so in
his behalf; that said Pabellano is the Clerk of Atty. Alfredo Raya, with whose
office he was not in any way connected; that since November, 1958 he had been
connected with the Ayala Company of Manila, and has resided in said city ever
since; that he got married on May 16, 1959, and it was only on May 29, 1959 that
he received copy of the decision from said Pabellano, when he visited his
parents at Lucena; and that his failure to file said motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period was due to mistake, the decision having been
served through an office with which he was not in any way connected. Attached to
said petition were the affidavits of Felicitas Pabellano explaining among other
things, why she received and retained the copy of the decision, and of Atty.
Alfredo Baya, to the effect that petitioners’ counsel had never been associated
with his law office at Lucena. On July 21, 1959, respondents Cerrodo and Vinas
filed an opposition to said petition.

On July 28, 1959, the court issued an order denying said petition (motion for
reconsideration), as well as petitioners’ urgent ex-parte petition to
hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of execution prayed for by respondents
Cerrodo and Vinas.

On August 26, 1959, petitioners filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents,
their agents, and/or representatives from executing, pending determination of
the case on the merits, the order of execution already issued by the court
below. In due time, we issued the preliminary injunction prayed for by
petitioners.

Petitioners claim that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying their motion for reconsideration dated June 3,1959, and in granting
respondents-tenants’ ex-parte motion for execution of June 16,
1959.

The claim has no merit. Counsel for petitioner admits that since November,
1958, or 6 months prior to the rendition of the decision in this case, he had
been residing in Manila. In spite of this change of address, he failed to notify
the court a quo, wherein he had a pending case, of said fact. Neither
did he inform respondent or their counsel about it. He, likewise, failed to
adopt a system hereby he could be sure of receiving promptly notices from the
court, during his absence from Lucena, Quezon, his former address appearing in
the records of the case. An attorney owes it to himself and to his clients to
invariably adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving promptly all
judicial notices during his absence from his address of record (Enriquez, et al.
vs. Bautista, et al., 79 Phil., 220; Martinez, et al. vs.
Martinez, et al., 90 Phil., 697). The failure of counsel to notify the court of
his change of address and to insure that he could receive judicial notices and
processes promptly, is to our mind, plain dereliction of duty to himself, to
client, and to the court.

There was reason to serve the notice and copy of the decision in question at
Atty. Alfredo Raya’s office, because it appears that on one occasion, counsel
for petitioner had used an envelope with a printed letterhead of Raya’s Law
Office on it, in one of his correspondence to respondents’ counsel, indicating
that he and Raya are associates or partners in the legal practice at Lucena, or
at least, have a common law office. In Civil Case No. 6039 of the Court of First
Instance of Lucena (Argosino, et al. vs. Chionglo), counsel for
petitioners and Raya appeared as counsel. Furthermore, it appears that there
used to be a signboard at Raya’s law office at Lucena wherein the names of his
associates, including that of petitioners’ counsel, appears. It is not without
reason, therefore, that Raya and Guevarra (petitioners’ counsel) are generally
known in Lucena as partners. Lastly, Felicitas Pabellano, a person of sufficient
discretion and a clerk of Atty. Raya, received the notice and copy of the
decision in question for and in behalf of Atty. Edgardo V. Guevarra. Under the
circumstances, and in view of the absence of Guevarra in Lucena and of notice of
the change of his address, the Chief of Police was justified in serving the
notice and copy of the decision in the manner he did.

There is another reason why the petition must be denied. The records disclose
that in his first motion for reconsideration dated June 3, 1959 of the decision
of the lower court (dated May 4, 1959), counsel for petitioners never raised as
one of the grounds for the grant thereof the fact that he received the notice
and copy of the said decision only on May 29,1959, for the reason that it was
not duly served on him at his residence, but on Felicitas Pabellano, clerk of
Atty. Alfredo Raya, with whose law office he was not, allegedly, in any way
connected. He raised the point only in his second motion for reconsideration on
July 17, 1959.” The rule is well-settled that a second motion for
reconsideration which is based on a ground already existing at the time
of the filing of the first motion for reconsideration, does not suspend the
running of the period of appeal (See Sec. 1, Rule 17, Rules of the CAR). Hence,
the denial of his first motion for reconsideration on July 3, 1959, did not
suspend the 15-day period within which to file his second motion for
reconsideration. He filed his first motion on June 3, 1959 (after 5 days elapsed
from the time he allegedly received notice and copy of the decision on May 29).
Ordinarily, he had until July 13 (10 days from July 3, date of order of denial)
within which to perfect his appeal. Instead of doing so, he filed a second
motion, but only on July 17, 1959, or 4 days late. Having been filed out of
time, the court correctly denied the second, motion for reconsideration on July
28, 1959.

For all the foregoing, the petition for writ of certiorari is hereby denied
and dismissed, and this injunction heretofore issued by this Court dissolved.
With costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Gutierrez David and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

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^[1] From May 12 (date of receipt of
notice of judgment) to June 3 (date of filing of motion for reconsideration)
elapsed 22 days. See section 12, Rep. Act No. 1267, as amended.